Results for 'Free agency'

974 found
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  1. Free agency and materialism.J. A. Cover & John O’Leary-Hawthorne - 1996 - In Daniel Howard-Snyder & Jeff Jordan (eds.), Faith, Freedom, and Rationality: Philosophy of Religion Today. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 47-72.
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  2. Direct Manipulation Undermines Intentional Agency (Not Just Free Agency).Andrei A. Buckareff - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    An account of what sort of causal integration is necessary for an agent to exercise agency is offered in support of a soft-line response to Derk Pereboom’s four-case argument against source-compatibilism. I argue that, in cases of manipulation, the manipulative activity affects the identity of the causal process of which it is a part. Specifically, I argue that causal processes involving direct manipulation fail to count as exercises of intentional agency because they involve heteromesial causal deviance. In contrast, (...)
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  3. John Perry’s Neo-Humean Compatibilism: Initiative and Free Agency.Robert Allen - manuscript
    John Perry has recently developed a form of Compatibilism that respects the Principle of Alternatives (PA), according to which free agency requires having the ability to do more than one thing. Eschewing so-called Frankfurt counterexamples to this intuitively plausible principle, long the bête noire of those who would like to believe in free agency and Determinism, Perry argues that there is an important sense in which we can act differently than we do. It signifies the “natural” (...)
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  4. Hegel, Aristotle and the Conception of Free Agency.Paul Redding - 2013 - In Gunnar Hindrichs Axel Honneth (ed.), Freiheit: Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 2011. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
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  5. The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Shepard, Eddy Nahmias, Chandra Sripada & Lisa Thomson Ross - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:27-41.
    In this paper, we present the results of the construction and validation of a new psychometric tool for measuring beliefs about free will and related concepts: The Free Will Inventory (FWI). In its final form, FWI is a 29-item instrument with two parts. Part 1 consists of three 5-item subscales designed to measure strength of belief in free will, determinism, and dualism. Part 2 consists of a series of fourteen statements designed to further explore the complex network (...)
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  6. Intellectual Agency and Responsibility for Belief in Free Speech Theory.Robert Mark Simpson - 2013 - Legal Theory 19 (3):307-330.
    The idea that human beings are intellectually self-governing plays two roles in free-speech theory. First, this idea is frequently called upon as part of the justification for free speech. Second, it plays a role in guiding the translation of free-speech principles into legal policy by underwriting the ascriptive framework through which responsibility for certain kinds of speech harms can be ascribed. After mapping out these relations, I ask what becomes of them once we acknowledge certain very general (...)
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  7. Does Agent-Causation Theory Explain Free Agency?Xiangdong Xu - manuscript
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  8. Beyond the Courtroom: Agency and the Perception of Free will.Edouard Machery, Markus Kneer, Pascale Willemsen & Albert Newen - 2023 - In Samuel Murray & Paul Henne (eds.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy of Action. Bloomsbury.
    In this paper, we call for a new approach to the psychology of free will attribution. While past research in experimental philosophy and psychology has mostly been focused on reasoning- based judgment (“the courtroom approach”), we argue that like agency and mindedness, free will can also be experienced perceptually (“the perceptual approach”). We further propose a new model of free will attribution—the agency model—according to which the experience of free will is elicited by the (...)
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  9. Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency?Rick Repetti (ed.) - 2016 - London, UK: Routledge / Francis & Taylor.
    A collection of essays, mostly original, on the actual and possible positions on free will available to Buddhist philosophers, by Christopher Gowans, Rick Repetti, Jay Garfield, Owen Flanagan, Charles Goodman, Galen Strawson, Susan Blackmore, Martin T. Adam, Christian Coseru, Marie Friquegnon, Mark Siderits, Ben Abelson, B. Alan Wallace, Peter Harvey, Emily McRae, and Karin Meyers, and a Foreword by Daniel Cozort.
