På mange måter er dette en bok som blir utgitt alt for sent. Det er den første antologien av sitt slag, og retter fokus på kvinnelige metafysikere som virket i den tidlige moderne perioden (16. og tidlig 17. århundre). Redaktør Emily Thomas skriver i introduksjonen at til tross for at flere antologier om moderne metafysikk allerede finnes, er kvinnelige filosofer fortsatt underrepresentert og den filosofiske kanon mannsdominert. De ni filosofene som blir omtalt i totalt 13 kapitler var alle originale og (...) velkjente tenkere i sin samtid, men har blitt glemt i filosofihistoriens løp. (shrink)

In many situations, people are unsure in their moral judgements. In much recent philosophical literature, this kind of moral doubt has been analysed in terms of uncertainty in one’s moral beliefs. Non-cognitivists, however, argue that moral judgements express a kind of conative attitude, more akin to a desire than a belief. This paper presents a scientifically informed reconciliation of non-cognitivism and moral doubt. The central claim is that attitudinal ambivalence—the degree to which one holds conflicting attitudes towards the same object—can (...) play the role of moral doubt for non-cognitivists. I will demonstrate that ambivalence has all of the features that we would expect it to have in order to play the role of moral doubt. It is gradable, can vary through time, covaries with strength of motivation, and is suitably distinct from the other features of our moral judgements. As well as providing a defence of non-cognitivism, this insight poses a new challenge for the view: deciding how to act under moral ambivalence. (shrink)

A lively topic of debate in decision theory over recent years concerns our understanding of the different risk attitudes exhibited by decision makers. There is ample evidence that risk-averse and risk-seeking behaviours are widespread, and a growing consensus that such behaviour is rationally permissible. In the context of clinical medicine, this matter is complicated by the fact that healthcare professionals must often make choices for the benefit of their patients, but the norms of rational choice are conventionally grounded in a (...) decision maker’s own desires, beliefs and actions. The presence of both doctor and patient raises the question of whose risk attitude matters for the choice at hand and what to do when these diverge. Must doctors make risky choices when treating risk-seeking patients? Ought they to be risk averse in general when choosing on behalf of others? In this paper, I will argue that healthcare professionals ought to adopt a deferential approach, whereby it is the risk attitude of the patient that matters in medical decision making. I will show how familiar arguments for widely held anti-paternalistic views about medicine can be straightforwardly extended to include not only patients’ evaluations of possible health states, but also their attitudes to risk. However, I will also show that this deferential view needs further refinement: patients’ higher-order attitudes towards their risk attitudes must be considered in order to avoid some counterexamples and to accommodate different views about what sort of attitudes risk attitudes actually are. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to provide a detailed characterisation of some ways in which our preferences reflect our reasons. I will argue that practical reasons can be characterised along two dimensions that influence our preferences: their balance and their weight. This is analogous to a similar characterisation of the way in which probabilities reflect the balance and weight of evidence in epistemology. In this paper, I will illustrate the distinction between the balance and weight of reasons, and show (...) how this is crucial for an adequate account of preference and choice. The upshot is a more complete picture of a particular kind of decision, labelled by Isaac Levi and, more recently, Ruth Chang as ‘hard choices’. These are choices in which one option is better than another in some ways, the other is better than the first in some ways, but neither seems better overall. The distinction between the balance and weight of reasons presents a new way of understanding how hard choices vary by degree and what it is that makes them so hard. (shrink)

This paper presents a unifying diagnosis of a number of important problems facing existing models of rational choice under moral uncertainty and proposes a remedy. I argue that the problems of (i) severely limited scope, (ii) intertheoretic comparisons, and (iii) 'swamping’ all stem from the way in which values are assigned to options in decision rules such as Maximisation of Expected Choiceworthiness. By assigning values to options under a given moral theory by asking something like ‘how much do I desire (...) this option, supposing this theory is true?’ rather than ‘how much value does this theory assign to this option?’ these problems can be avoided, while the appealing features of these accounts can be preserved. This amendment provides a role for the preferences, desires, or goals of rational agents that is curiously absent from the existing discussion of what individuals rationally ought to do when they are uncertain about what they morally ought to do. (shrink)

