Soon there will be sex robots. The creation of such devices raises a host of social, legal and ethical questions. In this article, I focus in on one of them. What if these sex robots are deliberately designed and used to replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse? Should the creation and use of such robots be criminalised, even if no person is harmed by the acts performed? I offer an argument for thinking that they should be. The argument (...) consists of two premises. The first claims that it can be a proper object of the criminal law to regulate wrongful conduct with no extrinsically harmful effects on others. The second claims that the use of robots that replicate acts of rape and child sexual abuse would be wrongful, even if such usage had no extrinsically harmful effects on others. I defend both premises of this argument and consider its implications for the criminal law. I do not offer a conclusive argument for criminalisation, nor would I wish to be interpreted as doing so; instead, I offer a tentative argument and a framework for future debate. This framework may also lead one to question the proposed rationales for criminalisation. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider Ripstein and Dan-Cohen's critiques of the 'harm principle'. Ripstein and Dan-Cohen have asserted that the harm principle should be jettisoned, because it allegedly fails to provide a rationale for criminalising certain harmless wrongs that ought to be criminalised. They argue that Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative and his concept of 'external freedom' are better equipped for ensuring that criminalisation decisions meet the requirements of fairness. Per contra, I assert that Kant's deontological theory (...) is about identifying morally wrongful and rightful conduct: it does not tell the legislature which of those wrongs justify a criminal law response in accordance with the requirements of fairness and justice. Some wrongdoers deserve censure and the stigma that results from criminalisation, but others do not. Kant's deontological theory does not limit the scope of the criminal law merely to those wrongs that deserve a criminal law response. Fair and principled criminalisation requires more than mere wrongdoing. I assert that it is only fair to criminalise wrongs when further normative reasons can be invoked to justify the use of the criminal law as a means for deterring the unwanted conduct. While 'harm to others' is not the only normative reason that can be used to demonstrate that it is fair to criminalise a given act, it is the justification that has the greatest reach. It would not be fair to criminalise mere wrongdoing (that is, every violation of freedom: trespass to goods etc. or every violation of the categorical imperative: every false promise etc.). Nor is it possible to distinguish one violation of freedom from the next, as freedom is not measurable. Thus, murder and trespass to goods would be equally wrong and equally criminalisable in Kant's scheme. A further problem with Dan-Cohen's use of the second formulation of Kant's categorical imperative is that it aims to be an inclusive criterion for identifying conduct that is prima facie criminalisable, but this inclusive approach does not explain the wrongfulness (or in Dan-Cohen's use of the categorical imperative the criminalisableness) of harming animals. In this paper, I demonstrate that the harm principle is able to meet the challenges raised by Ripstein and Dan-Cohen. I also demonstrate that it offers superior criteria for ensuring that criminalisation decisions are fair, just and principled than is offered by Kant's deontological theory. (shrink)

Criminalisation of prostitution, and minority rights for disabled persons, are important contemporary political issues. The article examines their intersection by analysing the conditions and arguments for making a legal exception for disabled persons to a general prohibition against purchasing sexual services. It explores the badness of prostitution, focusing on and discussing the argument that prostitution harms prostitutes, considers forms of regulation and the arguments for and against with emphasis on a liberty-based objection to prohibition, and finally presents and analyses (...) three arguments for a legal exception, based on sexual rights, beneficence, and luck egalitarianism, respectively. It concludes that although the general case for and against criminalisation is complicated there is a good case for a legal exception. (shrink)

This chapter provides a general overview and introduction to the law and ethics of virtual sexual assault. It offers a definition of the phenomenon and argues that there are six interesting types. It then asks and answers three questions: (i) should we criminalise virtual sexual assault? (ii) can you be held responsible for virtual sexual assault? and (iii) are there issues with 'consent' to virtual sexual activity that might make it difficult to prosecute or punish virtual sexual assault?

