It is not by thinking that we create worlds. It is by understanding the world that we learn to think. Cosmovision is a term that should mean a set of foundations from which emerges a systemic understanding of the Universe, its components as life, the world we live in, nature, human phenomena, and their relationships. It is, therefore, a field of analytical philosophy fed by the sciences, whose objective is this aggregated and epistemologically sustainable knowledge about everything that we are (...) and contain, that surrounds us, and that relates to us in any way. It is something as old as human thought, and, in addition to using elements of scientific cosmology, it encompasses everything in philosophy and science that refers to the universe and life. A cosmovision is not a set of ideas, hypotheses, and assumptions but a system based on observation, analysis, evidence, and demonstration. No cosmovision intends to define, establish, or propose but only to understand, analyse, and interpret. Each of us builds and transports his cosmovision throughout life, without establishing forms, as a background for our thinking and behaviour. Linguistically, the term “cosmovision” would derive from the German, equivalent to the concept of “ Weltanschauung,” as used by several philosophers. However, this linguistic relationship is not applicable because it contradicts what we propose as a cosmovision. This German word refers to a pre-logical or proto- experimental vision of reality, with an intuitive context and far from critical knowledge still non-existent at the time of its formulation. Undoubtedly, cosmovisions, in the sense in which we understand them, house and use these proto-experimental or pre-logical elements that include history, the collective unconscious, and all the archetypes we carry. However, in the concept that we apply here, the cosmovision goes far beyond this content, firstly by constantly submitting it to present critical thinking, and finally by making the analytic experience ( and not the thought itself or intuition) its actual universe. António Lopes expose the breadth of this content: -/- "Cosmovisions are not the product of thought. They do not spring from the simple desire to know. The apprehension of reality is an important moment in its configuration, but, nevertheless, it is only one. It comes from the vital conduct, from the experience of life's evaluation, and from the structure of our psychic totality. The elevation of life to consciousness in the knowledge of reality, in the valuation, and in the volitional reality is the slow and arduous work that humanity has done in the development of the conceptions of life. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)”(1) -/- In this work, we seek to outline a cosmovision based on the realities that science offers today. We do not propose, at any time, to do science; or theorise philosophy, but we will always seek to be supported by them or, at least, protected by them from the cognitive distortions that we usually carry. ________________________________________________ (1) Lopes , Antonio – “ Weltanschauung (Cosmovision)” (2009 ) in Carlos Ceia's E-Dictionary of Literary Terms. -/- . (shrink)

Many people believe that if we could produce meat without animal suffering—say, in ‘humane’ or ‘happy’ farms, or by growing it in a lab from biopsied cells—there would be no moral problem with doing so. This chapter argues otherwise. There is something morally ‘off’ with eating the flesh of sentient beings however it is produced. It is ‘off’ because anyone who truly understands the intimate relationship that an animal’s body stands in to all the value and disvalue in their lives (...) would not want to eat flesh. The chapter concludes by arguing that, as a society, we should not switch over to ‘happy’ or lab-grown meat. Instead, it is imperative that we pursue a public reckoning on our treatment of animals in factory farms, not only for the sake of animals, but for the sake of humanity itself. (shrink)

According to Longtermism, our acts’ expected influence on the expected value of the world is mainly determined by their effects in the far future. There is, given total utilitarianism, a straightforward argument for Longtermism due to the enormous number of people that might exist in the future, but this argument does not work on person-affecting views. In this paper, we will argue that these views might also lead to Longtermism if Prudential Longtermism is true. Prudential Longtermism holds for a person (...) if and only if our acts’ overall influence on that person’s expected well-being is mainly determined by the acts’ effects in the far future. We argue that (due to a small chance of anti-ageing and uploading) there could be an enormous amount of prudential value for some contemporary person in the far future and that value may be so large that it dominates their overall expectation of lifetime well-being. (shrink)

Climate change and the destruction of the earth is the most urgent issue of our time. We are hurtling towards the end of civilisation as we know it. With an unflinching honest approach, Rupert Read asks us to face up to the fate of the planet. This is a book for anyone who wants their philosophy to deal with reality and their climate concern to be more than a displacement activity. -/- As people come together to mourn the loss of (...) the planet, we have the opportunity to create a grounded, hopeful response. This meaningful hopefulness looks to the new communities created around climate activism. Together, our collective mourning enables us to become human in ways previously unknown. -/- Why Climate Breakdown Matters is a practical guide on how to be a radical, responsible climate activist. (shrink)

According to asymmetric comparativism, it is worse for a person to exist with a miserable life than not to exist, but it is not better for a person to exist with a happy life than not to exist. My aim in this paper is to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. My account of asymmetric comparativism begins with a different asymmetry, regarding the (dis)value of early death. I offer an account of this early death asymmetry, appealing to the (...) idea of conditional goods, and generalize it to explain how asymmetric comparativism could possibly be true. I also address the objection that asymmetric comparativism has unacceptably antinatalist implications. (shrink)

Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. (...) Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end. (shrink)

In this chapter I zoom in on a topic in climate ethics that has not previously received academic scrutiny: the intersection between evolutionary ethics and climate change. I argue that in the context of climate discourse, an evolutionary perspective can be illuminating, but may also invite moral corruption and reasoning fallacies. Relating my discussion to the general theme of the book, I argue that academic philosophy is well-positioned to fulfil a specific societal role, which is particularly important in the age (...) of popular science: to raise awareness of the ethical predicaments to which scientific findings can give rise, and to highlight the normative assumptions implicit in the reasoning of science communicators. (shrink)

Narrative views of agency and identity arise in opposition to reductionism in both domains. While reductionists understand both identity and agency in terms of their components, narrativists respond that life and action are both constituted by narratives, and since the components of a narrative gain their meaning from the whole, life and action not only incorporate their constituent parts but also shape them. I first lay out the difficulties with treating narrative as constitutive of metaphysical identity and turn to its (...) function in practical identity. I then explore the ways narrative shapes our agency—by tapping into our motivational structures, providing an understanding of the social background within which our agency operates, guiding our agency through an understanding of our histories and aspirations, providing the links that structure actions internally, and allowing us to change the meaning of our pasts. I suggest that putting these functions of narrative together may allow us to genuinely shape our past motivational structures through our actions. Finally, if life has the form of a narrative, it may seem as if mortality is necessary for our lives and their contents to be meaningful: a narrative, it might seem, relies on the ending for its meaning. If so, an immortal life would be meaningless. I examine the possibility that even an immortal life may draw meaning from local narratives that constitute projects within such a life, while arguing that, to the contrary, narrative may be a tool exclusively adapted to mortal lives. (shrink)

advanced directivesend-of-life decisionsharming the deadposthumous reproductiontransplant ethics.

