This study applies Arne Naess’ ecosophy as a tool for possible progressive research material concerning the National Greening Program (NGP) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). This study aims to conduct a phenomenological analysis of tree farming advantages, driven by a philosophical approach and practical strategy integrated through the principle of deep ecology. The philosophy of deep ecology presupposes ethics and the interrelatedness of human beings to nature that generally can be experienced anywhere. This study aims to (...) assess the core motives, plans, objectives, strategic implications, initiatives, provisions, and the probable outcome of the said government program. To realize this, this research enunciates a possible parallel study between Naess's deep ecology and the DENR's goal. Since this study is concerned with the current situation of human beings, it delves into the context of the phenomenological research approach. It provides different perspectives on the other government officials who were once the program's authors and implementers. As this research goes on, the findings have various outlooks on applying deep ecology to facilitate the government's NGP. The crucial part of making this program absolute must be the participation of every individual in such advocacy as a sole environmental bailiff. However, the challenge never ceases to interrupt the goodwill of human beings. On the other hand, man's passion never fails to contribute to sustainable ecological preservation, biodiversity, reparation, and community commitment. (shrink)

This paper considers the foundation of self-realization and the sense of morality that could justify Arne Naess’s claim ‘Self-realization is morally neutral,’ by focusing on the recent debate among deep ecologists. Self-realization, the ultimate norm of Naess’s ecosophy T, is the realization of the maxim ‘everything is interrelated.’ This norm seems to be based on two basic principles: the diminishing of narrow ego, and the integrity between the human and non-human worlds. The paper argues that the former is an extension (...) of Plato’s idea of self-development or self-mastery while the latter is implicit in Aristotle’s holism. It defends that Self-realization is morally neutral only if the term ‘moral’ is considered in the Kantian sense. However, Naess reluctantly distinguishes between ethics and morality, which makes his approach less credible. The paper concludes that Aristotle’s notion of eudaimonia supports Self-realization to qualify as a virtue. (shrink)

The most habitual and common use of the term natural corresponds to that which is – or could be – property of our experience, irrespective of whether that experience is mental or physical, viz. whatever can be known, perceived, determined and categorized by human mind, after it has bumped into and passed through the channels of our senses. The cooperation between our intellectual and sensual capabilities in relation to the usurpation of what is considered to be “natural”, is extremely crucial (...) for us to presume something as such, even if we are not familiar with – or sympathetic to – the duality of the Kantian Theory of Knowledge. That is inasmuch as the human mind, to be specific, is characterized by the intrinsic ability to conceive and contemplate on beings or events, which anything but belong to the natural order of things, beings such as Pegasus or the Valkyries, for instance, and counterfactual realities like the Purgatory or the Valhalla. (shrink)

The later Stoics, especially – and most notably – Posidonius of Apamea, allegedly the greatest polymath of his age and the last in a celebrated line of great philosophers of the ancient world, gradually developed the belief that all parts of the universe, either ensouled or not, were actually interconnected due to the omnipresent, corporeal, primordial kosmikon pyr which, according to Stoicism, pervades each being as the honey pervades the honeycomb. As for reasonable beings, in particular, kosmikon pyr takes the (...) form of logos. Due to that power, Posidonius believes, the phases of moon, for instance, can affect the succession of tides and ebb–tides; on the same grounds, the signs can have major effect on the course of events and, therefore, allow for divination. That kind of interconnectedness, apart from justifying the interdependentness of all beings to each other, testifies for an utter kinship between them, for sympatheia. In this short paper I intent to show that Posidonius’s approach has been promptly adopted and utilized by modern holistic theories concerning Environmental Ethics, especially by Arne Naess’s Deep Ecology and Ecosophy T, in the context of which notions such as kinship, interconnectedness, interdependentness and identification of all beings are key parameters for the articulation of their argumentation. I also intent to outline some essential – in my opinion – differences in the way Posidonius and Naess make use of the notion of interconnectedness, together with some inconsistencies which can be potentially fatal, at least as far as a system of ethics is concerned. This is because notions such as cosmic sympathy may possibly establish an interesting, even charming and influential cosmology or metaphysics, but when it comes to ethics, in my opinion, they can only provide shaky grounds for establishing a firm one, since they allow for deterministic views, which more or less leave no room for personal responsibility, to wit for personal praise or blame. (shrink)

