In his new book the eminent Kant scholar Henry Allison provides an innovative and comprehensive interpretation of Kant's concept of freedom. The author analyzes the concept and discusses the role it plays in Kant's moral philosophy and psychology. He also considers in full detail the critical literature on the subject from Kant's own time to the present day. In the first part Professor Allison argues that at the centre of the Critique of Pure Reason there is the foundation for a (...) coherent general theory of rational agency. The second part employs this account of rational agency as a key to understanding Kant's concept of moral agency and associated moral psychology. The third part focuses on Kant's attempt to ground both moral law and freedom in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason. This is a major contribution to the interpretation of Kant which will be of special interest to scholars and graduate students of Kant's moral theory. (shrink)

It is commonly held that Kant ventured to derive morality from freedom in Groundwork III. It is also believed that he reversed this strategy in the second Critique, attempting to derive freedom from morality instead. In this paper, I set out to challenge these familiar assumptions: Kant’s argument in Groundwork III rests on a moral conception of the intelligible world, one that plays a similar role as the ‘fact of reason’ in the second Critique. Accordingly, I argue, there is no (...) reversal in the proof-structure of Kant’s two works. (shrink)

This is the first book in English to elucidate the central issues in the work of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a figure crucial to the movement of philosophy from Kant to German idealism. The book explains Fichte's notion of subjectivity and how his particular view developed out of Kant's accounts of theoretical and practical reason. Fichte argued that the subject has a self-positing structure which distinguishes it from a thing or an object. Thus, the subject must be understood as an activity (...) rather than a thing and is self-constituting in a way that an object is not. In the final chapter, Professor Neuhouser considers how this doctrine of the self-positing subject enables us to understand the possibility of the self's autonomy, or self-determination. (shrink)

Daniel Breazeale presents a critical study of the early philosophy of J. G. Fichte, and the version of the Wissenschaftslehre that Fichte developed between 1794 and 1799. He examines what Fichte was trying to accomplish and how he proposed to do so, and explores the difficulties implicit in his project and his strategies for overcoming them.

This book explores the main stages and key concepts in the development of Kant's critical philosophy, from the early 1760s to the 1790s. Karl Ameriks provides a detailed and concise account of the main ways in which the later critical works provide a plausible defense of the conception of humanity's fundamental end that Kant turned to after reading Rousseau in the 1760s. Separate essays are devoted to each of the three Critiques, as well as to earlier notes and lectures and (...) several of Kant's later writings on history and religion. A final section devotes three chapters to post-Kantian developments in German Romanticism, accounts of tragedy up through Nietzsche, and contemporary philosophy. The theme of an elliptical path is shown to be relevant to these writers as well as to many aspects of Kant's own life and work. The topics of the book include fundamental issues in epistemology and metaphysics, with a new defense of the Amerik's 'moderate' interpretation of transcendental idealism. (shrink)

In this work, the first overview of the German Idealism that is both conceptual and methodological, Paul W. Franks offers a philosophical reconstruction that is...

The Fate of Reason is the first general history devoted to the period between Kant and Fichte, one of the most revolutionary and fertile in modern philosophy.

The Fate of Reason is the first general history devoted to the period between Kant and Fichte, one of the most revolutionary and fertile in modern philosophy. The philosophers of this time broke with the two central tenets of the modem Cartesian tradition: the authority of reason and the primacy of epistemology. They also witnessed the decline of the Aufkldrung, the completion of Kant's philosophy, and the beginnings of post-Kantian idealism. Thanks to Beiser we can newly appreciate the influence of (...) Kant's critics on the development of his philosophy. Beiser brings the controversies, and the personalities who engaged in them, to life and tells a story that has uncanny parallels with the debates of the present. (shrink)

This book argues that the development of German philosophy from Kant, through post-Kantian German Idealism, to the thought of Franz Rosenzweig, was largely driven by the perceived promise of Kant's philosophy for solving the conflict of reason, but also by its perceived shortcomings in solving this conflict.