This article argues that the creation of artificial offspring could make our lives more meaningful. By ‘artificial offspring’ I mean beings that we construct, with a mix of human and non-human-like qualities. Robotic artificial intelligences are paradigmatic examples of the form. There are two reasons for thinking that the creation of such beings could make our lives more meaningful and valuable. The first is that the existence of a collective afterlife—i.e. a set of human-like lives that continue after we die—is (...) likely to be an important source and sustainer of meaning in our present lives. The second is that the creation of artificial offspring provides a plausible and potentially better pathway to a collective afterlife than the traditional biological pathway. Both of these arguments are defended from a variety of objections and misunderstandings. (shrink)

Samuel Scheffler has recently defended what he calls the ‘afterlife conjecture’, the claim that many of our evaluative attitudes and practices rest on the assumption that human beings will continue to exist after we die. Scheffler contends that our endorsement of this claim reveals that our evaluative orientation has four features: non-experientialism, non-consequentialism, ‘conservatism,’ and future orientation. Here I argue that the connection between the afterlife conjecture and these four features is not as tight as Scheffler seems to suppose. In (...) fact, those with an evaluative orientation that rejects these four features have equally strong moral reasons to endorse the existence of the collective afterlife. (shrink)

It seems better to have a life that begins poorly and ends well than a life that begins well and ends poorly. One possible explanation is that the very shape of a life can be good or bad for us. If so, this raises a tough question: when can the shape of our lives be good or bad for us? In this essay, I present and critique an argument that the shape of a life is a non-synchronic prudential value—that is, (...) something that can be good or bad for us in a way that is not good or bad for us at any particular time. After distinguishing two interpretations of ‘the shape of a life’, I argue that the first type of shape can be good or bad for us at particular moments while the other cannot be good or bad for us at all. This suggests that the shape of a life gives us no reason to posit non-synchronic prudential values. (shrink)

Unamuno believes that longing for immortality is what motivates nearly all of human behavior. Unfortunately, in a world in which many people despair of ever achieving true personal immortality, we increasingly turn to what he calls mere “shadows of immortality” for comforting ideas about how our names, energy, or basic material substance will carry on in our absence. Unamuno advocates fighting against such despair, staying out of the shadows, and longing for personal immortality even when it seems impossible. Unamuno’s approach (...) to this issue resembles, in a few significant ways, Kierkegaard’s struggle for the cultivation of subjective selfhood. At the same time, it also runs afoul of Nietzsche’s derisive claims about immortality-seekers. Whereas Nietzsche sees longing for immortality as a sign of being too weak to make the most of mortal life, the more Kierkegaardian Unamuno counters that it is a sign of strong appreciation for life to demand, without surrender, that there be more of it. Given the proper understanding of Nietzsche’s claims about the eternal recurrence, I think he and Unamuno might not be quite as far apart as it initially seems. However, exploring the latter’s critique of the former suggests an intriguing way of seeing the contemporary analytic debate about the desirability of immortality. Building on Unamuno’s position, one could argue that pessimism about the value of immortality is actually indicative of a flawed character and an impoverished relationship with life. (shrink)

The common conception of justice as reciprocity seemingly is inapplicable to relations between non-overlapping generations. This is a challenge also to John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. This text responds to this by way of reinterpreting and developing Rawls’s theory. First, by examining the original position as a model, some revisions of it are shown to be wanting. Second, by drawing on the methodology of constructivism, an alternative solution is proposed: an amendment to the primary goods named ‘sustainability of (...) values’. This revised original position lends support to intergenerational justice as fairness. (shrink)

Many of us feel existential terror when contemplating our future nonexistence. I examine several attempts to rationally justify existential terror. The most promising of these appeals to the effects of future nonexistence on the meaningfulness of our lives. I argue that even this justification fails, and therefore existential terror is irrational.

In Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that the assumption of a “collective afterlife” plays an essential role in us valuing much of what we do. If a collective afterlife did not exist, our value structures would be radically different according to Scheffler. We would cease to value much of what we do. In Part I of the paper, I argue that there is something to Scheffler’s afterlife conjecture, but that Scheffler has misplaced the mattering of a collective afterlife. (...) Its significance lies not in the realm of axiology but more importantly in coming to terms with the fact of death and in viewing our lives as having meaning. In Part II of the paper, I outline three views on the sort of collective afterlife that matters and argue in favor of the view that it must involve creatures that recognize our existence, reasons, values, and contributions and the view that it must involve creatures that value similar things to us —but argue against the view that it necessarily be a human collective afterlife. (shrink)

The prospect of radical human enhancement challenges us with how we can even think about the choice to enhance or not enhance. Whether as individuals or as citizens of liberal democracies, we already recognize the prospect of a future that is defined by technology, without being able to predict or imagine what it will be like or how we should try to influence it. We can also be sure that radical enhancement of ourselves as individuals, or of a large proportion (...) of our fellow citizens, will alter the very standards and values by which we, as individuals or polities, later evaluate decisions to enhance – this is one version of the more general problem of transformative choice. In response to these challenges, it is plausible that we have no alternative to choosing and acting on our current desires and values, rather than our expected future values or some set of values that is objectively authoritative for us. On the other hand, our current value-outlooks include a degree of openness to our desires and values themselves changing, and for this reason we can often finesse the problem of transformative choice when it arises in everyday situations. On the gripping hand, this does not entirely solve the problem when it comes to something as dramatic and unprecedented as radical enhancement. There is some reason for an incremental, rather than apocalyptic, approach, even if we are sympathetic to a human future shaped by radical enhancement initiatives. (shrink)

Immortality—living forever and avoiding death—seems to many to be desirable. But is it? It has been argued that an immortal life would fairly soon become boring, trivial, and meaningless, and is not at all the sort of thing that any of us should want. Yet boredom and triviality presuppose our having powerful memories and imaginations, and an inability either to shake off the past or to free ourselves of weighty visions of the future. Suppose, though, that our capacities here are (...) limited, so that our temporal reach is fairly significantly constrained. Then, I argue, these alleged problems with immortality will recede. Moreover, similar limitations might help us in the actual world, where life is short. If we cannot see clearly to its end points, both ahead and behind, life will seem longer. (shrink)

