Switch to: Citations

References in:

A dilemma for Epicureanism

Philosophical Studies 176 (1):241-257 (2019)

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1638 citations  
  • The Philosophy of Death.Steven Luper - 2009 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    The Philosophy of Death is a discussion of the basic philosophical issues concerning death, and a critical introduction to the relevant contemporary philosophical literature. Luper begins by addressing questions about those who die: What is it to be alive? What does it mean for you and me to exist? Under what conditions do we persist over time, and when do we perish? Next, he considers several questions concerning death, including: What does dying consist in; in particular, how does it differ (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • Death and the Afterlife.Samuel Scheffler - 2013 - New York, NY: Oup Usa. Edited by Niko Kolodny.
    We normally take it for granted that other people will live on after we ourselves have died. Even if we do not believe in a personal afterlife in which we survive our own deaths, we assume that there will be a "collective afterlife" in which humanity survives long after we are gone. Samuel Scheffler maintains that this assumption plays a surprising - indeed astonishing - role in our lives.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   97 citations  
  • (1 other version)Doing Away with Harm.Ben Bradley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.
    I argue that extant accounts of harm all fail to account for important desiderata, and that we should therefore jettison the concept when doing moral philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   63 citations  
  • Merely Verbal Disputes.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):11-30.
    Philosophers readily talk about merely verbal disputes, usually without much or any explicit reflection on what these are, and a good deal of methodological significance is attached to discovering whether a dispute is merely verbal or not. Currently, metaphilosophical advances are being made towards a clearer understanding of what exactly it takes for something to be a merely verbal dispute. This paper engages with this growing literature, pointing out some problems with existing approaches, and develops a new proposal which builds (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.
    The philosophical interest of verbal disputes is twofold. First, they play a key role in philosophical method. Many philosophical disagreements are at least partly verbal, and almost every philosophical dispute has been diagnosed as verbal at some point. Here we can see the diagnosis of verbal disputes as a tool for philosophical progress. Second, they are interesting as a subject matter for first-order philosophy. Reflection on the existence and nature of verbal disputes can reveal something about the nature of concepts, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   228 citations  
  • (1 other version)How to Be Dead and Not Care: A Defense of Epicurus.Stephen E. Rosenbaum - 1986 - American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (2):217 - 225.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • A More Palatable Epicureanism.David B. Hershenov - 2007 - American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (2):171 - 180.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Less good but not bad: In defense of epicureanism about death.Aaron Smuts - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):197-227.
    In this article I defend innocuousism– a weak form of Epicureanism about the putative badness of death. I argue that if we assume both mental statism about wellbeing and that death is an experiential blank, it follows that death is not bad for the one who dies. I defend innocuousism against the deprivation account of the badness of death. I argue that something is extrinsically bad if and only if it leads to states that are intrinsically bad. On my view, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Fischer and Lamenting Nonexistence.Elizabeth Harman - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):129-142.
    Why do we wish to die later but do not wish to have been created earlier? There is no puzzle here. It is false that if we had been created earlier we would have lived longer lives. Why don’t we wish to have been created earlier but with our actual times of death? That wish simply is not mandated by the more general wish to have lived a longer life. Furthermore, one might prefer one’s actual life to the better, but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Well-being and death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Well-Being and Death addresses philosophical questions about death and the good life: what makes a life go well? Is death bad for the one who dies? How is this possible if we go out of existence when we die? Is it worse to die as an infant or as a young adult? Is it bad for animals and fetuses to die? Can the dead be harmed? Is there any way to make death less bad for us? Ben Bradley defends the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   167 citations  
  • (1 other version)Confrontations with the reaper: a philosophical study of the nature and value of death.Fred Feldman - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    What is death? Do people survive death? What do we mean when we say that someone is "dying"? Presenting a clear and engaging discussion of the classic philosophical questions surrounding death, this book studies the great metaphysical and moral problems of death. In the first part, Feldman shows that a definition of life is necessary before death can be defined. After exploring several of the most plausible accounts of the nature of life and demonstrating their failure, he goes on to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   96 citations  
  • Lucretius, Symmetry arguments, and fearing death.James Warren - 2001 - Phronesis 46 (4):466-491.
