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Choosing Rationally and Choosing Correctly.Ralph Wedgwood - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 201--229.details
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Quineanism, Noneism and Metaphysical Equivalence.Bruno Jacinto & Javier Belastegui - forthcoming - Studia Logica.details
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The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Measuring Belief and Risk Attitude.Sven Neth - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:354–364.details
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Wie versteht man eine Person?: Zum Streit über die Form der Alltagspsychologie.Oliver Robert Scholz - 1999 - Analyse & Kritik 21 (1):75-96.details
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Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
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Are We Playing a Moral Lottery? Moral Disagreement from a Metasemantic Perspective.Sinan Dogramaci - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):523-550.details
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Fundamentals of Comparative and Intercultural Philosophy.Lin Ma & Jaap van Brakel - 2016 - Albany: Albany.details
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The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press: Oxford.details
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Quine's Epistemic Norms in Practice: Undogmatic Empiricism.Michael Shepanski - 2023 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Probability in ethics.David McCarthy - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 705–737.details
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Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details
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Davidson on Reference.Robert Williams - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Blackwell.details
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Radical Interpretation and the Principle of Charity.Peter Pagin - 2013 - In Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson. Blackwell. pp. 225-246.details
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The Sense-Data Language and External World Skepticism.Jared Warren - 2024 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Vol 4. Oxford University Press.details
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Taking the intentional stance seriously.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):379-390.details
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Nonhuman intentional systems.H. S. Terrace - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):378-379.details
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A better way to deal with selection.B. F. Skinner - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377-378.details
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Intentions and adaptations.H. L. Roitblat - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):375-375.details
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Dennett's rational animals: And how behavorism overlooked them.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):372-373.details
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Parlez-vous baboon, Bwana Sherlock?E. W. Menzel - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):371-372.details
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Intentions as goads.David McFarland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):369-370.details
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The scope and ingenuity of evolutionary systems.Dan Lloyd - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):368-369.details
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Elementary errors about evolution.Richard C. Lewontin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):367-368.details
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Dennett' “Panglossian paradigm”.Alison Jolly - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):366-367.details
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The adaptiveness_ of _mentalism?.Nicholas Humphrey - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):366-366.details
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Thinking about animal thoughts.Donald R. Griffin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):364-364.details
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Lloyd Morgan's canon in evolutionary context.Michael T. Ghiselin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):362-363.details
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A la recherche du docteur Pangloss.Niles Eldredge - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):361-362.details
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Dennett' instrumentalism: A frog at the bottom of the mug.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):358-359.details
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Intentional systems in cognitive ethology: The 'panglossian paradigm' defended.Daniel C. Dennett - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):343-90.details
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Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Greco - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 84-104.details
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Quine, Ontology, and Physicalism.Frederique Janssen-Lauret - 2019 - In Robert Sinclair (ed.), Science and Sensibilia by W. V. Quine: The 1980 Immanuel Kant Lectures. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 181-204.details
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Physicalist thinking and conceptions of behaviour.Jennifer Hornsby - 1986 - In Philip Pettit (ed.), Subject, Thought, And Context. NY: Clarendon Press.details
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Minimalism, Psychological Reality, Meaning and Use.Henry Jackman - 2007 - In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism: New Essays on Semantics and Pragmatics. Oxford University Press UK.details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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Nuevo trabajo para una teoría de los universales [segunda parte].Diego Hernán Morales Pérez & David Lewis - 2015 - Ideas Y Valores 64 (158):249-279.details
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In praise of animals.Rhys Borchert & Aliya R. Dewey - 2023 - Biology and Philosophy 38 (4):1-26.details
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Three Arguments for Humility.David Yates - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (2):461-481.details
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Individualism, normativity, and the epistemology of understanding.Steven Yalowitz - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (1):43-92.details
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Field and McDowell on reference.John Wright - 1986 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (3):298 – 307.details
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Representational Scepticism: The Bubble Puzzle.J. Robert G. Williams - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):419-442.details
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Philosphical 'intuitions' and scepticism about judgement.Timothy Williamson - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):109–153.details
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Permutations and Foster problems: Two puzzles or one?J. Robert G. Williams - 2008 - Ratio 21 (1):91–105.details
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Normative Reference Magnets.J. Robert G. Williams - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (1):41-71.details
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Gavagai again.John Robert Gareth Williams - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):235-259.details
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Fundamental and Derivative Truths.J. R. G. Williams - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):103 - 141.details
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Eligibility and inscrutability.J. Robert G. Williams - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):361-399.details
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Realism and Behaviourism.Alan Weir - 1986 - Dialectica 40 (3):167-200.details
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