This lecture presents the text of the speech about the genealogy of the modern state delivered by the author at the 2008 British Academy Lecture. It explains that to investigate the genealogy of the state is to discover that there has never been any agreed concept to which the word state has answered. The lecture suggests that any moral or political term that has become so deeply enmeshed in so many ideological disputes over such a long period of time is (...) bound to resist any efforts at definition. (shrink)

Originally published in 1889, Ferdinand Tonnies published versions of two works by Thomas Hobbes. His editions of The Elements of Law: Natural and Politic and of Behemoth: or The Long Parliament were the first modern critical editions, based on manuscripts of works by Hobbes. Completed in 1640, The Elements of Law was Hobbes's first systematic political work. The book helps us see Hobbes's mind at work, for it is the first version of his later political works.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was the first great English philosopher and one of the most important theorists of human nature and politics in the history of Western thought. This superlative introduction explains Hobbes's main doctrines and arguments, covering all of Hobbes's philosophy. A.P.Martinich begins with a helpful overview of Hobbes's life and work, setting his ideas against the political and scientific background seventeenth century England. He then introduces and assesses, in clear chapters, Hobbes's contributions to fundamental areas of philosophy: * Epistemology (...) and metaphysics, in particular Hobbes's materialism and determinism and his relation to Descartes * Ethics and political philosophy, concentrating on Hobbes's most famous work, Leviathan and the theory of the social contract it advances * Philosophy of science, logic and language, considering Hobbes's theory of nominalism and his writing on rhetoric and the uses of language; * Religion, examining Hobbes's analyses ofrevelation, prophets and miracles. The final chapter considers the legacy of Hobbes's thought and his influence on contemporary philosophy. Additional features * Chapter summaries * Annotated further reading. (shrink)

This article answers questions about the consistency, coherence, and motivation of Hobbes's account of the right to punish. First, it develops a novel account of authorization that explains how Hobbes could have consistently held both that the subjects do not give the sovereign the right to punish and also that they authorize the sovereign to punish. Second, it shows that, despite appearances, the natural and artificial elements of Hobbes's account form a coherent whole. Finally, it explains why Hobbes thought it (...) was important to establish the sovereign's right to punish apart from the sovereign's power to punish. (shrink)

Is sovereignty in Hobbes the power of a person or of an office? This article defends the thesis that it is the latter. The interpretation is based on an analysis of Hobbes’s version of the social contract in Leviathan . Pace Quentin Skinner, it will be argued that the person whom Hobbes calls “sovereign” is not a person but the office of government.

Although sovereign jurisdictional authority is not itself a kind of property right for Hobbes, it is the object of the sovereign’s (not the state’s) proprietary rights. Jurisdictional authority for Hobbes is foundationally over persons rather than territory, so that the sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction is parasitic on jurisdiction over persons. Territory nevertheless plays a significant role in determining subjects’ political obligations because the sovereign’s ability to protect subjects is necessary for such obligations, and control over space is necessary to protect subjects. (...) Yet Hobbes shows why the modern ideology of the state does not univocally posit the state as an intrinsically territorial entity. There are two traditions here: The Lockean one that, in grounding jurisdictional authority in private dominion over things, portrays the state as intrinsically territorial, and the Hobbesian one that, in deriving property rights from jurisdictional authority, does not. (shrink)