I argue that 'deep' ecology (as exemplified by the work of Arnie Naess) involves three inter-related commitments: (1) to an ethics of nature or axiological anti-humanism in which natural entities, processes or systems can possess intrinsic value independently of human beings; (2) a metaphysical naturalism or anti-humanism in which human beings are themselves conceptualized as natural products; (3) a transformative aspect. Although (3) is sometimes cast in personal or psychological terms, I think the idea can be given a properly philosophical (...) reconstruction along the lines of a kind of Ideologiekritik. I give the examples of Heidegger and Adorno to show how deeply our understanding of nature has been corrupted, and hence the depth of conceptual transformation required correctly to conceive nature. But both these thinkers simultaneously demonstrate a hostility to metaphysical naturalism and therefore have ultimately limited value for deep ecology. I then outline three possible relations of axiological to metaphysical commitments: (a) the abandonment of naturalism about values; (b) a projective or transcendentally idealist account of values; (c) an account of values as themselves lodged within the operation of natural systems. My reconstruction of the Ideologiekritiker shows them belonging to (b). So that if deep ecology is to avoid (a), it must embrace (c). Deleuze is much touted by environmental philosophers as contributing to (c). I argue that this is correct, but that the axiological commitments Deleuze manifests in his account of nature are ultimately quite different from those to which deep ecologists appear sympathetic. (shrink)

Understanding of the term of crisis significantly influences the main argumentation line of the philosophical conceptions stimulated by the reflection of the crisis. The deep ecology of A. Naess belongs to these philosophical concepts. The term of crisis in his thinking appears in a form of a threat as well as opportunity, necessity to make important decisions. It also has a meaning of historical and political crisis, i.e. situations in which under the pressure the basic imperatives and organizational principles of (...) the society are reformulated. Such a broad semantic spectre of the crisis concept is connected with the fact that Naess wants to address not only ecologists, environmentalists and philosophers, but also political scientists and social activists by which he greatly contributed to the constitution of environmentalism as a political movement as well as a political ideology. -/- Chápanie pojmu krízy významne ovplyvňuje hlavnú argumentačnú líniu filozo­fických koncepcií, ktorých vznik podnietila reflexia krízy. K takýmto filozofickým kon­cepciám patrí aj hlbinná ekológia A. Naessa. Pojem krízy v jeho myslení vystupuje vo význame hrozby, ale aj príležitosti, nutnosti rozhodnúť sa, prijať závažné rozhodnutia. Má však tiež význam historickej a politickej krízy, teda situácií, v ktorých sa pod tlakom nutnosti reformulujú základné imperatívy a organizačné princípy spoločnosti. Takto široké významové spektrum pojmu krízy súvisí s tým, že Naess sa snaží osloviť nielen ekológov, ochranárov a filozofov, ale aj politológov, politikov a občianskych aktivistov, čím významne prispel k vzniku environmentalizmu ako politického hnutia i politickej ideológie. (shrink)

Naess and Sessions “Deep Ecology Platform” provided a loose framework for a movement that was gaining momentum after a series of successful social and political actions and events throughout the 1970s and early 1980s. Most of the points are essentially adopted from Naess’ earlier work, which provided the basis for a number of the core concepts expressed in the later eight points and is largely an expression of a movement that sought to create a shift in consciousness of society towards (...) the natural world. It is probably better understood as a lose framework that encapsulates a world view and perspective of nature which is better understood as an aesthetic movement rather than a moral or ethical movement. (shrink)

