My chapter aims to advance the debate on a problem often raised by philosophers who are skeptical of implied narrators in movies. This is the concern that positing such elusive narrators gives rise to absurd imaginings (Gaut 2004: 242; Carroll 2006: 179-180). -/- Friends of the implied cinematic narrator reply that the questions critics raise about the workings of the implied cinematic narrator are "silly ones" to ask. -/- I examine how the "absurd imaginings" problem arises for all the central (...) arguments for the elusive cinematic narrator and discuss why the questions critics pose about this narrator are legitimate ones to ask. (shrink)

Aristotle’s Poetics is the first philosophical account of an art form and is the foundational text in the history of aesthetics. The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Poetics is an accessible guide to this often dense and cryptic work. Angela Curran introduces and assesses: Aristotle’s life and the background to the Poetics the ideas and text of the Poetics , including mimēsis ; poetic technē; the definition of tragedy; the elements of poetic composition; the Poetics’ recommendations for (...) tragic plot patterns; catharsis ; epic and comedy; the nature of our emotional response to drama; the proper pleasure of tragedy; and the role that art plays in a human life the relevance of Aristotle’s work in metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and philosophical psychology to the Poetics a comparison of Plato and Aristotle on the value of mimetic art the continuing importance of Aristotle’s Poetics to contemporary philosophy, aesthetics, and philosophy of film. (shrink)

In this article, we aim to map out the complexities which characterise debates about the ethics of vaccine distribution, particularly those surrounding the distribution of the COVID-19 vaccine. In doing so, we distinguish three general principles which might be used to distribute goods and two ambiguities in how one might wish to spell them out. We then argue that we can understand actual debates around the COVID-19 vaccine – including those over prioritising vaccinating the most vulnerable – as reflecting disagreements (...) over these principles. Finally, we shift our attention away from traditional discussions of distributive justice, highlighting the importance of concerns about risk imposition, special duties, and social roles in explaining debates over the COVID-19 vaccine. We conclude that the normative complexity this article highlights deepens the need for decision-making bodies to be sensitive to public input. (shrink)

Among semanticists and philosophers of language, there has been a recent outburst of interest in predicates such as delicious, called predicates of personal taste (PPTs, e.g. Lasersohn 2005). Somewhat surprisingly, the question of whether or how we can distinguish aesthetic predicates from PPTs has hardly been addressed at all in this recent work. It is precisely this question that we address. We investigate linguistic criteria that we argue can be used to delineate the class of specifically aesthetic adjectives. We show (...) that there are, in fact, good motivations for keeping PPTs and aesthetic predicates apart: the semantic structure of the former, but not the latter, entails an experiencer. There are many adjectives whose semantic structure arguably also entails an experiencer, yet which are readily used in expressing aesthetic judgments. Adjectives such as provocative or moving are a case in point, since as adjectives they arguably maintain the experiencer argument from the verb they are derived from. Nevertheless, when we describe, say, a sculpture as provocative, or a theater performance as moving, we clearly make aesthetic judgments. The difficult question, then, is to articulate the relationship between an aesthetic predicate (of which beautiful and ugly are paradigms) and other predicates that just happen to be used in making an aesthetic judgment. Tightly related to this point is the more general question of the relationship between an evaluative predicate and a predicate that occurs in an evaluative judgment. One of our aims is to make some progress in addressing these questions. (shrink)

Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While some contemporary vision (...) scientists propose to draw the distinction between veridical experience and illusion in terms of the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of “hidden assumptions” deployed in the course of normal perceptual inference, I argue for a different approach. I contend that there are, in a sense, no illusions – illusions are as “open” as veridical experiences. Percepts lack the kinds of intentional content that would be needed for perceptual misrepresntation. My view gives a satisfying solution to a philosophical problem for disjunctivism about the good case/bad case distinction: with respect to illusions, every "bad case" of seeing an X can be equally well construed as a "good case" of seeing some Y (different from X). -/- . (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the implications of grief for philosophical theorising about absence experience. I argue that whilst some absence experiences that occur in grief might be explained by extant philosophical accounts of absence experience, others need different treatment. I propose that grieving subjects' descriptions of feeling as if the world seems empty or a part of them seems missing can be understood as referring to a distinctive type of absence experience. In these profound absence experiences, I will argue, (...) the absence of a person as a condition on various possibilities is made manifest in the structure of experience over time. Thus, by paying close attention to grief, we can see that even accounts of absence experience that are presented as in competition with one another may not be so, and that to explain all kinds of absence experience we sometimes need to appeal to something overlooked in other accounts, and which is neither straightforwardly perceptual or cognitive. I also suggest that we would have good reason to take such experiences to be part of and not merely psychological effects of grief. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article addresses the question of whether certain experiences that originate in causes other than bereavement are properly termed ‘grief’. To do so, we focus on widespread experiences of grief that have been reported during the Covid-19 pandemic. We consider two potential objections to a more permissive use of the term: grief is, by definition, a response to a death; grief is subject to certain norms that apply only to the case of bereavement. Having shown that these objections are unconvincing, (...) we sketch a positive case for a conception of grief that is not specific to bereavement, by noting some features that grief following bereavement shares with other experiences of loss. (shrink)