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  10. (1 other version)Précis of Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Gregg Caruso - 2014 - Science, Religion and Culture 1 (3):178-201.
    Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life provides the most lively and comprehensive defense of free will skepticism in the literature. It contains a reworked and expanded version of the view he first developed in Living without Free Will. Important objections to the early book are answered, some slight modifications are introduced, and the overall account is significantly embellished—for example, Pereboom proposes a new account of rational deliberation consistent with the belief that one’s actions (...)
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  11. A Case Against the Contemporary Taxonomy of Views on the Metaphysics of Freedom. Berkeley's Account of Free Will and Agency.Daniele Bertini - 2011 - Dialegesthai.
    My paper provides a preliminary work towards a theory of freedom and agency which I name "Theory of Procedural Agency (TPA)". Since TPA relies on intuitions which can not be settled into the metaphysical framework of contemporary approaches to freedom and agency, I focus on some reasons which explain why these intuitions should be preferred to the competing ones. My strategy is to argue for my view defending an embryonal version of TPA, that is Berkeley's considerations on (...)
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  12. Free Will Fundamentals: Agency, Determinism, and (In)compatibility.Kristin Mickelson - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Colorado, Boulder
    NOTE TO READERS: My current research program is firmly grounded in the technical aspects of this dissertation. That said, my views have evolved significantly since writing it, e.g. I've flipped my views on the best working definition of 'determinism', and I no longer defend the viability of incompatibilist-impossibilism (I still grant the superficial logical consistency of the two views, but now contend that there is no way to defend one without rejecting the other). I have also given up on the (...)
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  13. Free Will, Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise.Christian List - 2014 - Noûs 48 (1):156-178.
    I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of (...)
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  14.  42
    A Temporal and Timeless God: How Multiple Divine Persons Can Reconcile Libertarian Free Will, Divine Foreknowledge, and Divine Agency.Christopher Morgan - 2023 - Philotheos 23 (1):15-26.
    Libertarian free will and divine foreknowledge at first seem incompatible. Are humans in charge of their own destiny if God knows human agents’ free choices? We also have the related issue of God’s agency concerning foreknowledge of human events. Can God escape divine fatalism and interact with us meaningfully if he knows how humans will act in the future? There are ways to reconcile the three, but one proposal is to utilize the concept of separate divine persons. (...)
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  15. Mental Causation and Free Will after Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency.Alexander Batthyany - 2009 - In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom C. Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter.
    There are numerous theoretical reasons which are usually said to undermine the case for mental causation. But in recent years, Libet‘s experiment on readiness potentials (Libet, Wright, and Gleason 1982; Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl 1983), and a more recent replication by a research team led by John Dylan Haynes (Soon, C.S., Brass, M., Heinze, H.J., and Haynes, J.-D. [2008]) are often singled out because they appear to demonstrate empirically that consciousness is not causally involved in our choices and actions. (...)
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  16. Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life. [REVIEW]Sofia Jeppsson - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):241-244.
    Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 219) follows quite closely in the steps of his Living Without Free Will (2001). Pereboom argues for “hard incompatibilism” in both – the thesis that regardless of whether determinism is true, the kind of free will required for desert-entailing moral responsibility is unlikely to exist. In Free Will…, however, he pays more attention to issues other than moral responsibility. This, I (...)
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  17. Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leeds
    Plausibly, agents act freely iff their actions are responses to reasons. But what sort of relationship between reason and action is required for the action to count as a response? The overwhelmingly dominant answer to this question is modalist. It holds that responses are actions that share a modally robust or secure relationship with the relevant reasons. This thesis offers a new alternative answer. It argues that responses are actions that can be explained by reasons in the right way. This (...)
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  18. Agency and Two‐Way Powers.Maria Alvarez - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):101-121.
    In this paper I propose a way of characterizing human agency in terms of the concept of a two‐way power. I outline this conception of agency, defend it against some objections, and briefly indicate how it relates to free agency and to moral praise‐ and blameworthiness.
