This paper is the first in a series of three related papers on modal methods in interpretability logics and applications. In this first paper the fundaments are laid for later results. These fundaments consist of a thorough treatment of a construction method to obtain modal models. This construction method is used to reprove some known results in the area of interpretability like the modal completeness of the logic IL. Next, the method is applied to obtain new results: the modal completeness (...) of the logic ILMo, and modal completeness of ILW*. (shrink)

We show that a consistent, finitely axiomatized, sequential theory cannot prove its own inconsistency on every definable cut. A corollary is that there are at least three degrees of global interpretability of theories equivalent modulo local interpretability to a consistent, finitely axiomatized, sequential theory U.

If □ is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where □ is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates of (...) sentences has not been developed very far. By introducing possible-worlds semantics for the language of arithmetic plus the unary predicate □, we tackle both problems. Given a frame (W, R) consisting of a set W of worlds and a binary relation R on W, we investigate whether we can interpret □ at every world in such a way that □ $\ulcorner A \ulcorner$ holds at a world ᵆ ∊ W if and only if A holds at every world $\upsilon$ ∊ W such that ᵆR $\upsilon$ . The arithmetical vocabulary is interpreted by the standard model at every world. Several 'paradoxes' (like Montague's Theorem, Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, McGee's Theorem on the ω-inconsistency of certain truth theories, etc.) show that many frames, e.g., reflexive frames, do not allow for such an interpretation. We present sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a suitable interpretation of □ at any world. Sound and complete semi-formal systems, corresponding to the modal systems K and K4, for the class of all possible-worlds models for predicates and all transitive possible-worlds models are presented. We apply our account also to nonstandard models of arithmetic and other languages than the language of arithmetic. (shrink)

In this paper we study local induction w.r.t. Σ1‐formulas over the weak arithmetic. The local induction scheme, which was introduced in, says roughly this: for any virtual class that is progressive, i.e., is closed under zero and successor, and for any non‐empty virtual class that is definable by a Σ1‐formula without parameters, the intersection of and is non‐empty. In other words, we have, for all Σ1‐sentences S, that S implies, whenever is progressive. Since, in the weak context, we have (at (...) least) two definitions of Σ1, we obtain two minimal theories of local induction w.r.t. Σ1‐formulas, which we call Peano Corto and Peano Basso.In the paper we give careful definitions of Peano Corto and Peano Basso. We establish their naturalness both by giving a model theoretic characterization and by providing an equivalent formulation in terms of a sentential reflection scheme.The theories Peano Corto and Peano Basso occupy a salient place among the sequential theories on the boundary between weak and strong theories. They bring together a powerful collection of principles that is locally interpretable in. Moreover, they have an important role as examples of various phenomena in the metamathematics of arithmetical (and, more generally, sequential) theories. We illustrate this by studying their behavior w.r.t. interpretability, model interpretability and local interpretability. In many ways the theories are more like Peano arithmetic or Zermelo Fraenkel set theory, than like finitely axiomatized theories as Elementary Arithmetic, and. On the one hand, Peano Corto and Peano Basso are very weak: they are locally cut‐interpretable in. On the other hand, they behave as if they were strong: they are not contained in any consistent finitely axiomatized arithmetical theory, however strong. Moreover, they extend, the theory of parameter‐free Π1‐induction. (shrink)

People have always been interested in numbers, in particular the natural numbers. Of course, we all have an intuitive notion of what these numbers are. In the late 19th century mathematicians, such as Grassmann, Frege and Dedekind, gave definitions for these familiar objects. Since then the development of axiomatic schemes for arithmetic have played a fundamental role in a logical understanding of mathematics. There has been a need for some time for a monograph on the metamathematics of first-order arithmetic. The (...) aim of the book by Hajek and Pudlak is to cover some of the most important results in the study of a first order theory of the natural numbers, called Peano arithmetic and its fragments (subtheories). The field is quite active, but only a small part of the results has been covered in monographs. This book is divided into three parts. In Part A, the authors develop parts of mathematics and logic in various fragments. Part B is devoted to incompleteness. Part C studies systems that have the induction schema restricted to bounded formulas (Bounded Arithmetic). One highlight of this section is the relation of provability to computational complexity. The study of formal systems for arithmetic is a prerequisite for understanding results such as Gödel's theorems. This book is intended for those who want to learn more about such systems and who want to follow current research in the field. The book contains a bibliography of approximately 1000 items. (shrink)

The difficulties with formalizing the intensional notions necessity, knowability and omniscience, and rational belief are well-known. If these notions are formalized as predicates applying to (codes of) sentences, then from apparently weak and uncontroversial logical principles governing these notions, outright contradictions can be derived. Tense logic is one of the best understood and most extensively developed branches of intensional logic. In tense logic, the temporal notions future and past are formalized as sentential operators rather than as predicates. The question therefore (...) arises whether the notions that are investigated in tense logic can be consistently formalized as predicates. In this paper it is shown that the answer to this question is negative. The logical treatment of the notions of future and past as predicates gives rise to paradoxes due the specific interplay between both notions. For this reason, the tense paradoxes that will be presented are not identical to the paradoxes referred to above. (shrink)

