By a `denoting phrase' I mean a phrase such as any one of the following: a man, some man, any man, every man, all men, the present King of England, the present King of France, the center of mass of the solar system at the first instant of the twentieth century, the revolution of the earth round the sun, the revolution of the sun round the earth. Thus a phrase is denoting solely in virtue of its form. We may distinguish (...) three cases: (1) A phrase may be denoting, and yet not denote anything; e.g., `the present King of France'. (2) A phrase may denote one definite object; e.g., `the present King of England' denotes a certain man. (3) A phrase may denote ambiguously; e.g. `a man' denotes not many men, but an ambiguous man. The interpretation of such phrases is a matter of considerably difficulty; indeed, it is very hard to frame any theory not susceptible of formal refutation. All the difficulties with which I am acquainted are met, so far as I can discover, by the theory which I am about to explain. (shrink)

The ontology of (merely) intentional objects is a can of worms. If we can avoid ontological commitment to such entities, we should. In this paper, I offer a strategy for accomplishing that. This is to reject the traditional act-object account of intentionality in favor of an adverbial account. According to adverbialism about intentionality, having a dragon thought is not a matter of bearing the thinking-about relation to dragons, but of engaging in the activity of thinking dragon-wise.

Alongside his much-discussed theory that humans are permanently, if only tacitly, self-aware, Avicenna proposed that in actively conscious self-knowers the subject and object of thought are identical. He applies to both humans and God the slogan that the self-knower is “intellect, intellecting, and object of intellection (‘aql, ‘āqil, ma‘qūl)”. This paper examines reactions to this idea in the Islamic East from the 12th-13th centuries. A wide range of philosophers such as Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Šahrastānī, Šaraf al-Dīn al-Mas‘ūdī, (...) al-Abharī, al-Āmidī, and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī raised and countered objections to Avicenna's position. One central problem was that on widely accepted definitions of knowledge – according to which knowledge is representational or consists in a relation – it seems impossible for the subject and object of knowledge to be the same. Responses to this difficulty included the idea that a self-knower is “present” to itself, or that here subject and object are different only in “aspect (i‘tibār)”. (shrink)

Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. However, there is no mention of Brentano’s distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some lesser known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano makes such (...) a distinction and at underscoring the philosophical significance of his position. (shrink)

L'A. presenta un'analisi della Lettera sull'anima, in cui Avicenna affronta il tema delle idee di esseri fittizi, come la fenice, ed in particolare la permanenza di tali idee nell'anima dopo la sua separazione dal corpo. Nella parte centrale dello studio l'A. esamina il rapporto fra la risposta avicenniana al problema ed alcuni elementi dottrinali caratterizzanti il pensiero del filosofo: il tema degli universali, della quidditas, o natura comune, e la distinzione fra essenza ed esistenza.

One of the largest ongoing debates in scholarship on Avicenna concerns his epistemology of the first acquisition of intelligible forms or concepts. “Emanationists” hold that intelligibles are emanated by the separate Active Intellect directly into human minds. “ionists” hold that intelligibles are abstracted by the human intellect from sensory images. Neither of these positions has a satisfactory grip on Avicenna’s philosophy. I propose that the two positions can be reconciled because Avicenna states in many texts that what the AI emanates (...) is a power, and not the various intelligible forms. I argue that this can only be the power of abstraction itself. This new interpretation does greater justice to Avicenna’s system and reveals his unique place in the history of epistemology. (shrink)

In the Metaphysics of the Shifâ Avicenna distinguishes three ways in which universals are said. The second sense is puzzling since Avicenna explains that universals are said of what it is permissible to say of many, even if it is not a condition that these many should exist in actuality, and he illustrates this kind of universals with the “heptagonal house”. In its nature this universal can be said of many, but it does not follow necessarily that these many must (...) exist -not even one of them. This second case deals with a less common type of universal, since such universals may have either only one instantiation or even none at all. The example of the heptagonal house is not traditional, as Greek sources, such as Porphyry and Simplicius, use the phoenix instead. In this paper Thérèse-Anne Druart explores in depth the use of this particular illustration, namely, the “heptagonal house”. (shrink)

