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From Skepticism to Paralysis.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2012 - Ancient Philosophy 32 (2):369-392.details
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Ethics and Practical Reasoning.Matthew Silverstein - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):353 - 382.details
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Nietzschean Pragmatism.Neil Sinhababu - 2017 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (1):56-70.details
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Intending, Settling, and Relying.Facundo M. Alonso - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 50-74.details
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What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.details
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In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.details
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A writing guide for professional philosophers.Neil Mehta - manuscriptdetails
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa).Jie Gao - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):1901-1917.details
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Imaginative Resistance, Narrative Engagement, Genre.Shen-yi Liao - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (2):461-482.details
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The illusion of discretion.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1635-1665.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral reasons, epistemic reasons, and rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.details
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On the Very Idea of Direction of Fit.Kim Frost - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (4):429-484.details
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Rationalization as performative pretense.Jason D'Cruz - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):980-1000.details
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The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
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Scanlon's Promising Proposal and the Right Kind of Reasons to Believe.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 59-78.details
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Openmindedness and truth.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):207-224.details
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Reflection and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):3-41.details
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On the logic of aiming at truth.Seyed Ali Kalantari & Michael Luntley - 2013 - Analysis 73 (3):419-422.details
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Evolution and the Normativity of Epistemic Reasons.Sharon Street - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 35 (S1):213-248.details
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Basic Desert of Reactive Emotions.Zac Cogley - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):165-177.details
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(1 other version)Transparency, Doxastic Norms, and the Aim of Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 32 (3):59-74.details
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Truth promoting non-evidential reasons for belief.Brian Talbot - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):599-618.details
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Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Noûs 49 (4):776-799.details
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Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Semantic Normativity and Naturalism.José L. Zalabardo - 2012 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum companion to the philosophy of language. New York: Continuum International.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Changing Direction on Direction of Fit.Alex Gregory - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):603-614.details
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Expressivism and Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse.Allan Hazlett - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The love of truth.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.details
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Knowing the Good and Knowing What One is Doing.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):91-117.details
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Understanding and Structure.Allan Hazlett - 2017 - In Stephen R. Grimm (ed.), Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.details
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A new argument for evidentialism?Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):399-404.details
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Judging as a non-voluntary action.Conor McHugh - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.details
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Stakes and beliefs.Brad Armendt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (1):71 - 87.details
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Voluntarism and Transparent Deliberation.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2006 - South African Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):171-176.details
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Stake-invariant belief.Brad Armendt - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (1):29-43.details
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The normativity of meaning and content.Kathrin Glüer, Asa Wikforss & Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The reasons of trust.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236.details
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(1 other version)Why be rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.details
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Truth and correct belief.Allan Gibbard - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):338–350.details
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Against essential normativity of the mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.details
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Epistemic ownership and the practical/epistemic parallelism.Jesús Navarro - 2024 - Synthese 203 (5):163.details
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The Self-Reinforcing Nature of Joint Action.Facundo M. Alonso - 2024 - Philosophical Studies (5):1-19.details
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