They are correct that punctuated equilibria apply to sexually reproducing organisms and that morphological evolutionary change is regarded as largely (if not exclusively) correlated with speciation events. However, they err in suggesting that we attribute stasis strictly to "developmental constraints," which represent only one of a set of possible mechanisms that we have suggested for the causes of stasis. Others include habitat tracking and the internal structure of species themselves [for example, (2)].

The aim of this paper is to clarify and critically assess the methods of evolutionary psychology, and offer a sketch of an alternative methodology. My thesis is threefold. (1) The methods of inquiry unique to evolutionary psychology rest upon the claim that the discovery of theadaptive functions of ancestral psychological capacities leads to the discovery of thepsychological functions of those ancestral capacities. (2) But this claim is false; in fact, just the opposite is true. We first must discover the psychological (...) functions of our psychological capacities in order to discover their adaptive functions. Hence the methods distinctive of evolutionary psychology are idle in our search for the mechanisms of the mind. (3) There are good reasons for preferring an alternative to the methods of evolutionary psychology, an alternative that aims to discover the functions of our psychological capacities by appeal to the concept of awhole psychology. (shrink)

In exploring the nature of psychological explanation, this book looks at how psychologists theorize about the human ability to calculate, to speak a language and the like. It shows how good theorizing explains or tries to explain such abilities as perception and cognition. It recasts the familiar explanations of "intelligence" and "cognitive capacity" as put forward by philosophers such as Fodor, Dennett, and others in terms of a theory of explanation that makes established doctrine more intelligible to professionals and their (...) students.In particular, the book shows that vestigial adherence to the positivists' D-N model has distorted the view of philosophers of science about what psychologists (and biologists) do and has masked the real nature of explanation. Major sections in the book cover Analysis and Subsumption; Functional Analysis; Understanding Cognitive Capacities; and Historical Reflections.Robert Cummins is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois, Chicago Circle. A Bradford Book. (shrink)

Many areas of science develop by discovering mechanisms and role functions. Cummins' (1975) analysis of role functions-according to which an item's role function is a capacity of that item that appears in an analytic explanation of the capacity of some containing system-captures one important sense of "function" in the biological sciences and elsewhere. Here I synthesize Cummins' account with recent work on mechanisms and causal/mechanical explanation. The synthesis produces an analysis of specifically mechanistic role functions, one that uses the characteristic (...) active, spatial, temporal, and hierarchical organization of mechanisms to add precision and content to Cummins' original suggestion. This synthesis also shows why the discovery of role functions is a scientific achievement. Discovering a role function (i) contributes to the interlevel integration of multilevel mechanisms, and (ii) provides a unique, contextual variety of causal/mechanical explanation. (shrink)

It's been 41 years since the publication of Ernst Mayr's Cause and Effect in Biology wherein Mayr most clearly develops his version of the influential distinction between ultimate and proximate causes in biology. In critically assessing Mayr's essay I uncover false statements and red-herrings about biological explanation. Nevertheless, I argue to uphold an analogue of the ultimate/proximate distinction as it refers to two different kinds of explanations, one dynamical the other statistical.

A number of authors argue that while species are evolutionary units, individuals and real entities, higher taxa are not. I argue that drawing the divide between species and higher taxa along such lines has not been successful. Common conceptions of evolutionary units either include or exclude both types of taxa. Most species, like all higher taxa, are not individuals, but historical entities. Furthermore, higher taxa are neither more nor less real than species. None of this implies that there is no (...) distinction between species and higher taxa; the point is that such a distinction is more subtle than many authors have claimed. (shrink)

Over the past three decades, the philosophy of biology has emerged from the shadow of the philosophy of physics to become a respectable and thriving philosophical subdiscipline. The authors take a fresh look at the life sciences and the philosophy of biology from a strictly realist and emergentist-naturalist perspective. They outline a unified and science-oriented philosophical framework that enables the clarification of many foundational and philosophical issues in biology. This book will be of interest both to life scientists and philosophers.

Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index.

This article deals with a type of functional explanation, viability explanation, that has been overlooked in recent philosophy of science. Viability explanations relate traits of organisms and their environments in terms of what an individual needs to survive and reproduce. I show that viability explanations are neither causal nor historical and that, therefore, they should be accounted for as a distinct type of explanation.

