El objetivo central de este trabajo fue identificar los patrones funcionales-valorativos presentes en un corpus de informes de arbitraje, género clave en la producción de conocimiento científico. Para el análisis, se utilizó un procedimiento que implicó, primero, la identificación de los elementos funcionales o propósitos comunicativos más frecuentes y, luego, su descripción con algunas categorías del modelo de la valoración. El corpus, de carácter intencionado, estuvo compuesto por 42 informes de arbitraje de la revista de lingüística y traducción de la (...) Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Onomázein. Algunos de los resultados muestran que los propósitos comunicativos más frecuentes son “Describir un problema”, “Destacar un aspecto positivo”, “Solicitar una acción” y “Sugerir una acción”. La alta frecuencia de los propósitos “Describir un problema” y “Destacar un aspecto positivo” eran esperables en un género evaluativo. Ambos propósitos se focalizan más en elementos de contenido y presentan un fuerte posicionamiento monoglósico intensificado con significados de Gradación. El patrón monoglósico puede explicarse por la situación de poder en que se encuentra el árbitro al ser el evaluador del artículo. La alta frecuencia de los propósitos comunicativos “Solicitar acción” y “Sugerir acción” da cuenta de la función negociadora del género. Por último, tanto en la solicitud como en la sugerencia de acciones, los significados de actitud tienen como foco los elementos de forma y no de contenido. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criticism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I (...) contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by the structural social injustice that implicit attitudes reflect, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view. (shrink)

This paper has a two-fold goal. First, I defend the view that the prejudicial behaviour that results from implicit biases is best understood as a type of habitual action—as a harmful, yet deeply entrenched, passively acquired, socially relevant type of habit. Second, I explore how characterizing such implicitly biased behaviour as a habit aids our understanding of the responsibility we bear for it. As habits are ultimately susceptible of being controlled, agents ought to be held responsible for their implicit biased (...) actions. Yet, the blaming response should target agents only insofar as they have failed (while being able) to develop a particular kind of ability: the ability to spot the kind of situations that require the exercise of the relevant intellectual, moral, social, and prudential obligations. Being thus responsible, however, is consistent with the agent’s not being blameworthy. For the automaticity of the blamed agent’s implicitly biased behaviour makes it unintentional relative to intellectual, moral, social, and prudential values that she already cares about. (shrink)

Is action-guiding vision cognitively penetrable? More specifically, is the visual processing that guides our goal-directed actions sensitive to semantic information from cognitive states? This paper critically examines a recent family of arguments whose aim is to challenge a widespread and influential view in philosophy and cognitive science: the view that action-guiding vision is cognitively impenetrable. I argue, in response, that while there may very well be top–down causal influences on action-guiding vision, they should not be taken to be an instance (...) of cognitive penetration. Assuming otherwise is to assign a computational role to the influencing states that they cannot perform. Although questions about cognitive penetrability are ultimately empirical, the issues addressed in this paper are largely philosophical. The discussion here highlights an important set of considerations that help better understand the relations between cognition, vision, and action. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that beliefs formed on the basis of implicit biases pose a challenge for accessibilism, since implicit biases are consciously inaccessible, yet they seem to be relevant to epistemic justification. Recent empirical evidence suggests, however, that while we may typically lack conscious access to the source of implicit attitudes and their impact on our beliefs and behaviour, we do have access to their content. In this paper, I discuss the notion of accessibility required for this argument (...) to work vis-à-vis these empirical results and offer two ways in which the accessibilist could meet the challenge posed by implicit biases. Ultimately both strategies fail, but the way in which they do, I conclude, reveals something general and important about our epistemic obligations and about the intuitions that inform the role of implicit biases in accessibilist justification. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the view that the representational structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for implicitly biased behaviour is propositional—as opposed to associationist. The proposal under criticism moves from the claim that implicit biased behaviour can occasionally be modulated by logical and evidential considerations to the view that the structure of the implicit attitudes responsible for such biased behaviour is propositional. I argue, in particular, against the truth of this conditional. Sensitivity to logical and evidential considerations, I (...) contend, proves to be an inadequate criterion for establishing the true representational structure of implicit attitudes. Considerations of a different kind, which emphasize the challenges posed by the structural social injustice that implicit attitudes reflect, offer, I conclude, better support for deciding this issue in favour of an associationist view.En este artículo cuestiono la tesis de que la estructura representacional de las actitudes implícitas responsables del comportamiento implícitamente sesgado es proposicional—en lugar de asociacionista. De acuerdo con la propuesta criticada, si la conducta implícita sesgada puede ocasionalmente ser modulada por consideraciones lógicas y evidenciales, entonces la estructura de las actitudes implícitas responsables de esa conducta es proposicional. Cuestiono, en particular, la verdad de este condicional. Sostengo que la sensibilidad de las actitudes implícitas a consideraciones lógicas y evidenciales resulta ser un criterio inadecuado para establecer su verdadera estructura representacional. Consideraciones de otro tipo, que enfatizan los desafíos planteados por la injusticia social estructural que las actitudes implícitas reflejan, ofrecen, concluyo, un mejor apoyo para decidir esta cuestión a favor de una visión asociacionista. (shrink)