Philosophy has a language problem. A recent study by Schwitzgebel, Huang, Higgins and Gonzalez-Cabrera (2018) found that, in a sample of papers published in elite journals, 97% of citations were to work originally written in English. 73% of this same sample didn’t cite any paper that had been originally written in a language other than English. Finally, a staggering 96% of elite journal editorial boards are primarily affiliated with an Anglophone university. This is consistent with earlier data suggesting that journal (...) submissions from countries that are outside the Anglophone world and Europe have disturbingly low chances of being accepted. The route forward is not entirely clear. What is clear, however, is that this structural disadvantage deserves closer philosophical and empirical attention. We owe this to current and future members of our philosophical community who speak English non-natively. We also need this if we want to make sure philosophy is enriched by a diverse group of thinkers who have a grasp of different languages, and of the cultures strongly associated with them. (shrink)

Well-Being in African Philosophy: Insights for a Global Ethics of Development, edited by Bolaji Bateye, Mahmoud Masaeli, Louise Müller, and Angela Roothaan, explores the notion of well-being in African and intercultural philosophy and its insights into global ethics of development. Drawing from longstanding debates on communitarianism in the context of personhood in African philosophy, as well as those in intercultural philosophy, the diverse contributors present manifold ways to philosophize about well-being from African contexts. Hailing from sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, and (...) the Middle East, they address questions of human well-being related to the major global challenges of our time, such as climate change and socio-economic, gender, and racial inequality in society, education, and organization. This collection, building on the work of African independence philosophers as well as oral traditions from a critical development studies perspective, offers fresh views on well-being, development, and morality, thus contributing to global ethics from an African vantage point. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have argued that if you care about how much goodness your actions generate, or how good the state-of-affairs you actions bring about are, then your attention should be directed towards the very far future. But many don’t care about how much goodness their actions generate, nor do they care about things like “states-of-affairs”. Amongst a multitude of things, many people care about how their actions impact individuals. And they also care about the sorts of justifications they (...) are able to offer for those actions. One moral theory which captures this moral viewpoint is contractualism. In this chapter, I argue that contractualism is, in large part, incompatible with longtermism – the view that, in many contexts, we ought to do that which will most improve the prospects of future people. I then discuss what advice, if any at all, contractualism can offer to the longtermist. (shrink)

The reality of spirits? A historiography of the Akan concept of 'mind' (La réalité des esprits: Vers une historiographie de la conception akan de l'esprit). In this article the following thesis is considered: the classifications used to define African Indigenous Religions are 'inventions' of Western scholars of religion who employ categories that are entirely "non-indigenous". The author investigates the presumptions of this statement and discusses the work of scholars of religion studying the Akan and in particular the Akan concept of (...) mind. In the analytic philosophical tradition the precise meaning of Akan concepts of mind such as okra and sunsum, described by various scholars of religion in different eras, are reviewed. The pre-colonial, colonial and the postcolonial era all have had specific influence on the conceptualisation of the mind. On the basis of an historiography of the Akan mind the author concludes that, contrary to the originally thesis under review, 'cultural background' and 'academic discipline' are relatively unimportant in the classification of 'indigenous religions'. The 'paradigm' prevailing within a discipline , 'personal belief' and the spatio-temporal context in which conceptualisations are created, turn out to be far more significant. (shrink)

Advocates of longtermism point out that interventions which focus on improving the prospects of people in the very far future will, in expectation, bring about a significant amount of good. Indeed, in expectation, such long-term interventions bring about far more good than their short-term counterparts. As such, longtermists claim we have compelling moral reason to prefer long-term interventions. In this paper, I show that longtermism is in conflict with plausible deontic scepticism about aggregation. I do so by demonstrating that, from (...) both an ex-ante and ex-post perspective, longtermist interventions – and, in particular, those which aim to mitigate catastrophic risk – typically generate extremely weak claims of assistance from future people. (shrink)

