- Self-No-Self? Memory and Reflexive Awareness.Evan Thompson - 2011 - In Mark Siderits, Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi (eds.), Self, no self?: perspectives from analytical, phenomenological, and Indian traditions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Varieties of self-awareness.Thor Grunbaum & Dan Zahavi - 2013 - In K. W. M. Fulford, Martin Davies, Richard Gipps, George Graham, John Sadler, Giovanni Stanghellini & Tim Thornton (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy and psychiatry. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 221.details
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Introspection about phenomenal consciousness: Running the gamut from infallibility to impotence.Terry Horgan - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press.details
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Self-intimation.Galen Strawson - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (1):1-31.details
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Phenomenality and Self-Consciousness.Charles Siewert - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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Renewed Acquaintance.Brie Gertler - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 89-123.details
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In Defense of the What-It-Is-Likeness of Experience.Greg Janzen - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.details
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Exaggerated reports: reply to Block.David Rosenthal - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):431-437.details
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On Hawthorne and Magidor on Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.R. C. Stalnaker - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):399-409.details
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Sensory qualities, consciousness, and perception.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - In Consciousness and Mind. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 175-226.details
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The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):378-378.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (282):602-604.details
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(2 other versions)Consciousness and Cognition. [REVIEW]Joseph Levine - 2004 - Mind 113 (451):596-599.details
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The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.details
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Assertion, Context, and Epistemic Accessibility.John Hawthorne & Ofra Magidor - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):377-397.details
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Self-Intimation and Second Order Belief.Sydney Shoemaker - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):35-51.details
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The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct.Ned Block - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):419 - 431.details
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Thinking about consciousness: Phenomenological perspectives.Dan Zahavi - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.details
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Introspection and Necessity.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):389-410.details
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Phenomenal presence and perceptual awareness: A subjectivist account of perceptual openness to the world1.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):352-383.details
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Consciousness and Causality: A Debate on the Nature of Mind.Michael Tye - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):336-339.details
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