Bernard Williams’ discussion of immortality in “The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality” has spawned an entire philosophical literature. This literature tends to focus on one of Williams’ central claims: if we were to relinquish our mortality, we would necessarily become alienated from our existence and environment—“bored,” in his terms. Many theorists have defended this claim; many others have challenged it. Even if this claim is false, though, it still isn’t obvious that we should choose to relinquish our (...) mortality, given the option. And this is puzzling. Death is generally regarded as an evil, meriting anxiety, dread, and avoidance. What is it about our mortality that makes us hesitant to relinquish it? In this paper, I aim to explain this hesitancy and to argue in its favor: we should be hesitant to relinquish our mortality. Further, I take my discussion to suggest that most of us probably shouldn’t take this option if we were given it. To make these points, I draw on Williams’ discussion of immortality, developing and extending his thought in order to better understand how mortality shapes the way we relate to our lives, particularly the commitments and values that make them meaningful. Our mortality, it seems, plays a crucial role in our lives standing for something. Relinquishing it thus means risking the loss of this value. (shrink)

Why do we so often care about the outcomes of games when nothing is at stake? There is a paradox here, much like the paradox of fiction, which concerns why we care about the fates and threats of merely fictional beings. I argue that the paradox threatens to overturn a great deal of what philosophers have thought about caring, severing its connection to value and undermining its moral weight. I defend a solution to the paradox that draws on Kendall Walton's (...) solution to the paradox of fiction, developing his idea that it be extended to games. The solution takes games to involve make‐believe: in particular, players and spectators make‐believe that the outcome of the game matters. I also explore how the phenomenon extends beyond games. And I explore some moral implications: in particular, my view preserves the idea that we have reason not to impede others in their pursuit of what they care about. (shrink)

In this paper I describe a specific emotional reaction to the fact that we will cease to exist, namely existential dread, and I argue that the B-theory of time, according to which reality contains a four-dimensional spacetime manifold and the present time is metaphysically on a par with past and future times, cannot accommodate it. Some may see this as an advantage of the B-theory; some may see it as a problem for the view. My aim is not to argue (...) either for or against the B-theory, but merely to show that it is incompatible with a certain common emotion. The paper is split into three sections. I begin by introducing existential dread. Next, I show how existential dread fits into a widely accepted theory of emotion according to which emotions are intentional states susceptible of being both intelligible and correct, where an emotion is intelligible if, roughly, it makes sense; and is correct if, roughly, it fits its object. The core of the paper is the third section: in that section, I introduce the B-theory of time and I argue that it is incompatible with existential dread. (shrink)

I describe a distinctive kind of fear that is generated by a vivid recognition of one’s mortal nature. I name it ‘existential shock’. This special fear does not take our future annihilation as any kind of harm, whether intrinsic or extrinsic. One puzzling feature of existential shock is that it is experienced as disclosing an important truth, yet attempts to specify this revelatory content bring us back to familiar facts about one’s inevitable death. But how can I discover something that (...) I already knew? I argue that in our everyday lives, we are in the grip of deeply entrenched patterns of thought and feeling that prevent the knowledge of our mortality from being fully assimilated. Rather, we merely ‘pay lip service’ to the facts of our mortality. I propose that existential shock involves a distinctive mode of presentation of oneself as a mortal being, in a way that cuts through subtle layers of denial that govern our lives. I develop this thesis by utilizing and synthesizing ideas from several traditions, including the work of Samuel Scheffler, Mark Johnston, Martin Heidegger, and Jay L. Garfield. (shrink)

Samuel Scheffler defends “The Afterlife Conjecture”: the view that the continued existence of humanity after our deaths—“the afterlife”—lies in the background of our valuing; were we to lose confidence in it, many of the projects we engage in would lose their meaning. The Afterlife Conjecture, in his view, also brings out the limits of our egoism, showing that we care more about yet unborn strangers than about personal survival. But why does the afterlife itself matter to us? Examination of Scheffler’s (...) second argument helps answer this question, thereby undermining his argument. Our concern for the afterlife involves bootstrapping: we care more about the afterlife than about personal survival precisely because the latter has such salient limits that our lives are structured by adaptation to mortality, and it is only because the afterlife does provide a measure of personal survival that it can give meaning to our projects. (shrink)

Death is an undeniable fact of life. Whether it is a bad or feared thing is an important discussion that can be brought back to the ancient Greek philosophers. This article is primarily concerned with the discussion on what grounds Epicurus's thesis "death, is nothing to us; since when we exist, death is not yet present, and when death is present, then we do not exist," and to what extent satisfactory results are reached. Later, it tries to investigate how Lucretius, (...) who is regarded as the successor of Epicurus, derives the result of meaningless of fear of death from the symmetrical relationship between prenatal and post-mortem non-existences. Finally, it refers to the modern asymmetric approaches which argue that, contrary to Lucretius's claim, the relationship between these two periods of non-existence is not symmetrical, because there are serious differences between the later birth and the later death of people, given their deprivations. This article argues that death has a mystery that raises the anxiety that comes from the nature of death; however, it defends the idea that it makes a significant contribution to the meaning of life. (shrink)