An AI-based “patient preference predictor” (PPP) is a proposed method for guiding healthcare decisions for patients who lack decision-making capacity. The proposal is to use correlations between sociodemographic data and known healthcare preferences to construct a model that predicts the unknown preferences of a particular patient. In this paper, I highlight a distinction that has been largely overlooked so far in debates about the PPP–that between algorithmic prediction and decision-making–and argue that much of the recent philosophical disagreement stems from this (...) oversight. I show how three prominent objections to the PPP only challenge its use as the sole determinant of a choice, and actually support its use as a source of evidence about patient preferences to inform human decision-making. The upshot is that we should adopt the evidential conception of the PPP and shift our evaluation of this technology towards the ethics of algorithmic prediction, rather than decision-making. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of Stephen Makin's ontological argument. To some extent, the argument of this paper is recapitulated in *Ontological Arguments and Belief in God* (CUP, 1996).

Felsefî merak, insansoyunu yüzyıllardır birçok problemle yüz yüze bıraktı; evrene büyük sorular sordu, ondan büyük cevaplar bekledi. Evreni araştırırken, kendisinin de bir parçası olduğunun farkındaydı; hâlâ öyle… Evrenin bir parçası olan insan, sorularının kaynağına yöneldiğinde, yani kendisine yöneldiğinde, orada ne buldu: Soyut, kendinden menkul bir töz mü? Gayrimaddi, mistik ve bilinemez bir varlık mı? Yoksa tıpkı bilgisayar düzeneğine benzeyen bir makine mi? Evrenin bir parçası olan insan, yalnızca büyük sorular sorma ve yalnızca büyük cevaplar bekleme yoluyla kendini/kendiliğini anlamaya çalışmadı. Sıradan, (...) en sıradan yaşantıları dahi bu büyük problemin pençesinde neşv ü nema buldu. Günlük yaşantılar ve deneyimler, öznel durumlar ve algılar, hatta bir diş ağrısı tam olarak nedir: Cogito mu? Yoksa sadece beyin mi? Bu çalışmada, son yıllarda ivme kazanan zihin felsefesinin temel problemlerinden biri olan zihin-beden ilişkisini, Saffet Murat Tura’nın perspektifinden inceledik. Tura’nın zihin-beden ilişkisi problemine önerdiği Ontolojik Nöro/Fenomenal Özdeşlik Tezi etrafında, tekliflerinin ve sorunlarının ne olduğunu göstermeye çalıştık. Tura’nın teklifleri ve sorunlarını göstermenin, zihin felsefesinin temel problem alanlarıyla orijinal bir şekilde yüzleşmenin önünü açtığını düşündük. Böylelikle zihin felsefesi üzerine Türkiye’de yapılan çalışmalara bir katkı sağlamak istedik. (shrink)

Materialisme dan mekanisme memandang yang hidup tidak lebih dari benda. Penganut materialisme, melihat organisme hidup dipandang seperti mesin yang rumit. Bagian-bagiannya saling tergantung dan mempengaruhi. Sedangkan mekanisme melihat organisme hidup hanya berdasarkan hukum kimia-fisika. Segala sesuatunya cukup diterangkan melalui rumus-rumus yang rumit. Lawan dari dua paham itu adalah vitalisme. Menurut kaum vitalisme organisme hidup secara fundamental berbeda dari entitas non-hidup. Pada dasarnya diatur oleh prinsip-prinsip yang berbeda dari hal-hal yang mati. Ada dua kutub vitalisme: biologis dan spiritual. Artikel ini akan (...) mengungkap pemikiran filsuf Perancis Henri Bergson (1874–1948) tentang Elan vital untuk mengatasi hambatan materi dalam pembentukan tubuh makhluk hidup. Terutama ditekankannya vitalitas spiritual, yaitu kebebasan dan spontanitas, yang tidak dapat dikembalikan ke keadaan sebelumnya; mendobrak segala hukum kausalitas. Dinamika itu membawa manusia menuju penghayatan yang makin tinggi. (shrink)