The encounter of the medieval Muslims with Greek philosophy undeniably shaped the course of their philosophical and theological thought. This encounter led to the complex and contentious issue of ‘philosophy versus theology’. Medieval Muslim thinkers needed to develop a response to the issue of philosophy versus theology. The present article will first highlight the response of the Islamic theologians to their encounter with Greek philosophy in the form of three major trends in medieval Islamic theology: (1) strong opposition to the (...) application of reason and rationalist approach to Islamic doctrines, and strict adherence to the actual text of the Qur’an and the Hadith, (2) the adoption of Greek philosophy, and the application of reason and rationalist approach to explain and defend Islamic religion and (3) acknowledging the significance of reason in exploring the matters related to the natural world but, at the same time, stressing the subordination of reason to revelation. This article will discuss Atharism, Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism as the representatives of the first, second and third trends, respectively. The response of the medieval Islamic theologians to the issue of philosophy versus theology serves as a context in which medieval Muslim philosophers carried out their philosophy–theology debate. The article will proceed to show that some medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Abu Bakr Al-Razi, subordinated religion or revelation to philosophy or reason. Other medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Al-Ghazali, subordinated philosophy to theology. The third group of medieval Islamic philosophers represented by Alfarabi argued for the reconciliation and harmonious co-existence of philosophy and religion. Contribution: This article highlights the response of medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers to the issue of philosophy versus theology that was caused by their encounter with Greek philosophy. (shrink)

The object of this paper is to elaborate an understanding of Islamic law and legal theory in terms of the conceptual framework provided by Legal Positivism. The study is not based on denying or contesting the claim of Islamic law to being of divine origin; rather, it is based on the historical reality of Islamic law as part of a (once) living legal tradition, with structure, method, and theory, regardless of claims of origin. It will be suggested that Ash‘arism may (...) be taken as providing an Islamic version of Legal Positivism, and that the objections which Mu‘tazilism raised in the face of Ash‘arism were not different in substance from some of the objections that have been directed at contemporary Legal Positivism. It will also be suggested that the Ash‘arites and the Mu‘tazilites were not opposed to each other in the way they are commonly supposed to have been. Rather, they were preoccupied with different notions of what it is to be obliged (to have an obligation) to do something. (shrink)

This chapter (5) focuses on the concept of the forgiving God in Islamic religion and theology and claims that Islamic thinking about divine forgiveness accommodates two different views that emphasize two different attributes of God: justice and mercy. The first view is associated with a rationalist school of theology known as Mu'tazilism, while the second is associated with a fideistic school known as Ash'arism. The author argues that the first view, which is based on a strict calculus of desert, (...) leaves little or no room for mercy, and that the second view is more true to our ordinary notion of forgiveness. (shrink)

The motivating question of this paper is: ‘How are our beliefs in the theorems of mathematics justified?’ This is distinguished from the question ‘How are our mathematical beliefs reliably true?’ We examine an influential answer, outlined by Russell, championed by Gödel, and developed by those searching for new axioms to settle undecidables, that our mathematical beliefs are justified by ‘intuitions’, as our scientific beliefs are justified by observations. On this view, axioms are analogous to laws of nature. They are postulated (...) to best systematize the data to be explained. We argue that there is a decisive difference between the cases. There is agreement on the data to be systematized in the scientific case that has no analog in the mathematical one. There is virtual consensus over observations, but conspicuous dispute over intuitions. In this respect, mathematics more closely resembles stereotypical philosophy. We conclude by distinguishing two ideas that have long been associated -- realism (the idea that there is an independent reality) and objectivity (the idea that in a disagreement, only one of us can be right). We argue that, while realism is true of mathematics and philosophy, these domains fail to be objective. One upshot of the discussion is that even questions of fundamental physics may fail to be objective in roughly the sense that the question, ‘Is the Parallel Postulate is true?’, understood as one of pure mathematics, fails to be. Another is a kind of pragmatism. Factual questions in mathematics, modality, logic, and evaluative areas go proxy for non-factual practical ones. -/- . (shrink)