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  19. The Experience of Free Will.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - forthcoming - In Joe Campbell, Kristin Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Free Will. Blackwell. pp. 417-433.
    The main question that we address in this chapter is what to say about reportedly libertarian experiences of free agency – in other words, experiences of options as being open, and up to oneself to decide among, such that, if they are accurate or veridical, then (at a minimum) indeterminism must be true. A great deal rides on this question. If normal experiences of free agency are libertarian, and if compatibilists cannot explain them away, then all (...)
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  20. Free will eliminativism: reference, error, and phenomenology.Gregg D. Caruso - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2823-2833.
    Shaun Nichols has recently argued that while the folk notion of free will is associated with error, a question still remains whether the concept of free will should be eliminated or preserved. He maintains that like other eliminativist arguments in philosophy, arguments that free will is an illusion seem to depend on substantive assumptions about reference. According to free will eliminativists, people have deeply mistaken beliefs about free will and this entails that free will (...)
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  21. Free Will and the Tragic Predicament: Making Sense of Williams.Paul Russell - 2022 - In András Szigeti & Matthew Talbert (eds.), Morality and Agency: Themes From Bernard Williams. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Usa. pp. 163-183.
    Free Will & The Tragic Predicament : Making Sense of Williams -/- The discussion in this paper aims to make better sense of free will and moral responsibility by way of making sense of Bernard Williams’ significant and substantial contribution to this subject. Williams’ fundamental objective is to vindicate moral responsibility by way of freeing it from the distortions and misrepresentations imposed on it by “the morality system”. What Williams rejects, in particular, are the efforts of “morality” to (...)
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  22. Free Will, Art and Morality.Paul Russell - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):307 - 325.
    The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free (...)
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  23. Action and Agency in Artificial Intelligence: A Philosophical Critique.Justin Nnaemeka Onyeukaziri - 2023 - Philosophia: International Journal of Philosophy (Philippine e-journal) 24 (1):73-90.
    The objective of this work is to explore the notion of “action” and “agency” in artificial intelligence (AI). It employs a metaphysical notion of action and agency as an epistemological tool in the critique of the notion of “action” and “agency” in artificial intelligence. Hence, both a metaphysical and cognitive analysis is employed in the investigation of the quiddity and nature of action and agency per se, and how they are, by extension employed in the language (...)
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  24. Poverty, Agency, and Human Rights.Diana Tietjens Meyers (ed.) - 2014 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    Poverty, Agency, and Human Rights collects thirteen new essays that analyze how human agency relates to poverty and human rights respectively as well as how agency mediates issues concerning poverty and social and economic human rights. No other collection of philosophical papers focuses on the diverse ways poverty impacts the agency of the poor, the reasons why poverty alleviation schemes should also promote the agency of beneficiaries, and the fitness of the human rights regime to (...)
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  25. Free Acts and Chance: Why The Rollback Argument Fails.Lara Buchak - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):20-28.
    The ‘rollback argument,’ pioneered by Peter van Inwagen, purports to show that indeterminism in any form is incompatible with free will. The argument has two major premises: the first claims that certain facts about chances obtain in a certain kind of hypothetical situation, and the second that these facts entail that some actual act is not free. Since the publication of the rollback argument, the second claim has been vehemently debated, but everyone seems to have taken the first (...)
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  26. Free Will Skepticism and the Question of Creativity: Creativity, Desert, and Self-Creation.D. Caruso Gregg - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.
    Free will skepticism maintains that what we do, and the way we are, is ultimately the result of factors beyond our control and because of this we are never morally responsible for our actions in the basic desert sense—the sense that would make us truly deserving of praise and blame. In recent years, a number of contemporary philosophers have advanced and defended versions of free will skepticism, including Derk Pereboom (2001, 2014), Galen Strawson (2010), Neil Levy (2011), Bruce (...)
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  27. Free will, the self and the brain.Gilberto Gomes - 2007 - Behavioral Sciences and the Law 2 (25):221-234.
