Naturalism, construed as the idea that philosophy should be continuous with science, is a highly influential view. Its consequences for epistemology, however, are rather odd. Many believe that naturalized epistemology allows eschewing traditional skeptical challenges. This is often seen as an advantage; but it also calls into question its claim of belonging to the philosophical inquiry into knowledge. This paper argues that skeptical challenges can be stated to defy epistemic optimism within naturalized epistemology, and that there are distinctively naturalistic forms (...) of skepticism. To that end, it outlines some assumptions underlying many attempts to naturalize epistemology. It contrasts these approaches to traditional epistemology and identifies the reasons offered by naturalistic epistemologists to dismiss traditional skeptical challenges. Next, it argues that the problem of skepticism can be sensibly stated within a naturalistic setting. Finally, it contends that there are distinctively naturalistic strategies to argue for skepticism and diagnoses the prospects of naturalism vis-à-vis these kinds of skeptical challenges. (shrink)

Dies ist kein perfektes Buch, aber es ist einzigartig, und wenn Sie die ersten 400 oder so Seiten überspringen, sind die letzten 300 (von etwa 700) ein ziemlich guter Versuch, das, was über Verhalten bekannt ist, auf soziale Veränderungen in Gewalt und Manieren im Laufe der Zeit anzuwenden. Das Grundthema ist: Wie kontrolliert und begrenzt unsere Genetik den gesellschaftlichen Wandel? Überraschenderweise versäumt er es, die Natur der Verwandtseinsauswahl (inklusive Fitness) zu beschreiben, die einen Großteil des tierischen und menschlichen gesellschaftlichen (...) Lebens erklärt. Ihm fehlt (wie fast jeder) ein klarer Rahmen für die Beschreibung der logischen Struktur der Rationalität (LSR – John Searles bevorzugter Begriff), den ich lieber die Deskriptive Psychologie des Höheren Ordnungsdenkens (DPHOT) nenne. Er hätte etwas über die vielen anderen Arten des Missbrauchs und der Ausbeutung von Menschen und dem Planeten sagen sollen, da diese jetzt so viel schwerwiegender sind, dass andere Formen der Gewalt fast irrelevant werden. Die Ausweitung des Konzepts der Gewalt auf die globalen langfristigen-Folgen der Replikationvon Genen von jemandem und ein Verständnis dafür, wie Evolution funktioniert (d. h. die Auswahl von Verwandten), wird eine ganz andere Perspektive auf die Geschichte, die aktuellen Ereignisse und die Wahrscheinlichkeit bieten, wie die Dinge in den nächsten paar hundert Jahren ablaufen werden. Man könnte zunächst feststellen, dass der Rückgang der körperlichen Gewalt in der Geschichte durch die ständig wachsende gnadenlose Vergewaltigung des Planeten (d.h. durch die Zerstörung der Zukunft des eigenen Nachkommen) durch die Menschen ausgeglichen (und ermöglicht) wurde.’ Pinker (wie die meisten Menschen die meiste Zeit) wird oft durch die Oberflächlichkeiten der Kultur abgelenkt, wenn es auf die Biologie ankommt. Sehen Sie hier und im Netz meine aktuellen Rezensionen zu Wilsons 'The Social Conquest of Earth' und Nowak und Highfields 'SuperCooperators' hier und im Netz für eine kurze Zusammenfassung der Leere des 'wahren Altruismus'(Gruppenauswahl) und der Funktionsweise der Verwandtschaftsauswahl und der Nutzlosigkeit und Oberflächlichkeit der Beschreibung von Verhalten in kultureller Hinsicht. Dies ist die klassische Natur/Pflege-Frage und Die Natur übertrumpft die Pflege - unendlich. Was wirklich zählt, ist die Gewalt, die der Erde durch die unerbittliche Zunahme der Bevölkerungs- und Ressourcenvernichtung (aufgrund von Medizin und Technologie und Konfliktunterdrückung durch Polizei und Militär) zugefügt wird. Etwa 200.000 mehr Menschen