Many of those working on moral responsibility assume that "once blameworthy, always blameworthy." They believe that blameworthiness is like diamonds: it is forever. We argue that blameworthiness is not forever; rather, it can diminish through time. We begin by showing that the view that blameworthiness is forever is best understood as the claim that personal identity is sufficient for diachronic blameworthiness. We argue that this view should be rejected because it entails that blameworthiness for past action is completely divorced from (...) the distinctive psychological features of the person at the later time. This is because on none of the leading accounts of personal identity does identity require the preservation of any distinctive psychological features, but merely requires some form of continuity. The claim that blameworthiness is forever should therefore be rejected. We then sketch an account of blameworthiness over time, and consider two objections. (shrink)

Many theorists have found the notion of forgiveness to be paradoxical, for it is thought that only the blameworthy can be appropriately forgiven but that the blameworthy are appropriately blamed not forgiven. Some have appealed to the notion of repentance to resolve this tension. But others have objected that such a response is explanatorily inadequate in the sense that it merely stipulates and names a solution leaving the transformative power of repentance unexplained. Worse still, others have objected that such a (...) response cannot succeed because no amount of repentance can render the blameworthy not blameworthy. I argue that this latter objection is based on a mistaken assumption, the acknowledgement of which has the power to resolve the paradox in a way that meets the explanatory adequacy challenge, and, more generally, has significant implications with which any full theory of forgiveness must engage. (shrink)

Building on Peter French’s important work, this chapter draws three distinctions that arise in the context of attributions of moral responsibility, understood as the extent to which an agent is blameworthy or praiseworthy. First, the subject of an attribution of responsibility may be an individual agent or a collective agent. Second, the object of the responsibility attribution may be an individual action (or consequence) or a collective action (or consequence). The third distinction concerns the temporal dimension of the responsibility attribution. (...) Sometimes responsibility for an action is attributed to an agent at the time of the action. At other times responsibility for an action is attributed to an agent sometime after the action has taken place. Taken together, these three binary distinctions yield eight types of responsibility attribution. It is argued that a collective agent’s responsibility for a past collective act is properly understood on the same theoretical model as is an individual’s responsibility for a past individual act. While most assume that responsibility over time is a straightforward matter of identity over time, it is argued that instead this is a matter of psychological or attitudinal connectedness. The possibility is considered that this relation also grounds attributions involving an asymmetry between subject and object, such as individual responsibility for past collective action, but a skeptical worry is raised that such attributions entail an unpalatable form of moral luck and should therefore be rejected. (shrink)

The problem of moral luck arises due to a particular tension in our thought. On the one hand, we seem readily inclined to endorse the principle that moral responsibility, that is, one’s praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, cannot be affected by luck, that is, by factors over which one lacks control. But, when we examine our actual practices, we find that our moral judgments are highly sensitive to luck. This resulting tension between principle and practice is the problem of moral luck, and (...) an attempt to solve this problem is an attempt to resolve this tension. The article first explains the traditional characterization of the problem and reviews three general strategies in responding to it. It is then argued that we should characterize the problem in a slightly broader way. This refocusing turns out to have significant methodological implications. (shrink)

Die deutschen Richtlinien zur Lebertransplantation sehen vor, dass Patient*innen mit alkoholbedingten Lebererkrankungen in der Regel eine sechsmonatige Karenz nachweisen müssen, bevor sie auf die Warteliste für eine Lebertransplantation aufgenommen werden können. Die international weit verbreitete Karenzregel wurde von Beginn an sehr kritisch diskutiert, da hiermit Patient*innen eine wirksame und potentiell lebensrettende Therapie zumindest vorübergehend vorenthalten wird. Sie kommt in der Praxis einer Eingrenzung der Indikation zur Lebertransplantation gleich. Aus der medizinischen Fachliteratur lassen sich vier Interpretationsrahmen rekonstruieren, die mittels Herausstellung bestimmter (...) Aspekte eine jeweils unterschiedliche Wahrnehmung und Konzeptualisierung der sechsmonatigen Karenzregel begründen. Diese sprachlich vermittelten Deutungsmuster werden von Akteur*innen zur Eingrenzung der Indikation zur Lebertransplantation genutzt. Innerhalb dieser Interpretationsrahmen wird die sechsmonatige Karenzzeit jeweils 1) als diagnostisches Werkzeug zur Bestimmung der Regenerationsfähigkeit der Leber, 2) als prognostisches Werkzeug zur Bestimmung der Erfolgsaussichten einer Transplantation, bzw. 3) zur Bestimmung des Trinkverhaltens nach Transplantation dargestellt. In einem weiteren Rahmen wird die Karenzregel 4) als Ausdruck einer Verpflichtung zur Vermeidung von gesundheitsschädlichem Verhalten interpretiert. Aus diesen vier Interpretationsrahmen ergeben sich unterschiedliche ethische Fragestellungen, die eine systematische ethische Beurteilung der Karenzregel ermöglichen. In den ersten drei Interpretationsrahmen wird wiederum selbst die Frage nach der medizinischen Indiziertheit der Karenzregel aufgeworfen. (shrink)