En 1968 Raquel Carson comenzaba una revolución en el pensamiento, quizá una de las de mayor peso en la actualidad. En su libro "La primavera silenciosa" acusaba del deterioro ambiental al poder ilimitado del ser humano. La creencia surgida en la modernidad de que todo lo que el hombre decidía era en sí mismo lo mejor por haber sido fruto de una voluntad libérrima, daba primacía y legitimidad absoluta a su acción sobre la naturaleza. Surgieron con gran fuerza numerosos grupos (...) ecologistas que adoptaron un pensamiento que responde al nombre de "ecología profunda" o "Deep Ecology" descrito por primera vez por Arme Naess en un artículo publicado por la revista Inquiry y titulado "The Shallow and the Deep, Long Range Ecology Movement". Los principios que proponía este movimiento (Naess 1984) pueden ser resumidos en ocho grandes puntos: 1) la vida de los seres no humanos es un valor en sí: 2) la riqueza y la diversidad de estas formas de vida son también valores en sí; 3) los seres humanos no pueden intervenir de manera destructiva en la vida; 4) a este respecto, la intervención humana actual es eminentemente excesiva; 5) por consiguiente, las reglas de juego deben ser radicalmente modificadas; 6) esta modificación radical debe hacerse tanto a nivel de las estructuras económicas como de las estructuras ideológicas y culturales; 7) a nivel ideológico, el cambio principal consiste en apreciar más la calidad de la vida que el goce de los bienes materiales; 8) las personas que acepten estos principios tienen la obligación de contribuir, directa o indirectamente a la realización de los cambios fundamentales que aquellos implican. (shrink)

In the Andean and Amazonian regions of South America new environmental ethics have emerged that postulate intrinsic values in the non-human. These biocentrisms do not derive directly from the deep ecology of Arne Naess, presenting several differences, but there are also important similarities, which are briefly noted. Southern biocentrism recognizes the rights of Nature but does so in an intercultural perspective, is much more politicized, and is part of ̳ontological openings‘ to alternatives of ecological community that go beyond modernity.

Même si ce livre ne compte pas plus d’une centaine de pages, l’analyse qu’il offre de Heidegger et de sa relation à l’environnement s’avère plutôt exhaustive. Si Casey Rentmeester le fait débuter par une brève histoire du développement de la philosophie environnementale, précisant comment cette discipline a largement affaire à l’éthique appliquée et l’éthique normative, il y explique bientôt comment des philosophes tels que Naess, Thomson et Toadvine emploient aujourd’hui des méthodes non-traditionnelles — ecofeminism, ecophenomenology, deep ecology — pour explorer (...) des aspects négligés par le courant philosophique qui y domine. Avant de s’appuyer sur l’œuvre heideggérienne pour répondre aux questions peu examinées par cette tradition de pensée, l’A. décrit brièvement la manière dont certains des représentants de celle-ci — Siedel, Zimmerman et Foltz notamment — se servent de celle-là pour mieux saisir la position de l’homme dans la nature. À l’en croire, son but est double : utiliser d’abord la critique phénoménologique de la métaphysique établie par Heidegger pour montrer comment, au sein de cette dernière, notre compréhension de l’être a mené à une destruction de l’environnement, puis penser avec Heidegger pour chercher à ce problème une réponse post-métaphysique qu’il s’agirait d’esquisser si tant est qu’il y en ait une. Or, tel est le cas pour Casey Rentmeester, qui se tourne en définitive vers le taoïsme pour lui emprunter son image d’un environnement durable. (shrink)

A typical guiding principle of an account of truth is: “truth is objective,” or, to be clear, judging whether an assertion is true or false depends upon how things are in the world rather than how someone or some community believes it to be. Accordingly, whenever a claim is objectively true, its truth conditions ought not depend upon the context in which it is uttered or the utterer making the claim. Part of our ongoing empirical studies surveying people’s responses to (...) questions about truth involved prompts on objectivity. Our studies suggest the following: overall, individuals tend to endorse claims that are consistent with the objectivity of truth; not all conceptions of objectivity are equal, even people who endorse the objectivity of truth sometimes assent to one form of truth’s objectivity over other forms; philosophers and non-philosophers both endorse the objectivity of truth, but the apparent commitment of philosophers is stronger. (shrink)

Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account of (...) truth that may be buttressed by an examination of the ordinary person’s views of truth. Then, I address a concern raised by Tarski’s contemporaries who saw Næss’ results as refuting Tarski’s semantic conception. Following that, I summarize Næss’ results. Finally, I will contend with a few objections that suggest a strict interpretation of Næss’ results might recommend an overturning of Tarski’s theory. (shrink)