[Updated 2/23/21: complete chapter scan] In this chapter I sketch a rightist approach to monumentary policy in a diverse polity beleaguered by old ethnic grievances. I begin by noting the importance of tribalism, memorialization, and social trust. I then suggest a policy which 1) gradually narrows the gap between peoples in the heritage landscape, 2) conserves all but the most offensive of the least beloved racist monuments, 3) avoids recrimination (i.e., “keeps it positive”) and eschews ideological commentary in new monuments (...) or revisions to old ones, 4) as much as politically feasible, recognizes only the offense of willing tribemates, and 5) responds to aesthetic and other “irrational” offenses more than to “objective” historical or philosophical critiques. (shrink)

A review of Michael Ignatieff's book, 'Fire and Ashes: Success and Failure in Politics', published by Harvard University Press, 2013.

In this experimental investigation the Aluminium 6063 is treated with Aluminium Oxide (Al2O3) and Chicken Bone Ash (CBA). This Aluminium metal matrix composite is mixed at certain compositions and observed with the mechanical properties. Two main mechanical properties which includes Surface roughness and corrosion behavior is mainly focused in this research work. In this Research work aluminium hybrid metal matrix composite (AHMMC) is fabricated through stir casting process. Al6063 shows good mechanical properties and corrosion behavior changes, when combined with reinforcements, (...) Al2O3 and Chicken Bone Ash (CBA). Stir casting is an efficient cycle for the manufacture of aluminum hybrid composites. There are numerous boundaries in this cycle, which influence the behavior of corrosion and mechanical properties of the composites. Stir casting is a fluid state technique for the manufacture of composite materials, in which a scattered stage is blended in with a liquid network metal by methods for mechanical mixing. Stir Casting is the least difficult and the most financially savvy strategy for fluid state manufacture. Finally in this research work, when the compositions of each and every reinforcement increase, simultaneously the surface roughness of the composite also get increases. (shrink)

This provocative book questions whether contemporary humanity can face death in any of the traditional ways, since the events of our century have created a new selfhood and a new death. Wyschogrod describes the “death event” and the “death world”; these refer to the Holocaust but also to the destructive bombings in World War II, and most importantly to the death-in-life of the Nazi and Stalinist concentration and labor camps. Her thesis is.

The paper originated as an examination of the philosophical and historical (dis-) continuities that ran from Buddhism, through Schopenhauer, to Freud and Lacan. Due to the excessive length of the paper, the editor advised to drop the part on Schopenhauer.

uses Schopenhauer, Lacan, and Buddhism to elucidate the tragic sense of human existence as conveyed by Wong Kar-wai.

Contemporary discussion of biological teleology has been dominated by a complacent orthodoxy. Responsibility for this shortcoming rests primarily, I think, with those who ought to have been challenging dogma but have remained silent, leaving the orthodox to grow soft, if happily. In this silence, champions of orthodoxy have declared a signal victory, proclaiming the dominance of their view as one of philosophy’s historic successes. But this declaration is premature at best—this would be neither the first nor probably the last time (...) that a narrow school of philosophy has declared the resolution of age-old problems only to have those problems rise from the ashes of their better selves when a broader view is articulated. I propose to challenge orthodoxy by undermining its fundamental assumption and to enlist the help of others in articulating a formidable heterodox alternative to contemporary dogma concerning biological teleology, perhaps on the model I sketch below. (shrink)

This is a short reply to Dan Demetriou's "Ashes of Our Fathers: Racist Monuments and the Tribal Right." Both are included in Oxford University Press's Ethics, Left and Right: The Moral Issues That Divide Us.

