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  1. (5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.
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  • (5 other versions)Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1982 - Critica 14 (41):87-93.
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  • Review of John Martin Fischer: The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control[REVIEW]William L. Rowe - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):141-143.
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  • (1 other version)Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy.Bernard Williams - 1985 - Ethics 97 (4):821-833.
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  • Freedom Within Reason.Susan Wolf - 1990 - New York: Oup Usa.
    In Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf charts a course between incompatibilism, or the notion that freedom and responsibility require causal and metaphysical independence from the impersonal forces of nature, and compatibilism, or the notion that people are free and responsible as long as their actions are governed by their desires. Wolf argues that some of the forces which are beyond our control are friends to freedom rather than enemies of it, enabling us to see the world for what it is. (...)
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  • Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity.Vere Chappell (ed.) - 1999 - Cambridge University Press.
    Do human beings ever act freely, and if so what does freedom mean? Is everything that happens antecedently caused, and if so how is freedom possible? Is it right, even for God, to punish people for things that they cannot help doing? This volume presents the famous seventeenth-century controversy in which Thomas Hobbes and John Bramhall debate these questions and others. The complete texts of their initial contributions to the debate are included, together with selections from their subsequent replies to (...)
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  • Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.
    This book provides a comprehensive, systematic theory of moral responsibility. The authors explore the conditions under which individuals are morally responsible for actions, omissions, consequences, and emotions. The leading idea in the book is that moral responsibility is based on 'guidance control'. This control has two components: the mechanism that issues in the relevant behavior must be the agent's own mechanism, and it must be appropriately responsive to reasons. The book develops an account of both components. The authors go on (...)
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  • (1 other version)Essays on the Active Powers of Man.Thomas Reid - 1788 - john Bell, and G.G.J. & J. Robinson.
    The Scottish philosopher Thomas Reid first published Essays on Active Powers of Man in 1788 while he was Professor of Philosophy at King's College, Aberdeen. The work contains a set of essays on active power, the will, principles of action, the liberty of moral agents, and morals. Reid was a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment and one of the founders of the 'common sense' school of philosophy. In Active Powers Reid gives his fullest exploration of sensus communis as the (...)
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  • Of liberty and necessity.Thomas Hobbes - 1938 - Kiel,: Printed by Schmidt & Klaunig for the chairman of the Hobbes-society. Edited by Cay Ludwig Georg Conrad Brockdorff.
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  • (1 other version)Identification and Wholeheartedness.Harry Frankfurt - 1987 - In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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  • The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
    What is the Moral Problem? NORMATIVE ETHICS VS. META-ETHICS It is a common fact of everyday life that we appraise each others' behaviour and attitudes from ...
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  • Skepticism about weakness of will.Gary Watson - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.
    My concern in this paper will be to explore and develop a version of nonsocratic skepticism about weakness of will. In my view, socratism is incorrect, but like Socrates, I think that the common understanding of weakness of will raises serious problems. Contrary to socratism, it is possible for a person knowingly to act contrary to his or her better judgment. But this description does not exhaust the common view of weakness. Also implicit in this view is the belief that (...)
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  • (1 other version)Sanctification, hardening of the heart, and Frankfurt's concept of free will.Eleonore Stump - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (8):395-420.
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  • A theory of freedom and responsibility.Michael A. Smith - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 293-317.
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  • Freedom and desire.Wright Neely - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (September):32-54.
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  • (1 other version)Agent causation.Timothy O'Connor - 1995 - In Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 61-79.
    In what follows, I will contend that the commonsense view of ourselves as fundamental causal agents - for which some have used the term “unmoved movers" but which I think might more accurately be expressed as “not wholly moved movers” - is theoretically understandable, internally consistent, and consistent with what we have thus far come to know about the nature and workings of the natural world. In the section that follows, I try to show how the concept of ‘agent’ causation (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
    It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will. Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call "first-order desires" or "desires of the (...)
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  • (3 other versions)Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • 4. Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme.Gary Watson - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 119-148.
