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Anthropic Concepts

Noûs 54 (2):451-468 (2020)

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  1. The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception.Marc H. Bornstein - 1980 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 39 (2):203-206.
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  • What is Water?Paul Needham - 2000 - Analysis 60 (1):13-21.
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  • Indigenous and Scientific Kinds.David Ludwig - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (1).
    The aim of this article is to discuss the relation between indigenous and scientific kinds on the basis of contemporary ethnobiological research. I argue that ethnobiological accounts of taxonomic convergence-divergence patters challenge common philosophical models of the relation between folk concepts and natural kinds. Furthermore, I outline a positive model of taxonomic convergence-divergence patterns that is based on Slater's [2014] notion of “stable property clusters” and Franklin-Hall's [2014] discussion of natural kinds as “categorical bottlenecks.” Finally, I argue that this model (...)
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  • The Meaninglessness of Gardens.G. R. F. Ferrari - 2010 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 68 (1):33-45.
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  • Promiscuous Realism: Reply to Wilson.John Dupré - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (3):441-444.
    This paper presents a brief response to Robert A. Wilson's critical discussion of Promiscuous Realism [1996]. I argue that, although convergence on a unique conception of species cannot be ruled out, the evidence against such an outcome is stronger than Wilson allows. In addition, given the failure of biological science to come up with a unique and privileged set of biological kinds, the relevance of the various overlapping kinds of ordinary language to the metaphysics of biological kinds is greater than (...)
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  • Homeostasis, species, and higher taxa.Richard Boyd - 1999 - In Robert Andrew Wilson (ed.), Species: New Interdisciplinary Essays. MIT Press. pp. 141-85.
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  • Intention, history, and artifact concepts.Paul Bloom - 1996 - Cognition 60 (1):1-29.
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  • Water is not H2O.Michael Weisberg - manuscript
    In defending semantic externalism, philosophers of language have often assumed that there is a straightforward connection between scientific kinds and the natural kinds recognized by ordinary language users.1 For example, the claim that water is H2O assumes that the ordinary language kind water corresponds to a chemical kind, which contains all the molecules with molecular formula H2O as its members. This assumption about the coordination between ordinary language kinds and scientific kinds is important for the externalist program, because it is (...)
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  • Species pluralism and anti-realism.Marc Ereshefsky - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (1):103-120.
    Species pluralism gives us reason to doubt the existence of the species category. The problem is not that species concepts are chosen according to our interests or that pluralism and the desire for hierarchical classifications are incompatible. The problem is that the various taxa we call 'species' lack a common unifying feature.
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  • The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition.James J. Gibson - 1979 - Houghton Mifflin.
    This is a book about how we see: the environment around us (its surfaces, their layout, and their colors and textures); where we are in the environment; whether or not we are moving and, if we are, where we are going; what things are good for; how to do things (to thread a needle or drive an automobile); or why things look as they do.The basic assumption is that vision depends on the eye which is connected to the brain. The (...)
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  • An outline of a theory of affordances.Anthony Chemero - 2003 - Ecological Psychology 15 (2):181-195.
    The primary difference between direct and inferential theories of perception concerns the location of perceptual content, the meaning of our perceptions. In inferential theories of perception, these meanings arise inside animals, based upon their interactions with the physical environment. Light, for example, bumps into receptors causing a sensation. The animal (or its brain) performs inferences on the sensation, yielding a meaningful perception. In direct theories of perception, on the other hand, meaning is in the environment, and perception does not depend (...)
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  • Affordances explained.Andrea Scarantino - 2003 - Philosophy of Science 70 (5):949-961.
    I examine the central theoretical construct of ecological psychology, the concept of an affordance. In the first part of the paper, I illustrate the role affordances play in Gibson's theory of perception. In the second part, I argue that affordances are to be understood as dispositional properties, and explain what I take to be their characteristic background circumstances, triggering circumstances and manifestations. The main purpose of my analysis is to give affordances a theoretical identity enriched by Gibson's visionary insight, but (...)
