The conceptual spaces approach has recently emerged as a novel account of concepts. Its guiding idea is that concepts can be represented geometrically, by means of metrical spaces. While it is generally recognized that many of our concepts are vague, the question of how to model vagueness in the conceptual spaces approach has not been addressed so far, even though the answer is far from straightforward. The present paper aims to fill this lacuna.

This book covers a wide variety of topics in combinatorics and graph theory.

The notion of conceptual space, proposed by Gärdenfors as a framework for the representation of concepts and knowledge, has been highly influential over the last decade or so. One of the main theses involved in this approach is that the conceptual regions associated with properties, concepts, verbs, etc. are convex. The aim of this paper is to show that such a constraint—that of the convexity of the geometry of conceptual regions—is problematic; both from a theoretical perspective and with regard to (...) the inner workings of the theory itself. On the one hand, all the arguments provided in favor of the convexity of conceptual regions rest on controversial assumptions. Additionally, his argument in support of a Euclidean metric, based on the integral character of conceptual dimensions, is weak, and under non-Euclidean metrics the structure of regions may be non-convex. Furthermore, even if the metric were Euclidean, the convexity constraint could be not satisfied if concepts were differentially weighted. On the other hand, Gärdenfors’ convexity constraint is brought into question by the own inner workings of conceptual spaces because: some of the allegedly convex properties of concepts are not convex; the conceptual regions resulting from the combination of convex properties can be non-convex; convex regions may co-vary in non-convex ways; and his definition of verbs is incompatible with a definition of properties in terms of convex regions. Therefore, the mandatory character of the convexity requirement for regions in a conceptual space theory should be reconsidered. (shrink)

Comparative concepts such as greener than or higher than are ways of ordering objects. They are fundamental to our grasp of gradable concepts, that is, the type of meanings expressed by gradable general terms, such as "is green" or "is high", which are embeddable in comparative constructions in natural language. Some comparative concepts seem natural, whereas others seem gerrymandered. The aim of this paper is to outline a theoretical approach to comparative concepts that bears both on the account of naturalness (...) for comparative concepts and on the theory of gradable concepts. The approach is novel in that it carries some basic assumptions from Peter Gärdenfors' conceptual spaces account of categorical concepts over to comparative concepts. The offered approach is more general than Gärdenfors' account in that it supplies a framework of graded categorisation that includes his categorisation rule as a limiting case. Importantly, it provides also a new argument for adopting Gärdenfors' particular model of categorisation. (shrink)

In this brief note, we focus attention on a possible implementation of a basic hysteretic pattern (the Preisach one), suitably generalized, into a formal model of unconscious-conscious interconnection and based on representation of mental entities by m-adic numbers.

In the framework of p-adic analysis (the simplest version of analysis on trees in which hierarchic structures are presented through ultrametric distance) applied to formalize psychic phenomena, we would like to propose some possible first hypotheses about the origins of human consciousness centered on the basic notion of time symmetry breaking as meant according to quantum field theory of infinite systems. Starting with Freud's psychophysical (hydraulic) model of unconscious and conscious flows of psychic energy based on the three-orders mental representation, (...) the emotional order, the thing representation order, and the word representation order, we use the p-adic (treelike) mental spaces to model transition from unconsciousness to preconsciousness and then to consciousness. Here we explore theory of hysteresis dynamics: conscious states are generated as the result of integrating of unconscious memories. One of the main mathematical consequences of our model is that trees representing unconscious and conscious mental states have to have dierent structures of branching and distinct procedures of clustering. The psychophysical model of Freud in combination with the p-adic mathematical representation gives us a possibility to apply (for a moment just formally) the theory of spontaneous symmetry breaking of infinite dimensional field theory, to mental processes and, in particular, to make the first step towards modeling of interrelation between the physical time (at the level of the emotional order) and psychic time at the levels of the thing and word representations. Finally, we also discuss some related topological aspects of the human unconscious, following Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic ideas. (shrink)