In his formal papers on existential graphs , Peirce tended to obscure the simplicity of EGs with distracting digressions. In MS 514, however, he presented his simplest introduction to the EG syntax, semantics, and rules of inference. This article reproduces Peirce's original words and diagrams with further commentary, explanations, and examples. Unlike the syntax-based approach of most current textbooks, Peirce's method addresses the semantic issues of logic in a way that can be transferred to any notation. The concluding section shows (...) that his rules of inference can clarify the foundations of proof theory and relate diverse methods, such as resolution and natural deduction. To relate EGs to other notations for logic, this article uses the Existential Graph Interchange Format , which is a subset of the CGIF dialect of Common Logic. EGIF is a linear notation that can be mapped to and from the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma variants of EGs. It can also be translated to or from other formalisms, algebraic or geometrical. (shrink)

1 This article examines Peirce's semiotic philosophy and its development in the light of his characterisations of "representationism" and "presentationism". In his definitions of these positions, Peirce overtly pits the representationists, who treat percepts as representatives, against the presentationists, according to whom percepts do not stand for hidden realities. The article shows that Peirce's early writings—in particular the essay "On the Doctrine of Immediate Perception" and certain key texts from the period 1868–9—advocate an inferentialist approach clearly associated with representationism. However, (...) although Peirce continues to deny the cognitive import of first impressions throughout his philosophical career, the new view of perception that emerges in the early 1900s indicates a significant move in the direction of a presentationist point of view, a development partly corresponding to changes in his theory of categories. The strongest evidence for this reading is found in Peirce's contention that the percept is not a sign. The discussion concludes with considerations of possible objections and alternatives to the proposed interpretation in addition to some reflections on the consequences and relevance of Peirce's turn toward presentationism. (shrink)

Peirce believed that his pragmaticism can be conclusively proven. Beginning in 1903, he drafted several attempts, ending by 1908 with a semeiotic proof. Around 1905, he exposes the proof using the theory of Existential Graphs . This paper modernizes the semantics Peirce proposed for EGs in terms of game-theoretic semantics . Peirce's 1905 proof is then reconstructed in three parts, by relating pragmaticism to the GTS conception of meaning, showing that Peirce's proof is an argument for a relational structure of (...) the meaning of intellectual signs that our interpretative and strategic practices give rise to, and bringing out the key links between EGs and pragmaticism. (shrink)

Con este artículo reivindicamos que los grafos son ante todo un sistema filosófico que reflexiona sobre la naturaleza de la escritura. De ahí que propongamos el uso del vocablo español «grafo» y no «gráficos», como normalmente se traduce al español con una orientación matemática. Más que confeccionar un lenguaje de tipo algebraico o simbólico, Peirce pone la atención sobre la necesidad de la escritura, y por tanto del pensamiento, de expandir su existencia en sus trazas visibles. Abordamos los principales elementos (...) y convenciones del sistema. En primer lugar, las secciones que organizan la expansión del pensamiento según una lógica de obstrucciones y aperturas, respetando en todo momento el principio de tránsito continuo. A continuación, indagamos sobre los tres elementos que participan en el sistema: la hoja en blanco, el grafista y el grafeus, para terminar con una reflexión profunda sobre la ética de la creatividad. (shrink)

The matter concept has had an extraordinarily complex history, dating back to the earliest days of the sort of reflective thought that came to be called ‘philosophy'. History here, as elsewhere, offers a valuable means of understanding the present, so it is with history that I will be concerned – history necessarily compressed into simplified outline. This story, like that of Caesar's Gaul, falls readily into three parts. First is the gradual emergence in early Greek thought of a factor indispensable (...) to the discussion of the changing world and the progressive elaboration of that factor (or, more exactly, cluster of factors) as philosophic reflection deepened and divided. Second is the radical shift that occurred in the seventeenth century as the concept of matter took on new meanings, gave its name to the emerging philosophy of materialism and yielded place to a derivative concept, mass, in the fast-developing new science of mechanics. Third is the further transformation of the concept in the twentieth century in the light of the dramatic changes brought about by the three radically new theories in physics: relativity, quantum mechanics, and expanding-universe cosmology, with which that century will always be associated. Matter began to be dematerialized, as it were, as matter and energy were brought into some sort of equivalence, and the imagination-friendly particles of the earlier mechanics yielded way to the ghostly realities of quantum theory that are neither here nor there. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce’s pragmatist theory of logic teaches us to take the context of utterances as an indispensable logical notion without which there is no meaning. This is not a spat against compositionality per se , since it is possible to posit extra arguments to the meaning function that composes complex meaning. However, that method would be inappropriate for a realistic notion of the meaning of assertions. To accomplish a realistic notion of meaning (as opposed e.g. to algebraic meaning), Sperber (...) and Wilson’s Relevance Theory (RT) may be applied in the spirit of Peirce’s Pragmatic Maxim (PM): the weighing of information depends on (i) the practical consequences of accommodating the chosen piece of information introduced in communication, and (ii) what will ensue in actually using that piece in further cycles of discourse. Peirce’s unpublished papers suggest a relevance-like approach to meaning. Contextual features influenced his logic of Existential Graphs (EG). Arguments are presented pro and con the view in which EGs endorse non-compositionality of meaning. (shrink)

In this paper creativity is considered as a metaphysical question, with a mathematical ground on the notion of continuity. Of Peirce´s hand, and going be yond his claims, the author examines first the metaphysical grounds of creativity and then the aspects related with logic and semiotics.