I argue that there are at least four different ways in which the term ‘function’ is used in connection with the study of living organisms, namely: function as activity, function as biological role, function as biological advantage, and function as selected effect. Notion refers to what an item does by itself; refers to the contribution of an item or activity to a complex activity or capacity of an organism; refers to the value for the organism of an item having a (...) certain character rather than another; refers to the way in which a trait acquired and has maintained its current share in the population. The recognition of a separate notion of function as biological advantage solves the problem of the indeterminate reference situation that has been raised against a counterfactual analysis of function, and emphasizes the importance of counterfactual comparison in the explanatory practice of organismal biology. This reveals a neglected problem in the philosophy of biology, namely that of accounting for the insights provided by counterfactual comparison. (shrink)

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications (...) of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biologythe `explananda of selection' debate and the `units of selection' debate. (shrink)

Ecological theory is built upon assumptions about the fundamental nature of organism-environment interactions. We argue that two mutually exclusive sets of such assumptions are available and that they have given rise to alternative approaches to studying ecology. The fundamentally different premises of these approaches render them irreconcilable with one another. In this paper, we present the first logical formalisation of these two paradigms.The more widely-accepted approach - which we label the demographic paradigm - includes both population ecology and community ecology (...) (synecology). Demographic ecology assumes that the environment is relatively stable and that biotic processes, governed predominantly by resource availability, are the most important of ecological and evolutionary influences. Moreover, ecological processes are assumed to translate into directional selection pressures that drive significant evolutionary change on a local scale through the process of optimisation. (shrink)

According to historical theories of biological function, a trait's function is determined by natural selection in the past. I argue that, in addition to historical functions, ahistorical functions ought to be recognized. I propose a theory of biological function which accommodates both. The function of a trait is the way it contributes to fitness and fitness can only be determined relative to a selective regime. Therefore, the function of a trait can only be specified relative to a selective regime. Apart (...) from its desirable pluralism, only this view of relational function can support the function/accident and function/malfunction distinctions commonly thought to be part of the concept of function. Furthermore, only relational function correctly characterizes the explanatory consequences of function attributions in evolutionary biology. (shrink)