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  • Freedom within Reason.Gary Watson - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (4):890.
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  • Principia Ethica.Evander Bradley McGilvary - 1904 - Philosophical Review 13 (3):351.
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  • (1 other version)Identification and externality.Harry Frankfurt - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press.
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  • Of identity and diversity (book II, chapter XXVII).John Locke - 1689 - In An essay concerning human understanding. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Treatise on Nature and Grace.Nicolas Malebranche - 1992 - Clarendon Press.
    A scholarly edition of Nicolas Malebranche's Treatise on Nature and Grace by Patrick Riley. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.
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  • (1 other version)Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will.Eleonore Stump - 1993 - In John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (eds.), Perspectives on moral responsibility. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. pp. 211-234.
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  • (1 other version)Toward a credible agent–causal account of free will.Randolph Clarke - 1993 - Noûs 27 (2):191-203.
    Agent-causal accounts of free will face two problems. First, such a view needs an account of rational free action, that is, of acting for reasons when one acts freely. And second, an intelligible explication of causation by an agent is required. This paper addresses both of these problems. Free actions are seen as caused both by prior events and by agents. Reasons (or their mental representations) can then be seen as figuring causally when one freely acts for reasons. It is (...)
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  • (1 other version)Michael Smith: The Moral Problem. [REVIEW]James Lenman - 1994 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 1 (1):125-126.
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  • (3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry Frankfurt - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Responsibility, Freedom, and Reason. [REVIEW]John Martin Fischer - 1992 - Ethics 102 (2):368-389.
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  • (1 other version)Theodicy.Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - unknown
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  • (1 other version)Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 13 (3):7-9.
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  • Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action.G. F. Schueler - 1995 - MIT Press.
    Does action always arise out of desire? G. F. Schueler examines this hotly debated topic in philosophy of action and moral philosophy, arguing that once two senses of "desire" are distinguished - roughly, genuine desires and pro attitudes - apparently plausible explanations of action in terms of the agent's desires can be seen to be mistaken. Desire probes a fundamental issue in philosophy of mind, the nature of desires and how, if at all, they motivate and justify our actions. At (...)
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  • The Faintest Passion.Harry Frankfurt - 1992 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 66 (3):5-16.
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  • Autonomy Reconsidered.Sarah Buss - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):95-121.
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  • (2 other versions)Freedom in Belief and Desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1996 - Journal of Philosophy 93 (9):429-449.
    People ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought to believe and certain things they ought not to believe. In supposing this to be so, they make corresponding assumptions about their belief-forming capacities. They assume that they are generally responsive to what they think they ought to believe in the things they actually come to believe. In much the same sense, people ordinarily suppose that there are certain things they ought to desire and do and they make corresponding assumptions (...)
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  • (1 other version)Review of E thics and the Limits of Philosophy.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Journal of Philosophy 83 (6):351-360.
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  • Problematic responsibility in law and morals.Joel Feinberg - 1962 - Philosophical Review 71 (3):340-351.
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  • A Treatise of Freewill.Ralph Cudworth & John Allen - 1838 - John W. Parker.
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  • Frog and Toad lose control.Jeanette Kennett & Michael Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.
    It seems to be a truism that whenever we do something - and so, given the omnipresence of trying (Hornsby 1980), whenever we try to do something - we want to do that thing more than we want to do anything else we can do (Davidson 1970). However, according to Frog, when we have will power we are able to try not to do something that we ‘really want to do’. In context the idea is clearly meant to be that (...)
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  • Backgrounding desire.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (4):565-592.
    Granted that desire is always present in the genesis of human action, is it something on the presence of which the agent always reflects? I may act on a belief without coming to recognize that I have the belief. Can I act on a desire without recognizing that I have the desire? In particular, can the desire have a motivational presence in my decision making, figuring in the background, as it were, without appearing in the content of my deliberation, in (...)
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  • Freedom and value.S. Benson - 1987 - Journal of Philosophy 84 (September):465-87.
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