    This paper identifies two possible versions of the Epicurean 'Symmetry argument', both of which claim that post mortem non-existence is relevantly like prenatal non-existence and that therefore our attitude to the former should be the same as that towards the latter. One version addresses the fear of the state of being dead by making it equivalent to the state of not yet being born; the other addresses the prospective fear of dying by relating it to our present retrospective attitude to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Composition, colocation, and metaontology.Karen Bennett - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 38.
    The paper is an extended discussion of what I call the ‘dismissive attitude’ towards metaphysical questions. It has three parts. In the first part, I distinguish three quite different versions of dismissivism. I also argue that there is little reason to think that any of these positions is correct about the discipline of metaphysics as a whole; it is entirely possible that some metaphysical disputes should be dismissed and others should not be. Doing metametaphysics properly requires doing metaphysics first. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   147 citations  
  • Physical-object ontology, verbal disputes, and common sense.Eli Hirsch - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):67–97.
    Two main claims are defended in this paper: first, that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language. A verbal dispute is characterized not in terms of private idiolects, but in terms of different linguistic communities representing different positions. If we imagine a community that makes Chisholm's mereological essentialist assertions, and another community that makes Lewis's four-dimensionalist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   126 citations  
  • Why is death bad?Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1986 - Philosophical Studies 50 (2):213-221.
    It seems that, whereas a person's death needn't be a bad thing for him, it can be. In some circumstances, death isn't a "bad thing" or an "evil" for a person. For instance, if a person has a terminal and very painful disease, he might rationally regard his own death as a good thing for him, or at least, he may regard it as something whose prospective occurrence shouldn't be regretted. But the attitude of a "normal" and healthy human being (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   67 citations  
  • Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   257 citations  
  • Fear of death.O. H. Green - 1982 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (1):99-105.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Challenging, with several powerful arguments, some of our deepest beliefs about rationality, morality, and personal identity, Parfit claims that we have a false view about our own nature. It is often rational to act against our own best interersts, he argues, and most of us have moral views that are self-defeating. We often act wrongly, although we know there will be no one with serious grounds for complaint, and when we consider future generations it is very hard to avoid conclusions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2868 citations  
  • (1 other version)Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics.James Stacey Taylor - 2012 - New York: Routledge.
    Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics offers a highly distinctive and original approach to the metaphysics of death and applies this approach to contemporary debates in bioethics that address end-of-life and post-mortem issues. Taylor defends the controversial Epicurean view that death is not a harm to the person who dies and the neo-Epicurean thesis that persons cannot be affected by events that occur after their deaths, and hence that posthumous harms are impossible. He then extends this argument by asserting that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Physical‐Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense.Eli Hirsch - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):67-97.
    Two main claims are defended in this paper: first, that typical disputes in the literature about the ontology of physical objects are merely verbal; second, that the proper way to resolve these disputes is by appealing to common sense or ordinary language. A verbal dispute is characterized not in terms of private idiolects, but in terms of different linguistic communities representing different positions. If we imagine a community that makes Chisholm's mereological essentialist assertions, and another community that makes Lewis's four‐dimensionalist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   112 citations  
  • Your death might be the worst thing ever to happen to you (but maybe you shouldn't care).Travis Timmerman - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):18-37.
    Deprivationism cannot accommodate the common sense assumption that we should lament our death iff, and to the extent that, it is bad for us. Call this the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption. As such, either this assumption needs to be rejected or deprivationism does. I first argue that the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption is false. I then attempt to figure out which facts our attitudes concerning death should track. I suggest that each person should have two distinct (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • How Should We Feel About Death?Ben Bradley - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (1):1-14.
    This paper examines the implications of the context-sensitivity of counterfactuals for the correctness of emotions and attitudes towards death. I argue that the correctness of an attitude such as fear must be explained by appeal to its causal relations to certain preferences.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Art of Dying.Ward E. Jones - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (3):435-454.
    Abstract In this paper, I explore what Jean Améry calls the ?aesthetic view of death?. I address the following three questions. To what extent, and how, do we take an aesthetic view of death? Why do we take an aesthetic view of death? Third, for those whose deaths are impending and have some choice over how they die?most prominently the elderly and the terminally ill?what would it mean for them to take an aesthetic view of their own impending deaths, and, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Epicurean View of Death.Eric T. Olson - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):65-78.
    The Epicurean view is that there is nothing bad about death, and we are wrong to loathe it. This paper distinguishes several different such views, and shows that while some of them really would undermine our loathing of death, others would not. It then argues that any version that did so could be at best vacuously true: If there is nothing bad about death, that can only be because there is nothing bad about anything.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Why Death Is Not Bad for the One Who Died.David B. Suits - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):69 - 84.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Comparative Harm, Creation and Death.Neil Feit - 2016 - Utilitas 28 (2):136-163.