This memoir consists of two parts, of which the first deals with the foundations of the theory of the struggle for existence, and begins with the introduction of the important concept of quantity of life, besides that of population. The fundamental equations are then established for the case where the individuals of a biological association mutually devour each other, the reasoning being based on the principle of encounters and on the fundamental hypothesis of the existence of equivalents of the individuals (...) constituting the different species which form the association.Having now obtained the equations which determine the rates of change of the numbers of individuals and of the quantities of life of the species, the memoir proceeds to find the equations relating to the stationary state, by establishing theorems which are afterwards applied for the purpose of obtaining the three general laws of the fluctuations. This investigation of the equilibrium state is then followed by the determination of the integrals of the fluctuation equations, and the deduction from these of their most important consequences.The second part of the memoir contains the enumeration and demonstration of the general laws of the struggle for existence, which flow from the discussion of the principles and the integrals obtained in the first part. In this way there is established a new sort of dynamics, demographic dynamics, which, though substantially different from the dynamics of material systems, is developed from an analogous point of view.The second part begins with the principle of the conservation of demographic energy, according to which there are two sorts of energy, one actual and one potential, which transform mutually the one into the other. This principle is the analogue of the principle of conservation of mechanical energy. It is followed by the enunciation of the three laws relating to the biological fluctuations, the experimental verification of which has been investigated by several naturalists. The success which has attended their efforts is well known.Everybody knows the importance ofHamilton's principle in mechanics and in all the domains of physical science. An analogous variation principle can be found in biology, and from it one can deduce the fluctuation equations in the canonical Hamiltonian form and also in the form of a Jacobian partial differential equation. Their integrals in involution from the subject next studied, and in this way are found cases where the integration is reducible to quadratures.Hamilton's principle leads to the principle of least action . There exists also in biology a closely related principle, which may be called the principle of least vital action. Its analytical form is such that it requires the existence of a true minimum, a state of affairs which does not always hold good in the analogous case in mechanics.Die Abhandlung besteht aus zwei Teilen: Der erste ist den Grundlagen der Theorie des Kampfes ums Dasein gewidmet. Man beginnt damit, neben der Bevölkerung die Menge des Lebens einzuführen, welche eine sehr wichtige Rolle spielt. Man geht dann dazu über, die Grundgleichungen für den Fall aufzustellen, in welchem die Individuen einer biologischen Assoziation sich gegenseitig auffressen. Man wendet das Prinzip der Begegnungen an und stützt sich auf die Grundhypothese der Existenz von Individuenäquivalenten der verschiedenen Arten, welche die Assoziation bilden.Wenn man die Gleichungen, welche die Variationen der Individuenzahlen und der Lebensmengen der Arten liefern, gefunden hat, so schreitet man zu den statischen oder Gleichgewichtsgleichungen fort und findet so die Theoreme, die man alsdann benutzt, um die drei allgemeinen Gesetze der Fluktuationen zu erhalten.Nach dem Studium des Gleichgewichtes geht man dazu über, die verschiedenen Integrale der Fluktuationengleichungen zu finden und zieht endlich aus ihnen die wichtigsten Folgerungen.Im zweiten Teile werden die allgemeinen Gesetze des Kampfes ums Dasein, welche aus der Diskussion der Prinzipien und der im ersten Teil gewonnenen Integrale stammen, ausgesprochen und bewiesen. Man baut so eine neue Dynamik auf: die demographische Dynamik, welche, obschon sie wesentlich verschieden von derjenigen der materiellen Systeme ist, sich nach einem analogen Gesichtspunkt entwickelt.Man beginnt in diesem zweiten Teil mit dem Prinzip der Erhaltung der demographischen Energie, nach welchem zwei Energien, die aktuelle und die potentielle, sich ineinander verwandeln. Wir haben hier eine Analogie zum Prinzip der Erhaltung der mechanischen Energie. Dann werden die drei Gesetze der biologischen Fluktuationen formuliert. Für sie haben verschiedene Naturforscher experimentelle Bestätigungen gesucht. Man kennt den Erfolg ihrer Bemühungen.Alle Welt kennt die Bedeutung des Prinzips vonHamilton in der Mechanik und in allen Gebieten der Physik. Man kann ein dem Variationskalkül analoges Prinzip in der Biologie finden. Aus ihm kann man die Fluktuationsgleichungen in der kanonischen Form vonHamilton und in der Gestalt einer Gleichung mit partiellen Differentialquotienten vonJacobi herleiten. Ihre Integrale bilden den Gegenstand der folgenden Studien. Man findet Fälle, in denen die Integration sich auf Quadraturen reduziert.Das Prinzip vonHamilton zieht das Prinzip der kleinsten Wirkung oder das Prinzip vonMaupertuis nach sich. Auch in der Biologie gibt es ein mit dem vorgenannten zusammenhängendes Prinzip, welches man das Prinzip der kleinsten vitalen Wirkung nennen kann. Seine analytische Form ist derart, dass es sich um ein wahres Minimum handelt, das im analogen Fall in der Mechanik nicht immer zutrifft. (shrink)

Overmedication is nowadays a serious problem in health care due to influences from the pharmaceutical industry and agencies responsible for regulation. The situation has indeed become appalling in psychiatry, where both theories and treatments have deteriorated under the impact of the industry. The overmedication problem is associated with biased biology in medicine. Adequate biological approaches would indicate that drug therapies must yield to diet therapies, particularly treatments involving omega-3 fatty acids, in many cases. To the extent that philosophy of science (...) adapts to mainstream medicine in analyses of the current situation, it may reinforce the existing bias. To redress imbalances in health care, we ultimately have to rely on common sense. (shrink)

The Nature of Selection is a straightforward, self-contained introduction to philosophical and biological problems in evolutionary theory. It presents a powerful analysis of the evolutionary concepts of natural selection, fitness, and adaptation and clarifies controversial issues concerning altruism, group selection, and the idea that organisms are survival machines built for the good of the genes that inhabit them. "Sober's is the answering philosophical voice, the voice of a first-rate philosopher and a knowledgeable student of contemporary evolutionary theory. His book merits (...) broad attention among both communities. It should also inspire others to continue the conversation."-Philip Kitcher, Nature "Elliott Sober has made extraordinarily important contributions to our understanding of biological problems in evolutionary biology and causality. The Nature of Selection is a major contribution to understanding epistemological problems in evolutionary theory. I predict that it will have a long lasting place in the literature."-Richard C. Lewontin. (shrink)

