A case could be made that the practice of philosophy demands a certain humility, or at least intellectual humility, requiring such traits as inquisitiveness, openness to new ideas, and a shared interest in pursuing truth. In the positive psychology movement, the study of both humility and intellectual humility has been grounded in the methods and approach of personality psychology, specifically the examination of these virtues as traits. Consistent with this approach, the chapter begins with a discussion of the examination of (...) intellectual humility as a “character trait,” comparing intellectual humility to various well-known traits in the personality psychology literature (e.g the “Big 5” and the “Big 2”) as well as other key traits such as the need for cognition and the need for closure. The chapter then turns to the proverbial issue of whether virtues in general, and intellectual humility in particular, are a matter of “nature”- that is, an innate trait determined by heritability, or “nurture” – a trait mostly shaped by situation and environment. While the chapter does not resolve the issue, it provides occasion for an examination of the role of situations in the expression of intellectual humility, and for the interaction of “situation” and “trait.” The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the interaction of trait with situation provides the most robust understanding of the psychology of any character virtue, including humility and intellectual humility. (shrink)

Abstract: Don Ross’ Economic Theory and Cognitive Science (2005) provides an elaborate philosophical defense of neoclassical economics. He argues that the central features of neoclassical theory are associated with what he calls the Robbins-Samuelson argument pattern and that it can be reconciled with recent developments in experimental and behavioral economics, as well as contemporary cognitive science. This paper argues that Ross’ Robbins-Samuelson argument pattern is not in the work of either Robbins or Samuelson and in many ways (...) is in conflict with their own versions, and defenses, of neoclassical theory. (shrink)

V rámci filosofie věd panuje široká shoda na tom, že druhá polovina 20. století složila „labutí píseň" pozitivismu. Milton Friedman a Paul Samuelson, dva klíčoví autoři k metodologii ekonomie v daném časovém období, přitom tento vývoj ve filosofii vědy prý nikdy nereflektovali. Pozitivistická východiska - v prvé řadě v podobě redukcioni- stického přístupu - jsou tudíž stále přítomna ve vlivných teoretických konceptech rozvinutých ekonomy hlavního proudu. Značný počet autorů však v současnosti sdílí náhled, že tyto koncepty v nezanedbatelné míře (...) přispěly k vývoji, jenž ústil ve finanční krizi, vrcholící v letech 2008 a 2009. Předkládaný článek se proto táže, zda to byla právě krize - v níž mnozí spatřují empirické zamítnutí řady pozitivistických konceptů - která napsala „labutí píseň" pozitivismu v ekonomii hlavního proudu. (shrink)

The article discusses Friedman's classic claim that economics can be based on irrealistic assumptions. It exploits Samuelson's distinction between two "F-twists" (that is, "it is an advantage for an economic theory to use irrealistic assumptions" vs "the more irrealistic the assumptions, the better the economic theory"), as well as Nagel's distinction between three philosophy-of-science construals of the basic claim. On examination, only one of Nagel's construals seems promising enough. It involves the neo-positivistic distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical ("observable") terms; (...) so Friedman would in some sense argue for the major role of theoretical terms in economics. The paper uses a model-theoretic apparatus to refine the selected construal and check whether it can be made to support the claim. This inquiry leads to essentially negative results for both F-twists, and the final conclusion is that they are left unsupported. (shrink)

This paper shows that implicit assumptions about the numeraire good in the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-equity analysis involve a "same-yardstick" fallacy (a fallacy pointed out by Paul Samuelson in another context). These results have negative implications for cost-benefit analysis, the wealth-maximization approach to law and economics, and other parts of applied welfare economics--as well as for the whole vision of economics based on the "production and distribution of social wealth.".

Abstract: The paper argues that mainstream economics and mainstream philosophy of natural science had much in common during the period 1945-1965. It examines seven common features of the two fields and suggests a number of historical developments that might help explain these similarities. The historical developments include: the Vienna Circle connection, the Samuelson-Harvard-Foundations connection, and the Cold War operations research connection.

