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John-Michael Kuczynski [16]John-Michael M. Kuczynski [3]
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  1. The Concept of a Symbol and the Vacuousness of the Symbolic Conception of Thought.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2005 - Semiotica 2005 (154 - 1/4):243-264.
    Linguistic expressions must be decrypted if they are to transmit information. Thoughts need not be decrypted if they are to transmit information. Therefore thought-processes do not consist of linguistic expressions: thought is not linguistic. A consequence is that thought is not computational, given that a computation is the operationalization of a function that assigns one expression to some other expression (or sequence of expressions).
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  2. Another Argument Against the Thesis That There is a Language of Thought.John-Michael M. Kuczynski - 2004 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 37 (2):83-103.
    One cannot have the concept of a red object without having the concept of an extended object. But the word "red" doesn't contain the word "extended." In general, our concepts are interconnected in ways in which the corresponding words are not interconnected. This is not an accidental fact about the English language or about any other language: it is inherent in what a language is that the cognitive abilities corresponding to a person's abilities to use words cannot possibly be reflected (...)
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  3. Mathematics as the Science of Pure Structure.John-Michael Kuczynski - manuscript
    A brief but rigorous description of the logical structure of mathematical truth.
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  4. Review of "Descriptions and Beyond". [REVIEW]John-Michael Kuczynski - 2006 - Pragmatics and Cognition 14 (1):196-204.
    In order to understand a sentence, one must know the relevant semantic rules. Those rules are not learned in a vacuum; they are given to one through one's senses. As a result, knowledge of semantic rules sometimes comes bundled with semantically irrelevant, but cognitively non-innocuous, knowledge of the circumstances in which those rules were learned. Thus, one must work through non-semantic information in order to know what is literally meant by a given sentence-token. A consequence is that one's knowledge of (...)
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  5. Does Possible World Semantics Turn All Propositions Into Necessary Ones?John-Michael Kuczynski - 2007 - Journal of Pragmatics 39 (5):972-916.
    "Jim would still be alive if he hadn't jumped" means that Jim's death was a consequence of his jumping. "x wouldn't be a triangle if it didn't have three sides" means that x's having a three sides is a consequence its being a triangle. Lewis takes the first sentence to mean that Jim is still alive in some alternative universe where he didn't jump, and he takes the second to mean that x is a non-triangle in every alternative universe where (...)
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  6. Two Concepts of "Form" and the so-Called Computational Theory of Mind.John-Michael M. Kuczynski - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):795-821.
    According to the computational theory of mind , to think is to compute. But what is meant by the word 'compute'? The generally given answer is this: Every case of computing is a case of manipulating symbols, but not vice versa - a manipulation of symbols must be driven exclusively by the formal properties of those symbols if it is qualify as a computation. In this paper, I will present the following argument. Words like 'form' and 'formal' are ambiguous, as (...)
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  7. Intensionality, Modality, Rationality: Some Presemantic Considerations.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2010 - Journal of Pragmatics 42 (8):2314-2346.
    On the basis of arguments put forth by (Kripke, 1977a) and (Kripke, 1980), it is widely held that one can sometimes rationally accept propositions of the form "P and not-P" and also that there are necessary a posteriori truths. We will find that Kripke's arguments for these views appear probative only so long as one fails to distinguish between semantics and presemantics—between the literal meanings of sentences, on the one hand, and the information on the basis of which one identifies (...)
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  8. Non-Declarative Sentences and the Theory of Descriptions.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2004 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 8 (1).
    A consequence of Russell's Theory of Descriptions is that non-indicative sentences (questions and imperatives) either have meanings that are obviously distinct from their actual meanings, even after all pragmatic and contextual variables are allowed for, or are categorically non-sensical. Therefore, the Theory of Descriptions is false.
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  9. Formal Operations and Simulated Thought.John-Michael M. Kuczynski - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):221-234.
    A series of representations must be semantics-driven if the members of that series are to combine into a single thought: where semantics is not operative, there is at most a series of disjoint representations that add up to nothing true or false, and therefore do not constitute a thought at all. A consequence is that there is necessarily a gulf between simulating thought, on the one hand, and actually thinking, on the other. A related point is that a popular doctrine (...)