The autonomy of biology is a consequence of the directedness governing vital processes. This directedness is not complete purposiveness, but only the coordination of the processes toward a definite end, which, in living organisms, we must define as the formation and continued maintenance of individuals of a definite form. But there are numerous instances of vital processes which do not serve a recognisable purpose. Such processes obey the rules of probability. Of these the Mendelian laws of heredity are an example. (...) The inheritance of variations, which are of no importance to the organism, occurs according to the law of probability, so far as concerns the number of possible combinations. If it should be possible to transform such indifferent variations into variations either useful or harmful to the race, it would be a splendid proof of the power of directedness in vital processes, if it could be demonstrated, that in these new conditions the individuals possessing favourable variations were more numerous than could be expected according to the Mendelian rules.L'autonomie de la biologie se repose sur la finalité qui gouverne le processus biologique. Cette finalité ne signifie pas une efficacité complète, mais seulement l'orientation du processus vers un but déterminé, qui est, chez les êtres vivants, le développement et la conservation d'individus de forme déterminée. Cependant il se produit dans le domaine de la vie de nombreux processus qui ne servent aucun but biologique apparent. De tels processus sont soumis aux règles de la probabilité. Nous citons comme exemple les lois de l'hérédité de Mendel. L'hérédité de variétés indifférentes pour les êtres vivants correspond, en ce qui concerne les combinaisons possibles, aux règles de la probabilité. Si l'on pouvait obtenir , que de telles variétés deviennent utiles ou nuisibles à ces races, la domination de la finalité dans le processus biologique serait prouvée de façon éclatante, s'il apparaissait, que sous des conditions ainsi transformées, il se produisait un plus grand nombre d'individus présentant la variation favorable, qu'il ne serait à prévoir d'après les lois de Mendel. (shrink)

Finality, the characteristic sign of vital processes, implies no opposition to causality; on the contrary the causal method of thinking must be applied to living nature. We must, however, distinguish between a final causality, one directed towards reaching a specific goal, and a causality which works mechanically without reference to a goal.A final or teleological treatment is applicable to inanimate nature as well, and is by many philosophers and physicists so applied. This teleology is however merely the inverse of causality. (...) According as we look forwards or backwards along the course of an event we can think of it in terms of means and end or of cause and effect . This method of interpretation can in the inorganic realm be applied to any stage of a process. In contradistinction therefrom the stages of the processes which occur in living nature are in no way equivalent, inasmuch as only one quite definite state can be regarded as the real and specific goal of the particular process. Only in this last sense can finality be regarded as the characteristic sign of the specific vital process.La finalité, indice caractéristique des processus vitaux, ne s'oppose pas à la causalité; la causalité en matière d'observation doit plutÔt s'étendre à la nature vivante également. Pourtant il faut distinguer une causalité finale, c.à.d. tendant à atteindre uncertain but, d'avec une causalité mécanique ne visant à aucun but.Une observation finale ou téléologique cependant peut s'appliquer aussi à la nature inanimée. Plusieurs philosophes et physiciens ont cherché en effet à l'appliquer. Cette téléologie cependant n'est autre chose que l'inverse de la causalité. Selon que nous considérons le cours d'un phénomène qui se produit, en regardant en avant ou bien en arrière, nous pouvons le concevoir au premier cas comme moyen et but, au second cas comme cause et effet. Cette manière de voir peut Être appliquée dans le domaine de la nature inanimée à chaque état d'un processus. Par opposition à cela, les processus qui se présentent dans la nature vivante sont, en ce qui concerne leurs états isolés, absolument non-équivalents, en tant qu'il n'y a qu'un état bien défini qui peut Être regardé comme le but véritable du processus en question. Ce n'est qu'en ce sens-à que la finalité peut Être regardée comme l'indice caractéristique des processus vitaux. (shrink)

