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Values and Emotions

In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 80-95 (2015)

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  1. Émotions et Valeurs.C. Tappolet - 2000 - Presses Universitaires de France.
    Pour contrer le scepticisme au sujet de la connaissance des valeurs, la plupart soutiennent avec John Rawls qu’une croyance comme celle qu’une action est bonne est justifiée dans la mesure où elle appartient à un ensemble de croyances cohérent, ayant atteint un équilibre réfléchi. -/- Christine Tappolet s’inspire des travaux de Max Scheler et d’Alexius von Meinong pour défendre une conception opposée au cohérentisme. La connaissance des valeurs est affirmée dépendre de nos émotions, ces dernières étant conçues comme des perceptions (...)
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  • Emotions: An Essay In Aid of Moral Psychology.Robert C. Roberts - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 7 (5):551-553.
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  • Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Ethics 97 (4):821-833.
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  • Thick Concepts and Variability.Pekka Väyrynen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11:1-17.
    Some philosophers hold that so-called "thick" terms and concepts in ethics (such as 'cruel,' 'selfish,' 'courageous,' and 'generous') are contextually variable with respect to the valence (positive or negative) of the evaluations that they may be used to convey. Some of these philosophers use this variability claim to argue that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative in meaning; rather their use conveys evaluations as a broadly pragmatic matter. I argue that one sort of putative examples of contextual variability (...)
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  • Thick Concepts.Simon Kirchin (ed.) - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    An international team of experts explores the distinction between 'thin' concepts and 'thick' concepts. Their essays touch on key debates in metaethics about the evaluative and normative, and raise fascinating questions about how language works.
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  • Brentano and Intrinsic Value. [REVIEW]James C. Klagge & Roderick M. Chisholm - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (3):390.
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  • Action, Emotion and Will.Keith S. Donnellan & Anthony Kenny - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):526.
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  • A Study of Concepts.Christopher PEACOCKE - 1992 - Erkenntnis 42 (3):409-412.
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  • The Rationality of Emotion.Ronald DE SOUSA - 1987 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 22 (4):302-303.
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  • Intrinsic Value: Concept and Warrant.Noah M. Lemos - 1994 - Cambridge University Press.
    This book addresses some basic questions about intrinsic value: What is it? What has it? What justifies our beliefs about it? In the first six chapters the author defends the existence of a plurality of intrinsic goods, the thesis of organic unities, the view that some goods are 'higher' than others, and the view that intrinsic value can be explicated in terms of 'fitting' emotional attitudes. The final three chapters explore the justification of our beliefs about intrinsic value, including coherence (...)
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  • Are Emotions Perceptions of Value?Jérôme Dokic & Stéphane Lemaire - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):227-247.
    A popular idea at present is that emotions are perceptions of values. Most defenders of this idea have interpreted it as the perceptual thesis that emotions present (rather than merely represent) evaluative states of affairs in the way sensory experiences present us with sensible aspects of the world. We argue against the perceptual thesis. We show that the phenomenology of emotions is compatible with the fact that the evaluative aspect of apparent emotional contents has been incorporated from outside. We then (...)
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  • Is Emotion a Form of Perception?Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):137-160.
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  • The Lewd, the Rude and the Nasty: A Study of Thick Concepts in Ethics.Pekka Vayrynen - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    In addition to thin concepts like the good, the bad and the ugly, our evaluative thought and talk appeals to thick concepts like the lewd and the rude, the selfish and the cruel, the courageous and the kind -- concepts that somehow combine evaluation and non-evaluative description. Thick concepts are almost universally assumed to be inherently evaluative in content, and many philosophers claimed them to have deep and distinctive significance in ethics and metaethics. In this first book-length treatment of thick (...)
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  • Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of the Emotions.Jesse J. Prinz - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
    Gut Reactions is an interdisciplinary defense of the claim that emotions are perceptions of changes in the body.
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  • The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro‐Attitudes and Value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):391-423.
    The paper presents and discusses the so-called Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem (WKR problem) that arises for the fitting-attitudes analysis of value. This format of analysis is exemplified for example by Scanlon's buck-passing account, on which an object's value consists in the existence of reasons to favour the object- to respond to it in a positive way. The WKR problem can be put as follows: It appears that in some situations we might well have reasons to have pro-attitudes toward objects (...)
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  • The Language of Morals.R. M. Hare - 1952 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
    Part I The Imperative Mood 'Virtue, then, is a disposition governing our choices '. ARISTOTLE, Eth. Nic. 36 Prescriptive Language. ...
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  • Moral Thinking.Peter Millican & R. M. Hare - 1983 - Philosophical Quarterly 33 (131):207.
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  • The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony, Gareth Evans & John McDowell - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
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  • The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):701-704.
    The Emotional Construction of Morals is a book about moral judgements – the kinds of mental states we might express by sentences such as, ‘It's bad to flash your neighbors’, or ‘You ought not eat your pets’. There are three basic questions that get addressed: what are the psychological states that constitute such judgements? What kinds of properties do such judgements refer to? And, where do these judgements come from? The first question concerns moral psychology, the second metaethics and the (...)
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  • Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary & George Edward Moore - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
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  • The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory.Michael Tye - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:25--50.
    The experience of emotion is a fundamental part of human consciousness. Think, for example, of how different our conscious lives would be without such experiences as joy, anger, fear, disgust, pity, anxiety, and embarrassment. It is uncontroversial that these experiences typically have an intentional content. Anger, for example, is normally directed at someone or something. One may feel angry at one=s stock broker for provid- ing bad advice or angry with the cleaning lady for dropping the vase. But it is (...)
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  • The Elements of Moral Philosophy.James Rachels - 1986
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  • The Nature of Intrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2003 - Mind 112 (447):587-590.
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  • The Definition of Good.A. C. Ewing - 1947 - Mind 58 (229):84-94.
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  • Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?John Mcdowell & I. G. Mcfetridge - 1978 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 52:13-42.
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  • Literal Meaning.François Recanati - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):487-492.
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  • Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience.Michael S. Brady - 2013 - Oxford University Press.
    Michael S. Brady offers a new account of the role of emotions in our lives. He argues that emotional experiences do not give us information in the same way that perceptual experiences do. Instead, they serve our epistemic needs by capturing our attention and facilitating a reappraisal of the evaluative information that emotions themselves provide.
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  • From Thick to Thin: Two Moral Reduction Plans.Daniel Y. Elstein & Thomas Hurka - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):pp. 515-535.
    Many philosophers of the last century thought all moral judgments can be expressed using a few basic concepts — what are today called ‘thin’ moral concepts such as ‘good,’ ‘bad,’ ‘right,’ and ‘wrong.’ This was the view, fi rst, of the non-naturalists whose work dominated the early part of the century, including Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, W.D. Ross, and C.D. Broad. Some of them recognized only one basic concept, usually either ‘ought’ or ‘good’; others thought there were two. But they (...)
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  • Upheavals of Thought. The Intelligence of Emotions.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 65 (1):174-175.
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  • Five Types of Ethical Theory.C. D. Broad - 1930 - Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (19):463-465.
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  • Morality and Thick Concepts.Allan Gibbard & Simon Blackburn - 1992 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 66:267-299.
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  • Spreading the world.Simon Blackburn - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 176 (3):385-387.
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