    Given that a person's death is bad for her,whenis it bad? I defendsubsequentism, the view that things that are bad in the relevant way are bad after they occur. Some have objected to this view on the grounds that it requires us to compare the amount of well-being the victim would have enjoyed, had she not died, with the amount she receives while dead; however, we cannot assign any level of well-being, not even zero, to a dead person. In the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Plural Harm.Neil Feit - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388.
    In this paper, I construct and defend an account of harm, specifically, all-things-considered overall harm. I start with a simple comparative account, on which an event harms a person provided that she would have been better off had it not occurred. The most significant problems for this account are overdetermination and preemption cases. However, a counterfactual comparative approach of some sort is needed to make sense of harm, or so I argue. I offer a counterfactual comparative theory that accounts nicely (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • (1 other version)Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics.James Stacey Taylor - 2012 - New York: Routledge.
    _Death, Posthumous Harm, and Bioethics_ offers a highly distinctive and original approach to the metaphysics of death and applies this approach to contemporary debates in bioethics that address end-of-life and post-mortem issues. Taylor defends the controversial Epicurean view that death is not a harm to the person who dies and the neo-Epicurean thesis that persons cannot be affected by events that occur after their deaths, and hence that posthumous harms are impossible. He then extends this argument by asserting that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • (1 other version)Doing Away with Harm.Ben Bradley - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):390-412.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   73 citations  
  • The Time of Death’s Misfortune.Neil Feit - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):359–383.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • Accounting for the Harm of Death.Duncan Purves - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):89-112.
    I defend a theory of the way in which death is a harm to the person who dies that fits into a larger, unified account of harm ; and includes an account of the time of death's harmfulness, one that avoids the implications that death is a timeless harm and that people have levels of welfare at times at which they do not exist.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Epicurean equanimity towards death.Kai Draper - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):92–114.
    This paper assesses two reformulations of Epicurus' argument that "death ... is nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present; and whenever death is present, we do not exist." The first resembles many contemporary reformulations in that it attempts to reach the conclusion that death is not to the disadvantage of its subject. I argue that this rather anachronistic sort of reformulation cannot succeed. The second reformulation stays closer to the spirit of Epicurus' actual position on death (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Disappointment, sadness, and death.Kai Draper - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (3):387-414.
    Many find the prospect of death distressing at least partly because they believe that death deprives its subject of life’s benefits. Properly qualified, the belief is surely true. But should its truth lead us to conclude that there is something dreadful or awful about death, something that merits distress?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Epicureanism, Extrinsic Value, and Prudence.Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2015 - In Michael Cholbi (ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. New York: Rowman & Littlefield International.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Death, posthumous harm, and bioethics.James Stacey Taylor - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (9):636-637.
    If pressed to identify the philosophical foundations of contemporary bioethics, most bioethicists would cite the four-principles approach developed by Tom L Beauchamp and James F Childress,1 or perhaps the ethical theories of JS Mill2 or Immanuel Kant.3 Few would cite Aristotle's metaphysical views surrounding death and posthumous harm.4 Nevertheless, many contemporary bioethical discussions are implicitly grounded in the Aristotelian views that death is a harm to the one who dies, and that persons can be harmed, or wronged, by events that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Where is the Harm in Dying Prematurely? An Epicurean Answer.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):79-97.
    Philosophers have said less than is needed about the nature of premature death, and about the badness or otherwise of that death for the one who dies. In this paper, premature death’s nature is clarified in Epicurean terms. And an accompanying argument denies that we need to think of such a death as bad in itself for the one who dies. Premature death’s nature is conceived of as a death that arrives before ataraxia does. (Ataraxia’s nature is also clarified. It (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Death's badness.Anthony L. Brueckner & John Martin Fischer - 1993 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):37-45.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Lucretian Palingenesis Recycled.James Warren - 2001 - Classical Quarterly 51 (2):499-508.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • On the Nature of Things: De Rerum Natura.Titus Lucretius Carus - 1995 - Focus.
    This text is a translation of Lucretius’ poem which adheres faithfully to the text, yet with poetic force, accuracy, and humanitas and includes introduction, notes, and a glossary of philosophical terms cross-referenced to use throughout the poem.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations