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The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.details
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Mechanisms and Consciousness: Integrating Phenomenology with Cognitive Science.Marek Pokropski - 2021 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Is Husserl guilty of Sellars’ myth of the sensory given.Heath Williams - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6371-6389.details
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Husserl on Personal Level Explanation.Heath Williams - 2020 - Human Studies 43 (1):1-22.details
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Embodied cognition and mindreading.Shannon Spaulding - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (1):119-140.details
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I.Wilfrid Sellars - 1981 - The Monist 64 (1):3-36.details
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I.Wilfrid Sellars - 1981 - The Monist 64 (1):3-36.details
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Foundations for a metaphysics of pure process: The Carus lectures of Wilfrid Sellars.Wilfrid Sellars - 1981 - The Monist 64 (1):3-90.details
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The 'theory theory' of mind and the aims of Sellars' original myth of Jones.James R. O’Shea - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):175-204.details
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An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.details
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Personal and sub‐personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinction.Jennifer Hornsby - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):6-24.details
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Folk psychological and phenomenological accounts of social perception.Mitchell Herschbach - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (3):223 – 235.details
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You can fool some of the people all of the time, everything else being equal: Hedged laws and psychological explanation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Mind 100 (397):19-34.details
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Rethinking commonsense psychology: a critique of folk psychology, theory of mind and simulation.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2007 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Wilfrid Sellars: Naturalism with a Normative Turn.James O'Shea - 2007 - Malden, MA: Polity.details
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Naturalism and ontology.Wilfrid Sellars - 1982 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 87 (4):559-560.details
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Naturalism and Ontology.Wilfrid Sellars & Jeffrey F. Sicha - 1981 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 171 (2):249-249.details
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Concepts, conceptions, reflective understanding: Reply to Peacocke.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press.details
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Qualia and intentional content: Reply to Block.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In Martin Hahn & B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge. MIT Press. pp. 405--415.details
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Direct Perception, Inter-subjectivity, and Social Cognition: Why Phenomenology is a Necessary but not Sufficient Condition.Jack Reynolds - 2015 - The New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research:333-354.details
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When the twain meet : Could the study of mind be a meeting of minds.Michael Wheeler & Massimiliano Cappuccio - 2010 - In James Williams (ed.), Postanalytic and Metacontinental: Crossing Philosophical Divides. Continuum. pp. 125.details
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