We study the arithmetical schema asserting that every eventually decreasing elementary recursive function has a limit. Some other related principles are also formulated. We establish their relationship with restricted parameter-free induction schemata. We also prove that the same principle, formulated as an inference rule, provides an axiomatization of the Σ2-consequences of IΣ1.Using these results we show that ILM is the logic of Π1-conservativity of any reasonable extension of parameter-free Π1-induction schema. This result, however, cannot be much improved: by adapting a (...) theorem of D. Zambella and G. Mints we show that the logic of Π1-conservativity of primitive recursive arithmetic properly extends ILM.In the third part of the paper we give an ordinal classification of -consequences of the standard fragments of Peano arithmetic in terms of reflection principles. This is interesting in view of the general program of ordinal analysis of theories, which in the most standard cases classifies Π-classes of sentences. (shrink)

The fact that “natural” theories, i.e. theories which have something like an “idea” to them, are almost always linearly ordered with regard to logical strength has been called one of the great mysteries of the foundation of mathematics. However, one easily establishes the existence of theories with incomparable logical strengths using self-reference . As a result, PA+Con is not the least theory whose strength is greater than that of PA. But still we can ask: is there a sense in which (...) PA+Con is the least “natural” theory whose strength is greater than that of PA? In this paper we exhibit natural theories in strength strictly between PA and PA+Con by introducing a notion of slow consistency. (shrink)

In this paper we show how to interpret Robinson’s arithmetic Q and the theory R of Tarski, Mostowski, and Robinson as theories of cardinals in very weak theories of relations over a domain.

This paper is a presentation of astatus quæstionis, to wit of the problemof the interpretability logic of all reasonablearithmetical theories.We present both the arithmetical side and themodal side of the question.Dedicated to Dick de Jongh on the occasion of his 60th birthday.

We show that the modal prepositional logicILM (interpretability logic with Montagna's principle), which has been shown sound and complete as the interpretability logic of Peano arithmetic PA (by Berarducci and Savrukov), is sound and complete as the logic ofπ 1-conservativity over eachbE 1-sound axiomatized theory containingI⌆ 1 (PA with induction restricted tobE 1-formulas). Furthermore, we extend this result to a systemILMR obtained fromILM by adding witness comparisons in the style of Guaspari's and Solovay's logicR (this will be done in a (...) separate continuation of the present paper). (shrink)

This paper is devoted to the algebraization of an arithmetical predicate introduced by S. Feferman. To this purpose we investigate the equational class of Boolean algebras enriched with an operation (g=rtail), which translates such predicate, and an operation τ, which translates the usual predicate Theor. We deduce from the identities of this equational class some properties of (g=rtail) and some ties between (g=rtail) and τ; among these properties, let us point out a fixed-point theorem for a sufficiently large class of (...) (g=rtail)-τ polynomials. The last part of this paper concerns the duality theory for (g=rtail)-τ algebras. (shrink)

We suggest an algebraic approach to proof-theoretic analysis based on the notion of graded provability algebra, that is, Lindenbaum boolean algebra of a theory enriched by additional operators which allow for the structure to capture proof-theoretic information. We use this method to analyze Peano arithmetic and show how an ordinal notation system up to 0 can be recovered from the corresponding algebra in a canonical way. This method also establishes links between proof-theoretic ordinal analysis and the work which has been (...) done in the last two decades on provability logic and reflection principles. Because of its abstract algebraic nature, we hope that it will also be of interest for non-prooftheorists. (shrink)

PA is Peano arithmetic. The formula $\operatorname{Interp}_\mathrm{PA}(\alpha, \beta)$ is a formalization of the assertion that the theory PA + α interprets the theory PA + β (the variables α and β are intended to range over codes of sentences of PA). We extend Solovay's modal analysis of the formalized provability predicate of PA, Pr PA (x), to the case of the formalized interpretability relation $\operatorname{Interp}_\mathrm{PA}(x, y)$ . The relevant modal logic, in addition to the usual provability operator `□', has a (...) binary operator ` $\triangleright$ ' to be interpreted as the formalized interpretability relation. We give an axiomatization and a decision procedure for the class of those modal formulas that express valid interpretability principles (for every assignment of the atomic modal formulas to sentences of PA). Our results continue to hold if we replace the base theory PA with Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, but not with Gödel-Bernays set theory. This sensitivity to the base theory shows that the language is quite expressive. Our proof uses in an essential way earlier work done by A. Visser, D. de Jongh, and F. Veltman on this problem. (shrink)

Extending previous results from work on the complexity of cut elimination for the sequent calculus LK, we discuss the role of quantifier alternations and develop a measure to describe the complexity of cut elimination in terms of quantifier alternations in cut formulas and contractions on such formulas.

It is shown that the propositional modal logic IRM (interpretability logic with Montagna's principle and with witness comparisons in the style of Guaspari's and Solovay's logicR) is sound and complete as the logic ofII 1-conservativity over each∑ 1-sound axiomatized theory containingI∑ 1. The exact statement of the result uses the notion of standard proof predicate. This paper is an immediate continuation of our paper [HM]. Knowledge of [HM] is presupposed. We define a modal logic, called IRM, which includes both ILM (...) andR (the logic of [GS]) and prove an arithmetical completeness theorem in the style of [GS], thus showing that IRM is the logic ofII 1-conservativity with witness comparisons. The reader is recommended to have Smoryński's book [Sm] at his/her disposal. (shrink)

Hájek and Montagna proved that the modal propositional logic ILM is the logic of -conservativity over sound theories containing I (PA with induction restricted to formulas). I give a simpler proof of the same fact.