This chapter aims to lay out a map of the diverse epistemological perspectives within the Islamic theological tradition, in the conceptual framework of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. In order achieve that goal, it aims to consider epistemological views in light of their historic context, while at the same time seeking to “translate” those broadly medieval perspectives into contemporary philosophical language. In doing so, the chapter offers a succinct overview of the main epistemic trends within the Islamic theological tradition concerning (...) religious epistemology. The chapter is divided into two main sections designated for discussions of differing accounts found in distinct trends of the tradition, namely the Rationalist and Traditionalist trends. The discussion concerning the Rationalist trend focuses on the philosophical-theologians of the dominant Mu’tazilite, Ash’arite, and Maturidite schools. The section on Islamic Traditionalism focuses on the Atharite scripturalism of Ibn Qudāma, and in particular the thought of Ibn Taymiyya. In order to map out these historic positions in light of contemporary religious epistemology, reference is made to a threefold typology of current views in the literature: (1) theistic evidentialism, (2) reformed epistemology, and (3) fideism. As such, the remainder of the chapter will attempt to outline the different approaches toward religious epistemology in the Islamic theological tradition with this threefold typology in mind. (shrink)

Sunni or Sunnism stands for Ahlu As-Sunnah wa al-Jamā`ah which is also called ASWAJA. Many people publish and debate it without clear meaning and reference. This article is a demonstrative-linguistic study that outlines the meaning and reference to the term "Sunni" to understand it clearly. This research shows that Sunnis have at least two groups. First, Sunni Ahlu Al- Ḥadīts, the path of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taimiyyah, which tends to be puritan and at some point raises hardline intolerant Muslims. (...) Second, moderate Sunnis, who opened the space for fiqh schools other than Ibn Hanbal, and chooses to refer to moderate Islamic thinkers, such as Ash-Shāfi'i in fiqh (Islamic law), Al-Asy`ari in kalam (Islamic theology) and Al -Ghazali in Sufism (Islamic mysticism). The two Sunni groups were both Ahlu as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā`ah. The first group tends to embody the phrase Ahlu as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah terminologically (iṣṭilāḥan), while the second group tends to display the phrase linguistically (lughatan). (shrink)

While spreading wide-world, the new coronavirus Sars-CoV-2 made changes in many social departments of our society on levels we never thought about and messes with all our cultural habits. Thus, we witnessed that the religious denominations took into consideration changes without precedent in their cultic history and thus dogmatic as well concerning the actual threat of Coronavirus. We saw for example the Roman-Catholic Church who suspended all masses here and there[1] at first or banned the crucial gestures in rituals [to (...) suspend the distribution of Holy Communion from the Chalice[2], to distribute the Eucharist preferably into the hands of the faithful, and to avoid the physical contact from a peaceful handshake, to forego ash crosses on forehead, to suspend placing water in holy water fonts at the entrance of churches, that the churchgoers "refrain" from kissing or touching the cross for veneration, or even cancellation of masses]. We witnessed Buddhist temples and Protestant churches around Korea [at first] and beyond that have also suspended religious gatherings, and so on. In my case, the Romanian Orthodox Church did the same thing[3], but in a controversial way, firstly making some recommendations for its believers [e.g. not to kiss public icons in Churches, but their indoor ones, and receive Holy Communion with teaspoons for single-use]; afterward same Church reconsidered these recommendations and withdrew its decision [perhaps at the pressure of civil fundamentalists]. How can we qualify all these measures and, moreover, the withdrawal on behalf of religious believers, as weakness, populism, diligence, assuming the human limits, or...something else? What would be the correct and coherent answer religion should assume in this particular regard, and especially what are the reasons to qualify it in a way or another? (shrink)

One contentious issue in contemporary interpretations of medieval Islamic philosophy is the degree of esotericism espoused by its proponents, and therefore the degree of interpretive effort required by its modem readers to ascertain the author's real beliefs. One philosopher who has been accused of esotericism is Averroes (Ibn Rushd), particularly because he is quite explicit in distinguishing among the different types of reasoning appropriate to different classes of people: philosophers, theologians, and laypersons. But on closer inspection Averroes appears to have (...) at his disposal some subtle strategies for achieving partial reconciliation between religion and philosophy, strategies which do not actually involve falsifying the views of either side, although that is how it might appear at first sight. These polemical devices appear most clearly in his exchanges with the theologians (mutakallimun) of the Ash'arite school, of which Ghazali is the most original representative. In this paper I will examine Averroes's position on two sensitive matters, the creation of the universe and the possibility of miracles, in order to illustrate the use of what may be called his "method of re-interpretation," whereby certain key terms are interpreted in such a way as to emphasize the agreements between the two sides while downplaying the differences. (shrink)

This album brings together photos from a documentary trip I made in December 2008-January 2009 in Central America (Guatemala and Honduras), to discover the old Maya civilization. In one of those blurry days caused by Pacaya volcano’s debris and ash, along the ruins of Petén, I believe I must have had an encounter with the Maya deity Kʼawiil….