Art among Iranian and Islamic philosophers has always been associated with moral, so that many philosophers have considered art to be synonymous with virtue. By examining Farabi's opinions, it is possible to extract his special ideas about art and artist. In Farabi's theory of Virtuous Art, the artist is on the second floor of utopia and carries religious truths and reasonable happiness. Also, the theory of Virtuous Art has all the aesthetic features and artistic creativity, and in fact, all artistic (...) values are the presupposition of being an art of Virtuous Art. By reflecting on Suhrawardi’s numerous works and intellectual foundations, we can also see that he also paid special attention to the virtuous art and the supreme aspects of art; although he did not directly theorize about the basics of art, but by examining his theories, we can infer the basics of Ishraghi's Virtuous Art. Moreover, Suhrawardi has written some of his works in allegorical and artistic language, and this is a manifestation of Suhrawardi’s Illuminating Art. Among contemporary thinkers, Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Titus Burckhardt have presented an approach with the title of Sacred Art, considering the sacred foundations of art and Traditionalism. (shrink)

In this paper we track the ‘body positivity’ movement from its origins, promoting radical acceptance of marginalized bodies, to its co-optation as a push for self-love for all bodies, including those bodies belonging to socially dominant groups. We argue that the new focus on the ‘body positivity’ movement involves a single-minded emphasis on beauty and aesthetic adornment, and that this undermines the original focus of social and political equality, pandering instead to capitalism and failing to rectify unjust institutions and policies. (...) As such, we argue that the ‘body positivity’ movement ultimately marginalises further the bodies for which it initially sought justice and acceptance. (shrink)

The metaphysical concept of love in Sinawi philosophy examines the three axes of the essence, reason, and manner of love in Avicenna’s intellectual system, resulting in Avicenna’s theory of love. By examining Avicenna’s views on love, particularly in his treatise on love, it can be understood that he has presented two definitions of love (essence), and in the seven chapters of the treatise on love, he admits that love is a pervasive essential substance throughout existence, and no creature is devoid (...) of this substance. It can, therefore, be argued that love is the cause of the existence of creatures (reason). On the other hand, Avicenna has also explained the flow and dependence of creatures on love under each chapter (manner). The result of understanding and examining these three axes in Avicenna’s views, which is the goal of this research, has led to the theory of Sinawi love, which shows Avicenna’s worldview on love. (shrink)

Suhrawardi is among the philosophers who, compared to other philosophers, developed his intellectual system in an innovative manner. Suhrawardi’s illuminative intellectual system is the result of his thoughts in philosophy and mysticism, and the ultimate of his illuminative school is to achieve the station of mystic perception and theosophy using intuition and reasoning. The pure soul is an important pillar in the wayfarer’s intuition; and since the soul has descended from the world of the dominant lights to the world of (...) nature, it may have diseases just like the body. In his treatises, the Master of Illumination opened a new door in philosophy by discussing the disease of the soul, and sought to provide a mystical and ethical solution for the treatment of the human’s rational soul through his illuminative way of thinking. Suhrawardi’s method for treating the diseases of the soul is expressed as an allegory because it is considered as a part of his mystical materials; and it is regarded as a moral matter because it is a prescription for all wayfarers. By recognizing the symbols in Suhrawardi’s allegorical treatises, we can identify his moral way of treating the diseases of the soul. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to find out that whether the jobs of nurses in Pakistan are fulfilling their necessary requirements or not. This issue is being analyzed by the relation of Person-Job (P-J) Fit with three different JobBehaviors and the whole relation is being tested under the moderation of Agreeableness, which is a personality trait of the Big5 Model. A survey method is deployed, questionnaires are used to obtain data. 120 Nurses were accessed from different hospitals of Islamabad/Rawalpindi. (...) Data were analyzed through statistical tests and regression analysis. Findings of the study highlight that P-J fit is related positively to job satisfaction of nurses and negatively to their Turnover Intentions.Where no significant impact of agreeableness as a moderator is found for this study. The Sample size was too small (120participants). This may restrict the generalizability of the studies. In the Pakistani context, only a limited study has been conducted on nurses. Thus, this piece of research will play a significant role in enhancing and boosting the confidence of deprived nurses of Pakistan by identifying the causes of negative job outcomes and help in mitigating those triggers. (shrink)