    The free will problem is defined and three solutions are discussed: no-freedom theory, libertarianism, and compatibilism. Strict determinism is often assumed in arguing for libertarianism or no-freedom theory. It assumes that the history of the universe is fixed, but modern physics admits a certain degree of randomness in the determination of events. However, this is not enough for a compatibilist position—which is favored here—since freedom is not randomness. It is the I that chooses what to do. It is argued (...)
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  28. Free Will Pessimism.Paul Russell - 2017 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 93-120..
    The immediate aim of this paper is to articulate the essential features of an alternative compatibilist position, one that is responsive to sources of resistance to the compatibilist program based on considerations of fate and luck. The approach taken relies on distinguishing carefully between issues of skepticism and pessimism as they arise in this context. A compatibilism that is properly responsive to concerns about fate and luck is committed to what I describe as free will pessimism, which is to (...)
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  29. The free market model versus government: A reply to Nozick.John T. Sanders - 1977 - Journal of Libertarian Studies 1 (1):35-44.
    In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Robert Nozick argues, first, that free-market anarchism is unstable -that it will inevitably lead back to the state; and, second, that without a certain "redistributive" proviso, the model is unjust. If either of these things is the case, the model defeats itself, for its justification purports to be that it provides a morally acceptable alternative to government (and therefore to the state). I argue, against Nozick's contention, that his "dominant protection agency" neither meets (...)
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  30. Holistic Free Will: Bridging Autonomy, Ethics, and Structured Reality.Juan Chavez - manuscript
    This paper introduces Holistic Free Will (HFW), a transformative framework that reconceptualizes autonomy as a dynamic, relational, and ethically aspirational process embedded within structured realities. Distinct from traditional theories like libertarian free will and compatibilism, HFW integrates interdisciplinary insights from neuroscience, moral philosophy, and cultural traditions to provide a comprehensive understanding of free will that aligns individual agency with systemic and relational contexts. HFW emphasizes structured reality as comprising four dimensions—natural laws, human constructs, social norms, and (...)
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  31. Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action.John Christopher Bishop - 1989 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    From a moral point of view we think of ourselves as capable of responsible actions. From a scientific point of view we think of ourselves as animals whose behaviour, however highly evolved, conforms to natural scientific laws. Natural Agency argues that these different perspectives can be reconciled, despite the scepticism of many philosophers who have argued that 'free will' is impossible under 'scientific determinism'. This scepticism is best overcome, according to the author, by defending a causal theory of (...)
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  32. The Free Actions of Glorified Saints.Richard Tamburro - 2014 - Dissertation, University of York
    This project examines whether we can consistently make two claims: i) God cannot prevent sin without destroying free will; and ii) in heaven, God prevents sin without destroying free will. It explores the conditions under which agents may be said to be acting freely, guided by consideration of the free will defence to the problem of evil. This involves considering prominent themes in the philosophy of action, and in the metaphysics of free will. It develops, and (...)
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  33. Agential Free Choice.Melissa Fusco - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (1):57-87.
    The Free Choice effect—whereby \\) seems to entail both \ and \—has traditionally been characterized as a phenomenon affecting the deontic modal ‘may’. This paper presents an extension of the semantic account of free choice defended by Fusco to the agentive modal ‘can’, the ‘can’ which, intuitively, describes an agent’s powers. On this account, free choice is a nonspecific de re phenomenon that—unlike typical cases—affects disjunction. I begin by sketching a model of inexact ability, which grounds a (...)
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  34. The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
    The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive (...)
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  35. Free Will, Agent Causation, and “Disappearing Agents”.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - Noûs:76-96.
    A growing number of philosophers now hold that agent causation is required for agency, or free will, or moral responsibility. To clarify what is at issue, this paper begins with a distinction between agent causation that is ontologically fundamental and agent causation that is reducible to or realized in causation by events or states. It is widely accepted that agency presents us with the latter; the view in question claims a need for the former. The paper then (...)
