This essay is concerned with two interrelated questions. First, a broad question: in what sense is Skepticism a philosophy− or in what sense is it “philosophy” (as we will see, these are not identical questions)? Second, a narrow one: how should we understand the process whereby ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) emerges out of epochē (suspension of judgment)? The first question arises because Skepticism is often portrayed as anti-philosophy. This depiction, I contend, surreptitiously turns a Skeptical method into a so-called (...) Skeptical doctrine which is then either condemned for being self-refuting or salvaged as a plausible (albeit odd) epistemological theory. Instead, philosophy, for the Skeptics, is a matter of practice. Skepticism is not so much a philosophy that has a worldview to proclaim as it is a philosophy that invites us to perform something. (shrink)

My purpose in this article is to revisit an issue concerning the state of undisturbedness or tranquility (ἀταραξία) in ancient Pyrrhonism as this skeptical stance is depicted in Sextus Empiricus’s extant works. The issue in question is whether both the pursuit and the attainment of undisturbedness in matters of opinion should be regarded as defining features of Pyrrhonism not merely from a systematic standpoint that examines Pyrrhonism as a kind of philosophy, but mainly according to Sextus’s own account of that (...) skeptical stance. In exploring this issue, I will develop an interpretation defended in previous work, responding to some objections, discussing alternative interpretations, offering further textual support, and putting forward new arguments. It is my contention that examining whether both the pursuit and the attainment of undisturbedness in matters of opinion are essential to Pyrrhonism will make it possible to gain a more accurate understanding of this brand of skepticism. (shrink)

The purpose of the present paper is twofold. First, to examine what beliefs, if any, underlie (a) the Pyrrhonist’s desire for ataraxia and his account of how this state may be attained, and (b) his philanthropic therapy, which seeks to induce, by argument, ejpochv and ataraxia in the Dogmatists. Second, to determine whether the Pyrrhonist’s philanthropy and his search for and attainment of ataraxia are, as scholars have generally believed, essential aspects of his stance.

Following the inferences of my previous work "Monadic Conditionality", this work further investigates the nature of being-for-itself's transformations and what happens with any being-for-itself in between eternal returns, completing a quasi-principled view on immortality (suggested and started in my previous work). Through mathematical reasoning, this model infers that infinitesimal differences between successive event lines grow gradually across subspaces, until reaching the state of eternal return; the cycle repeats, resulting in each event line having its own eternal return, preserving monadic homeostasis. (...) Thus, "amor fati" is enriched by extending fixed eternal recurrences with all "inter-idem" variations, ultimately reaching a fertile ground for ataraxia. (shrink)

Epicurus is strongly committed to psychological and ethical egoism and hedonism. However, these commitments do not square easily with many of the claims made by Epicureans about friendship: for instance, that the wise man will sometimes die for his friend, that the wise man will love his friend as much as himself, feel exactly the same toward his friend as toward himself, and exert himself as much for his friend's pleasure as for his own, and that every friendship is worth (...) choosing for its own sake. These claims have led some scholars to assert that Epicurus inconsistently affirms that friendship has an altruistic element. I argue that the Epicurean claims about friendship can be reconciled with egoism and hedonism in psychology and ethics. Friendship is valuable because having friends provides one with security more effectively than any other means, and having confidence that one will be secure in the future either is identical to ataraxia, or the grounds on which one has it. (shrink)

This chapter presents Gustave Flaubert’s Madame Bovary and Samuel Beckett’s Trilogy as modern fictions with ancient-skeptical ambitions. Whether in the affective domain (Flaubert) or in the cognitive (Beckett), the aim is to help the reader achieve a position of studied neutrality—ataraxia, époché—thanks not to an a priori decision but to the mutual cancellation of opposing tendencies. Understanding Flaubert and Beckett in this way allows us, first, to enrich our sense of what “catharsis” may involve; second, to see why the (...) apparently odious Charles, in Madame Bovary, suddenly becomes a deeply touching figure; and third, to recognize the severe limitations of empathy-based moralist theories of fiction. (shrink)

It is widely supposed that Epicurus' identification of aponia (painlessness) and the absence of anxiety (ataraxia) yields as a consequence the claim that the most pleasant life is one that requires little in the way of resources or power. This paper argues that the remarks in Cicero which attempt to reconstruct Epicurus' reasons for thinking that aponia and ataraxia are the limit of pleasure are best interpreted if we suppose that the inference runs the other direction. Epicurus supposed (...) that it was a pre-theoretical constraint on any account of human happiness that it should be natural. Moreover, its naturalness means its in-principle availability to most humans. (shrink)