Gazali'nin hayatını 1095 yılında geçirdiğini söylediği krize göre üç döneme ayırmamız mümkündür. Kriz öncesi dönem, kriz dönemi (1095) ve kriz sonrası dönem. Bu dönemlerde akla ve felsefeye bakışı değişmiştir dolayısıyla felsefî ilimlerden sayılan matematik ilmine bakışı da değişmiştir. Gazali kriz öncesi ve kriz dönemlerinde aklı eleştirmekle birlikte çok sistematik bir eleştiri yaptığı söylenemez. Gazali bu dönemde felsefe yorumlarında 'felsefi/bilimsel aklı" din açısından zararlı görmemektedir hatta zaman zaman olumlu yanlarından bahsetmektedir. Makasıdu’l Felasife ve Tehafütü’l Felasife ‘de akılla ilgili mevzulara değinmiş, bazı (...) felsefî ilimlerin dinle alakalı olmadığını, din açısından fayda veya zarar vermediğini ifade etmiş ama temelde felsefi aklın “sadece dini (metafizik) konulara” yetmeyeceği kanaatine varmıştır. Fakat bu dönemde o, felsefeyi 'dinileştirme' çabasının bir sonucu olarak akıl eleştirisiyle karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Aklın, felsefenin ve felsefî ilimlerin (mantık, astronomi, fizik… vb.) kökenini Kur’an’a dayandırmış ve filozofların bütün bu ilimlerin ‘tümellerini’ dinden öğrendiklerini iddia etmiştir. Böylece Gazali, akılla bir teoloji kurmanın mümkün olmadığını ispatlayarak yani dini ‘akla uygun hale getirme’ girişimlerinin önüne geçerek ‘aklı ve bütün aklî ilimleri dine uygun hale’ getirmek için vahye ve mistik tecrübeye dayalı yeni bir sistem kurmuştur. Dinî akıl, vahyi anlar ve uygular. Kriz sonrası dönemde bütün felsefî sistemleri dinî ve mistik/gnostik bir düşünce etrafında yorumlayan Gazali'de akıl tamamen dinileşmektedir. Avam ilimleri seviyesine indirdiği felsefî (tıp, astronomi, kimya, biyoloji, mantık, matematik vs.) ve dinî ilimleri (kelam, fıkıh ve tefsir) mistik bir zihniyetle yeniden ele alır. Felsefî ilimlerin esası dinîdir ve insanlar bu ilimleri peygamberlerden öğrenmiştir. Kelam ilmi, aklî bir ilim değil, dini bir ilimdir, kelamı kullanarak akli hükümler vermekten vazgeçip sadece dini ve uhrevi hükümler vermesi sağlanmalıdır. Fıkıh ilmi de aklî bir ilim değil dini bir ilimdir ve fıkıh alimleri sadece ahiretle ilgili hüküm verilmelidir. Bunlardan daha üstün olan ise havas ilimleridir. Havas ilmi Gazali'ye göre gnostik tasavvuf öğretisidir. Dünyevî akıl insanı yanılttığı ve ona güvenilmez olduğu için akıl yerine peygamberin vahyi gelmelidir ve ondan sonra vahye benzerliği dolayısıyla "velinin ilhamı" yer almalıdır. Bu ise ilk başta dini anlaması için gerekli olan ‘dinî akıl” ve daha sonra ruh, aşk ve nur yoluyla elde edilmektedir. (shrink)

Whereas many others have scrutinized the Allais paradox from a theoretical angle, we study the paradox from an historical perspective and link our findings to a suggestion as to how decision theory could make use of it today. We emphasize that Allais proposed the paradox asa normative argument, concerned with ‘the rational man’ and not the ‘real man’, to use his words. Moreover, and more subtly, we argue that Allais had an unusual sense of the normative, being concerned not so (...) much with therationality of choicesas with therationality of the agent as a person. These two claims are buttressed by a detailed investigation – the first of its kind – of the 1952 Paris conference on risk, which set the context for the invention of the paradox, and a detailed reconstruction – also the first of its kind – of Allais’s specific normative argument from his numerous but allusive writings. The paper contrasts these interpretations of what the paradox historically represented, with how it generally came to function within decision theory from the late 1970s onwards: that is, as an empirical refutation of the expected utility hypothesis, and more specifically of the condition of von Neumann–Morgenstern independence that underlies that hypothesis. While not denying that this use of the paradox was fruitful in many ways, we propose another use that turns out also to be compatible with an experimental perspective. Following Allais’s hints on ‘the experimental definition of rationality’, this new use consists inletting the experiment itself speak of the rationality or otherwise of the subjects. In the 1970s, a short sequence of papers inspired by Allais implemented original ways of eliciting the reasons guiding the subjects’ choices, and claimed to be able to draw relevant normative consequences from this information. We end by reviewing this forgotten experimental avenue not simply historically, but with a view to recommending it for possible use by decision theorists today. (shrink)

My philosophical case study concerns textbook presentations of the theory of demand. Does this theory contain anything more than just a collection of tautologies? In order to determine its empirical content, it must be viewed holistically. But then, the theory implies false factual claims. We can avoid this result by embracing the theory’s normative character. The resulting consequences will be illuminated with the new autodetermination thesis recently proposed in the philosophy of physics by Oliver Timmer. Applying his ideas to the (...) theory of demand reveals that the statements of this discipline simultaneously concern both values and facts. (shrink)