Ang Diyos ay hindi naglalaro ng dado", inulit ni Einstein mula sa taas ng kanyang determinismo, ngunit sa katunayan ang kosmos ay naghahagis ng mga buto nito nang sadyang mapagpasya: ang mga dado nito ay laruin. Hindi sa pag-iisip na tayo ay lumikha ng mga mundo. Sa pamamagitan ng pag-unawa sa mundo natututo tayong mag-isip. Ang Cosmovision ay isang termino na dapat ay nangangahulugang isang hanay ng mga pundasyon kung saan lumalabas ang isang sistematikong pag-unawa sa Uniberso, ang mga bahagi (...) nito bilang buhay, ang mundong ating ginagalawan, kalikasan, mga phenomena ng tao, at ang kanilang mga relasyon. Ito ay, samakatuwid, isang larangan ng analytical na pilosopiya na pinapakain ng mga agham, na ang layunin ay ang pinagsama-samang at epistemologically sustainable na kaalaman tungkol sa lahat ng kung ano tayo at nilalaman, na nakapaligid sa atin, at nauugnay sa atin sa anumang paraan. Ito ay isang bagay na kasingtanda ng pag-iisip ng tao, at, bilang karagdagan sa paggamit ng mga elemento ng siyentipikong kosmolohiya, sinasaklaw nito ang lahat ng bagay sa pilosopiya at agham na tumutukoy sa uniberso at buhay. Ang cosmovision ay hindi isang set ng mga ideya, hypotheses, at assumptions kundi isang sistemang batay sa obserbasyon, pagsusuri, ebidensya, at pagpapakita. Walang cosmovision na naglalayong tukuyin, itatag, o imungkahi ngunit para lamang maunawaan, suriin, at bigyang-kahulugan. Bawat isa sa atin ay nagtatayo at naghahatid ng kanyang kosmobisyon sa buong buhay, nang hindi nagtatatag ng mga anyo, bilang isang background para sa ating pag-iisip at pag-uugali. Sa lingguwistika, ang terminong "cosmovision" ay magmumula sa Aleman, katumbas ng konsepto ng "Weltanschauung," na ginamit ng ilang mga pilosopo. Gayunpaman, ang relasyong pangwika na ito ay hindi naaangkop dahil sumasalungat ito sa aming iminumungkahi bilang isang cosmovision. Ang salitang Aleman na ito ay tumutukoy sa isang pre-logical o proto- experimental na pananaw ng realidad, na may intuitive na konteksto at malayo sa kritikal na kaalaman na wala pa rin sa oras ng pagbabalangkas nito. Walang alinlangan, ang mga cosmovision, sa diwa kung saan natin nauunawaan ang mga ito, ay nagtataglay at gumagamit ng mga proto-experimental o pre-logical na elementong ito na kinabibilangan ng kasaysayan, ang sama-samang walang malay, at lahat ng mga archetype na dala natin. Gayunpaman, sa konseptong inilalapat natin dito, ang cosmovision ay higit na lumalampas sa nilalamang ito, una sa pamamagitan ng patuloy na pagsusumite nito upang ipakita ang kritikal na pag-iisip, at sa wakas sa pamamagitan ng paggawa ng analitikong karanasan (at hindi ang kaisipan mismo o intuwisyon) ang aktwal nitong uniberso. Inilantad ni António Lopes ang lawak ng nilalamang ito: "Ang mga cosmovision ay hindi produkto ng pag-iisip. Hindi sila nagmumula sa simpleng pagnanais na malaman. Ang pagkaunawa sa katotohanan ay isang mahalagang sandali sa pagsasaayos nito, ngunit, gayunpaman, ito ay isa lamang. Ito ay nagmumula sa mahahalagang pag-uugali, mula sa karanasan ng pagsusuri sa buhay, at mula sa istruktura ng ating saykiko na kabuuan Ang pagtaas ng buhay sa kamalayan sa kaalaman sa realidad, sa pagpapahalaga, at sa kusang katotohanan ay ang mabagal at mahirap na gawain. na ginawa ng sangkatauhan sa pagbuo ng mga konsepto ng buhay (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120). Sa gawaing ito, hinahangad nating balangkasin ang isang kosmobisyon batay sa mga realidad na inaalok natin ngayon hindi nagmumungkahi, sa anumang oras, na gumawa ng agham; o magteorya ng pilosopiya, ngunit lagi nating hahanapin na suportahan sila o, hindi bababa sa, protektahan nila mula sa mga pang-unawang distorsyon na karaniwan nating dala. (shrink)

Cosmovisione è un termine che dovrebbe significare un insieme di fondamenti da cui emerge una comprensione sistemica dell'Universo, delle sue componenti come la vita, il mondo in cui viviamo, la natura, il fenomeno umano e le sue relazioni. Si tratta, quindi, di un campo della filosofia analitica alimentato dalle scienze, il cui obiettivo è questa conoscenza aggregata ed epistemologicamente sostenibile su tutto ciò che siamo e conteniamo, che ci circonda e che in qualche modo si relaziona con noi. È qualcosa (...) di antico quanto il pensiero umano e, oltre a utilizzare elementi di cosmologia scientifica, racchiude tutto ciò che nella filosofia e nella scienza si riferisce all'universo e alla vita. Una cosmovisione non è un insieme d’idee, ipotesi e presupposti, ma un sistema basato su osservazione, analisi, prove e dimostrazione. Nessuna cosmovisione intende definire, stabilire, proporre, ma solo comprendere, analizzare e interpretare. Ognuno di noi costruisce e porta avanti la propria cosmovisione per tutta la vita, senza stabilire forme, come sfondo per il proprio pensiero e comportamento. Linguisticamente il termine “cosmovisione” deriverebbe dal tedesco, equivalente al concetto di“Weltanschauung”, utilizzato da diversi filosofi. Tuttavia, questa relazione linguistica non è applicabile perché contraddice ciò che proponiamo come cosmovisione. Questa parola tedesca rimanda a una visione prelogica o proto-sperimentale della realtà, con un contesto intuitivo e lontana da una conoscenza critica che non esisteva ancora al momento della sua formulazione. Senza dubbio, le cosmovisioni, nel senso in cui le intendiamo, ospitano e utilizzano questi elementi proto-sperimentali o prelogici che includono la storia, l’inconscio collettivo e tutti gli archetipi che portiamo con noi. Tuttavia, nel concetto che qui applichiamo, la cosmovisione va ben oltre questo contenuto, dapprima sottoponendolo costantemente al pensiero critico attuale e, infine, facendo dell'esperienza analitica (e non del pensiero o dell'intuizione stessa) il suo universo reale. In questo lavoro, cerchiamo di delineare una cosmovisione basata sulle realtà che la scienza offre oggi. Non proponiamo, in nessun momento, di fare scienza; o teorizzare la filosofia, ma cercheremo sempre di essere supportati da loro o, almeno, protetti da loro dalle distorsioni cognitive che abitualmente ci portiamo dietro. (shrink)

Космовізі — це термін, який має означати набір основ, з яких виникає системне розуміння Всесвіту, його складових як життя, світу, в якому ми живемо, природи, людського феномену та їхніх взаємозв’язків. Таким чином, це галузь аналітичної філософії, що живиться науками, метою якої є це сукупне та епістемологічно стійке знання про все, що ми є і що містить у собі, що оточує нас і що будь-яким чином до нас відноситься. Це щось таке ж давнє, як людська думка, і, окрім використання елементів наукової (...) космології, воно охоплює все у філософії та науці, що стосується Всесвіту та життя. Космогляд — це не набір ідей, гіпотез і припущень, а система, заснована на спостереженнях, аналізі, доказах і демонстраціях. Жодне космобачення не має на меті визначати, встановлювати чи пропонувати, а лише розуміти, аналізувати та інтерпретувати. Кожен з нас будує і транспортує своє космогляд протягом життя, не встановлюючи форми, як фон для нашого мислення і поведінки . Лінгвістично термін «космовізія» походить від німецької мови, що еквівалентно поняттю « Weltanschauung», яке використовували кілька філософів. Однак цей лінгвістичний зв’язок незастосовний, оскільки він суперечить тому, що ми пропонуємо як космовізію. Це німецьке слово відноситься до дологічного або протоекспериментального бачення реальності з інтуїтивним контекстом і далеко не критичним знанням, яке ще не існувало на момент його формулювання. Безсумнівно, космовізії, у тому сенсі, як ми їх розуміємо, містять і використовують ці протоекспериментальні або до-логічні елементи, які включають історію, колективне несвідоме та всі архетипи, які ми носимо. Однак у концепції, яку ми тут застосовуємо, космовізія виходить далеко за межі цього змісту, по-перше, постійно підпорядковуючи його теперішньому критичному мисленню і, нарешті, роблячи аналітичний досвід (а не саму думку чи інтуїцію) своїм справжнім всесвітом. У цій роботі ми прагнемо окреслити космогляд, заснований на реаліях, які пропонує сьогодні наука. Ми ніколи не пропонуємо займатися наукою; або теоретизувати філософію, але ми завжди будемо прагнути отримати їхню підтримку або, принаймні, захистити їх від когнітивних викривлень, які ми зазвичай несемо. (shrink)

