Switch to: Citations

References in:

Values and Emotions

In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. New York NY: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 80-95 (2015)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Thick Concepts.Simon Kirchin (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    There seems to be an interesting difference between judging someone to be good and judging them to be kind. Both judgements are typically positive, but the latter seems to offer more description of the person: we get a slightly more specific sense of what they are like. Very general evaluative concepts are referred to as thin concepts, whilst more specific ones are termed thick concepts. Examples of the former include good, bad, right and wrong, whilst there are countless examples of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant.Noah Marcelino Lemos - 1994 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including coherence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   95 citations  
  • (2 other versions)The Elements of Moral Philosophy.James Rachels & Stuart Rachels - 2018 - New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education. Edited by James Rachels.
    The Elements of Moral Philosophy 9e by James Rachels and Stuart Rachels is a best-selling text for undergraduate courses in ethics. Thirteen thought-provoking chapters introduce readers to major moral concepts and theories in philosophy through clear, understandable explanations and compelling discussions. Chapters are written so that they may be read independently of one another thus providing greater flexibility for students and instructors.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   218 citations  
  • Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience.Michael Brady - 2013 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    Michael S. Brady offers a new account of the role of emotions in our lives. He argues that emotional experiences do not give us information in the same way that perceptual experiences do. Instead, they serve our epistemic needs by capturing our attention and facilitating a reappraisal of the evaluative information that emotions themselves provide.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   127 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Nature of Intrinsic Value.N. Lemos - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):587-590.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • (1 other version)Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Ethics 97 (4):821-833.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   928 citations  
  • The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory.Michael Tye - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1):25--50.
    The experience of emotion is a fundamental part of human consciousness. Think, for example, of how different our conscious lives would be without such experiences as joy, anger, fear, disgust, pity, anxiety, and embarrassment. It is uncontroversial that these experiences typically have an intentional content. Anger, for example, is normally directed at someone or something. One may feel angry at one=s stock broker for provid- ing bad advice or angry with the cleaning lady for dropping the vase. But it is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics.Pekka Vayrynen - 2013 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    In addition to thin concepts like the good, the bad and the ugly, our evaluative thought and talk appeals to thick concepts like the lewd and the rude, the selfish and the cruel, the courageous and the kind -- concepts that somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. Thick concepts are almost universally assumed to be inherently evaluative in content, and many philosophers claimed them to have deep and distinctive significance in ethics and metaethics. In this first book-length treatment of thick (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Are emotions perceptions of value?Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):227-247.
    A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   50 citations  
  • Thick Concepts and Variability.Pekka Väyrynen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-17.
    Some philosophers hold that so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics (such as 'cruel,' 'selfish,' 'courageous,' and 'generous') are contextually variable with respect to the valence (positive or negative) of the evaluations that they may be used to convey. Some of these philosophers use this variability claim to argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning; rather their use conveys evaluations as a broadly pragmatic matter. I argue that one sort of putative examples of contextual variability (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • (1 other version)Robert C. Roberts: Emotions: An Essay In Aid of Moral Psychology. [REVIEW]Monique F. Jonas - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):551-553.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   147 citations  
  • Literal Meaning. [REVIEW]Kent Bach - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):487-492.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   294 citations  
  • The strike of the demon: On fitting pro‐attitudes and value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):391-423.
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons to have pro-attitudes toward objects (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   344 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):137-160.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • (1 other version)The language of morals.Richard Mervyn Hare - 1963 - Oxford,: Clarendon Press.
    Part I The Imperative Mood 'Virtue, then, is a disposition governing our choices '. ARISTOTLE, Eth. Nic. 36 Prescriptive Language. ...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   402 citations  
  • Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   576 citations  
  • (2 other versions)Moral Thinking.Peter Millican & R. M. Hare - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (131):207.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   209 citations  
  • Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   578 citations  
  • Brentano and Intrinsic Value. [REVIEW]James C. Klagge & Roderick M. Chisholm - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):390.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   69 citations  
  • From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans.Daniel Y. Elstein & Thomas Hurka - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 515-535.
    Many philosophers of the last century thought all moral judgments can be expressed using a few basic concepts — what are today called ‘thin’ moral concepts such as ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right,’ and ‘wrong.’ This was the view, fi rst, of the non-naturalists whose work dominated the early part of the century, including Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and C.D. Broad. Some of them recognized only one basic concept, usually either ‘ought’ or ‘good’; others thought there were two. But they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Action, Emotion and Will.Keith S. Donnellan - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):526.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   118 citations  
  • (1 other version)Five Types of Ethical Theory.C. D. Broad - 1930 - Humana Mente 5 (19):463-465.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   139 citations  
  • The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1137 citations  
  • Spreading the world.Simon Blackburn - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3):385-387.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   308 citations  
  • (1 other version)Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 65 (1):174-175.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   353 citations  
  • (1 other version)The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald DE SOUSA - 1987 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (4):302-303.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   308 citations  
  • Émotions et Valeurs.Christine Tappolet - 2000 - Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
    Pour contrer le scepticisme au sujet de la connaissance des valeurs, la plupart soutiennent avec John Rawls qu’une croyance comme celle qu’une action est bonne est justifiée dans la mesure où elle appartient à un ensemble de croyances cohérent, ayant atteint un équilibre réfléchi. Christine Tappolet s’inspire des travaux de Max Scheler et d’Alexius von Meinong pour défendre une conception opposée au cohérentisme. La connaissance des valeurs est affirmée dépendre de nos émotions, ces dernières étant conçues comme des perceptions des (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   110 citations