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  • The Essential Child:Origins of Essentialism in Everyday Thought: Origins of Essentialism in Everyday Thought.Susan A. Gelman - 2003 - Oxford Series in Cognitive Development.
    Essentialism is the idea that certain categories, such as "dog," "man," or "intelligence," have an underlying reality or true nature that gives objects their identity. Where does this idea come from? In this book, Susan Gelman argues that essentialism is an early cognitive bias. Young children's concepts reflect a deep commitment to essentialism, and this commitment leads children to look beyond the obvious in many converging ways: when learning words, generalizing knowledge to new category members, reasoning about the insides of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Joseph LaPorte, Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, USD 84.00, ISBN 0521825997 (cloth), x + 221 pp. [REVIEW]R. W. Fischer - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (3):415-419.
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  • Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change.Joseph LaPorte - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    According to the received tradition, the language used to to refer to natural kinds in scientific discourse remains stable even as theories about these kinds are refined. In this illuminating book, Joseph LaPorte argues that scientists do not discover that sentences about natural kinds, like 'Whales are mammals, not fish', are true rather than false. Instead, scientists find that these sentences were vague in the language of earlier speakers and they refine the meanings of the relevant natural-kind terms to make (...)
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  • Discussion. Water=H2O.B. Abbott - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):145-148.
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  • (1 other version)Historical kinds and the "special sciences".Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.
    There are no "special sciences" in Fodor's sense. There is a large group of sciences, "historical sciences," that differ fundamentally from the physical sciences because they quantify over a different kind of natural or real kind, nor are the generalizations supported by these kinds exceptionless. Heterogeneity, however, is not characteristic of these kinds. That there could be an univocal empirical science that ranged over multiple realizations of a functional property is quite problematic. If psychological predicates name multiply realized functionalist properties, (...)
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  • Folk biology and the anthropology of science: Cognitive universals and cultural particulars.Scott Atran - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (4):547-569.
    This essay in the "anthropology of science" is about how cognition constrains culture in producing science. The example is folk biology, whose cultural recurrence issues from the very same domain-specific cognitive universals that provide the historical backbone of systematic biology. Humans everywhere think about plants and animals in highly structured ways. People have similar folk-biological taxonomies composed of essence-based species-like groups and the ranking of species into lower- and higher-order groups. Such taxonomies are not as arbitrary in structure and content, (...)
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  • Pluralism on Artefact Categories: A Philosophical Defence.Wybo Houkes & Pieter E. Vermaas - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):543-557.
    In this paper we use our work in the philosophy of technology to formulate a pluralist view on artefact categories and categorisation principles, as studied in cognitive science. We argue, on the basis of classifications derived by philosophical reconstruction, that artefacts can be clustered in more than one way, and that each clustering may be taken as defining psychological artefact categories. We contrast this pluralism with essentialism and super-minimalism on artefact categories and we argue that pluralism is coherent with experimental (...)
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  • Natural Kinds and Conceptual Change.Joseph Laporte - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (221):672-674.
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  • (1 other version)Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences‘.Millikan Ruth Garrett - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):45-65.
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  • Water is not H 2 O.B. C. Malt - 1994 - Cognitive Psychology 27:41--70.
    What makes a liquid water? A strong version of ``psychological essentialis'' predicts that people use the presence or absence of H2O as the primary determinant of what liquids they call ``water.'' To test this prediction, subjects were asked to judge the amount of H2O in liquids called ``water'' and liquids not called ``water.'' Neither their beliefs about the simple presence/absence of H2O nor about the proportion of H2O in the liquids accounted well for which ones are normally called "water." Typicality (...)
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  • Water =h 2 O.Barbara Abbott - 1999 - Mind 108 (429):145 - 148.
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  • Core knowledge and its limits: The domain of food.Kristin Shutts, Kirsten F. Condry, Laurie R. Santos & Elizabeth S. Spelke - 2009 - Cognition 112 (1):120-140.
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  • Time to get a new mountain? The role of function in children's conceptions of natural kinds.Cara DiYanni & Deborah Kelemen - 2005 - Cognition 97 (3):327-335.
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