Goldman’s epistemology has been influential in two ways. First, it has influenced some philosophers to think that, contrary to erstwhile orthodoxy, relations of evidential support, or confirmation, are not discoverable a priori. Second, it has offered some philosophers a powerful argument in favor of methodological reliance on intuitions about thought experiments in doing philosophy. This paper argues that these two legacies of Goldman’s epistemology conflict with each other.

A review of Failure by Arjun Appadurai and Neta Alexander.

According to one line of thought only propositions can be part of one’s evidence, since only propositions can serve the central functions of our ordinary concept of evidence. Ram Neta has challenged this argument. In this paper I respond to Neta’s challenge.

This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam Pautz, (...) I show why a perceiver’s belief is better justified than the belief of someone who suffers a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination. I show, moreover, why the capacity view is compatible with standard Bayesian principles and how it accounts for degrees of justification. In response to Ram Neta, I discuss the relationship between evidence and rational confidence, as well as the notion of evidence in light of an externalism about perceptual content. (shrink)

Many contemporary epistemologists hold that a subject S’s true belief that p counts as knowledge only if S’s belief that p is also, in some important sense, safe. I describe accounts of this safety condition from John Hawthorne, Duncan Pritchard, and Ernest Sosa. There have been three counterexamples to safety proposed in the recent literature, from Comesaña, Neta and Rohrbaugh, and Kelp. I explain why all three proposals fail: each moves fallaciously from the fact that S was at epistemic (...) risk just before forming her belief to the conclusion that S’s belief was formed unsafely. In light of lessons from their failure, I provide a new and successful counterexample to the safety condition on knowledge. It follows, then, that knowledge need not be safe. Safety at a time depends counterfactually on what would likely happen at that time or soon after in a way that knowledge does not. I close by considering one objection concerning higher-order safety. (shrink)

This article focuses on `therefore' constructions such as ‘The switch is on, and therefore the lights are on’. We submit that the contribution of `therefore’ is to express a dependence as part of the core content of these constructions, rather than being conveyed by conventional implicature (Grice 1975, Potts 2005, Neta 2013) or a triggered presupposition (Pavese 2017, forthcoming, Stokke 2017). We argue that the standard objections to this view can be answered by relying on the general projection hypothesis (...) defended by Roberts et al. (2009) and Simons et al. (2010), leaving our view on solid ground. (shrink)

Al tratar de disolver la neta separación entre una mente racional y la materia inerte abogada por el dualismo Cartesiano, el monismo lucha por reunificar estas distintas realidades ontológicas. Tal como para Claude Lévi-Strauss y Baruch Spinoza, esa dicha unificación no puede prescindir de la trascendencia de la mente humana como locus del pensamiento y conocimiento de la naturaleza externa. A través de una discusión entre las abstracciones de la etnología Amerindia (animismo-perspectivismo), las teorizaciones del estructuralismo y las relaciones (...) que estos tienen con algunas especulaciones filosóficas occidentales, este artículo trata de analizar las intricadas interacciones humano-naturaleza entre los Shuar de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana. De esta forma, se argumenta que las realidades metafísicas de las experiencias oníricas y visionarias están ontológicamente determinadas por el grado de intensidad de contacto que los humanos establecen con las subjetividades materiales del ecosistema. (shrink)

A short summary of the key arguments and theses of Awareness and the Substructure of Knowledge (OUP). Presented at the 2023 meeting of the Pacific APA. Comments given by Ram Neta, Clayton Littlejohn, and Sara Aronowitz.

Through the application of the Dialectical materialism of Karl Marx’s, the essence of Dialectical materialism is created in literature. From this doctrine, it can be understood that the writers have sympathetic attitude towards the distressed and marginalized people of the society. Marxism is the essence of the struggle to free people against exploitation and torture. Feudalism is divided into two classes-one is exploited class, the other exploiting class or the owner of the extender. The key word of Marx’s dialectical materialism (...) is to build a society free from exploitation, through comprehensive range of absorption and class struggle. If we discuss the Manasamangala epic in the context of dialectical materialism, it is easily seen that the effort of Manasa to be worshipped by the feudal lord Cad was actually a fight for establishing marginalised people in the society. If we discuss it from another angle, it is noticed that Manasa being a daughter of feudal lord Mahadev exploited the human being Cad and in this way it expresses the cheap aggressive attitude of rulers. In the conflict between Manasa of Cad, Behula became victimized who has been utilized by Manasa for her own interest and these sufferings of Behula compelled her to take step against Manasa. In this epic Neta, the follower of Manasa showed the tactical intelligence of the political leaders. (shrink)