宇宙观是一个词汇，应该意味着一组基础，从中产生对 宇宙的系统性理解，包括生命、我们所处的世界、自然 界、人类现象及其相互关系。因此，这是一种由科学支 持的分析哲学领域，其目标是对我们周围及与我们相关 的所有事物的综合而认识，并在认识上具有认识论的支 持。它是与人类思维一样古老的存在，并且除了运用科 学宇宙学的元素外，还涵盖了所有涉及宇宙和生命的哲 学和科学。 一个宇宙观并不是一组想法、假设和假定，而是一个基 于观察、分析、证据和论证的系统。没有一个宇宙观会 试图定义、确立或提出，而只是理解、分析和解释。每 个人在一生中构建和承载着自己的宇宙观，作为我们思 维和行为的背景。 从语言学角度来看，术语“宇宙观”来源于德语，相当 于多位哲学家所使用的“Weltanschauung”概念。然 而，这种语言上的关系并不适用，因为它与我们所提出 的宇宙观相悖。这个德语词指的是一种先前逻辑或原始 实验性的现实观，具有直觉性的背景，并且在其形成时 6 还不存在批判性的认识。毫无疑问，在我们理解的意义 上，宇宙观包含并使用了这些原始实验性或先前逻辑的 元素，包括历史、集体无意识和我们所承载的所有原型。 然而，在我们应用的概念中，宇宙观远远超越了这些内 容，首先是因为它不断地将其置于当前的批判性思维之 下，并最终使经验成为其真实的宇宙，而非仅仅是思维 或直觉。 安东尼奥·洛佩斯展示了这一内容的广度：1 “宇宙观并不是思维的产物。它并非源于简单 的求知欲望。对现实的理解是宇宙观形成的重 要时刻，但仅仅是其中之一。它源自生活的行 为，源自对生命的经验，源自我们心灵的整体 结构。将生命提升到意识中，在对现实的认识、 对生命的价值以及意志的现实性中，是人类在 生活观念的发展中所做的缓慢而艰难的工作。 （W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120）”。 -/- 在这项工作中，我们试图勾勒出一种基于当今科学所提 供的现实的宇宙观。我们在任何时候都不会试图进行科 学研究，或对哲学进行理论化，而始终努力在它们的支 持下，或至少在它们的保护下，免受我们通常所带有的 认知扭曲的影响。 .

Космовидение - термин, под которым следует понимать совокупность оснований, из которых возникает системное понимание Вселенной, таких ее составляющих, как жизнь, мир, в котором мы живем, природа, феномен человека, и их взаимосвязей. таким образом, это область аналитической философии, питаемая науками, целью которой является совокупное и эпистемологически устойчивое знание обо всем, чем мы являемся и что в нас содержится, что нас окружает и что так или иначе с нами связано. это старое, как человеческая мысль, понятие, которое не только использует элементы научной космологии, (...) но и охватывает все, что относится к вселенной и жизни в философии и науке. Космовидение — это не набор идей, гипотез и предположений, а система, основанная на наблюдениях, анализе, доказательствах и демонстрациях. Космовидение не ставит своей целью определить, установить или предложить, а лишь понять, проанализировать и интерпретировать. Каждый из нас строит и переносит свое космовидение в течение жизни, не устанавливая форм, как фон для нашего мышления и поведения. С лингвистической точки зрения термин "космовидение" происходит от немецкого, эквивалентного понятию "Weltanschauung", используемому рядом философов. Однако эта лингвистическая связь неприменима, поскольку противоречит тому, что мы предлагаем в качестве космовидения. Это немецкое слово обозначает дологическое или протоэкспериментальное видение реальности, имеющее интуитивный контекст и далекое от критического знания, еще не существовавшего на момент его формулировки. Несомненно, космовидения в том смысле, как мы их понимаем, содержат и используют эти протоэкспериментальные или дологические элементы, включающие историю, коллективное бессознательное и все архетипы, которые мы носим в себе. Однако в той концепции, которую мы здесь применяем, космовидение выходит далеко за пределы этого содержания, во-первых, постоянно подчиняя его современному критическому мышлению и, наконец, делая аналитический опыт (а не саму мысль или интуицию) своей актуальной вселенной. Антониу Лопес раскрывает широту этого содержания: -/- "Космовидения не являются продуктом мысли. Они не возникают из простого желания знать. Постижение реальности - важный момент в ее конфигурации, но, тем не менее, только один. Оно исходит из жизненного поведения, из жизненного опыта, из структуры нашей психической совокупности. Возвышение жизни до сознания в познании реальности, в оценке жизни и в волевой реальности — это медленная и тяжелая работа, которую проделало человечество в развитии представлений о жизни". (В. Дильтей, 1992 [1911]: 120)". . В данной работе мы стремимся изложить космовидение, основанное на тех реалиях, которые сегодня предлагает наука. Мы ни в коем случае не собираемся заниматься наукой или теоретизировать философию, но всегда будем стремиться опираться на них или, по крайней мере, защищаться ими от тех когнитивных искажений, которые мы обычно несем. (shrink)