Can anti-deportation resistance be justified, and if so how and by whom may, or perhaps should, unjust deportations be resisted? In this paper, I seek to provide an answer to these questions. The paper starts by describing the main forms and agents of anti-deportation action in the contemporary context. Subsequently, I examine how different justifications for principled resistance and disobedience may each be invoked in the case of deportation resistance. I then explore how worries about the resister’s motivation for engaging (...) in the action and their epistemic position apply in the specific context of anti-deportation action and consider in what circumstances there is not merely a right but a duty to resist deportation. The upshot of this argument, I conclude, is that the liberal state ought to respond to anti-deportation action not by criminalising disobedience and resistance in this field, but rather by creating legal avenues for such actors to influence deportation decision-making. DOI 10.17879/95189423213. (shrink)

The Human Rights Studies Programme, School of International Studies (JNU), in collaboration with the Centre for Inner Asian Studies, School of International Studies (JNU), and the Indian Law Institute (Delhi), organized a Human Rights Day Webinar on the Intersections of Human Rights and Criminal Law on December 9-10, 2021. Experts and young scholars from the field shared their insights and research on the webinar theme. The presentations were organized under four sessions, including Session I on Rights Jurisprudence and Criminal Law, (...) Session II on Proposals for Criminalisation and Decriminalisation, Session III on Crimes, Victims, and Punishments, and Session IV on Reforms in the Future. The Webinar was conceptualized keeping in view the responsibility of states under international human rights law to prohibit and punish for the protection of human rights and the redressal of violations. The obligations of States to prohibit and punish inform the development of criminal rules and procedures under different legal systems, leading to the near universalization of legislative frameworks, legal justifications, and punishments. In the working of international human rights institutions, the criminal laws adopted by States are an indicator or marker of the level of compliance of States with the international mandates. In recent years, the interface between the two fields, i.e., international human rights and domestic criminal laws, has sparked great jurisprudential, political, and constitutional debates in different parts of the world. Against this backdrop, the Webinar was organized on Human Rights Day to discuss the relevant issues. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that we can make sense of moral norms against consensual, adult incest by appealing to the value of familial relationships and the potential for sex to damage them. Viewing sex as unconscionable between family members helps to enable the loving intimacy normally associated with family relationships. Therefore, there is good reason for incest, even when consensual and between adults, to remain taboo. That being said, I argue that there is insufficient legal justification for all consensual, (...) adult incest to be criminalised. I examine four potential arguments in favor of consensual, adult incest being illegal, and conclude that none of them succeeds in justifying a total legal prohibition against it. (shrink)

This chapter discusses major theories of domestic justice in the context of South African Constitutional, statutory and case law. It begins by considering when it is permissible for legislators to restrict civil liberty. South Africa's Parliament has criminalised prostitution, liquor sales on Sundays and marijuana use, actions that few liberals would say should be illegal. However, South African law permits abortion, gambling and homosexual relationships, which many conservatives would criminalise. Is there any deep inconsistency here? Should South Africa become more (...) liberal or less? Then, this essay takes up the issue of the way the law ought to govern the distribution of personal property such as houses, TVs and money. Is it permissible for the state to force those who have acquired wealth without using force or fraud to give some of it to those with less? Libertarians say that it is not permissible, while redistributivists say that it is. If the latter are correct, are wealthy South Africans giving their fair share, and is the South African state redistributing it in the right way? Next, the discussion considers whether the law should protect private property, something that capitalists affirm and socialists deny. Despite its socialist disposition before the end of apartheid, the ANC has decisively promoted private ownership of the means of production. Has this been appropriate? Is there a 'third way' between the communism of the East and the capitalism of the West that South Africa should pursue? The chapter concludes by providing a brief summary of the use of legal coercion in the new South Africa along with readings for further consideration. (shrink)