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  36.  78
    Free Will: How Does Decision-Making Work?Difei Chen - 2024 - Dialogue, Journal of Phi Sigma Tau 66 (2-3):83-87.
    Compatibilism claims that a person is a free agent when no external circumstances prevent an action; internal factors such as unconscious thoughts and conditioned responses do not prevent free agency. Contemporary psychology and neuroscience reveal, however, that complex internal factors are involved in our decision-making process and invite new criticisms of compatibilism. I introduce the dual-system theory and implicit bias and discuss the case of mental illness as a disability to decision making. I argue that compatibilist accounts (...)
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  37. Interest and Agency.Katerina Deligiorgi - 2017 - In Anders Moe Rasmussen & Markus Gabriel (eds.), German Idealism Today. Boston ;: De Gruyter. pp. 3-26.
    (2017) 'Interest and Agency', in Gabriel, Markus and Rasmussen, Anders Moe (eds.) German Idealism Today. De Guyter Verlag. -/- Abstract: Undeterred by Kant’s cautionary advice, contemporary defenders of free will advance substantive metaphysical theses in support of their views. This is perhaps unsurprising given the mixed reception of Kant’s solution of the conflict between freedom and natural necessity, which is supposed to vindicate reason’s withdrawal from speculation. Kant argues that neither libertarians nor determinists can win, because they deal (...)
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  38. Free Will and External Reality: Two Scepticisms Compared.Helen Steward - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (1):1-20.
    This paper considers the analogies and disanalogies between a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about free will and a certain sort of argument designed to oppose scepticism about the external world. In the case of free will, I offer the ancient Lazy Argument and an argument of my own, which I call the Agency Argument, as examples of the relevant genre; and in the case of the external world, I consider Moore’s alleged proof of (...)
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  39. Autonomous agency and the threat of social psychology.Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - In M. Marraffa, M. Caro & F. Ferretti (eds.), Cartographies of the Mind: Philosophy and Psychology in Intersection. Springer.
    This chapter discusses how research in situationist social psychology may pose largely undiscussed threats to autonomous agency, free will, and moral responsibility.
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  40. The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays.Paul Russell - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    The Limits of Free Will presents influential articles by Paul Russell concerning free will and moral responsibility. The problems arising in this field of philosophy, which are deeply rooted in the history of the subject, are also intimately related to a wide range of other fields, such as law and criminology, moral psychology, theology, and, more recently, neuroscience. These articles were written and published over a period of three decades, although most have appeared in the past decade. Among (...)
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  41. Spinoza on Freedom, Feeling Free, and Acting for the Good.Leonardo Moauro - 2023 - Argumenta 1:1-16.
    In the Ethics, Spinoza famously rejects freedom of the will. He also offers an error theory for why many believe, falsely, that the will is free. Standard accounts of his arguments for these claims focus on their efficacy against incompatibilist views of free will. For Spinoza, the will cannot be free since it is determined by an infinite chain of external causes. And the pervasive belief in free will arises from a structural limitation of our self-knowledge: (...)
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  42. Can AI systems have free will?Christian List - manuscript
    While there has been much discussion of whether AI systems could function as moral agents or acquire sentience, there has been relatively little discussion of whether AI systems could have free will. In this article, I sketch a framework for thinking about this question. I argue that, to determine whether an AI system has free will, we should not look for some mysterious property, expect its underlying algorithms to be indeterministic, or ask whether the system is unpredictable. Rather, (...)
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  43. Buddhism, Free Will, and Punishment: Taking Buddhist Ethics Seriously.Gregg D. Caruso - 2020 - Zygon 55 (2):474-496.
    In recent decades, there has been growing interest among philosophers in what the various Buddhist traditions have said, can say, and should say, in response to the traditional problem of free will. This article investigates the relationship between Buddhist philosophy and the historical problem of free will. It begins by critically examining Rick Repetti's Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will (2019), in which he argues for a conception of “agentless agency” and defends a view he calls “Buddhist (...)