Não é pensando que criamos mundos. É compreendendo o mundo que aprendemos a pensar. Cosmovisão é um termo que deve significar um conjunto de fundamentos dos quais emerge uma compreensão sistêmica do Universo, seus componentes como a vida, o mundo em que vivemos, a natureza, o fenômeno humano e suas relações. Trata-se, portanto, de um campo da filosofia analítica alimentado pelas ciências, cujo objetivo é esse conhecimento agregado e epistemologicamente sustentável sobre tudo o que somos e contemos, que nos cerca (...) e que nos relaciona de alguma forma. É algo tão antigo quanto o pensamento humano e, além de utilizar elementos da cosmologia científica, engloba tudo na filosofia e na ciência que se refere ao universo e à vida. Uma cosmovisão não é um conjunto de ideias, hipóteses e suposições, mas um sistema baseado em observação, análise, evidência e demonstração. Nenhuma cosmovisão pretende definir, estabelecer, propor, mas apenas compreender, analisar e interpretar. Cada um de nós constrói e transporta sua cosmovisão ao longo da vida, sem estabelecer formas, como pano de fundo para nosso pensamento e comportamento. Linguisticamente, o termo “cosmovisão” derivaria do alemão, equivalente ao conceito de “ Weltanschauung”, usado por vários filósofos. No entanto, essa relação linguística não é aplicável porque contraria o que propomos como cosmovisão. Esta palavra alemã refere-se a uma visão pré-lógica ou proto-experimental da realidade, com um contexto intuitivo e longe de um conhecimento crítico ainda inexistente no momento da sua formulação. Sem dúvida, as cosmovisões , no sentido em que as entendemos, abrigam e utilizam esses elementos protoexperimentais ou pré-lógicos que incluem a história, o inconsciente coletivo e todos os arquétipos que carregamos. No entanto, no conceito que aqui aplicamos, a cosmovisão vai muito além desse conteúdo, primeiro por submetê-lo constantemente ao pensamento crítico presente e, finalmente, por tornar a experiência analítica (e não o próprio pensamento ou intuição) seu universo real. António Lopes expõe a amplitude deste conteúdo: -/- “Cosmovisões não são o produto do pensamento. Não nascem do simples desejo de saber. A apreensão da realidade é um momento importante em sua configuração, mas, no entanto, é apenas um. Vem da conduta vital, da experiência da vida, da estrutura de nossa totalidade psíquica. A elevação da vida à consciência no conhecimento da realidade, na valorização da vida e na realidade volitiva é o trabalho lento e árduo que a humanidade tem feito no desenvolvimento das concepções de vida. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)” Neste trabalho, buscamos traçar uma cosmovisão baseada nas realidades que a ciência oferece hoje. Não nos propomos, em nenhum momento, a fazer ciência ou teorizar a filosofia, mas sempre buscaremos ser apoiados por elas ou, pelo menos, protegidos por elas das distorções cognitivas que costumamos carregar. (shrink)

Nicht durch das Denken erschaffen wir Welten. Indem wir die Welt verstehen, lernen wir zu denken. Kosmovision ist ein Begriff, der eine Reihe von Grundlagen bedeuten sollte, aus denen ein systemisches Verständnis des Universums, seiner Bestandteile als Leben, der Welt, in der wir leben, der Natur, des menschlichen Phänomens und ihrer Beziehungen hervorgehen sollte. Es handelt sich also um ein von den Wissenschaften gespeistes Feld der analytischen Philosophie, deren Ziel dieses aggregierte und erkenntnistheoretisch nachhaltige Wissen über alles ist, was wir (...) sind und beinhalten, was uns umgibt und was uns in einer Weise betrifft. Sie ist so alt wie das menschliche Denken und umfasst neben der Verwendung von Elementen der wissenschaftlichen Kosmologie alles in Philosophie und Wissenschaft, was sich auf das Universum und das Leben bezieht. Eine Kosmovision ist keine Sammlung von Ideen, Hypothesen und Annahmen, sondern ein System, das auf Beobachtung, Analyse, Beweisen und Demonstrationen basiert. Keine Kosmovision will definieren, etablieren oder vorschlagen, sondern nur verstehen, analysieren und interpretieren. Jeder von uns baut und transportiert sein ganzes Leben lang seine Kosmovision, ohne Formen zu etablieren, als Hintergrund für unser Denken und Handeln. In dieser Arbeit versuchen wir, eine Kosmovision zu skizzieren, die auf den Realitäten basiert, die die Wissenschaft heute bietet. Wir schlagen zu keinem Zeitpunkt vor, Wissenschaft zu betreiben; oder Philosophie zu theoretisieren, aber wir werden immer versuchen, von ihnen unterstützt oder zumindest vor den kognitiven Verzerrungen geschützt zu werden, die wir normalerweise mit uns herumtragen. (shrink)

Ce n'est pas en pensant que nous créons des mondes. C'est en comprenant le monde que nous apprenons à penser. La cosmovision est un terme qui devrait désigner un ensemble de fondements d'où émerge une compréhension systémique de l'Univers, de ses composantes comme la vie, le monde dans lequel nous vivons, la nature, le phénomène humain et leurs relations. C'est donc un champ de la philosophie analytique nourri par les sciences, dont l'objectif est cette connaissance agrégée et épistémologiquement soutenable de (...) tout ce que nous sommes et contenons, qui nous entoure, et qui nous concerne de quelques manières que ce soit. C'est quelque chose d'aussi vieux que la pensée humaine et, en plus d'utiliser des éléments de la cosmologie scientifique, il englobe tout ce qui, dans la philosophie et la science, se réfère à l'univers et à la vie. Une cosmovision n'est pas un ensemble d'idées, d'hypothèses et de suppositions, mais un système établi sur l'observation, l'analyse, la preuve et la démonstration. Aucune cosmovision n'entend définir, établir ou proposer, mais seulement comprendre, analyser et interpréter. Chacun de nous construit et transporte sa cosmovision tout au long de sa vie, sans établir de forme, comme toile de fond de nos pensées et de nos comportements. Linguistiquement, le terme « cosmovision » dériverait de l'allemand, équivalent au concept de « Weltanschauung », tel qu'il a été utilisé par plusieurs philosophes. Cependant, cette relation linguistique n'est pas applicable, car elle contredit ce que nous proposons comme cosmovision. Ce mot allemand fait référence à une vision prélogique ou proto-expérimentale de la réalité, avec un contexte intuitif et loin des connaissances critiques encore inexistantes au moment de sa formulation. Sans aucun doute, les cosmovisions, au sens où nous les entendons, abritent et utilisent ces éléments proto-expérimentaux ou prélogiques qui incluent l'histoire, l'inconscient collectif et tous les archétypes que nous portons. Or, dans le concept que nous appliquons ici, la cosmovision va bien au-delà de ce contenu, d'abord en le soumettant constamment à la pensée critique actuelle et enfin en faisant de l'expérience analytique (et non de la pensée elle-même ou de l'intuition) son univers réel. António Lopes expose l'étendue de ce contenu : [ ] « Les cosmovisions ne sont pas le produit de la pensée. Ils ne naissent pas du simple désir de savoir. L'appréhension de la réalité est un moment important dans sa configuration, mais, néanmoins, ce n'en est qu'un. Elle vient de la conduite vitale, de l'expérience de la vie, de la structure de notre totalité psychique. L'élévation de la vie à la conscience dans la connaissance de la réalité, dans l'évaluation de la vie et dans la réalité volitive est le travail lent et ardu que l'humanité a fait dans le développement des conceptions de la vie. (W.Dilthey, 1992 [1911] : 120). Dans cet ouvrage, nous cherchons à esquisser une cosmovision fondée sur les réalités que la science offre aujourd'hui. Nous ne proposons, à aucun moment, de faire de la science ; ou théoriser la philosophie, mais nous chercherons toujours à être soutenus par eux ou, du moins, protégés par eux des distorsions cognitives que nous portons habituellement. -/- . (shrink)

