- (4 other versions)Précis of doing without concepts.Edouard Machery - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):602-611.details
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Against Arguments From Diagnostic Reasoning.Jeske Toorman - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (11):e13376.details
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How do people use and appraise concepts?James A. Hampton (ed.) - forthcoming - Switzerland: Springer Nature.details
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Attention as a patchwork concept.Henry Taylor - 2023 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 13 (3):1-25.details
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Psychological Essentialism and the Structure of Concepts.Eleonore Neufeld - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (5):e12823.details
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Chomskyan Arguments Against Truth-Conditional Semantics Based on Variability and Co-predication.Agustín Vicente - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):919-940.details
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Teleological Essentialism.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2019 - Cognitive Science 43 (4):e12725.details
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(1 other version)Water is and is not H 2 O.Kevin P. Tobia, George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (2):183-208.details
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What are natural concepts? A design perspective.Igor Douven & Peter Gärdenfors - 2019 - Mind and Language (3):313-334.details
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Ontology and geographic objects: An empirical study of cognitive categorization.David M. Mark, Barry Smith & Barbara Tversky - 1999 - In Freksa C. & Mark David M. (eds.), Spatial Information Theory. Cognitive and Computational Foundations of Geographic Information Science (Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1661). pp. 283-298.details
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The Big Concepts Paper: A Defence of Hybridism.Agustín Vicente & Fernando Martínez Manrique - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):59-88.details
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On deriving essentialism from the theory of reference.Jussi Haukioja - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2141-2151.details
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Are Automatic Conceptual Cores the Gold Standard of Semantic Processing? The Context‐Dependence of Spatial Meaning in Grounded Congruency Effects.Lauren A. M. Lebois, Christine D. Wilson-Mendenhall & Lawrence W. Barsalou - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (8):1764-1801.details
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Essentialism, word use, and concepts.Nick Braisby, Bradley Franks & James Hampton - 1996 - Cognition 59 (3):247-274.details
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Artifact Categorization and the Modal Theory of Artifact Function.Bence Nanay - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):515-526.details
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Essence and natural kinds: When science meets preschooler intuition.Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:108-66.details
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Mental Representation and Closely Conflated Topics.Angela Mendelovici - 2010 - Dissertation, Princeton Universitydetails
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Chemical substances and the limits of pluralism.Robin Findlay Hendry - 2011 - Foundations of Chemistry 14 (1):55-68.details
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Splitting concepts.Gualtiero Piccinini & Sam Scott - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (4):390-409.details
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Natural kind terms: A neo-Lockean theory.A. D. Smith - 2005 - European Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):70–88.details
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Innate cognitive capacities.Muhammad ali KhAlidi - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):92-115.details
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How to acquire a concept.Eric Margolis - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (3):347-369.details
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On the inventors of XYZ.Jaap van Brakel - 2004 - Foundations of Chemistry 7 (1):57-84.details
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Under Pressure from the Empirical Data: Does Externalism Rest on a Mistaken Psychological Theory?Bryan Temples Miller - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)Water is and is not H 2 O.Kevin P. Tobia, George E. Newman & Joshua Knobe - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (2):183-208.details
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(1 other version)On the functional orgins of essentialism.H. Clark Barrett - 2001 - Mind and Society 2 (1):1-30.details
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Why are different features central for natural kinds and artifacts?: the role of causal status in determining feature centrality.Woo-Kyoung Ahn - 1998 - Cognition 69 (2):135-178.details
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Précis of how children learn the meanings of words.Paul Bloom - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (6):1095-1103.details
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Perceptions of perceptual symbols.Lawrence Barsalou - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):637-660.details
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Essentialism as a generative theory of classification.Bob Rehder - 2007 - In Alison Gopnik & Laura Schulz (eds.), Causal learning: psychology, philosophy, and computation. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 190--207.details
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Causal‐Based Property Generalization.Bob Rehder - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (3):301-344.details
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Content Externalism and Quine’s Criterion are Incompatible.T. Parent - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (3):625-639.details
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(1 other version)Mental Concepts as Natural Kind Concepts.Diana I. Pérez - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (sup1):201-225.details
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Similarity-based categorization and fuzziness of natural categories.James A. Hampton - 1998 - Cognition 65 (2-3):137-165.details
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Why essences are essential in the psychology of concepts.Woo-Kyoung Ahn, Charles Kalish, Susan A. Gelman, Douglas L. Medin, Christian Luhmann, Scott Atran, John D. Coley & Patrick Shafto - 2001 - Cognition 82 (1):59-69.details
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Feature Centrality and Conceptual Coherence.Steven A. Sloman, Bradley C. Love & Woo-Kyoung Ahn - 1998 - Cognitive Science 22 (2):189-228.details
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The Essentialist Aspect of Naive Theories.Michael Strevens - 2000 - Cognition 74 (149):175.details
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Intention, history, and artifact concepts.Paul Bloom - 1996 - Cognition 60 (1):1-29.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Why We Should Do Without Concepts.Barbara C. Malt - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (5):622-633.details
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(1 other version)On the functional origins of essentialism.H. Clark Barrett - 2001 - [Journal (Paginated)] (in Press) 2 (1):1-30.details
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Concepts as Pluralistic Hybrids.Collin Rice - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):597-619.details
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Early noun vocabularies: do ontology, category structure and syntax correspond?Larissa K. Samuelson & Linda B. Smith - 1999 - Cognition 73 (1):1-33.details
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Artifacts and Essentialism.Susan A. Gelman - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):449-463.details
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Anthropic Concepts.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):451-468.details
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Do we need two notions of natural kind to account for the history of “jade”?Françoise Longy - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1459-1486.details
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Only causation matters: reply to Ahn et al.Michael Strevens - 2001 - Cognition 82 (1):71-76.details
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Reasons to doubt the present evidence for metaphoric representation.G. Murphy - 1997 - Cognition 62 (1):99-108.details
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Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out?Guido Löhr - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (2):161-185.details
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Differences in preschoolers’ and adults’ use of generics about novel animals and artifacts: A window onto a conceptual divide.Amanda C. Brandone & Susan A. Gelman - 2009 - Cognition 110 (1):1-22.details
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