A number of experiences have demonstrated how digital solutions are effective in improving quality of life (QoL) and health outcomes for older adults. Smart Health Age-Friendly Environments (SHAFE) is a new concept introduced in Europe since 2017 that combines the concept of Age-Friendly Environments with Information Technologies, supported by health and community care to improve the health and disease management of older adults and during the life-course. This chapter aims to provide an initial overview of the experiences available not only (...) in Europe, based on the research work of the participants of the International Interdisciplinary Network on Health and Well-being in an Age-Friendly Digital World (NET4Age-Friendly), which could be of interest to preventive, health and social authorities. The chapter reports good practices, pain points, and bottlenecks that may require a collaborative, interdisciplinary research approach to facilitate the transformations towards smart, sustainable, health and age-friendly cities and communities. (shrink)

Suhrawardi created a revolution in the field of Iranian and Islamic thought by compiling the Illuminated Philosophy. The philosophy of Suhrawardi, which includes the collection of works and philosophical and mystical thoughts of Suhrawardi, is well presented in his book Hikma al-Ishraq. Unlike Farabi, Suhrawardi did not write an independent work about Utopia, but he spoke about the ideal ruler and the right to rule. Moreover, in his allegorical works, more than anything else, he pointed out moral points that can (...) lead the people of a society to salvation. Suhrawardi's philosophy is based on the originality of light, which shows that he had an opinion on the philosophers of Ancient Iran. In addition, Suhrawardi has repeatedly referred to Khosrvanion and Ancient Persian Scholars such as Zoroaster and Key Khosro and, for example, considered Key Khosro's government to be a desirable government in terms of politics and government. Another pillar of Suhrawardi's thought is the Quran and Islamic traditions, and therefore, his opinion about the government and ruler is consistent with Islamic teachings. In addition, he considered himself indebted to the divine philosophers of Greece such as Pythagoras and Plato and other divine scholars of the world such as Hermes, and he also took many of the opinions of his predecessor philosophers such as Farabi and Avicenna; Therefore, it can be assumed that he agrees with Farabi in many respects about utopia and its governing characteristics and conditions. (shrink)

Resultant moral luck occurs whenever aspects of an agent’s moral responsibility are affected by luck pertaining to the outcomes of their actions. Many authors reject the existence of moral luck in this sense, but they do so in different ways. Michael Zimmerman argues that resultant luck affects the scope of moral responsibility, but not its degree. That is, it affects what agents are responsible for, but not how responsible they are. Andrew Khoury takes a more resolute approach, arguing that both (...) the scope and the degree of moral responsibility are free from resultant luck. -/- In this paper, I criticize both accounts and develop an alternative. I argue, first, that Khoury’s approach leads to an implausibly far-reaching error-theory about moral responsibility. Second, Zimmerman’s account cannot account for all the ways in which moral responsibility comes in degrees. Third, these problems can be overcome by introducing a distinction between two concepts of responsibility that both come with scope and degree. The first concept I call internal responsibility, as it applies exclusively to agent-internal factors. The second concept I call external responsibility, as it applies to (partly) agent-external factors such as actions and their outcomes. Given this distinction, we can avoid the problems of Khoury’s as well as Zimmerman’s accounts while preserving the central intuition behind the rejection of resultant moral luck. (shrink)

This volume considers challenges to forgiveness in the most difficult circumstances, such as in criminal justice contexts, when the victim is dead or when bystanders disagree, and when anger and resentment seem preferable and important. Contributing philosophers include Myisha Cherry, Jonathan Jacobs, Barrett Emerick, Alice MacLachlan, David McNaughton and Eve Garrard. Contributing psychologists include Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, Robert D. Enright and Mary Jacqueline Song, C. Ward Struthers, Joshua Guilfoyle, Careen Khoury, Elizabeth van Monsjou, Joni Sasaki, Curtis Phills, Rebecca Young, and Zdravko (...) Marjanovic. (shrink)