pro Tag (ein anderes Las Vegas alle 10 Tage, ein anderes Los Angeles jeden Monat), die etwa 6 Tonnen Oberboden, die ins Meer/Person/Jahr gehen – etwa 1% der gesamten jährlichen Verschwinden der Welt, etc. bedeuten, dass, wenn nicht irgendein Wunder geschieht, die Biosphäre und Zivilisation in den nächsten zwei Jahrhunderten, weitgehend zusammenbrechen werden, und es wird Hunger, Elend und Gewalt jeder Art in einem schwindelerregenden Ausmaß geben. Die Manieren, Meinungen und Tendenzen der Menschen, Gewalttaten zu begehen, sind ohne ihre Möglichkeit, etwas zu tun, um diese Katastrophe zu vermeiden, von Bedeutung, und ich sehe nicht, wie das geschehen wird. Es gibt keinen Raum für Argumente, und auch keinen Sinn (ja, ich bin ein Fatalist), also werde ich nur ein paar Kommentare machen, als ob es Fakten wären. Stellen Sie sich nicht vor, dass ich ein persönliches Interesse daran habe, eine Gruppe auf Kosten anderer zu fördern. Ich bin 78, habe keine Nachkommen und keine nahen Verwandtenund identifiziere mich nicht mit einer politischen, nationalen oder religiösen Gruppe und betrachte die, zu der ich standardmäßig gehöre, als ebenso abstoßend wie alle anderen. Eltern sind die schlimmsten Feinde des Lebens auf der Erde, und wenn man den weiten Blick auf die Dinge nimmt, sind Frauen so gewalttätig wie Männer, wenn man bedenkt, dass die Gewalt von Frauen (wie die meisten von Männern) weitgehend in Zeitlupe, in zeitlicher und raumweiseer Entfernung erfolgt und meist durch Stellvertreter - von ihren Nachkommen und von Männern - ausgeübt wird. In zunehmendem Maße tragen Frauen Kinder, unabhängig davon, ob sie einen Partner haben, und die Wirkung, eine Frau von der Zucht abzuhalten, ist im Durchschnitt viel größer als das Stoppen eines Mannes, da sie der Fortpflanzungsengpass sind. Man kann der Ansicht sein, dass die Menschen und ihre Nachkommen das Elend, das ihnen zukommt, verdienen und (mit seltenen Ausnahmen) die Reichen und Berühmten die schlimmsten Übeltäter sind. Meryl Streep oder Bill Gates oder J.K Rowling und jedes ihrer Kinder kann 50 Tonnen Topsoil jedes Jahr für Generationen in die Zukunft zerstören, während ein indischer Bauer und seine 1 Tonne zerstören können. Wenn jemand das leugnet, ist das in Ordnung, und zu seinen Nachkommen sage ich "Willkommen in der Hölle auf Erden" (WTHOE). Heute liegt der Schwerpunkt immer auf den Menschenrechten, aber es ist klar, dass die menschliche Verantwortung die Menschenrechte ersetzen muss, wenn die Zivilisation eine Chance haben soll. Niemand bekommt Rechte, ohne ein verantwortungsvoller Bürger zu sein, und das erste, was dies bedeutet, istdie minmale Umweltzerstörung. Die grundlegendste Verantwortung sind keine Kinder, es sei denn, eure Gesellschaft bittet euch, sie zu produzieren. Eine Gesellschaft oder eine Welt, die Menschen nach dem Zufallsprinzip züchten lässt, wird immer von egoistischen Genen ausgebeutet, bis sie zusammenbricht (oder einen Punkt erreicht, an dem das Leben so schrecklich ist, dass es nicht lebenswert ist). Wenn, die Gesellschaft weiterhin die Menschenrechte als primäre, zu ihren Nachkommen, kann man mit Zuversicht sagen "WTHOE". Wer aus der modernen zweisystems-Sichteinen umfassenden, aktuellen Rahmen für menschliches Verhalten wünscht, kann mein Buch "The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mindand Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019) konsultieren. Diejenigen,die sich für mehr meiner Schriften interessieren, können 'Talking Monkeys--Philosophie, Psychologie, Wissenschaft, Religion und Politik auf einem verdammten Planeten --Artikel und Rezensionen 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) und Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) und andere sehen. (shrink)