While Kant’s claim that the moral law discloses our freedom to us has been extensively discussed in recent decades, the reactions to this claim among Kant’s immediate successors have gone largely overlooked by scholars. Reinhold, Creuzer, and Maimon were among three prominent thinkers of the era unwilling to follow Kant in making the moral law the condition for knowing our freedom. Maimon went so far as to reject Kant’s method of appealing to our everyday awareness of duty on the grounds (...) that common human understanding is susceptible to error and illusion. In this paper I shall examine how these skeptical reactions to Kant’s position shaped the background for Fichte’s method of moral justification, leading up to his own deduction of the moral law in the System of Ethics. By way of conclusion, I shall propose a new interpretation of how consciousness of the moral law serves as an entry-point to Fichte’s form of idealism. (shrink)

Salomon Maimon argued forcefully for the indispensability of what he called “the method of fictions” in mathematics and physics, but also in philosophy. This last claim provoked critical responses from G. E. Brastberger, G. E. Schultze, and K. L. Reinhold. This paper offers a brief exposition of Maimon's “method of fictions” and an analysis of his response to critics of his claims concerning the employment of this method within philosophy.

Reinholds Briefe uber die Kantische Philosophie gehoren zu den wirkungsmachtigsten Produkten seines umfangreichen Schaffens. Von den Zeitgenossen teils mit grosser Begeisterung aufgenommen, tragen sie wesentlich zur Etablierung der ersten Kant-Bewegung bei. Durch ihr Bestreben, die Vernunftkritik als Theorie der moralisch-religiosen Erneuerung zu prasentieren, gelten sie als die brisanteste unter den damaligen philosophischen Neuerscheinungen. Sie sind wegweisend fur einen Kantianismus, der sich im Laufe der 1790er Jahre als eine die politischen Umwalzungen in Frankreich flankierende Geistesrevolution begreift. Der neu herausgegebene Band enthalt (...) zwolf Briefe, welche die auffallendsten Resultate von Kants Vernunftkritik ausgehend von den dringendsten wissenschaftlichen und moralischen Bedurfnissen unserer Zeit darstellen. Der Adressat erfahrt, dass mit Kants Erkenntniskritik und moralischer Neubegrundung der speziellen Metaphysik ein taugliches Mittel zur Bewaltigung gegenwartiger Grundlagenkrisen im Gebiete von Moral, Naturrecht, Theologie und Asthetik bereitsteht. Mit Nachdruck wird das problemlosende Potential von Kants moraltheologischen Resultaten hervorgehoben. In Kants Vernunftglauben und Statuierung eines moralischen Erkenntnisgrundes fur das Dasein Gottes und die Unsterblichkeit der Seele sieht Reinhold die besten Voraussetzungen fur die Beendigung einer Reihe aufklarungshemmender Debatten. Im Visier steht allem voran der als Pantheismusstreit beruhmt gewordene Disput zwischen Mendelssohn und Jacobi, in dessen Einflussbereich ein wenig ergiebiger Kampf zwischen Naturalisten und Supernaturalisten dominant werden sollte. Die Darstellung geschichtlicher Kontexte zur Idee der Unsterblichkeit der Seele und die eingehende Auseinandersetzung mit den antiken Seelenlehren kulminieren in der These, durch Kants Kritik und Neufundierung der rationalen Psychologie konne auch der bisherige, Antike und Neuzeit durchziehende Gegensatz zwischen Spiritualisten und Materialisten als aufgelost gelten. Wiederholt wird zu Reflexionen uber die Geschichte der Menschheit angesetzt, die deutlich machen, dass Reinhold das Geschichtsbild der Illuminaten mehr und mehr in Anlehnung an Lessings Idee einer kommenden Menschheitsepoche des dritten Evangeliums sowie an Kants Vision eines weltburgerlichen Endzustandes vortragt. Die Neuedition ist mit einer ausfuhrlichen Einleitung und einem Kommentar versehen. In diesen Teilen wird unter anderem auf die Entstehungsgeschichte der Briefe, auf Reinholds Kant-Rezeption sowie auf sein Kant-Verstandnis, das mit der damals gangigen Ansicht uber den Alleszermalmer kontrastiert, eingegangen. Vermerkt werden zudem inhaltlich relevante Abweichungen von fruheren Fassungen der in den Band von 1790 eingeflossenen Textteile. (shrink)