No es pensando como creamos mundos. Es comprendiendo el mundo como aprendemos a pensar. Cosmovisión es un término que debe significar un conjunto de fundamentos a partir de los cuales emerge una comprensión sistémica del Universo, sus componentes como la vida, el mundo en que vivimos, la naturaleza, el fenómeno humano y sus relaciones. Es, por tanto, un campo de la filosofía analítica alimentado por las ciencias, cuyo objetivo es ese conocimiento agregado y epistemológicamente sostenible sobre todo lo que somos (...) y contenemos, que nos rodea y con lo que nos relacionamos de alguna manera. Es algo tan antiguo como el pensamiento humano y, además de utilizar elementos de la cosmología científica, engloba todo lo que en filosofía y ciencia se refiere al universo y la vida. Una cosmovisión no es un conjunto de ideas, hipótesis y suposiciones, sino un sistema basado en la observación, el análisis, la evidencia y la demostración. Ninguna cosmovisión pretende definir, establecer, proponer, sino solo comprender, analizar e interpretar. Cada uno de nosotros construimos y transportamos nuestra cosmovisión a lo largo de nuestra vida, sin establecer formas, como trasfondo de nuestro pensamiento y comportamiento. Lingüísticamente, el término “cosmovisión” se deriva del alemán, equivalente al concepto de “Weltanschauung” utilizado por varios filósofos. Sin embargo, esta relación lingüística no es aplicable porque va en contra de lo que proponemos como cosmovisión. Esta palabra alemana hace referencia a una visión prelógica o protoexperimental de la realidad, con un contexto intuitivo y alejado de un conocimiento crítico que aún no existía en el momento de su formulación. Sin duda, las cosmovisiones, no tiene sentido en que las entendamos, cobijen y utilicen estos elementos proto-experimentales o prelógicos que incluyen la historia, el inconsciente colectivo y todos los arquetipos que portamos. Sin embargo, en el concepto que aquí aplicamos, la cosmovisión va mucho más allá de este contenido, primero al someterlo constantemente al pensamiento crítico actual y, finalmente, al hacer de la experiencia analítica (y no del pensamiento o la intuición en sí) su verdadero universo. António Lopes expone la amplitud de este contenido: -/- “Las cosmovisiones no son el producto del pensamiento. No nacen del simple deseo de saber. La aprehensión de la realidad es un momento importante en su configuración, sin embargo, es uno solo. Proviene de la conducta vital, de la experiencia de vida, de la estructura de nuestra totalidad psíquica. El apoyo de la vida a la conciencia en el conocimiento de la realidad, en la apreciación de la vida y en la realidad volitiva, es el trabajo lento y arduo que ha hecho la humanidad en el desarrollo de los conceptos de vida. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)” . En este trabajo buscamos esbozar una cosmovisión a partir de las realidades que ofrece la ciencia en la actualidad. No nos proponemos, en ningún momento, hacer ciencia; o teorizar la filosofía, pero siempre buscaremos ser apoyados por ellos o, al menos, protegidos por ellos de las distorsiones cognitivas que solemos llevar. -/- . (shrink)

Is it fair to leave the next generation a public debt? Is it defensible to impose legal rules on them through constitutional constraints? From combating climate change to ensuring proper funding for future pensions, concerns about ethics between generations are everywhere. In this volume sixteen philosophers explore intergenerational justice. Part One examines the ways in which various theories of justice look at the matter. These include libertarian, Rawlsian, sufficientarian, contractarian, communitarian, Marxian and reciprocity-based approaches. In Part Two, the authors look (...) more specifically at issues relevant to each of these theories, such as motivation to act fairly towards future generations, the population dimension, the formation of preferences through education and how they impact on our intergenerational obligations, and whether it is fair to rely on constitutional devices. (shrink)

We find meaning and value in our lives by engaging in everyday projects. But, according to a recent argument by Samuel Scheffler, this value doesn’t depend merely on what the projects are about. In many cases, it depends also on the future generations that will replace us. By imagining the imminent extinction of humanity soon after our own deaths, we can recognize both that much of our current valuing depends on a background confidence in the ongoing survival of humanity and (...) that the survival and flourishing of those future generations matters to us. After presenting Scheffler’s argument, I will explore two twentieth century precursors—Hans Morgenthau and Simone de Beauvoir—before returning to Scheffler to see that his argument can not only show us why future generations matter, but it can also give us hope for immortality and a blueprint for embracing a changing future. (shrink)

What moral reasons, if any, do we have to ensure the long-term survival of humanity? This article contrastively explores two answers to this question: according to the first, we should ensure the survival of humanity because we have reason to maximize the number of happy lives that are ever lived, all else equal. According to the second, seeking to sustain humanity into the future is the appropriate response to the final value of humanity itself. Along the way, the article discusses (...) various issues in population axiology, particularly the so-called Intuition of Neutrality and John Broome’s ‘greediness objection’ to this intuition. (shrink)

This book is a collection of all the papers and the essay published in the special issue “Philosophy and Meaning in Life Vol.3,” Journal of Philosophy of Life, Vol.11, No.1, 2021, pp.1-154. We held the Third International Conference on Philosophy and Meaning in Life online at the University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK, on July 21–23, 2020. This conference was co-hosted by the Birmingham Centre for Philosophy of Religion, and the Waseda Institute of Life and Death Studies. We accepted about 50 (...) presentations from around the world. Professor Lisa Bortolotti and I gave keynote lectures. After the conference, we called for papers for publication from the speakers, and we accepted seven papers and an essay for the special issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Life. We would like to give special thanks to the anonymous referees who kindly reviewed the submitted manuscripts. The accepted papers deal with a variety of topics, such as the subjective/objective debate, narrative meaning, Simone de Beauvoir, and Alain Badiou, and they are all discussed from the perspective of the philosophy of meaning in life. (shrink)

