Addison and Steele’s legacy on polite manners has been widely acknowledged as a hallmark of the Scottish Enlightenment’s tradition. On the other hand the place of courtly, ‘French’ politeness within the Scottish Enlightenment is much less debated. Conceiving the European Enlightenment as a status quo built on ‘French manners and English liberty’, as Pocock perfectly synthesizes1, points out to the restrictions imposed on religious fanaticism and warfare by the ‘jus gentium’ and European civility. In my paper I aim to shift (...) the attention to the seemingly obvious fact that manners, the backbone of European civility, originate in court, and Versailles was the court par excellence. In this context I explore Adam Smith’s struggle to strip politeness and civility of its aristocratic components. In the heart of the matter lies the strange idea of courtoisie without a court, of propriety that should overcome formal politeness i.e. imitation of aristocratic manners. (shrink)

This paper explains Sophie de Grouchy’s philosophical debts to Adam Smith. I have three main reasons for this: first, it should explain why eighteenth-century philosophical feminists found Smith, who has—to put it mildly—not been a focus of much recent feminist admiration, a congenial starting point for their own thinking; second, it illuminates De Grouchy’s considerable philosophical originality, especially her important, overlooked contributions to political theory; third, it is designed to remove some unfortunate misconceptions that have found their way into Karin (...) Brown’s ‘Introduction’ to the recent and much-to-be-welcomed translation of Sophie de Grouchy’s Lettres Sur La Sympathie. While Brown claims that there are major ‘differences’ in their programs of ‘social reform’, I argue there are important commonalities between Smith and De Grouchy. In particular, I highlight how they share a common understanding of how human sensibilities are shaped by social institutions and I show that De Grouchy’s path-breaking analysis of negative and positive liberty is grounded in her extension of Smith’s political theory and moral psychology. (shrink)

In this article, I present the arguments of three republican women philosophers of eighteenth-century France, focusing especially on two themes: equality (of class, gender, and race) and the family. I argue that these philosophers, Olympe de Gouges, Marie-Jeanne Phlipon Roland, and Sophie de Grouchy, who are interesting and original in their own right, belong to the neo-republican tradition and that re-discovering their texts is an opportunity to reflect on women’s perspectives on the ideas that shaped our current political thought.

Adam Smith is often cited as one of the intellectual forefathers of the concept of civil society. Although there is undeniable truth to this characterization, this chapter seeks to illuminate the major differences between Smith’s vision of civil society and contemporary appropriations. Unlike latter-day communitarians, social scientists, or Marxians who define civil society as the realm of the voluntary and private, or as the structural antithesis of the state, Smith’s account represents a complex blend of moral, historical, legal, sociological, and (...) economic elements. In particular, understanding the nature and origins of a civil society requires a fuller attention to the moral virtue of civility. (shrink)