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious legitimacy of the science (...) of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

Although some Muslim scholars have been affected in their ethical system by ancient Greek philosophers, they have also added some Islamic teachings to it and established a combined ethical system (philosophical and religious). Raghib Isfahani, the author of Al-Dharīʿa, is one of these Muslim scholars whose ethical system in this book should be regarded as a combined Islamic Virtue Ethics. It is the combination of Quranic and Philosophical Virtue Ethics. The general framework of his theory is philosophical adopted from Aristotle's (...) and Plato's Virtue Ethics, however, the content of his theory is completely Islamic and Quranic. One of the significant innovations of Raghib in philosophical Virtue Ethics is adding religious virtues to moral virtues. He added theses four religious virtues: Hidāya (God's guidance), Rushd (God's supplement), Tasdīd (God's giving strong will to individuals) and Taʾyīd (God's assistance) to Plato's four ethical virtues (wisdom, temperance, courage and justice). He has called them Tufīqī virtues. According to Raghib, there is no way to obtain virtues but by God's guidance and supplement. By inspiration from Quran, he divided justice into absolute and conditional one. This innovation help us in reconciling Muʿtazilites and as Ashʿarites dispute in being moral goodness and badness rational or religious. (shrink)

Easter is the most important solemnity (just before Christmas) of the Church. It is the first of the five cardinal feasts of the Catholic liturgical year. Easter commemorates the resurrection of Jesus Christ laid down by the Bible, the third day after his passion. The solemnity begins on Easter Sunday, which for Catholics mark the end of fasting of Lent, and lasts for eight days (Easter week, or week or radiant, or week of eight Sundays). Many customs dating back to (...) ancient times designed to accommodate the return of spring attached themselves to Easter. The egg is the symbol of germination occurs in early spring. Similarly, the hare is an ancient symbol which has always represented fertility. The custom of the Easter egg was found among Coptic Christians from the late fifth century, it is perhaps in memory of ardent eggs (ova ignita) with which the martyrs were tortured or red egg laid by an imperial hen the day of the birth of Alexander Severus in 208 BC. The tradition of offering eggs in spring dates back to antiquity: the Persians, the Egyptians offered, as a lucky, decorated hen eggs as renewal sign. The rabbit once symbolizing fertility and renewal (like spring), it was in Upper Germany where was born the tradition (Osterhase) before it spreads in the Germanic countries. Subsequently, this tradition is exported to the United States by German immigrants in the eighteenth century. CONTENTS: Easter - Date history - Religious celebrations - - Catholic Church - - Orthodox and Eastern Churches - - Evangelical Church - Popular festivals and traditions - Easter eggs - Easter eggs - - Symbolic - - History - - - The red eggs - - - Painted eggs, pissanka and precious eggs - - - Chocolate eggs - - Games and traditions - - - Egg hunting - - - Egg rolling - - - Egg battles - Ash Wednesday - Paschal Triduum - Easter Water - - Picking the Easter Water - - Properties of Easter Water - - - Physical properties - - - Spiritual or magical properties - - Washing in Water Easter - Paschal candle - - Rite of fire at Easter - - Using the paschal candle - Easter Monday - - Liturgical and religious significance - - Folk customs for Easter Monday - Easter Bunny - - Origin - - Alternatives - Osterbrunnen Easter food - Pastiera - - Origins - - - Mythical origin - - - Other origins - - Tradition - - Features . (shrink)