As a libertarian studying, embracing, and teaching a philosophy of individual freedom, John Hospers, like many of us, was heavily influenced by the philosophical writings of Ayn Rand. Rand’s major novels The Fountainhead and Atlas Shrugged continue to delight and empower readers through embracing the heroic creator or inventor, technological and scientific progress, and the competent individual. These are some of the archetypes of the Randian hero. At the other end of the scale were the incompetent looters and moochers who (...) could only function in her world by controlling those with ability and the savages of ancient or undeveloped cultures who could not comprehend ability, seizing the means of progress before killing the inventor, then retreating into mysticism and magic. Rand was not an archaeologist and wrote at a time before scholars of prehistory focused on the rational and productive aspects of ancient civilizations upon which enabled the present to emerge in fits and starts. These aspects include technology, record keeping, maritime trade, and pre- monetary economies. This paper will consider the emergence of globalized connectivites in the Mediterranean during the Late Bronze Age (ca. 1700-1300 BCE) which was arguably the first age of globalization in human history. It was also one of the first ages of social acceleration characterized by a confluence of increasing technological and economic interdependency, yet fragile in its susceptibility to climate change, plagues, and authoritarian city-states and small empires ruled by kings claiming divinity or divine authority. Thus, the Late Bronze Age was also an economically fragile era with a high concentration of wealth distributed among supra-regional global elite plutocrats unified more by wealth and shared symbolism than by cultural tradition or ideology. This era was susceptible to populist resistance in the form of piratical activity and banditry. This paper explores the globalist and populist aspects of the ancient Mediterranean. In doing so, I suggest that some globalized elites of the present day perpetuate another Randian archetype, the moochers and looters. In doing so, it transcends ideology to focus on how the non-productive in current society acquire vast concentrations of wealth and power. (shrink)

It is a commonly held view that the existence of moral value somehow depends upon the existence of God. Some proponents of this view take the very strong position that atheism entails that there is no moral value; but most take the weaker position that atheism cannot explain what moral value is, or how it could have come into being. Call the first position Incompatibility, and the second position Inadequacy. In this paper, I will focus on the arguments for Inadequacy. (...) There are two main arguments for this position: the Argument from Arbitrariness and the Screening-Off Argument. I’ll discuss each in turn., and argue that neither is successful. To conclude, I’ll sketch what I think is a promising beginning to a naturalistic account of morality. (shrink)

Psychological eudaimonism is the view that we are constituted by a desire to avoid the harmful. This entails that coming to see a prospective or actual object of pursuit as harmful to us will unseat our positive evaluative belief about that object. There is more than one way that such an 'unseating' of desire may be caused on an intellectualist picture. This paper arbitrates between two readings of Socrates' 'attack on laziness' in the Meno, with the aim of constructing a (...) model of moral education based on PE's implied moral psychology. In particular, we argue against the view that when we come to see - through prudential reasoning - that our blatant evaluative beliefs and desires disserve eudaimonism, we will no longer perceive their intentional objects as choice-worthy. We suggest, instead, that it is by experiencing shame that we cease to see the intentional objects of our evaluative beliefs and desires as worthy of pursuit. This form of 'hydraulic education' bypasses reason-responsiveness altogether. As such, it only allows for practical norms to be derived from the nature of agency indirectly, namely by enabling the use of discursive practical reasoning. (shrink)

In Québec, the Act Respecting Access to Documents Held by Public Bodies and the Protection of Personal Information provides an exception to transparency to most public institutions where public health research is conducted by allowing them to not disclose their uses of personal data. This exceptionalism is ethically problematic due to important concerns and we argue that all those who conduct research should be transparent and accountable for the work they do in the public interest.

It is generally accepted that sight—the capacity to see or to have visual experiences—has the power to give us knowledge about things in the environment and some of their properties in a distinctive way. Seeing the goose on the lake puts me in a position to know that it is there and that it has certain properties. And it does this by, when all goes well, presenting us with these features of the goose. One might even think that it is (...) part of what it is to be a perceptual capacity that it has this kind of epistemological power, such that a capacity that lacked this power could not be perceptual. My focus in this essay is the sense of taste—the capacity to taste things or to have taste experiences. It has sometimes been suggested that taste lacks sight-like epistemological power. I argue that taste has epistemological power of the same kind as does sight, but that as a matter of contingent fact, that power often goes unexercised in our contemporary environment. We can know about things by tasting them in the same kind of way as we can know about things by seeing them, but we often do not. I then consider the significance of this conclusion. I suggest that in one way, it matters little, because our primary interest in taste is not epistemic but aesthetic. But, I end by suggesting, it can matter ethically. (shrink)

Jerry Fodor has argued that concept acquisition cannot be a psychological or “rational-causal” process, but can only be a “brute-causal” process of acquisition. This position generates the “doorknob  DOORKNOB” problem: why are concepts typically acquired on the basis of experience with items in their extensions? I argue that Fodor’s taxonomy of causal processes needs supplementation, and characterize a third type: what I call “intelligible-causal processes.” Armed with this new category I present what I regard as a better response than (...) Fodor’s to the doorknob  DOORKNOB problem. (shrink)

Paper 18 Defines patriarchal radicalization, imprinted on the mind to change it from being a thinking organ to being a belief-organ. I claim that rights to correct information and factual names about the speech-making species can only be sapient rights.

In this article the author concentrates on the use of Indigenous Religion among the Akuapem in Ghana for the construction of their group identity. She discusses the way in which the Akuapem make use of the celebration of an annual indigenous religious festival (Odwira) to strengthen their group identity by self-identification, differentiation and the perception of other cultural groups. Her specific focus is on the common Asante-Akuapem history, the foundation of the Akan Golden Stools, akom dancing and the Odwira festival (...) procession and Durbars. She concludes that Indigenous Religion should not be left out in the study of the construction of group identities in the social sciences. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Christianity was predominantly a white Euro- American religion with 83 per cent of all Christians living in the Global North. Today, it is a global religion where over two-thirds of Christians are non-Westerners residing in the Global South. Christianity is on the rise in Latin America, Asia and especially Africa: a trend that is predicted to continue in the second half of the twenty-first century. I will explore explanations for the appeal of Christianity, (...) and Pentecostalism in particular, for contemporary Africans. (shrink)

Describes my book from the first bias creating belief in male superiority, to developing language with a massive number of names embedding male bias to guarantee patriarchy's survival, creating belief supplanting knowledge. Suggests changing language with evidence-based, neutral, inclusive and specific names reducing, and perhaps, eliminating male dominance.

Quotes re the situation of the 10,000 embedded male-biased names in language about our species making people believe the basis of mind is male.

Paper 3 This paper discusses how patriarchy made the name 'man' their Brand. It would guarantee their entitlement to rule and control the masses by repeating man in so many names. Partial lists are shown.

The aim of this research was to find out what the most popular films among the Akan in southeast Amsterdam (The Netherlands) are and how these films are used by this West African diaspora in the formation of a new religious identity after their migration to Europe. The outcome of this research is that the most popular films among the Akan are those with Pentecostal-Charismatic proselytizing messages. The Akan use these films to create an ‘imagined diasporic community’ to remain culturally (...) connected to West Africa. The second most popular films are those of an Akan indigenous religious nature. However, because the name of these films does not fit with the newly acquired European Christian identity of the Akan people in the diaspora, they have slightly changed the name of these movies to ‘cultural films’ in order to overcome the contradiction between over three centuries of ‘Akan spirits of migration’ to Europe with the recent ‘migration of spirits’ via Ghanaian films. (shrink)

This paper ties some less well-known names to the bigger categories of embedded male-bias in names (see other papers) that patriarchy made in its development of language, making the masses believe in phallic-based fantasy, the male as superior and mind of the species.

Patriarchy's timeline showing how the Lords of patriarchy developed language in its own self-interest. Exposes the need patriarchy had to make and use language as a political tool to achieve its political ends, control, power and domination.

This article aims to enhance understanding of the changing nature of the pre-colonial, (neo)colonial and postcolonial imagination of space and time in Africa and of its organising principle in African cinema. It will focus on the cartographic and time reckoning techniques and traditions of Africans in precolonial times in contrast to the space-time imagination expressed in colonial film in Africa, such as in the instruction documentary Daybreak in Udi (1949). This documentary, which promotes British colonial self-help development projects in Africa, (...) tells the story of the building of a maternity home in an Igbo village in Nigeria. Furthermore, the article will enhance understanding of the cinematic turn to a counterhegemonic film tradition as a stepping stone to the newly emerging field of African intercultural philosophical cinema. The time-space imagination in Common Threads (2018), shortlisted by the Zanzibar International Film Festival (ZIFF) for the best documentary will be analysed as a case in point. This documentary concentrates on the nineteenth-century and current Afro-Indian textile trade, the associated oral narratives and their visual impact on the so-called Kanga and Vitenge textiles. (shrink)

Looks at the development of the sacred after the Sumerians' named the phallus Supreme Creator in 9000 B.C.E. Lists names invented creating belief in Sacred Phallus and names the part male genitals played in supporting the phallus as sacred.

During the 11,000 years patriarchy ruled it embedded male-bias in over 20,000 names thus making language suit their ideology of eternal males rule. Every male-biased name stops our species from seeing reality-as-it-is. Every bias hides a truth creating ignorance of what actually exists to be seen and known.

Paper 6 A personal voyage through the seminal tunnel of language made up of 20,000 names embedding male-bias.

Every person is equipped with both the Dionysian or life force soul (in Greek Eros), and the Apollonian or death force soul (in GreekThanatos). Dionysus was a Greek fertility god from c. 580 BCE associated with wine, music, and choral dance (Csapso 2016). In Attic art, Dionysus was often depicted as a slumping god on a ship, which had a vineover laden with grapes as a mast, surrounded by a sea with a pod of dolphins; the dolphins being the rescuers (...) of sailors (life force) (Carpenter 1990). Dionysus, who was resurrected from death, repre- sented hedonism, happiness, and the good life that he celebrated with a glass of wine. His half-brother Apollo was in many respects his polar opposite. Apollo was a cerebral god associated with the sun, light, and intellectual pursuit. Dio- nysus symbolized the ability of (wo) man to submerge him- or herself in a greater whole, the ecstatic, and the chaotic emotions. Apollo, on the contrary, symbolised his or her formally rational and reasoning mind. The Dionysian and Apollonian natural forces are complementary and one needs both to be a balanced person; one needed to be capable of creating form and struc- ture as well as being passionate and vital. Brown believed that a utopian society would primarily consist of such balanced persons who are at home in both the world of rationality and logic and of symbols and emotions. (shrink)

Paper 1 The argument is made that the names made to be used by our species as its identity fall short of being a theory. Up to the present it was assumed that the names were based on a theory. No one questioned this situation before.

Clarifies some of the biases embedded in patriarchal language discussed in the previous 9 papers.

Some time ago, the philosopher Luciano Floridi suggested that Western philosophy, and the mainstream contemporary approach to it traditionally called ‘analytic philosophy’, is in dire need of a reboot. The concern was that the discipline might be in a period of decadence. Analytic philosophy would be benefited by greater internationalization, wider and more transparent decision-making, and the reduction (as much as possible) of conflicts of interest as well as of its current habit of hiring and providing publication opportunities on the (...) basis of contacts, networking, and academic pedigree. If we are right, then we need a reconditioning of the institutional framework of analytic philosophy that adjusts it to the current global and interconnected world. (shrink)

"Based on extensive research in primary and secondary sources and on field research in Ghana, including more than 40 interviews, and applying her formidable expertise in African history, philosophy, historical anthropology and religious studies, Dr Louise Müller has produced a superb analysis of the history and transformation of the roles of chieftaincy in the religious institutions, rituals and ideas among the Asante." David E. Skinner, Professor of History - African and Islamic Studies. (Santa Clara University, USA .

This paper offers a philosophical analysis of mental illness as a concept and attempts to provide an understanding of what contributes to the instability of this concept. Mental illness is argued to be susceptible to looping effects, which means that the behaviours of those diagnosed is affected by their classification. This idea of looping is a contributor to mental illness being an unstable category as it affects the behaviours of those classified and the classifications themselves. Specific mental disorders such as (...) anxiety and depression are particularly vulnerable to looping effects due to their value-laden and subjective diagnostic criteria, argued by many anti-psychiatrists such as Rosenhan, Foucault and Szasz. These looping effects are more relevant than ever, with the increased awareness of mental illnesses on social media, overgeneralized information surrounding the symptoms of disorder, the glamorisation and self-assessments which inspire self-diagnosis. Whilst mental illness should not be abandoned as a concept, ‘mental illness’ has deviated from the proper use of ‘mental disorder’ due to overdiagnosis and looping effects and this conceptual instability is a bad thing due to the long-term consequences of over-prescribing antidepressants, preventing access to treatment, political and social implications and a looping trap: which is the idea that an individual cannot escape from their classification once identified. This paper gives a conceptual analysis of ‘mental illness’ and argues that looping effects are mainly responsible for its instability and in order to avoid the negative consequences of such an instability, we should be aware of these effects and attempt to find a basic framework which presents a clear understanding of what we mean by ‘abnormal’ or ‘disordered’ behaviours. (shrink)