The rationality of the human being applied in science-technique in the contemporary capitalist system is distorted; the purpose, which is the good life for human beings, has become the means to sustain and feedback the technicist system of technological capitalism. Thus, the modus operandi of science, aims only to legitimize technology, apart from the ethics applied in this relationship between technology and human beings, and cut off from critical philosophical thinking. With the result presented, the problem lies in the reason (...) of the contemporary human being, who seeks to satisfy his desires and envisions the good life (eudaimonía) in material goods, suppressing the contemplative leisure of life (ataraxia); becoming a slave to the system it fosters. The objective is to demonstrate the need to reformulate the modern system, in order to earn a good life for human beings as a purpose of technical science, which should be the means for this and as technological advances in favor of the quality of human beings. and, not for capitalist reproduction. The research methodology is an exploratory bibliography, exposing and dialoguing with authors on the subject in order to forge our conclusion, that pleads for science-technical that enjoys ethics and human reason in favor of eudaimonia. (shrink)

It is undeniable that human beings seek happiness and have difficulty finding it. This is not a new phenomenon: ever since ancient times man has wondered about what happiness is, where it lies and how to achieve it. For the Greeks, a people of deep pessimism, the search for happiness (eudaimonia) was a traditional theme of philosophy and it was precisely in Greece where Epicurus ́ (341-270 BC) doctrine of happiness emerged. A cursed and manipulated author (just like his admirer (...) Nietzsche), Epicurus has probably been the thinker who has most lucidly approached the question of eudaimonia. Its doctrine seeks and promises its followers happiness through pleasure (hedoné), self-sufficiency (autarky), friendship (philía) and mental calm (ataraxia), offering itself as medicine against the pain of flesh and the sufferings of the mind. But Epicurean hedonism, which harmonizes well with the ancient Apollonian maxim that wisdom consists of moderation and the knowledge of limits, is totally removed from both the tyranny of the happycracy and from the noxious culture of unrestrained and vacuous desire of contemporary postmodernity. This is precisely why Epicurus's timeless proposal for authentic happiness deserves to be known for everyone: for constituting an effective therapy against the ills that afflict the nihilistic human being of the neoliberal era. (shrink)

This article considers two alternative responses to the question of the motivation behind the suspensive argumentation developed by the Pyrrhonic version of the ancient scepticism and also shows their respective difficulties: a) the therapeutic motivation, that takes the suspension of assent for the condition to reach not only a state of mental tranquillity concerning matters of opinion but also a moderate attitude towards passions; b) the epistemic motivation, which states that the suspension corresponds to the unique possibility to preserve philosophical (...) life in the absence of rational criteria to decide among competing philosophical theories. The latter kind of motivation, which consists in creating propitious conditions for the search for the truth, has nothing to do with the methodic motivation characterizing the modern reception of ancient scepticism. Although this motivation was not present in the Pyrrhonic scepticism, it could not be unknown to the academic sceptics because of their Socratic origins. (shrink)

Emotions have often been considered a threat to morality and rationality; in the Romantic tradition, passions were placed at the center of both human individuality and moral life. This ambivalence has led to an ambiguity between the terms of emotions for vices and virtues. Epicureans and Stoics have argued that emotions are irrational. The Stoics believed that virtue is nothing but knowledge, and emotions are essentially irrational beliefs. Skeptics believed that beliefs were responsible for pain, recommending rejection of opinions of (...) any kind. These schools emphasized the general value of "ataraxia", the absence of mental disturbance, the philosophy being regarded as therapy for the cleansing of the emotions in the soul. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27533.77282. (shrink)

