- Error theory and reasons for belief.Jonas Olson - 2011 - In Andrew Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Destabilizing the Error Theory.Terence Cuneo - 2016 - In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals. De Gruyter. pp. 71-94.details
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Truth in ethics.Crispin Wright - 1995 - Ratio 8 (3):209-226.details
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Why Companions in Guilt Arguments Won't Work.C. Cowie - 2014 - Philosophical Quarterly 64 (256):407-422.details
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Toward a pluralist and teleological theory of normativity.David Copp - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):21-37.details
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Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.details
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Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence Bonjour - 1980 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.details
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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In defense of moral error theory.Jonas Olson - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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Mathematics, Morality, and Self‐Effacement.Jack Woods - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):47-68.details
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Evolutionary Debunking of Moral Realism.Katia Vavova - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (2):104-116.details
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Why Jonas Olson Cannot Believe the Error Theory Either.Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (4):419-436.details
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No, We Cannot.Bart Streumer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):537-546.details
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Can We Believe the Error Theory?Bart Streumer - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (4):194-212.details
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A Darwinian dilemma for realist theories of value.Sharon Street - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):109-166.details
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Moral and Epistemic Error Theory : The Parity Premise Reconsidered.Jonas Olson - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 107-121.details
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Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.details
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Radical interpretation.David K. Lewis - 1974 - Synthese 23 (July-August):331-344.details
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No Commitment to the Truth.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2021 - Synthese 198:7449-7472.details
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How Truth Governs Belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Toward a pluralist and teleological theory of normativity.David Copp - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Wiley Periodicals.details
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