Büyük varlık zinciri felsefe tarihinde özellikle ontolojik bir tasvir olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu kavram her ne kadar düşünce tarihinde bir “mefhum” olarak yer alsa da 1936’da Arthur Lovejoy tarafından kökenlerine inilmek suretiyle sistematize edilmiş ve düşünce tarihindeki izi Lovejoy’un çalışmasından itibaren daha detaylı olarak sürülebilmiştir. Her düşünürde farklı nüanslarla ele alındığını müşahede ettiğimiz büyük varlık zinciri ana hatlarıyla; cansızlıktan bitkilere oradan sırasıyla hayvanlar ve insanlar alemine daha sonra ise melekler, gayr-ı maddi varlıklar alemi ve nihayetinde ana gaye olan (...) Tanrı’ya değin varlıkları en düşük mertebeden en yüksek mertebeye değin hiyerarşik bir düzene tabi tutan ontolojik bir sistem olarak tanımlanabilir. Çokluk, mertebeleşme ve devamlılık ilkelerinden müteşekkil hiyerarşik bir şema olarak karşımıza çıkan büyük varlık zinciri felsefi, teolojik ve hatta edebi bağlamlarda pek çok filozof ve düşünür tarafından epistemik düzeyde çeşitli problemlere cevap üretebilmek adına etkili bir şekilde kullanılmıştır. Bu bağlamda hakkında Türkçe literatürde çok fazla çalışma olmadığını müşahede ettiğimiz büyük varlık zincirinin, Lovejoy’un ortaya koyduğu prensiplerden hareketle ilk olarak kökenlerini tespit edecek akabinde ise ilgili hiyerarşinin; Antik Dönem, Orta Çağ, Rönesans Dönemi, Aydınlanma Dönemi ve modern zamanda Batı düşüncesindeki etkilerinin izini sürmeye çalışacağız. Bu açıdan bahsi geçen dönemlerde ilgili hiyerarşinin tüm etkilerini ele almak bir makalenin sınırlarını aşacağı için her. (shrink)

This article argues for an unconventional interpretation of Arthur O. Lovejoy’s distinctive approach to method in the history of ideas. It is maintained that the value of the central concept of the ‘unit-idea’ has been misunderstood by friends and foes alike. The commonality of unit-ideas at different times and places is often defined in terms of familial resemblance. But such an approach must necessarily define unit-ideas as being something other than the smallest conceptual unit. It is therefore in tension (...) with Lovejoy’s methodological prescription and, more importantly, disregards a potentially important aspect of intellectual history – the smaller conceptual units themselves. In response to this, an alternative interpretation of unit-ideas as ‘elemental’ – as the smallest identifiable conceptual components – is put forward. Unlike the familial resemblance approach, the elemental approach can provide a plausible explanation for changes in ideas. These are construed as being either the creation of new unit-ideas, the disappearance of existing ones, or alterations in the groups of unit-ideas that compose idea-complexes. The focus on the movement of unit-ideas and idea-complexes through history can also be sensitive to contextual issues, carefully distinguishing the different meanings that single words may have, in much the way that both Lovejoy and his influential critic Quentin Skinner suggest. (shrink)

‘Romanticism’ is one of the more hotly contested terms in the history of ideas. There is a singular lack of consensus as to its meaning, unity, and historical extension, and many attempts to fix the category of romanticism very quickly become blurry. As a result, the great historian of ideas, Arthur Lovejoy, famously concludes that: ‘the word ‘romantic’ has come to mean so many things that, by itself, it means nothing. It has ceased to perform the function of a (...) verbal sign’ But his pessimistic advice has not stopped scholars from trying to define romanticism. If anything, it has brought renewed vigour to the determination with which critics try to pinpoint the term. There are several approaches to take, for those who attempt to do so. One class of critics tries to enumerate the features shared by the authors and texts generally considered romantic. An alternative approach would try to identify the fundamental unity that informs romanticism and gives rise to the empirical commonalities. But what would this essential feature be? Both of these approaches take an external perspective on romanticism, seeing it as the object of inquiry. An alternative approach, which we will pursue, looks at romantic subjects, and romanticism as a self-constituting category, rather than merely as an externally imposed one. In other words, we will take as basic neither an (empirical) array of candidate properties constituting romanticism, nor a supposed underlying (rationalist) essence from which properties can be derived, but rather we will focus on how the romantics themselves took up the idea of romanticism and transformed it into a self-conscious movement. We will treat the question of romanticism with respect to England, but above all Germany. Although romantic movements arose and flourished elsewhere in Europe (and in France in particular), German and English romanticism were uniquely theoretically sophisticated and philosophically nuanced. (shrink)

The short cover-description of the present book tells that "Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854) was one of the formative philosophers of German idealism, whose great service was in the areas of the philosophy of nature, art, and religion." Those having some familiarity with Schelling, and his influence on American philosophy, indirectly via Coleridge and Carlyle and more directly via Emerson and C. S. Peirce, will perhaps not be surprised to learn that German idealism itself looks somewhat different, understanding Schelling's differences (...) with Kant, Fichte, and Hegel; and while the work under review shows no awareness of the distant American influence of Schelling, or American developments in general (except perhaps in some citations of Arthur Lovejoy's The Great Chain of Being), I will take the present opportunity to emphasize connections and possible connections to American philosophy, as allowed by the author's account of Schelling and some further citations. (shrink)

Susan Neiman pointed out to this reviewer the danger that Carl Jung studies pose to contemporary scholars. It is keeping in mind Neiman's cautionary advice that this review establishes Jung's contributions to Romanticism. "[Craig] Stephenson’s analysis of Aurélia has now superseded Arthur Lovejoy’s (1873–1962) and Mario Praz’s (1896–1982) contributions to the definitions of Romanticism.".