This article focuses on the religious information inside Ghanaian and Nigerian video movies regarding Akan and Yoruba women. More specifically, it focuses on the indigenous religious, Christian, and Islamic messages inside these movies in relation to women. The article demonstrates that Akan and Yoruba filmmakers, who dominate the Ghanaian and Nigerian video movie industries, are part of networks of religious institutions, predominantly Pentecostal-Charismatic Christian and modest Islamic ones. These organizations sponsor filmmakers to spread religious messages that promote hierarchical gender relations (...) and the suppression of equal rights for women, e.g., economic independence. By providing an overview of Akan and Yoruba belief systems, in respect of indigenous, Christian, and Islamic gender-related positional concepts and ideological communication on what is appropriate behavior for women, the author will show and support the hypothesis that these movies contribute to women’s demonization and (economic) discrimination. (shrink)

The goal of this short paper is to show that esthetic adjectives—exemplified by “beautiful” and “elegant”—do not pattern stably on a range of linguistic diagnostics that have been used to taxonomize the gradability properties of adjectives. We argue that a plausible explanation for this puzzling data involves distinguishing two properties of gradable adjectives that have been frequently conflated: whether an adjective’s applicability is sensitive to a comparison class, and whether an adjective’s applicability is context-dependent.

In this article I analyse two complaints of white vilification, which are increasingly occurring in Australia. I argue that, though the complainants (and white people generally) are not harmed by such racialized speech, the complainants in fact harm Australians of colour through these utterances. These complaints can both cause and constitute at least two forms of epistemic injustice (willful hermeneutical ignorance and comparative credibility excess). Further, I argue that the complaints are grounded in a dual misrecognition: the complainants misrecognize themselves (...) in their own privileged racial specificity, and they misrecognize others in their own marginal racial specificity. Such misrecognition preserves the cultural imperialism of Australia’s dominant social imaginary—a means of oppression that perpetuates epistemic insensitivity.Bringing this dual misrecognition to light best captures the indignity that is suffered by the victims of the aforementioned epistemic injustices. I argue that it is only when we truly recognize difference in its own terms, shifting the dominant social imaginary, that “mainstream Australians”can do their part in bringing about a just society. (shrink)

Politiek filosofe en kritisch traditionaliste, onderzocht Afrikaanse orale literaire tradities op hun filosofische betekenis. Maakt zich sterk voor een authentieke Afrikaanse filosofie. Sophie Oluwoles ouders waren beiden afkomstig uit de staat Edo in het zuidwesten van Nigeria. Oluwole zelf werd geboren in het dorp Igbara Oke in de naburige staat Ondo, waar zij ook haar lagere en middelbare school doorliep. In 1964 trouwde zij met een eveneens Nigeriaanse wetenschapper. Ze vertrok nog in hetzelfde jaar naar Moskou, waar haar man een (...) baan kreeg aangeboden bij de Verenigde Naties. Vanwege taalproblemen vertrokken beiden na een jaar naar Duitsland, waar zij Duits studeerden aan de Universiteit in Keulen. Kort nadat zij in 1966 verhuisde naar de Verenigde Staten, scheidde Oluwole van haar man omdat deze haar verdere studies dwarsboomde. Oluwole keerde terug naar Nigeria waar zij aan de Universiteit van Lagos een studie filosofie begon. In de periode 1968-1970 doceerde Oluwole op een middelbare school in haar thuisstaat Ondo. Daarna keerde zij terug naar de universiteit van Lagos, waar zij werkzaam was als studentassistente en ondertussen afstudeerde. Oluwole werd als promovenda toegelaten op de universiteit van Ibadan. In 1984 behaalde zij als eerste student in sub-Sahara Afrika een doctorstitel in de filosofie. Hoewel Oluwoles filosofische carrière een aanvang nam met de studie van westerse meta-ethiek, besloot zij zich na het behalen van haar doctorstitel verder te ontwikkelen in de richting van de Afrikaanse filosofie. Zij doceerde filosofie aan de universiteit van Lagos, was decaan van deze universiteit en was voorzitter van de Nigeriaanse Vereniging voor Filosofie. Tegenwoordig is Oluwole actief als directeur van het Centrum voor Afrikaanse Cultuur en Ontwikkeling in Lagos, dat zich onder andere richt op de ontwikkeling van vrouwen in Afrika. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that we find in Kant a more plausible alternative to his transcendental conception of freedom. In the Metaphysics of Morals in particular, we find a naturalistic conception of freedom premised upon a theory of rational self-cultivation. The motivation for a naturalising reading of Kant is two-fold. On the one hand, a naturalistic conception of freedom avoids the charges levelled against Kant’s 'panicky metaphysics', which both forces us to accept an ontologically extravagant picture of the world (...) and the self, and also commits us to understanding freedom in nonspatiotemporal terms, thus excluding the possibility that the process of becoming free is progressive. And second, on a naturalistic reading we can repackage normativity back into Kant’s account of freedom, which has seemed to scholars unacceptably absent. I explain how the process of becoming free, on the naturalistic view, involves cultivating certain 'aesthetic preconditions of the mind’s receptivity to concepts of duty'.1 Happily, these conditions incur no unpalatable ontological penalties; rather, they constitute an achievement of the rational aspect of the self. Pointedly, this is not a self who is free only in virtue of having membership in the noumenal realm. Rather, effortful self-development entails a battle to become practically free, and thereby moral. The primary attraction to this reading of Kant is that it describes freedom as a naturalistic achievement, rather than a metaphysical given. Thus I show that by jettisoning, or at least naturalising, the picture of noumenal selfhood we not only find a theory that is poorer in panicky metaphysics, but much richer in normative force. (shrink)