To what extent do we value future generations? It may seem from our behavior that we don’t value future generations much at all, at least in relation to how much we value present generations. However, in his book _Death and the Afterlife_, Samuel Scheffler argues that we value the future even _more_ than we value the present, even though this is not immediately apparent to us. If Scheffler’s argument is sound, then it has important ramifications: It would give us a (...) strong motivation to put more energy into abating environmental crises like climate change, and it supports at least a limited form of ethical _longtermism_. However, in this paper, I show that Scheffler’s argument is fallacious. Scheffler claims that we do not regard the fact that we in the present generation will all die relatively soon as a catastrophe, but we do regard the non-existence of future generations as a catastrophe. But the particular scenario used by Scheffler to illustrate this point—the plot of the book _The Children of Men_—is one in which _both_ the present generation will perish _and_ there will be no future generations, and it is this _conjunction_ that is catastrophic, thus giving no information about which is worse. I suggest other ways to compare our valuations of present and future generations, and recommend that philosophers who are interested in the moral psychology of how we value future generations ought to engage with social science, as it is an empirical issue. (shrink)

The idea of an eternal and immortal life like the one we lead now seems quite appealing because (i) it will be sufficiently like our own earth-bound life and (ii) we will have the same kinds of desires we have now to want to live an eternal life. This paper will challenge the view that we have a conception of what the conscious experience of an immortal is like, regardless of whether we might want to live it. Given that for (...) us to conceive of an immortal life we must project onto it our own view of what it is like to live our own life and given that an immortal life may not be anything like the life we live, we cannot conceive of what it is like to be immortal. (shrink)

Perhaps death’s badness is an illusion. Epicureans think so and argue that agents cannot be harmed by death when they’re alive nor when they’re dead. I argue that each version of Epicureanism faces a fatal dilemma: it is either committed to a demonstrably false view about the relationship between self-regarding reasons and well-being or it is involved in a merely verbal dispute with deprivationism. I first provide principled reason to think that any viable view about the badness of death must (...) allow that agents have self-regarding reason to avoid death if doing so would increase their total well-being. I then show that Epicurean views which do not preserve this link are subject to reductio arguments and so should be rejected. After that, I show that the Epicurean views which accommodate this desideratum are involved in a merely verbal dispute with deprivationism. (shrink)

There is a rich tradition within game theory, decision theory, economics, and philosophy correlating practical rationality with impartiality, and spatial and temporal neutrality. I argue that in some cases we should give priority to people over both times and places, and to times over places. I also show how three plausible dominance principles regarding people, places, and times conflict, so that we cannot accept all three. However, I argue that there are some cases where we should give priority to times (...) over people, suggesting that there is impersonal value to the distribution of high quality life over different times. (shrink)

I argue that death can be (and sometimes is) bad for cattle because it destroys relationships that are valuable for cattle for their own sake. The argument relies on an analogy between valuable human relationships and relationships cattle form with conspecifics. I suggest that the reasons we have for thinking that certain rich and meaningful human relationships are valuable for their own sake should also lead us to think that certain cattle relationships are valuable for their own sake. And just (...) as death is bad for us when it destroys our valuable relationships, so death is bad for cattle when it destroys their valuable relationships. This argument is important because it pinpoints something that is bad about death for cattle that is overlooked by popular accounts of the badness of death for non-human animals that focus exclusively on the impact of death on lifetime well-being levels. Thus, the argument reveals an overlooked moral cost of some of our farming practices. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the connection between certain metaphysical views of time and emotional attitudes concerning one’s own death and mortality. I argue that one metaphysical view of time, B-theory, offers consolation to mortals in the face of death relative to commonsense and another metaphysical view of time, A-theory. Consolation comes from three places. First, B-theory implies that time does not really pass, and as a result one has less reason to worry about one’s time growing short. Second, B-theory (...) entails that there is a real sense in which one’s death does not result in one’s annihilation, and this fact can temper feelings of existential distress. Third, B-theory has the consequence that the benefits one has lost have concrete existence, and this fact can mitigate the emotional significance of the losses of death. (shrink)

Schechtman’s ‘Person Life View’ offers an account of personal identity whereby persons are the unified loci of our practical and ethical judgment. PLV also recognises infants and permanent vegetative state patients as being persons. I argue that the way PLV handles these cases yields an unexpected result: the dead also remain persons, contrary to the widely-accepted ‘Termination Thesis.’ Even more surprisingly, this actually counts in PLV’s favor: in light of our social and ethical practices which treat the dead as moral (...) patients, PLV gives a more plausible account of the status of the dead than its rival theories. (shrink)

Theories of intergenerational justice are a very common and popular way to conceptualise the obligations currently living people may have to future generations. After briefly pointing out that these theories presuppose certain views about the existence, number and identity of future people, I argue that the presuppositions must themselves be ethically investigated, and that theories of intergenerational justice lack the theoretical resources to be able to do this. On that basis, I claim it is necessary to do the ‘ethics of (...) metaphysics’ in order to fully comprehend what, if anything, we may owe future generations. I defend these claims against some important objections. (shrink)

Climate change and other contemporary harms are often depicted as New Harms because they seem to constitute unprecedented challenges. This New Harms Discourse rests on two important premises, both of which we criticise on empirical grounds. First, we argue that the Premise of changed conditions of human interaction—according to which the conditions regarding whom people affect have changed recently and which emphasises the difference with past conditions of human interaction—risks obfuscating how humanity’s current predicament is merely the transient result of (...) long-term, gradual processes and developments. Second, we dispute the Premise that New Harms have certain features that render them new and argue that New Harms share characteristics with other harms. On the basis of these premises, the New Harms Discourse concludes that climate change is a unique social challenge that requires radically new moral thinking, but we argue that this Uniqueness Myth distracts attention from the valuable lessons we can draw from humanity’s successes and failures in dealing with past harms. We will illustrate how action to tackle climate change and other complex, systemic harms can be informed by the interdisciplinary study of historic harms. We will argue that rejecting the New Harms Discourse is not only empirically justified, it also gives cause for optimism, because it opens up the possibility to draw upon the past to face problems in the present and future. (shrink)

Head transplantation fits within the broader conceptual space occupied by transhumanists and others who seek to extend the lives of human beings indefinitely. It is reasonable to reflect on whether, under what circumstances, and in what ways human immortality would be good. In this paper, I disambiguate the ways in which immortality might be considered a human good and then argue that immortality is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for objective meaning in life. I also argue that mortality is not (...) a necessary condition for objective meaning in life. (shrink)

One of the many brilliant insights of C. Thi Nguyen’s brilliant book, Games: Agency as Art, is the connection he draws between the distinctive agency of game play and one important feature of a lif...