The aim of this entry is to provide the reader with a philosophical map of the progression of the concept and experience of boredom throughout the Western tradition—from antiquity to current work in Anglo-American philosophy. By focusing primarily on key philosophical works on boredom, but also often discussing important literary and scientific texts, the entry exposes the reader to the rich history of boredom and illustrates how the different manifestations of boredom—idleness, horror loci, acedia, sloth, mal du siècle, melancholy, ennui, (...) monotony, and emptiness—are grounded in the historical context in which they arise. (shrink)

The non-dualizing philosophy of Josef Mitterer as a contemporary version of Heglism -/- The aim of this paper is to present an analogy between philosophy of contemporary Austrian thinker Josef Mitterer and philosophy of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. In his works (Das Jenseits der Philosophie and Die Flucht aus Beliebigkeit) Mitterer presents the project of non-dualizing way of speaking. He rejects fundamental philosophical assumption of ontological distinction between language and reality. He claims that when we realize that this assumption is (...) arbitrary we understand that one of the most important contemporary question about relationship between language and reality is not relevant. Analogical considerations we can find in Hegelian Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, where Hegel proposes to reject the assumption of ontological distinction between subject and object. He notices that “fear of error” characteristic for modern critic of cognition is a result of this assumption and it can be rejected when we reject this assumption. I claim that the starting point of this two philosophical projects is the same thought although it is expressed in two different philosophical languages. In the second part of my paper I try to consider quality of this characteristic for Mitterer and Hegel way of thinking. (shrink)

This is a compilations of short talks presented at a workshop held at Harvard in April 14 on the life of analytic philosophy today in Spanish. Authors include Susanna Siegel, Diana Acosta and Patricia Marechal, Diana Perez, Laura Pérez, and Josefa Toribio.

Through the 'Spiritual Affections' of the Abbess of Tunja, Sister Francisca Josefa de la Concepción del Castillo, a reflection on colonial art is posed around the question of its apparent usefulness as a 'vehicle of evangelization', investigating its genuine purpose in the mysticism of the Mother of the Castle and the relationship of her work with Him. The aesthetic purpose of the work of colonial art is to bring the Divine closer to the human, trying to reflect and communicate (...) the testimony of a mystical spiritual search and experience lived by the author, inspired and revealed by God. -/- A través de los 'Afectos Espirituales' de la Abadesa de Tunja, Sor Francisca Josefa de la Concepción del Castillo, se plantea una reflexión acerca del arte colonial en torno a la cuestión de su aparente utilidad como 'vehículo de evangelización', indagando su genuino propósito en el misticismo de la Madre del Castillo y la relación de su obra con Él. Se planteará que el propósito estético de la obra de arte colonial es acercar lo Divino a lo humano, intentado reflejar y comunicar el testimonio de una búsqueda y experiencia espiritual mística vivenciada por la autora, inspirada y develada por Dios. (shrink)