In this thesis I develop an account of how processes of social understanding are implicated in experiences of mental disorder, critiquing the lack of examination of this phenomena along the way. First, I demonstrate how disorder concepts, as developed and deployed by psychiatric institutions, have the effect of shaping the cognition of individuals with psychopathology through setting expectations. Such expectation-setting can be harmful in some cases, I argue, and can perpetuate epistemic injustices. Having developed this view, I criticise enactive accounts (...) of mental disorder for failing to consider how such terms like ‘dysfunction’ are open to interpretation and can come embedded with normative expectations. Enactive accounts consequently run the risk of perpetuating injustices in their account of the sociality of mental disorder. Similar concerns arise when we consider the attachment of enactivism to the medical model, I argue. But by adapting enactivism to consider other experiences of disorder, such as those described as ‘madness’, enactive psychiatry may genuinely provide ethical groundwork for a better conception of disordered experience. Then, I consider a further concern with a distinctly medicalised conception of mental disorder from the perspective of self-illness ambiguity, arguing that self-illness ambiguities appear to form a special class of ambiguities due to their proximity to disorder concepts which mark them as appropriate targets for therapeutic treatment. However, I argue further that we should be critical of the idea that self-illness ambiguities necessitate disambiguation, as, in cases where self and illness are demarcated, individuals may still experience distress because simply having a mental disorder can be socially alienating. The medicalised focus in self-illness ambiguity, and the explicit need from the medical perspective to disambiguate it, might then exacerbate the distress someone experiences in mental disorder. Moreover, drawing on Mad Studies, I suggest that one might not need a coherent self-narrative to live well. Because of this, one may not need to adopt a medicalised view of the self in the case of selfillness ambiguity. In order to support this analysis, I provide a phenomenological account of language and argue that the very thoughts implicated in mental disorder shape the individual’s perception of the world due to the way that language foregrounds particular aspects of our world. This demands a critical examination of the language adopted and used by both clinicians and disordered individuals. I thus conclude with some thoughts on how to approach research and developing understanding of mental disorder given that we, as people, are always implicated in this process and therefore socialisation of some kind will always be taking place. (shrink)

