In this classic work of feminist political thought, Iris Marion Young challenges the prevailing reduction of social justice to distributive justice.

For them, citizenship is by definition a matter of treating people as individuals with equal rights under the law. This is what distinguishes democratic citizenship from feudal and other pre-modern views that determined people's political status by ...

In the course of the last 30 years, feminist theories of gender have shifted from quasi-Marxist, labor-centered conceptions to putatively ‘post-Marxist’ culture-and identity-based conceptions. Reflecting a broader political move from redistribution to recognition, this shift has been double edged. On the one hand, it has broadened feminist politics to encompass legitimate issues of representation, identity and difference. Yet, in the context of an ascendant neoliberalism, feminist struggles for recognition may be serving less to enrich struggles for redistribution than to displace (...) the latter. Thus, instead of arriving at a broader, richer paradigm that could encompass both redistribution and recognition, feminists appear to have traded one truncated paradigm for another – a truncated economism for a truncated culturalism. This article aims to resist that trend. I propose an anaysis of gender that is broad enough to house the full range of feminist concerns, those central to the old socialist-feminism as well as those rooted in the cultural turn. I also propose a correspondingly broad conception of justice, capable of encompassing both distribution and recognition, and a non-identitarian account of recognition, capable of synergizing with redistribution. I conclude by examining some practical problems that arise when we try to envision institutional reforms that could redress gender maldistribution and gender misrecognition simultaneously. (shrink)

Im Ausgang von den Differenzierungen, die bereits der junge Hegel an dem Begriff der Anerkennung vorgenommen hat, unternehme ich in diesem Aufsatz den Versuch, die Skizze eines moralphilosophischen Programms in ersten Zügen zu umreißen. Dabei soll in einem ersten, gewissermaßen negativen Schritt der Zusammenhang von Moral und Anerkennung dadurch vorgeführt werden, daß als der Kern moralischer Verletzungen die Erfahrung analysiert wird, in bestimmten Aspekten der eigenen Selbstbeziehung nicht anerkannt oder respektiert zu werden. Im Ausgang von dieser Beobachtung führt dann der (...) Vorschlag, drei Aspekte der individuellen Selbstbeziehung zu unterscheiden, zu einer Typologie von moralischen Verletzungen. Aus diesen Überlegungen gewinne ich die These, daß die Moral den Innenbegriff all der Einstellungen darstellt, die wir wechselseitig einzunehmen verpflichtet sind, um gemeinsam die Bedingungen unserer persönlichen Identität zu sichern. Am Ende führt dieses ethische Verständnis von Moral als differenziertes Verhältnis von Anerkennungsverpflichtungen zu einer Neuinterpretation der moralphilosophischen Tradition, derzufolge in den drei großen Begriffen der Fürsorge, der Gerechtigkeit und der Solidarität jeweils eine der Einstellungen artikuliert worden ist, die den drei Anerkennungsformen entsprechen, mit denen wir zusammengenommen unsere persönliche Integrität als menschliche Wesen schützen. (shrink)

This volume stages a debate between two philosophers, one North American, the other German, who hold different views of the relation of redistribution to ...

I would like to present a two part response to the following question that Seyla Benhabib posed at a conference at Harvard University in 1999: “Is there a Transition from Distribution to Recognition?” The first part proposes that issues of distribution and recognition should be seen as aspects of political struggles, rather than distinct types of struggle, and thus a form of analysis is required that has the capacity to study political struggles under both aspects. The second part suggests that (...) struggles over multicultural and multinational recognition are undergoing an important change in practice which requires a corresponding change in the prevailing forms of analysis. These two recommendations rest on and follow from an underlying orientation. The primary but not exclusive orientation would be practices of freedom rather than theories of justice. The aim of such an aspectival political philosophy and corresponding democratic political practice would not be to discover and constitutionalize thejust and definitive form of recognition and distribution, but to ensure that ineliminable, agonic democratic games over recognition and distribution, with their rival theories of distribution and recognition, can be played freely, with a minimum of domination. (shrink)

Is it possible for the state simultaneously to respect deep cultural differences and to protect the hard-won citizenship rights of vulnerable group members, particularly women? This 2001 book argues that it is not only theoretically needed, but also institutionally feasible. Rejecting prevalent normative and legal solutions to this 'paradox of multicultural vulnerability', Multicultural Jurisdictions develops a powerful argument for enhancement of the jurisdictional autonomy of religious and cultural minorities while at the same time providing viable legal-institutional solutions to the problem (...) of sanctioned intra-group rights violation. This new 'joint governance' approach is guided by an innovative principle that strives for the reduction of injustice between minority groups and the wider society, together with the enhancement of justice within them. This book will interest students of political and social theory, law, religion, institutional design, as well as cultural and gender studies. (shrink)

Rosemary Hennessy, Materialist Feminism and the Politics of DiscourseRichard J. Bernstein, Hannah Arendt and the Jewish QuestionDavid Ames Curtis, The Castoriadis ReaderDavid Ames Curtis, World in Fragments: Writings on Politics, Society, Psychoanalysis and the ImaginationMorris Kaplan, Sexual Justice: Democratic Citizenship and the Politics of Desire.

In Liberalism, Community and Culture, Will Kymlicka suggests that the cultural resources with which communitarians have been concerned, inasmuch as they are prerequisites for the individual choice of the good, are appropriate objects of liberal protection. But Kymlicka's liberalism fails to fully meet the concerns of those who see their communities as intrinsically valuable—not merely as necessary means for the clarification of their options. Ultimately Kymlicka's approach shares in the tendency of liberalism to reduce manifold values to the single standard (...) of equal concern for individuals—which results in a paternalistic disregard for those individuals’ actual motivations. (shrink)