The purpose of this study was to compare the nutrient contents and phytochemical composition of the leaves, roots, and stem bark of Cissus populnea. The specimens came from Nsukka in Nigeria's Enugu State. Laboratory experimental design was used for this study. Samples of leaves, roots, and stem barks were prepared by drying them for two hours at 50 0C in a food dehydrator, ground into fine powder and dried again using the air-drying process The analyses were carried out using standard (...) methods. The proximate analyses showed that the samples contain crude protein (1.89 - 2.11%), crude fibre (22.23 - 22.48%), crude fat (1.99 - 2.09%), carbohydrates (43.71 - 64.96%), ash (4.11 - 6.64%) and moisture (4.46- 4.84%). The phytochemical data showed that all plant components contained phenol, alkaloids, tannins, and terpenoids, but not steroids. Both saponin and flavoloid were found in the plant's roots and leaves only. Flavonoid was not detected in the stem. The results of mineral compositions showed that the root, stem, and leaf samples included potassium (340.83 – 439.33 mg/100g) calcium (132.99 – 295.78 mg/100g), iron (1.12 – 4.21 mg/100g), magnesium (27.41- 39.67 mg/100g) and manganese (0.14 – 3.99 mg/100g). Because of its nutrient contents and phytochemical proportions, consumers are encouraged to use any parts, though root parts of the plant seem to contain high nutrient. (shrink)

This paper cuts across three nineteenth-century Russian thinkers—Pyotr Chaadaev, Mikhail Bakunin and Nikolai Fedorov—to reconstruct a speculative trajectory that seeks to think an ungrounding and delegitimation of the (Christian-modern) world and its logics of violence, domination, and exclusion. In Chaadaev, Russia becomes a territory of nothingness—an absolute exception from history, tradition, and memory, without attachment or relation to world history. Ultimately, Chaadaev affirms this atopic void in its immanence, as capable of creating immanently from itself a common future. Bakunin is (...) antagonistic to political theology as an apparatus of transcendence spanning across nature and history, cannibalism and patriotism, abstraction and religious transcendence. Against these amalgams, and against Schmitt’s naturalist reading of Bakunin, we detect in him the idea of socialism or anarchism as what has never taken place in nature or history, and the image of an unnatural humanity affirmed as the common task linking an absolute futurity with a revolutionary nowness. Against the violence of nature and history in which the present is sacrificed, and death is justified, for future life, Fedorov (the founder of Russian Cosmism) seeks to think the apocalyptic common task of immanent resurrection—and the void as the cosmic void, the expanse of the universe to be inhabited in-common. For him, thought must proceed from death and the ashes (of history and the earth) as what we have in common. The resulting trajectory is ambivalent, caught between an ungrounding of modernity and world-history, and providential or theodical modes of its justification. (shrink)

“The issue of obligation and free determination had been subject to polemics due to religious concerns. One group defended carbriyya on the basis of the absolute sovereignty of God. While others argued the idea of indetermination in terms of divine justice. After explaining and critizing these thoughts, Molla Sadra gave explanation to the opinions of the Ash’arites on the subject. And then he formed the basis of a new theory called “theory of ahl-i yakin” while getting inspired by the words (...) of Ali b. Ebu Talib who says “there is neither determination nor tawfiz, indeed it is between these” So to speak, human acts are related to both human beings and God.”. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide a roadmap to AI governance. In contrast to the reigning paradigms, we argue that AI governance should not be merely a reactive, punitive, status-quo-defending enterprise, but rather the expression of an expansive, proactive vision for technology—to advance human flourishing. Advancing human flourishing in turn requires democratic/political stability and economic empowerment. Our overarching point is that answering questions of how we should govern this emerging technology is a chance not merely to categorize and manage narrow risk (...) but also to construe the risks and opportunities much more broadly, and to make correspondingly large investments in public goods, personnel, and democracy itself. To lay out this vision, we take four steps. First, we define some central concepts in the field, disambiguating between forms of technological harms and risks. Second, we review normative frameworks governing emerging technology that are currently in use around the globe. Third, we outline an alternative normative framework based in power-sharing liberalism. Fourth, we walk through a series of governance tasks that ought to be accomplished by any policy framework guided by our model of power-sharing liberalism. We follow these with proposals for implementation vehicles. (shrink)