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  10. Counterfactuals: The Epistemic Analysis.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2005 - Philosophia Scientiae 9 (1):83-126.
    Ordinarily counterfactuals are seen as making statements about states of affairs, albeit ones that hold in merely possible or alternative worlds. Thus analyzed, nearly all counterfactuals turn out to be incoherent. Any counterfactual, thus analyzed, requires that there be a metaphysically (not just epistemically) possible world w where the laws are the same as here, and where almost all of the facts are the same as here. (The factual differences relate to the antecedent and consequent of the counter-factual.) But, as (...)
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  11. Boguslawski's Analysis of Quantification in Natural Language.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2010 - Journal of Pragmatics 42 (10):2836-2844.
    The semantic rules governing natural language quantifiers (e.g. "all," "some," "most") neither coincide with nor resemble the semantic rules governing the analogues of those expressions that occur in the artificial languages used by semanticists. Some semanticists, e.g. Peter Strawson, have put forth data-consistent hypotheses as to the identities of the semantic rules governing some natural-language quantifiers. But, despite their obvious merits, those hypotheses have been universally rejected. In this paper, it is shown that those hypotheses are indeed correct. Moreover, data-consistent (...)
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  12. Does the Idea of a "Language of Thought" Make Sense?John-Michael Kuczynski - 2002 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 35 (4):173-192.
    Sense-perceptions do not have to be deciphered if their contents are to be uploaded, the reason being that they are presentations, not representations. Linguistic expressions do have to be deciphered if their contents are to be uploaded, the reason being that they are representations, not presentations. It is viciously regressive to suppose that information-bearing mental entities are categorically in the nature of representations, as opposed to presentations, and it is therefore incoherent to suppose that thought is mediated by expressions or, (...)
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  13.  73
    What is Literal Meaning?John-Michael Kuczynski - 2014 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 46 (1-4).
    The meaning of morpheme (a minimal unit of linguistic significance) cannot diverge from what it is taken to mean. But the meaning of a complex expression can diverge without limit from what it is taken to mean, given that the meaning of such an expression is a logical consequence of the meanings of its parts, coupled with the fact that people are not infallible ratiocinators. Nonetheless, given Chomsky’s distinction between competence (ability) and performance (ability to deploy ability), what a complex (...)
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  14. Implicit Comparatives and the Sorites.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2006 - History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (1):1-8.
    A person with one dollar is poor. If a person with n dollars is poor, then so is a person with n + 1 dollars. Therefore, a person with a billion dollars is poor. True premises, valid reasoning, a false a conclusion. This is an instance of the Sorites-paradox. (There are infinitely many such paradoxes. A man with an IQ of 1 is unintelligent. If a man with an IQ of n is unintelligent, so is a man with an IQ (...)
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  15. Conceptual Atomism and the Computational Theory of Mind: A Defense of Content-Internalism and Semantic Externalism.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2007 - John Benjamins & Co.
    Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain their literal meanings. It is (...)
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  16. Analytic Philosophy.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2009 - Kendall Hunt Pub. Co.
    Philosophy is the science of the science; it is the analysis of the assumptions underlying empirical inquiry. Given that these assumptions cannot possibly be examined or even identified on the basis of empirical data, it follows that philosophy is a non-empirical discipline. And given that our linguistic and cultural practices cannot possibly be examined or even identified except on the basis of empirical data, it follows that philosophical questions are not linguistic questions and do not otherwise concern our conventions or (...)
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  17. Morality, Politics, and Law.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2010 - Kendall Hunt Publishing.
    It is argued (a) that laws are assurances of protections of rights and (b) that governments are protectors of rights. Lest those assurances be empty and thus not really be assurances at all, laws must be enforced and governments must therefore have the power to coerce. For this reason, the government of a given region tends to have, as Max Weber put it, a "monopoly on power" in that region. And because governments are power-monopolizers, it is tempting to think that (...)
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  18.  77
    Ninety Paradoxes of Philosophy and Psychology.John-Michael Kuczynski & John Michael Kuczynski - 2018 - Madison, WI, USA: Freud Institute.
    Solutions to ninety paradoxes, some old, some new.
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