The philosophical theory of scientific explanation proposed here involves a radically new treatment of causality that accords with the pervasively statistical character of contemporary science. Wesley C. Salmon describes three fundamental conceptions of scientific explanation--the epistemic, modal, and ontic. He argues that the prevailing view is untenable and that the modal conception is scientifically out-dated. Significantly revising aspects of his earlier work, he defends a causal/mechanical theory that is a version of the ontic conception. Professor Salmon's theory furnishes a robust (...) argument for scientific realism akin to the argument that convinced twentieth-century physical scientists of the existence of atoms and molecules. To do justice to such notions as irreducibly statistical laws and statistical explanation, he offers a novel account of physical randomness. The transition from the "reviewed view" of scientific explanation to the causal/mechanical model requires fundamental rethinking of basic explanatory concepts. (shrink)

A major theme in biological research is the quest for mechanism, embodied in explanatory reductionism: the interpretation of phenomena through links to the entities and laws of more fundamental sciences. For example, the form of Starling's Law of the Heart, relating contractile force to heart volume, follows from the sliding-filament hypothesis of muscle contraction, a molecular concept. Although alternative mechanisms for muscle contraction and cardiac regulation could be deduced from biochemical principles, the formulation provides clear correspondence with the phenomena and (...) a deeper understanding of cardiac function. Moreover, even if the reduction provides no better formulation of the phenomenon, of the macro-regularity, it is still prized as a nearer approach to physical reality, as a step toward realizing fundamental unities and codifying general principles, and as a door to new experimental opportunities. (shrink)

The correct explanation of why species, in evolutionary theory, are individuals and not classes is the cladistic species concept. The cladistic species concept defines species as the group of organisms between two speciation events, or between one speciation event and one extinction event, or (for living species) that are descended from a speciation event. It is a theoretical concept, and therefore has the virtue of distinguishing clearly the theoretical nature of species from the practical criteria by which species may be (...) recognized at any one time. Ecological or biological (reproductive) criteria may help in the practical recognition of species. Ecological and biological species concepts are also needed to explain why cladistic species exist as distinct lineages, and to explain what exactly takes place during a speciation event. The ecological and biological species concepts work only as sub-theories of the cladistic species concept and if taken by themselves independently of cladism they are liable to blunder. The biological species concept neither provides a better explanation of species indivudualism than the ecological species concept, nor, taken by itself, can the biological species concept even be reconciled with species individualism. Taking the individuality of species seriously requires subordinating the biological, to the cladistic, species concept. (shrink)

I discuss two types of evidential problems with the most widely touted experiments in evolutionary psychology, those performed by Leda Cosmides and interpreted by Cosmides and John Tooby. First, and despite Cosmides and Tooby's claims to the contrary, these experiments don't fulfil the standards of evidence of evolutionary biology. Second Cosmides and Tooby claim to have performed a crucial experiment, and to have eliminated rival approaches. Though they claim that their results are consistent with their theory but contradictory to the (...) leading non-evolutionary alternative, Pragmatic Reasoning Schemas theory, I argue that this claim is unsupported. In addition, some of Cosmides and Tooby's interpretations arise from misguided and simplistic understandings of evolutionary biology. While I endorse the incorporation of evolutionary approaches into psychology, I reject the claims of Cosmides and Tooby that a modular approach is the only one supported by evolutionary biology. Lewontin's critical examinations of the applications of adaptationist thinking provide a background of evidentiary standards against which to view the currently fashionable claims of evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

The now-classic Metaphors We Live By changed our understanding of metaphor and its role in language and the mind. Metaphor, the authors explain, is a fundamental mechanism of mind, one that allows us to use what we know about our physical and social experience to provide understanding of countless other subjects. Because such metaphors structure our most basic understandings of our experience, they are "metaphors we live by"--metaphors that can shape our perceptions and actions without our ever noticing them. In (...) this updated edition of Lakoff and Johnson's influential book, the authors supply an afterword surveying how their theory of metaphor has developed within the cognitive sciences to become central to the contemporary understanding of how we think and how we express our thoughts in language. (shrink)