This paper examines Fichte's conception of the freedom of choice in Das System der Sittenlehre of 1798 as a solution to the dilemma posed by determinism and indeterminism. It show that Fichte does not simply affirm an indifferent power of voluntary choice, but demonstrates how such a power might co-exist with the measure of regularity and lawfulness we normally admit of human choices. Particular choices do not occur at random, but are based on general reasons. These reasons are in turn (...) based on the extent to which we have freely reflected on our original drive. Thus our choices can be comprehended and predicted from the point of reflection from which we choose. This does not lead to the denial of the freedom of choice, but only to rethinking it in terms of the freedom of reflection: Though we cannot choose other than what we choose from the point of reflection we occupy, we can choose other than what we choose by raising or lowering ourselves through reflection to a higher or lower point of reflection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.1 (2001) 101-134 [Access article in PDF] Getting Maimon's Goad:Discursivity, Skepticism, and Fichte's Idealism Peter Thielke The image of J. G. Fichte has of late displayed a rather substantial, and even remarkable, transformation. Where before Fichte was viewed—and most often dismissed—as advancing an unpalatable type of metaphysical idealism, in recent years several new perspectives on Fichte have emerged, each claiming to improve on (...) the old, standard picture. 1 The transformation of Fichte's image has been accompanied—or, more precisely, has been made possible—by a renewed interest in the relatively forgotten figures in the interregnum between Kant and Hegel. Fichte's thought is now understood in the context not only of Kant's transcendental idealism, but of, among others, Reinhold's Elementarphilosophie, Aenesidemus-Schulze's skepticism, Jacobi's intuitionism, and Beck's Standpunktslehre. By casting Fichte in this light, a more nuanced understanding of his project has been developed, one that does not simply follow the [End Page 101] traditional view of the Wissenschaftslehre as a full-blown metaphysical idealism in which the world of objects is understood as the product of an Absolute I.But while this 'contextual' approach has led to a renewed appreciation of the Wissenschaftslehre, I will suggest that the new focus on Fichte's historical milieu is incomplete. A lacuna in the current understanding of Fichte can be traced to a neglect of Salomon Maimon, an idiosyncratic and rather obscure critic of Kant. In this paper, I will argue that taking Maimon's skepticism into account when interpreting Fichte's idealism requires a rethinking of Fichte's project. In particular, in order to respond to Maimon's skepticism—an avowed project of the Wissenschaftslehre—Fichte's position must advance an idealist metaphysics, one in which the content of cognition is taken to be constituted by an act of the absolute I. This claim, of course, might seem rash, since it threatens to saddle Fichte with a gratuitous form of absolute idealism. It thus seems to run counter to recent attempts to make Fichte into a figure appealing to modern eyes. Such a concern, however, is I think misplaced. Instead, I will argue that Fichte's idealism, although perhaps ultimately unsuccessful, nevertheless should be of great interest precisely because it stands as an important attempt to provide an answer to a question—the nature of 'givenness'—that remains central to epistemology. 2The paper is divided into five parts. The first presents the historical evidence for Maimon's influence on Fichte. Part 2 offers a discussion of what I call 'Maimon's challenge' to the Kantian notion of 'discursive' cognition, as well as the ways in which this served as a goad to the development of the Wissenschaftslehre. In Part 3 I turn to a close reading of §1 of the Grundlage of 1794, where I try to show how a recognition of Maimon's challenge can help make sense of the foundations of the Wissenschaftslehre's project, and in particular the 'category of reality,' an otherwise highly obscure step in Fichte's argument. Part 4 offers a short discussion of the ways in which a Maimonian-minded account of §1 contributes to the understanding of the Grundlage as a whole. Finally, I conclude in Part 5 with some brief remarks about the broader philosophical implications of Fichte's response to Maimon's challenge: Fichte, I will argue, offers the first (but not the last) attempt at answering a type of Maimonian skepticism that remains viable even today. [End Page 102] 1. The Skeptical Goad Salomon Maimon, perhaps more than any other figure in German philosophy, embodied the Enlightenment notion of a Selbstdenker. He was born in Lithuania in 1753, to a rural Jewish family. 3 After marrying at eleven and becoming a father at fourteen, in his early twenties he fled from his family, after which he wandered the German countryside, until he was finally was able to establish himself in Berlin in 1779. Here he was taken in by Moses... (shrink)