In the semantic revolution that has led many philosophers of language away from Fregeanism and towards the acceptance of direct reference, the notion of rigidity introduced by Saul Kripke in Naming and Necessity has played a crucial role. The notions of rigidity and direct reference are indeed different, but proponents of new theories of reference agree that there is a one way connection between them: although not all rigid terms are directly referential (witness rigid definite descriptions), all directly referential terms (...) are rigid. My purpose in this paper is to contest this widely held view. I will argue that, on a certain conception of what direct reference is (a conception present in the works of the main proponents of the theory), the fact that a term is directly referential does not entail that it is rigid. From this conclusion, I will argue, we can learn some substantial lessons about the assumptions and commitments of new theories of reference. (shrink)

ABSTRACT W.L. Craig has argued that the universe has a beginning because (1) the infinitude of the past entails the existence of actual infinite multitudes of past intervals of time, and (2) the existence of actual infinite multitudes is impossible. Puryear has rejected (1) and argued that what the infinitude of the past entails is only the existence of an actual infinite magnitude of past time. But this does not preclude the infinitude of the past, Puryear claims, because there can (...) be no justification for the claim that actual infinite magnitudes are impossible. I argue, against Puryear, that there can be such a justification. I claim, nevertheless, that, for reasons entirely different from Puryear’s, the finitude of the past cannot be established based either on the impossibility of actual infinite multitudes or on the impossibility of actual infinite magnitudes. My arguments in this paper draw on insights from al-Kindī and Avicenna. (shrink)

At face value, intentionality is a relational notion. There are, however, arguments intended to show that it is not. I categorize the strongest arguments against the relationality of intentionality into three major groups: Brentanian arguments, Fregean arguments, and Quinean arguments. I argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, none of these arguments eventually succeeds. I then conclude that, in the absence of defeating evidence against what at face value looks correct, we are justified to consider intentionality as a relational notion.

W.L. Craig has argued that the universe has a beginning because (1) the infinitude of the past entails the existence of actual infinite multitudes of past intervals of time, and (2) the existence of actual infinite multitudes is impossible. Puryear has rejected (1) and argued that what the infinitude of the past entails is only the existence of an actual infinite magnitude of past time. But this does not preclude the infinitude of the past, Puryear claims, because there can be (...) no justification for the claim that actual infinite magnitudes are impossible. I argue, against Puryear, that there can be such a justification. I claim, nevertheless, that, for reasons entirely different from Puryear’s, the finitude of the past cannot be established based either on the impossibility of actual infinite multitudes or on the impossibility of actual infinite magnitudes. My arguments in this paper draw on insights from al-Kindī and Avicenna. (shrink)

in a seminal and highly influential study, Werner Jaeger presented the development of Aristotle, or Aristotelianism, as the emergence of an empiricist alternative to the rationalist fold of Plato and Platonism.1 Pitting perceived phenomena against the recollection of innate ideas, Aristotle founded knowledge on the perception of universal features and regularities in concrete things instead of an intuitive access to a separate world of incorporeal forms. In close analysis, such a straightforward opposition is forced, of course, and sets aside a (...) number of complicated questions of interpretation. To say nothing of Plato, Aristotle's alleged empiricism stands in rather stark contrast to the axiomatic tendencies in his... (shrink)

RésuméDans cet article, je pose le problème suivant: quelles propositions ont un import dans la logique modale d'Avicenne? Lesquelles n'en ont pas? Partant de l'assomption que les propositions singulières et quantifiées ont un import si elles requièrent l'existence de leur sujet pour être vraies, j'analyse d'abord l'import des propositions absolues, ensuite celui des propositions modales en tenant compte des définitions d'Avicenne et des relations entre ces propositions. Cette analyse conduit aux résultats suivants: Avicenne défend l'opinion générale selon laquelle les affirmatives, (...) qu'elles soient modales ou assertoriques, ont un import alors que les négatives n'en ont pas. Il attribue un import aux propositions possibles affirmatives aussi bien dans l'interprétation externaliste que dans l'interprétation internaliste des logiciens post-Avicenniens, pourvu que le sujet ne soit pas impossible. Toutefois, la théorie n'est pas toujours claire, car Avicenne attribue un import aux propositions contenant ‘parfois non’ et aux nécessaires négatives contenant ‘tant qu'il est P’ malgré leur caractère négatif; les propositions nécessaires affirmatives contenant ‘tant qu'il est P’ sont considérées comme ayant un import alors qu'elles ne l'exigent pas. De plus, l'analyse qu'il donne des assertoriques spéciales E et O et de leurs contradictoires est erronée, ce qui ne permet pas de déterminer clairement leur import. Mais quand elles sont correctement analysées, ces propositions E et O n'ont pas d'import, alors que leurs contradictoires – les assertoriques spéciales I et A respectivement – ont un import. (shrink)