This article explores how institutions play a pivotal role in shaping collective knowledge and ignorance concerning the human–animal relationship. It contends that institutions, by obstructing or facilitating the production and dissemination of knowledge, significantly influence societal perceptions of animals, and in turn, our treatment of them. Such epistemic processes lead to speciesist beliefs and behaviour, which I assume to be morally problematic. The discussion centres on the obstruction of collective moral knowledge related to the human–animal relationship. Specifically, my article identifies (...) various ‘corrupting conditions’ within institutions which obstruct agents’ epistemic functioning, and thereby, contribute to collective moral ignorance and consequent speciesist moral wrongdoings, including: (1) Lack of anti-speciesist alternatives or behaviours; (2) derogation of anti-speciesist processes or behaviours; (3) valorization of speciesist processes or behaviour; (4) re-branding of undesirable epistemic processes as commendable; (5) conditions increasing the costs of anti-speciesist inquiry; (6) conditions fostering indifference about animal issues; (7) policies mandating speciesist commitments. The article discusses how these conditions influence epistemic processes in detail. Furthermore, using the production of animal products as a case study, the article illustrates how political institutions, legal institutions, search engines and media, perpetuate moral ignorance regarding animals. It argues that these institutional corrupting conditions normalize speciesism, encouraging the widespread adoption of speciesist beliefs. I conclude that it is necessary to improve institutional epistemic environments to facilitate successful animal advocacy efforts, including widespread moral knowledge about animals and voting support for animal protection policies. The article lays the groundwork for discussing the epistemic responsibilities institutions bear in shaping perceptions of the human–animal relationship. (shrink)

Door de eeuwen heen hebben talloze vrouwen zich verdiept in een veel-heid aan filosofische thema’s, maar vaak zijn deze denkers onzichtbaar gebleven. Van de 17e-eeuwse filosofe Anna Maria van Schurman zullen sommigen wel hebben gehoord, maar wie kent haar tijdgenote Anne Conway? Uit de 20e eeuw is Hannah Arendt inmiddels wereldberoemd, maar de namen Susanne Langer, Gloria Anzaldúa en Werewere Liking zullen misschien alleen de specialisten bekend in de oren klinken. Vele vrouwelijke denkers waren uitgesloten van officiële onderwijsin-stellingen en namen (...) hun toevlucht tot andere vormen van filo so fie -beoefening, zoals briefwisselingen en essays. En dat levert een onschat-bare rijkdom aan filosofische bronnen op. In dit nieuwe standaardwerk worden 67 vrouwelijke denkers bij elkaar gebracht; van de Oudheid tot onze eeuw; van islamitische en katholieke mystica’s, een 18e-eeuwse Nederlandse logica tot een Nigeriaanse politiek filosofe. (shrink)

Even-like particles have widely been analyzed as inducing scalar and additive presuppositions (cf. Horn 1969; Karttunen & Peters 1979; Rooth 1992; Gast & van der Auwera 2011). However, the additivity of even has been controversial since at least Horn 1992 and increasingly called into question (see Greenberg & Umbach 2021 for references); Greenberg specifically argues that scalar even-like particles can vary in additivity. This claim is surprising in light of the typological study in Gast & van der Auwera 2011, which (...) subsumes even and similar expressions under a larger class of additive particles. Against this background, we present an analysis of Italian addirittura, which with perfino has been described as scalar-additive (Visconti 2005) – but only optionally so – and is chosen preferentially over perfino precisely in those contexts that Greenberg takes to challenge the additivity of even. We argue, drawing on observations in Atayan 2017, that addirittura contrasts with perfino in deriving its scalar alternatives from rhetorical structure rather than focus structure. Once this is recognized we can view addirittura as additive, after all, in a rhetorical sense we describe below. (shrink)

A companion volume to the best-selling Mass Media and Society. this collection provides a lively and authoritative introduction to cultural studies, written by some of the most influential scholars and researchers in the field. It offers a critical guided tour of the key debates raised by feminism, postmodernism, the politics of identity, and theories of ideology. It goes beyond a narrow definition of cultural studies in terms of the audience to consider the entire communication circuit from production to consumption within (...) a wider theoretical framework. (shrink)

Aristotle's conception of being is dynamic. He believes that a thing is most itself when engaged in its proper activities, governed by its nature. This paper explores this idea by focusing on Metaphysics , a text that continues the investigation of substantial being initiated inMetaphysics Z. Q.1 claims that there are two potentiality-actuality distinctions, one concerned with potentiality in the strict sense, which is involved in change, the other concerned with potentiality in another sense, which he says is more useful (...) for the present project. His present project is the investigation of substantial being, and the relevant potentiality is the potentiality for activity, the full manifestation of what a thing is. I explore Aristotle's two potentiality-actuality distinctions AND argue that the second distinction is modeled on the first, with one crucial modification. Whereas a change is brought about by something other than the object or by the object itself considered as other (as when a doctor cures himself), an activity is brought about byte object itself considered as itself. This single modification yields an important difference: whereas a change leads to a state other than the one an object was previously in, an activity maintains or develops what an object already is. (shrink)