Helen L. Daly [3]Helen Daly [1]
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Helen Daly
Colorado College
  1.  94
    Sex, Vagueness, and the Olympics.Helen L. Daly - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (4):708-724.
    Sex determines much about one's life, but what determines one's sex? The answer is complicated and incomplete: on close examination, ordinary notions of female and male are vague. In 2012, the International Olympic Committee further specified what they mean by woman in response to questions about who, exactly, is eligible to compete in women's Olympic events. I argue, first, that their stipulation is evidence that the use of vague terms is better described by semantic approaches to vagueness than by epistemic (...)
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  2. On Insults.Helen L. Daly - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (4):510-524.
    Some bemoan the incivility of our times, while others complain that people have grown too quick to take offense. There is widespread disagreement about what counts as an insult and when it is appropriate to feel insulted. Here I propose a definition and a preliminary taxonomy of insults. Namely, I define insults as expressions of a lack of due regard. And I categorize insults by whether they are intended or unintended, acts or omissions, and whether they cause offense or not. (...)
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  3. Modelling Sex/Gender.Helen L. Daly - 2017 - Think 16 (46):79-92.
    People often assume that everyone can be divided by sex/gender (that is, by physical and social characteristics having to do with maleness and femaleness) into two tidy categories: male and female. Careful thought, however, leads us to reject that simple ‘binary’ picture, since not all people fall precisely into one group or the other. But if we do not think of sex/gender in terms of those two categories, how else might we think of it? Here I consider four distinct models; (...)
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  4.  28
    Love and Death.Helen Daly - 2018 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), Heaven and Philosophy. Lexington Books. pp. 137-52.
    Imagine you find yourself in heaven after death, only to discover that the soul of your dearest love is suffering in hell. Would your bliss be marred by the suffering of your loved one? The “argument from love” challenges the traditional Christian conception of heaven and hell as places of perfect bliss and terrible suffering, respectively, on the grounds that no lover in heaven could be very happy if she were aware that her beloved was suffering in hell. Love requires (...)
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