Fericirea este un concept fuzzy. Ea poate fi definită în termeni de a trăi o viață bună sau de a înflori, mai degrabă decât de a experimenta o emoție. Fericirea în acest sens a fost folosită pentru a traduce eudaimonia greacă și este încă folosită în etica virtuții. A existat o tranziție în timp, de la accent pe fericirea virtuții la virtutea fericirii. În psihologie, fericirea este o stare mentală sau emoțională a bunăstării, care poate fi definită, printre altele, de (...) emoții pozitive sau plăcute, variind de la mulțumire până la bucuria intensă. În Vedele hinduse, ānanda semnifică fericirea veșnică, cea care însoțește sfârșitul ciclului de renaștere. Pentru grecii antici, ataraxia este o stare lucidă de echilibru robust, caracterizată de elibertatea continuă de teama primejdiei și îngrijorare. Filosofii consideră că fericirea poate fi înțeleasă ca fiind scopul moral al vieții sau ca aspect al hazardului, explicând fericirea fie ca o stare de spirit, fie ca o viață înfloritoare pentru persoana căreia i se aplică. „Conceptul de fericire este un concept atât de vag încât, în ciuda dorinței fiecărui om de a fi fericit, nimeni nu poate spune niciodată în termeni preciși și coerent ce vrea și dorește cu adevărat. Motivul este că elementele care fac parte din conceptul de fericire sunt în totalitate empirice, adică trebuie împrumutate din experiență, și că în același timp, pentru ideea fericirii, un întreg absolut, este necesar un maxim de bunăstare în starea actuală și cea viitoare. Ori, este imposibil ca o persoană finită să fie atât de perspicace și, în același timp, atât de puternică încât să se presupună că poate crea un concept cert despre ceea ce își dorește cu adevărat. Bogăție? ... Cunoaștere? ... Viață lungă? .. Sănătate? Prin urmare, nu există, în acest sens, un imperativ care să ne impună în sensul strict al cuvântului ce să facem pentru a fi fericiți, deoarece fericirea este un ideal nu al rațiunii, ci al imaginației." (Emmanuel Kant, Critica facultății de judecată) -/- CUPRINS: -/- Fericirea - Definiție - Legătura cu sănătatea fizică - Filozofie - Religie - - Religiile orientale - - - Budism - - - Hinduism - - - Confucianismul - - Religiile abrahamice - - - Iudaismul - - - Catolicismul roman - - - Islam - Psihologie - - Ierarhia nevoilor a lui Maslow - - Teoria autodeterminării - - Psihologie pozitivă - - Măsurarea fericirii - Viziunea economică și politică Ānanda - Diferite sensuri de fericire în filosofia hindusă - - Swami Vivekananda - - Sri Aurobindo - - Advaita vedanta - - Dvaita vedanta - - Vishishtadvaita vedanta - - Sri Ramana Maharshi - Modalități de realizare a ānandei Ataraxia - Epicureismul - Pironism - Stoicism Indici ai fericirii: Fericirea Națională Brută - Definirea FNB - Implementarea FNB în Bhutan - Răspândirea FNB în afara Bhutan - Critica Filosofia fericirii - Grecia antică - - Platon - - Aristotel - - Cinism - - Cirenaicism - - Pironism - - Epicureism - - Stoicism - Roma antică - - Școala lui Sextius - - Augustin de Hippo - - Boețiu - Evul Mediu - - Avicenna - - Al-Ghazali - - Maimonide - - Thomas de Aquino - Perioada modernă timpurie - - Michel de Montaigne - - Jeremy Bentham - - Arthur Schopenhauer - Perioada contemporană - - Władysław Tatarkiewicz - - Herbert Marcuse - - Viktor Frankl - - Robert Nozick - Scientismul - Studiul fericirii - - Sonja Lyubomirsky Teoria (etica) virtuții - Concepte cheie - Istoria virtuții - - „Turnura aretaică” contemporană Consecințialism - Filosofii - - Consecințialismul de stat - - Utilitarism - - Egoismul etic - - Altruismul etic - - Consecințialismul regulilor - - Consecințialismul pe două niveluri - - Consecințialismul motivațional - - Consecințialism negativ - - Etica teleologică - - Actele și omisiunile, și "doctrina actelor și omisiunilor" Referințe Despre autor - Nicolae Sfetcu - - De același autor - - Contact Editura - MultiMedia Publishing . (shrink)

I argue that a circa first century B.C./A.D. anonymous epistolary comic novel depicting a fictional interaction between Hippocrates of Cos and Democritus of Abdera contains an insightful imitation of Democritus that can cast light on the historical Democritus’s thought, including his thought on the touchy subject of appropriate and inappropriate laughter. The only thing certain about Democritus’s view of laughter is that he denounced laughter at human misfortune as inappropriate. The later legend of him as laughing at everything and everyone (...) indiscriminately is a later distortion of his view which the author of the comic novel seems concerned to counteract. (shrink)

Epictetus, a former slave who lived in Rome during Nero’s reign but was exiled (along with all those who practiced philosophy in Rome) to Greece by Domitian’s decree in 93 CE, espoused an austere ethical philosophy which aimed at happiness (eudaimonia), or tranquility (ataraxia), through the delimitation of valuation to things within one’s control. Although Epictetus never set to writing his beliefs, his disciple Arrian recorded eight books of his sayings (entitled Discourses [ διατριβαί ] of which only four (...) books survive) and edited a compendium entitled the Handbook ( Ἐγχειρίδιον). In his preface to the volume under review, editor Theodore Scaltsas writes that “there is no message that would be of greater value in the face of today’s threats to society than Epictetus’ ‘bear and forbear.'” (1) Although Epictetus’ “forbearance” is not exactly the philosophy of hope much in vogue in contemporary politics, there is no doubt that Epictetus offers a perennial source of strength and self-reliance. (shrink)

Democritus of Abdera, best known as a cosmologist and the founder of atomism, wrote more on ethics than anyone before Plato. His work Peri euthumiês (On Contentment) was extremely influential on the later development of teleological and intellectualist ethics, eudaimonism, hedonism, therapeutic ethics, and positive psychology. The loss of his works, however, and the transmission of his fragments in collections of maxims (gnomai), has obscured the extent his contribution to the history of systematic ethics and influence on later philosophy, especially (...) in the Hellenistic age. In this essay I review the evidence basis for Democritus’ ethics, discuss the rhetorical and logical aspects of his maxims, attempt to synthesize the fragments into an overall interpretation, and offer a summary some of the more influential aspects of his ethics. (shrink)