Il naturale senso della logica in relazione alla scienza è quello di fornire un linguaggio alle acquisizioni epistemologiche: tale sembra essere il senso assegnatogli anche da Avicenna in al-Mantiq. La questione in realtà è molto più profonda: quale relazione c'è fra gli universali predicabili e gli oggetti della scienza? Attraverso l'esame della questione quale è delineata nel Madkhal, in particolare in merito al genere e alla differenza, e il loro ruolo nelle scienze in alcuni passaggi del Kitab al-Burhan, l'A. verifica (...) l'applicazione delle considerazioni teoretiche in un problema fisico pratico affrontato nel Kitab-al-Tabi'iyat. (shrink)

RésuméSelon Avicenne, certains objets des mathématiques existent et d'autres non. Chaque objet mathématique existant est un attribut connotationnel non sensible d'un objet physique et peut être perçu par la faculté d'estimation. Les objets mathématiques non existants peuvent être représentés et perçus par la faculté d'imagination en séparant et en combinant des parties d'images d'objets mathématiques existants qui sont précédemment perçues par estimation. Dans tous les cas, même les objets mathématiques non existants doivent être considérés comme des propriétés d'entités matérielles. Ils (...) ne peuvent jamais être saisis comme des entités totalement immatérielles. Avicenne pense que nous ne pouvons saisir aucun concept mathématique à moins d'avoir au préalable des expériences perceptives spécifiques. Ce n'est que par l'opération non éliminable et irremplaçable des facultés d'estimation et d'imagination sur certaines données sensibles que nous pouvons saisir les concepts mathématiques. Cela montre qu'Avicenne approuve une sorte d'empirisme conceptuel sur les mathématiques. (shrink)

The intuition that we can think about non-existent objects seems to be in tension with philosophical concerns about the relationality of intentionality. Tim Crane’s psychologism removes this tension by proposing a psychologistic account of intentionality according to which intentionality is a purely non-relational notion. I argue that his account has counterintuitive consequences regarding our thoughts about existing objects, and as such is insufficiently plausible to convince us to reject the relationality of intentionality.

It has generally been assumed that Anselm was the originator of the ontological argument. Notwithstanding the fact that it has received much criticism, Malcolm defends its so-called second version. In this paper we shall examine some features of ibn Sina’s notion of the Necessary Existent which show that prior to Anselm, ibn Sina formulated a version of this argument which corresponds in some senses to Malcolm’s version, and that a close examination of ibn Sina’s peculiar version enables us to criticize (...) Malcolm’s version as it has not been done heretofore. (shrink)

Dans ses traités consacrés à l'âme, Ibn Sīnā élabore une doctrine complexe de la perception dont l'analyse permet de dégager deux conceptions distinctes de l'image. L'une détermine l'image comme une doublure du réel, qui re-présente quelque chose, et tient lieu d'une chose absente. Cette caractérisation de l'image comme un double et une entité matérielle qui se forme dans les puissances-organes comme par réification s'inscrit dans la conception antique et médiévale de l'image. L'image, dans l'horizon épistémique de l'Antiquité et du Moyen (...) Âge, n'est jamais conçue, en effet, que dans sa relation à ce qu'elle représente. Le statut ontologique de cette image-reflet est celui d'un double: c'est un reflet que sa matérialité rend manifeste. (shrink)

Nazariyat, Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences, issued twice a year in English and Turkish (Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi), is a refereed international journal. It publishes original studies, critical editions of classical texts and book reviews on Islamic philosophy, kalām, theoretical aspects of Sufism and the history of sciences. The goal of Nazariyat is to contribute to the discovery, examination and reinterpretation of the theoretical traditions in the history of Islamic thought, by giving (...) special attention to the post-classical period of it. **ISSN: 2148-8088 E-ISBN: 2547-9415**. (shrink)