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  44. Agency and aesthetic identity.Kenneth Walden - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (12):3253-3277.
    Schiller says that “it is only through beauty that man makes his way to freedom.” Here I attempt to defend a claim in the same spirit as Schiller’s but by different means. My thesis is that a person’s autonomous agency depends on their adopting an aesthetic identity. To act, we need to don contingent features of agency, things that structure our practical thought and explain what we do in very general terms but are neither universal nor necessary features (...)
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  45. Human Agency and Neural Causes.Jason D. Runyan - 2013 - New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Libet-style experiments and volitions -- The need for an analysis of human agency -- An Aristotelian account of human agency -- Compatibilist concerns -- Choices and voluntary conduct -- Neuronal mechanisms and voluntary conduct -- A metaphysical framework : voluntary agency, emergence and downward causation.
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  46. The Value of a Free and Wandering Mind.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond: Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. pp. 270-288.
    Miriam Schleifer McCormick delineates the limits, or at least one limit, of the ethics of mind. Many theorists, including McCormick herself, have argued that some states of mind are appropriate targets of certain reactive attitudes even if they cannot be directly controlled. McCormick now worries that the scope of agency can be widened too far so that no area of mind is beyond the reach of appropriate assessment and judgement. She begins with the intuition that there is, or ought (...)
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  47. Free Will and Agential Powers.Randolph Clarke & Thomas Reed - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Agency and Moral Responsibility 3:6-33.
    Free will is often said—by compatibilists and incompatibilists alike—to be a power (or complex of powers) of agents. This paper offers proposals for, and examines the prospects of, a powers-conception of free will that takes the powers in question to be causal dispositions. A difficulty for such an account stems from the idea that when one exercises free will, it is up to oneself whether one wills to do this or that. The paper also briefly considers whether (...)
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  48. Breaking Good: Moral Agency, Neuroethics, and the Spontaneity of Compassion.Christian Coseru - 2017 - In Jake H. Davis (ed.), A Mirror is for Reflection: Understanding Buddhist Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 109-128.
    This paper addresses two specific and related questions the Buddhist neuroethics program raises for our traditional understanding of Buddhist ethics: Does affective neuroscience supply enough evidence that contempla- tive practices such as compassion meditation can enhance normal cognitive functioning? Can such an account advance the philosophical debate concerning freedom and determinism in a profitable direction? In response to the first question, I argue that dispositions such as empathy and altruism can in effect be understood in terms of the mechanisms that (...)
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  49. Cut-free Calculi and Relational Semantics for Temporal STIT Logics.Tim Lyon & Kees van Berkel - 2019 - In Francesco Calimeri, Nicola Leone & Marco Manna (eds.), Logics in Artificial Intelligence. Springer. pp. 803 - 819.
    We present cut-free labelled sequent calculi for a central formalism in logics of agency: STIT logics with temporal operators. These include sequent systems for Ldm , Tstit and Xstit. All calculi presented possess essential structural properties such as contraction- and cut-admissibility. The labelled calculi G3Ldm and G3Tstit are shown sound and complete relative to irreflexive temporal frames. Additionally, we extend current results by showing that also Xstit can be characterized through relational frames, omitting the use of BT+AC frames.
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  50. Why Moral Rights of Free Speech for Business Corporations Cannot Be Justified.Ava Thomas Wright - 2021 - Southwest Philosophy Review 37 (1):187-198.
    In this paper, I develop two philosophically suggestive arguments that the late Justice Stevens made in Citizens United against the idea that business corporations have free speech rights. First, (1) while business corporations conceived as real entities are capable of a thin agency conceptually sufficient for moral rights, I argue that they fail to clear important justificatory hurdles imposed by interest or choice theories of rights. Business corporations conceived as real entities lack an interest in their personal security; (...)
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