Schlick schreibt der empirischen Erkenntnis ein unerschütterliches Fundament zu: es bestehe aus "Konstatierungen", d.h. Aussagen, die unmittelbar Erfahrenes ausdrücken und durch die alle empirischen Aussagen hypothetisch-deduktiv überprüfbar sein müssen. Neuraths Auffassung dagegen war diese: (1) Aussagen können logisch nicht durch Vergleich mit "Erfahrungstatsachen" beurteüt werden, sondern nur durch Prüfung ihres Zusammenpassens mit anderen, bereits akzeptierten Aussagen; (2) der Empkismus verlangt, daß die letzteren "Protokollsätze" enthalten müssen, die (etwa von experimentierenden Wissenschaftlern) dkekt akzeptiert wurden; (3) jeder akzeptierte Satz, selbst ein Protokollsatz, (...) ist revisionsfähig: es gibt kein festes Fundament der Erkenntnis.Beide Denker vermischen den semantischen Begriff der Wahrheit mit dem epistemologischen Begriff der Akzeptierbarkeit von Sätzen. Schlicks Einwand, Neuraths "Kohärenztheorie" identifiziere die Wahrheit eines Hypothesensystems mit logischer Widerspruchsfreiheit, übersieht Neuraths empiristische Bedingung (2), die der Akzeptierbarkeit implizit kausale Bedingungen auferlegt. Ähnlich haben Schlicks Konstatierungen einen kausalen Aspekt: hier liegt der empiristische Charakter beider Auffassungen. Neuraths Grundideen wurden in der neueren soziologisch-pragmatischen Wendung der Wissenschaftstheorie weitergeführt. (shrink)

Schlick schreibt der empirischen Erkenntnis ein unerschütterliches Fundament zu: es bestehe aus "Konstatierungen", d.h. Aussagen, die unmittelbar Erfahrenes ausdrücken und durch die alle empirischen Aussagen hypothetisch-deduktiv überprüfbar sein müssen. Neuraths Auffassung dagegen war diese: (1) Aussagen können logisch nicht durch Vergleich mit "Erfahrungstatsachen" beurteüt werden, sondern nur durch Prüfung ihres Zusammenpassens mit anderen, bereits akzeptierten Aussagen; (2) der Empkismus verlangt, daß die letzteren "Protokollsätze" enthalten müssen, die (etwa von experimentierenden Wissenschaftlern) dkekt akzeptiert wurden; (3) jeder akzeptierte Satz, selbst ein Protokollsatz, (...) ist revisionsfähig: es gibt kein festes Fundament der Erkenntnis.Beide Denker vermischen den semantischen Begriff der Wahrheit mit dem epistemologischen Begriff der Akzeptierbarkeit von Sätzen. Schlicks Einwand, Neuraths "Kohärenztheorie" identifiziere die Wahrheit eines Hypothesensystems mit logischer Widerspruchsfreiheit, übersieht Neuraths empiristische Bedingung (2), die der Akzeptierbarkeit implizit kausale Bedingungen auferlegt. Ähnlich haben Schlicks Konstatierungen einen kausalen Aspekt: hier liegt der empiristische Charakter beider Auffassungen. Neuraths Grundideen wurden in der neueren soziologisch-pragmatischen Wendung der Wissenschaftstheorie weitergeführt. (shrink)

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the function (...) and the essential characteristics of scientific explanation. In the present essay, an attempt will be made to shed some light on these issues by means of an elementary survey of the basic pattern of scientific explanation and a subsequent more rigorous analysis of the concept of law and of the logical structure of explanatory arguments. (shrink)

The classic logical positivist account of historical explanation, putting forward what is variously called the "regularity interpretation" (#Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation), the "covering law model" (#Dray, Laws and Explanation in History), or the "deductive model" (Michael #Scriven, "Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations"). See also #Danto, Narration and Knowledge, for further criticisms of the model. Hempel formalizes historical explanation as involving (a) statements of determining (initial and boundary) conditions for the event to be explained, and (b) statements of (...) general laws that imply that whenever events of the kind described in (a) occur, an event of the kind to be explained will take place. He admits that in practice historians rarely explain historical events in this way, but instead give only fragmentary "explanation sketches." Such sketches can, however, be "scientifically acceptable," providing it points to where "more specific statements" are to be found (351). An interesting aspect of the article is its "late" positivist, proto‑Kuhnian assertion that "the separation of 'pure description' and 'hypothetical generalization and theory construction' in empirical science is unwarranted" (356). But Hempel does not work out the wider implications of this important conclusion. It is also worth noting that he himself was not much interested in the philosophy of history; other authors took up his model and discussed it within that context. Usefully discussed by #Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 1:112‑17. (shrink)

Two chief problems of the theory of knowledge are the question of meaning and the question of verification. The first question asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning, in the sense of cognitive, factual meaning. The second one asks how we get to know something, how we can find out whether a given sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first one. Obviously we must understand a sentence, i.e. we must know its meaning, before we can (...) try to find out whether it is true or not. But, from the point of view of empiricism, there is a still closer connection between the two problems. In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we knew what it would be for a given sentence to be found true then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood; and a sentence has meaning only if such a determination is possible. (shrink)

Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-1997) was one of the preeminent figures in the philosophical movement of logical empiricism. He was a member of both the Berlin and Vienna circles, fled Germany in 1934 and finally settled in the US where he taught for many years in New York, Princeton, and Pittsburgh. The essays in this collection come from the early and late periods of Hempel's career and chart his intellectual odyssey from a rigorous commitment to logical positivism in the 1930s (when (...) Hempel allied himself closely with Carnap) to a more sociological approach close in spirit to the work of Neurath and Kuhn. The collection brings together essays which have up till now been difficult to find, four of which are appearing in English for the first time. Cumulatively they offer a fresh perspective on Hempel's intellectual development and on the rise and demise of logical empiricism. (shrink)

: Considerable unclarity exists in the literature concerning the origin and authorship of Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis, the Vienna Circle's manifesto of 1929 and on the extent of and the reasons for the mixed reception it received in the Circle itself. This paper reconsiders these matters on the light of so far insufficiently consulted documents.

Considerable unclarity exists in the literature concerning the origin and authorship of Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis, the Vienna Circle’s manifesto of 1929 and on the extent of and the reasons for the mixed reception it received in the Circle itself. This paper reconsiders these matters on the light of so far insufªciently consulted documents.

In the light of two unpublished letters from Carnap to Kuhn, this essay examines the relationship between Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and Carnap's philosophical views. Contrary to the common wisdom that Kuhn's book refuted logical empiricism, it argues that Carnap's views of revolutionary scientific change are rather similar to those detailed by Kuhn. This serves both to explain Carnap's appreciation of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and to suggest that logical empiricism, insofar as that program rested on Carnap's (...) shoulders, was not substantially upstaged by Kuhn's book. (shrink)

The concept of base and superstructure has been one of the hotly debated issues in Marxist theory. Otto Neurath, who considered Marxism to be decisive for empirical sociology, accepted the significance of economic conditions as a driving force in the historical process. In contrast to Max Weber and Werner Sombart, he put the importance of ideas and the “capitalist spirit” into perspective. However, he also generally rejected the idea of economic determinism that was then very common among Marxists. In assuming (...) a “coherence” of social structure, mode of production, way of life and ideology, Neurath’s approach enabled even an extensive understanding of cultural phenomena. Although he never elaborated a cultural theory , his assumptions on this subject are worth considering. (shrink)