- There are no phenomenal concepts.Derek Ball - 2009 - Mind 118 (472):935-962.details
|
|
(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2006 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.details
|
|
Individualism and psychology.Tyler Burge - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (January):3-45.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.details
|
|
(1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.details
|
|
(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
|
|
(1 other version)Grasping phenomenal properties.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.details
|
|
(1 other version)Phenomenal concepts and the knowledge argument.David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. MIT Press. pp. 269.details
|
|
Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind.Michael Tye - 1995 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.John Perry - 2001 - MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2008 - MIT Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Consciousness, color, and content.Michael Tye - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233-235.details
|
|
Phenomenal and perceptual concepts.David Papineau - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 111--144.details
|
|
Mental pointing: Phenomenal knowledge without concepts.Jesse Prinz - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):184-211.details
|
|
Property dualism, phenomenal concepts, and the semantic premise.Stephen L. White - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. New York, US: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-248.details
|
|
(1 other version)Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.John Perry - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):616-618.details
|
|
The phenomenal concept strategy.Peter Carruthers & Benedicte Veillet - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (9-10):212-236.details
|
|
Consciousness, colour, and content. Michael Tye.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):869-874.details
|
|