To date, both the United States federal government and twenty-one individual states have passed Religious Freedom Restoration Acts that aim to protect religious persons from having their sincere beliefs substantially burdened by governmental interests. RFRAs accomplish this by offering a three-pronged exemption test for religious objectors that is satisfied only when (1) an objector has a sincere belief that is being substantially burdened; (2) the government has a very good reason (e.g., health or safety) to interfere; and (3) there is (...) a reasonable alternative to serve the compelling interest. Legal balancing tests like those found in RFRA are content neutral insofar as they sideline the belief-content of conscientious objections as irrelevant when determining the permissibility of granting legal accommodations. However, some theorists worry that this legal picture may be backward: perhaps balancing tests should be content non-neutral given the usual features of conscientious objections. For example, Yossi Nehushtan contends that, contrary to their typical codification, religious conscience beliefs seem undeserving of special legal accommodations because they possess uniquely strong empirical and theoretical ties to intolerance. Thus, the illiberally intolerant content of these conscientious objections might actually give the state a reason to refuse to grant legal exemptions. In this paper, I offer a cursory defense of content neutrality with respect to balancing tests like those found in RFRA. To begin, I outline Nehushtan’s argument for content non-neutrality. The cornerstone of his argument is that illiberal intolerance is intolerable such that conscientious objections that are based upon illiberally intolerant values provide the state with strong, normally prevailing reason not to grant an exemption. I argue that, even when the illiberally intolerant content of one’s conscience constitutes a weighty and relevant factor in determining the permissibility of granting a legal exemption, there remain significant problems. It is difficult, for example, to determine which views are illiberally intolerant and difficult to say whether illiberally intolerant views can effectively serve as the principled demarcating line in balancing tests. To conclude, I offer several cursory arguments in favor of adopting content-neutral approaches without necessarily making a comprehensive case. By drawing on the work of Amy Sepinwall, Nadia Sawicki, and Nathan Chapman, I show that content-neutral approaches can help to safeguard robust protections for conscience by permitting atypical exercises of conscience, protect minority thoughts and practices from being coercively supplanted by majoritarian understandings of morality, appropriately maintain the skepticism and humility that we owe each other as compatriots in a pluralistic society, and allow the kind of justifiable civil disobedience that has an important place in political history among other things. (shrink)

Dedication: I would like to dedicate this essay to Mort Morehouse, whose intelligence, warmth, and good humour sustains NAACI to this day. I would like, too, to dedicate this essay to Nadia Kennedy who, in her paper “Respecting the Complexity of CI,” suggests that respect for the rich non-reductive emergent memories and understandings that evolve out of participating in the sort of complex communicative interactions that we experienced at the 2012 NAACI conference requires “a turning around and looking back (...) so that we might understand it better.” Thus, though “we cannot grasp the essence of the system in some determinate way, since each description provides a limited view, and portrays some aspect of the system from a specific position inside or outside it, and at a specific point in time,” nonetheless respect requires that we try “to take different ‘snapshots’ of such systems and attempt to make sense of them.” It is as a result of this urging that the following snapshot was attempted. My thanks to Nadia for being such an inspiration, and to all the participants for making this conference such a memorable occasion. (shrink)

This article seeks to contribute to the debate on how political representation can promote democracy by analysing the Chamber in the Square, which is a component of legislative theatre. A set of techniques devised to democratise representative governments, legislative theatre was created by Augusto Boal when he was elected a political representative in 1993. After briefly reviewing Nadia Urbinati’s understanding of democratic representation as a diarchy of will and judgement, I partially endorse Hélène Landemore’s criticism and contend that if (...) representation is to be democratic, citizens’ exchange of opinions in the public sphere should be invested with the power not only to judge, but also to decide political affairs. By opening up a space where the represented can judge, decide, and contest the general terms of the bills representatives present in the assembly, the Chamber in the Square harnesses political representation to democracy. (shrink)

Relativamente difundida na teoria democrática contemporânea, a dicotomia entre democracia epistêmica e democracia agonística é endossada por autores como Luis Felipe Miguel, Chantal Mouffe e Nadia Urbinati. De acordo com eles, a ideia de que a deliberação democrática possa funcionar como uma troca de argumentos racionais que visa à verdade é incompatível com o reconhecimento do conflito como um componente basilar da política. Tudo se passa, pois, como se a abordagem epistêmica estivesse fadada a obliterar a dimensão agonística da (...) política. A fim de problematizar semelhante entendimento, este artigo reconstrói a associação entre democracia e compromisso feita por John Stuart Mill, John Morley e Hans Kelsen e conclui que a conceitualização da democracia como compromisso oferece uma alternativa à dicotomia democracia epistêmica vs. democracia agonística. (shrink)