In earlier publications of the first author it was shown that intentional explanation of actions, functional explanation of biological traits and causal explanation of abnormal events share a common structure. They are called explanation by specification (of a goal, a biological function, an abnormal causal factor, respectively) as opposed to explanation by subsumption under a law. Explanation by specification is guided by a schematic train of thought, of which the argumentative steps not concerning questions were already shown to be logically (...) valid (elementary) arguments.Independently, the second author developed a new, inferential approach to erotetic logic, the logic of questions. In this approach arguments resulting in questions, with declarative sentences and/or other questions as premises, are analyzed, and validity of such arguments is defined. (shrink)

We analyse theories and research approaches in ecology and find that they fall into two internally homogeneous groups of linked ideas, each comprising a unique set of premises. The two sets of interpretive statements are thus mutually exclusive; they constitute alternative theoretical developments in ecology and should not be seen as complementary. They can, therefore, be considered two paradigms (Kuhn, 1962). Our interpretation is supported by the minimal overlap, if any, in the premises and research directions of the two approaches. (...) We label the dominant group of ideas the demographic paradigm and the less developed one the autecological paradigm. The internal logic of the demographic paradigm of ecology is strongly developed and consistent. Its premises and logic extend into current models of population genetics, biogeography, palaeontology, evolutionary theory and conservation biology. Nevertheless, many phenomena contradict the premises of the demographic paradigm; these contradictions cannot be accommodated within its theoretical framework without major disruptions in logic ensuing. Such phenomena can, in contrast, be understood in terms of the autecological paradigm. Because the status and strengths of the autecological paradigm are generally unrecognised and because autecology is frequently misrepresented in the literature, we redefine its premises and clarify its structure and aims as an aid to its future development. (shrink)

This paper analyses the broad methodological structure of population-biological theorising. In it, I show that the distinction between initial exploratory, hypothesis-generating research and the subsequent process-reconstructing, hypothesis-testing type of research is not being made. Rather, the hypotheses generated in population biology are elaborated in such detail that students confound the initial research phase with the subsequent hypotheses-testing phase of research. In this context, I therefore analyse some testing procedures within the exploration phase and show that, as an extreme form of (...) confusion, statistical null-models are mistakenly given the status of causal population-biological theory. (shrink)

This paper reviews and extends ideas of eukaryotization by endosymbiosis. These ideas are put within an historical context of processes that may have led up to eukaryotization and those that seem to have resulted from this process. Our starting point for considering the emergence and development of life as an organized system of chemical reactions should in the first place be in accordance with thermodynamic principles and hence should, as far as possible, be derived from these principles. One trend to (...) be observed is the ever-increasing complexity resulting in several layers of compartmentalization of the reaction system, either spatial (of which the eukaryotic cell is an example), or functional (as in the gradually deepening distinction between metabolic, enzymatic and information-storing functions within the cell). One of the causes of this complexification of living systems will have been the changes in environmental conditions, particularly the geochemical impoverishment of the biosphere during geological history, partly brought about by living systems themselves, and partly by the trend towards increasing efficiency and specificity of the reactions that occur. (shrink)

A number of philosophers and ‘evolutionary psychologists’ have argued that attacks on adaptationism in contemporary biology are misguided. These thinkers identify anti-adaptationism with advocacy of non-adaptive modes of explanation. They overlook the influence of anti-adaptationism in the development of more rigorous forms of adaptive explanation. Many biologists who reject adaptationism do not reject Darwinism. Instead, they have pioneered the contemporary historical turn in the study of adaptation. One real issue which remains unresolved amongst these methodological advances is the nature of (...) ‘phylogenetic inertia’. To what extent is an adaptive explanation needed for the persistence of a trait as well as its origin? (shrink)

John Maynard Smith has defended against philosophical criticism the view that developmental biology is the study of the expression of information encoded in the genes by natural selection. However, like other naturalistic concepts of information, this ‘teleosemantic’ information applies to many non-genetic factors in development. Maynard Smith also fails to show that developmental biology is concerned with teleosemantic information. Some other ways to support Maynard Smith’s conclusion are considered. It is argued that on any definition of information the view that (...) development is the expression of genetic information is misleading. Some reasons for the popularity of that view are suggested. (shrink)