Comment en arrive-t-on à proposer comme oeuvre d’art une relation sexuelle tarifée avec un collectionneur? En 2003, l’artiste en art conceptuel et performeuse américaine, Andrea Fraser, commettra l’impensable de « coucher » avec un collectionneur afin de critiquer le milieu et surtout le marché de l’art contemporain. L’article qui suit propose une analyse thématique de l’aspect sexuel et éthique de cette oeuvre intitulée Untitled. Il sera d’abord question des significations possibles de cette performance et ses questionnements artistiques plus autoréférentiels. Je (...) compte ensuite aborder plus précisément la position trouble de la subjectivité de l’artiste qui oscille entre une posture d’objet sexuel et d’artiste. De même, le texte fera état de la position novatrice que l’oeuvre présente sur les enjeux éthiques du travail du sexe en déconstruisant les arguments paternalistes généralement invoqués pour criminaliser le travail du sexe. Et finalement, j’aborderai la question de savoir comment la nature sexuelle de l’oeuvre vient désacraliser à la fois l’art et la sexualité, et par le fait même critiquer l’idée que la sexualité soit le siège de la subjectivité. En désacralisant ainsi la sexualité, je postule qu’Untitled offre la possibilité de concevoir le travail du sexe de manière plus neutre.How can a sexual act in exchange of money with an art collector be offered as a work of art? In 2003, performer and conceptual artist Andrea Fraser committed the unthinkable of sleeping with an art collector in order to critique the contemporary art milieu and market. The following article proposes a thematic analysis of sexual and ethical components of this work of art entitled Untitled. I will first discuss possible meanings of such a performance and its artistic considerations. I will then address more precisely the troubled position of the artist’s subjectivity, which vacillates between a sexual object and an artist. Moreover, the article will highlight the innovative position presented by this work of art on ethical issues regarding sex work by deconstructing paternalistic claims generally used to support the criminalization of sex work. Finally, I will discuss how the sexual nature of this work of art comes to desecrate art, along with sexuality, thereby criticizing the idea that sexuality is the main site of subjectivity. Through this desecration of sexuality, I argue that Untitled offers the possibility to apprehend sex work in a more neutral way. (shrink)

The recent distribution of nude photos of a number of high profile Hong Kong celebrities has provoked intense discussion about the state of Hong Kong's obscenity and indecency laws. In this paper, I argue that Hong Kong's laws prohibiting the transfer of obscene and indecent information and images between consenting adults are both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. The Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance is under-inclusive in that it does not adequately criminalise grave violations of privacy. It is also over-inclusive (...) because it is a blanket prohibition against the transfer by all parties (including consenting adults) of all forms of obscene and indecent materials. The laws unnecessarily violate the free expression rights of both the producer and consenting viewer of the offensive materials. The producer/publisher of such materials does not harm his or her audience as they willingly view such materials. The justification for maintaining a blanket prohibition against all transfers of such materials is invalid and utterly and totally out of touch with modern life in Hong Kong. The proponents of such laws have used Victorian positive morality considerations to justify continued criminalisation. These laws should be abrogated and replaced with a new piece of legislation that is narrowly tailored to deal with those types of offensive displays that are wrongful in a critical rather than a mere positive morality sense. Criminalisation should be limited to those offences that target children or use children in the production process, violate the rights of non-consenting adult audiences not to receive certain intimate information in certain public contexts, and violate privacy rights by publishing a person's private and intimate information without consent. If x obtains y's profoundly private information and publishes it without y's consent, then x violates y's privacy rights in a grave way. The violation in the right circumstances will justify a criminal law response rather than a mere civil law response. Similarly, if x and y copulate on a public bus they subject the captive audience to an offensive display which violates the non-consenting audience's right not to receive certain intimate information. I argue below that these types of privacy violations give the lawmaker a legitimate justification for invoking the criminal law. (shrink)

Its critics call it ‘feminism-as-crime-control’, or ‘Governance Feminism’, diagnosing it as a pernicious form of identity politics. Its advocates call it taking sexual violence seriously – by which they mean wielding the power of the state to ‘punish perpetrators’ and ‘protect vulnerable women’. Both sides agree that this approach follows from the radical feminist analysis of sexual violence most strikingly formulated by Catharine MacKinnon. The aim of this paper is to rethink the Governance Feminism debate by questioning this common presupposition. (...) I ask whether taking MacKinnon’s analysis of sexual violence seriously might, in fact, itself give us reason to be critical of political strategies that embrace the punitive state. By raising this question, I hope to persuade radical feminists to listen to critics of carceral politics rather than dismissing them as rape apologists, and critics of carceral politics to listen to radical feminists rather than dismissing them as state apologists. (shrink)