- Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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The skeptic's dogmatism: a constructive response to the skeptical problem.Kaplan Levent Hasanoglu - 2011 - Dissertation, details
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Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Noûs 49 (4):776-799.details
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Extended cognition meets epistemology.Fred Adams - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):107 - 119.details
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Reverse Engineering Epistemic Evaluations.Sinan Dogramaci - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (3):513-530.details
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Entitlement, Justification, and the Bootstrapping Problem.Jon Altschul - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):345-366.details
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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Tracking Theories of Knowledge.Fred Adams - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):1-35.details
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Catholics vs. Calvinists on Religious Knowledge.John Greco - 1997 - American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):13-34.details
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Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.details
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Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.details
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Moral Intuitions, Reliability, and Disagreement.David Killoren - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 4 (1):1-35.details
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Evidence does not equal knowledge.Aaron Rizzieri - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):235-242.details
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How to make the generality problem work for you.Christopher Lepock - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (4):275-286.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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(1 other version)Skepticism and internalism.Halvor Nordby - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):pp. 35-54.details
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Reliabilism in philosophy.Sanford Goldberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.details
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Primitively rational belief-forming processes.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200.details
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(1 other version)What's epistemology for? The case for neopragmatism in normative metaepistemology.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 26--47.details
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Epistemic responsibility.J. Angelo Corlett - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):179 – 200.details
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Reliabilism and Antirealist Theories of Truth.James Beebe - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):375 - 391.details
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Justification, reasons, and reliability.Marshall Swain - 1985 - Synthese 64 (1):69 - 92.details
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A minimal expression of non–reductionism in the epistemology of testimony.Jennifer Lackey - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):706–723.details
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(2 other versions)Learning from words.Jennifer Lackey - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77–101.details
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Memory as a generative epistemic source.Jennifer Lackey - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):636–658.details
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Ernest Sosa, knowledge, and understanding.Stephen R. Grimm - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (3):171--191.details
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Access externalism.John Gibbons - 2006 - Mind 115 (457):19-39.details
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Personal and doxastic justification in epistemology.Mylan Engel - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 67 (2):133-150.details
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Epistemic intuitions.Jennifer Nagel - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):792–819.details
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Our epistemic goal.Andrew Latus - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1):28 – 39.details
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Reliabilism and Goldman's theory of justification.Robert Almeder & Franklin J. Hogg - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (2-3):165-187.details
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Resurrecting the tracking theories.Fred Adams & Murray Clarke - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):207 – 221.details
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The dialectical context of Boghossian's memory argument.Sanford Goldberg - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):135-48.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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The Rational Roles of Experiences of Utterance Meanings.Berit Brogaard - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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Reflection, confabulation, and reasoning.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - In Luis Oliveira & Joshua DiPaolo (eds.), Kornblith and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Internalism and Externalism in Early Modern Epistemology.Nathan Rockwood - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Internalism and culpable irrationality.Karl Gustav Bergman - 2024 - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Responsibility.Berit Brogaard - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 213–246.details
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On justifying case verdicts. A dialectical hypothesis.Adriano Angelucci - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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The Dark Knowledge Problem: Why Public Justifications are Not Arguments.Sean Donahue - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (3-4):298-332.details
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Trust Responsibly: Non-Evidential Virtue Epistemology.Jakob Ohlhorst - 2023 - New York City: Routledge.details
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Partially Autonomous Belief.Lukas Schwengerer - 2024 - Acta Analytica 39 (2):207–221.details
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Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.details
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What the tortoise should do: A knowledge‐first virtue approach to the basing relation.Lisa Miracchi Titus & J. Adam Carter - 2024 - Noûs.details
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A Challenge for Indexical Reliabilism.Balder Edmund Ask Zaar - 2023 - Acta Analytica 39 (1):143-162.details
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The Perils of Rejecting the Parity Argument.YiLi Zhou & Rhys Borchert - 2023 - Philosophy 98 (2):215-241.details
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Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical Epistemic Warrant.Tyler Burge - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-142.details
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