Many philosophers treat mental imagery as a kind of perceptual representation – it is either a perceptual state, or a representation of a perceptual state. In the sciences, writers point to mental imagery by way of a standard gloss – mental imagery is said to be (often, early) perceptual processing not directly caused by sensory stimuli (Kosslyn et al. 1995). Philosophers sometimes adopt this gloss, which I will call the basic view. Bence Nanay endorses it, and appeals to it in (...) a number of places to argue that mental imagery plays various functional or explanatory roles, as well as to argue that some mental phenomena should be seen as forms of mental imagery. In places he goes even further, relying on this view of mental imagery to explain how mental imagery is a unified kind despite heterogeneous appearances, and using this view to support his claim that mental imagery is a natural kind. Nanay’s book – which is a both a useful introduction to the many ways that mental imagery appears in discussions across philosophy, neuroscience, and psychology, as well as an extended argument for the multi-faceted relevance of mental imagery to a range of projects in the philosophy of mind and psychology – thus also serves as a nice test case for whether this basic view of mental imagery is good enough to aid theorizing across philosophy and the sciences. I think not. I will illustrate why by looking at two areas. First, I will discuss Nanay’s argument regarding mental imagery and object files. Second, I will discuss an issue Nanay raises, regarding the relationship between mental and motor imagery. A longer discussion might look to many more areas – as already mentioned, Nanay’s book covers a wide range of mental phenomena – with the same lesson emerging. The nature of mental imagery cannot be fully understood without facing an array of choice points, many of which push us to make commitments beyond the basic view. (shrink)

Recent work on Natural Kind Essentialism has taken a deflationary turn. The assumptions about the grounds of essentialist truths concerning natural kinds familiar from the Kripke-Putnam framework are now considered questionable. The source of the problem, however, has not been sufficiently explicated. The paper focuses on the Twin Earth scenario, and it will be demonstrated that the essentialist principle at its core (which I call IDENT)—that necessarily, a sample of a chemical substance, A, is of the same kind as another (...) sample, B, if and only if A and B have the same microstructure—must be re-evaluated. The Twin Earth scenario also assumes the falsity of another essentialist principle (which I call INST): necessarily, there is a 1:1 correlation between (all of ) the chemical properties of a chemical substance and the microstructure of that substance. This assumption will be questioned, and it will be argued that, in fact, the best strategy for defending IDENT is to establish INST. The prospects for Natural Kind Essentialism and microstructural essentialism regarding chemical substances will be assessed with reference to recent work in the philosophy of chemistry. Finally, a weakened form of INST will be presented. (shrink)

What role does the concept of naturalness play in the development of scientific knowledge and understanding? Whether naturalness is taken to be an ontological dimension of the world or a cognitive dimension of our human perspective within it, assumptions of naturalness seem to frame both concepts and practices that inform the partitioning of parts and the kinding of kinds. Within the natural sciences, knowledge of what something is as well as how it is studied rely on conceptual commitments. These conceptual (...) commitments shape how entities and processes are categorized _as_ natural depending on how naturalness has been understood within that discipline. In this paper, I explore how commitments to naturalness shape different conceptualizations of what were previously and what are now considered to be fundamental parts in plant morphology. Relying on an historically informed epistemological approach, I trace the origins and development of models of plant morphology from (1) Goethe’s classical LEAF-ROOT-STEM archetype model; (2) Agnes Arber’s revisions to Goethe’s model reconceived in her partial-shoot theory of the leaf; and (3) Rolf Sattler’s proposal for a processual model of plant morphology. These influential models posit ontologically and epistemologically inconsistent conceptualizations of the natural fundamental parts of plants and how they are related to each other. To explain what this inconsistency means for the concept of naturalness and the role it plays in plant morphology, I suggest naturalness might best be conceived of as a contextually bound classificatory concept that is made and remade through its operationalized use within a model, theory, set of practices, or discipline. (shrink)

Language suggestive of natural law ethics, similar to the Catholic understanding of ethical foundations, is prevalent in a number of disciplines. But it does not always issue in a full-blooded commitment to objective ethics, being undermined by relativist ethical currents. In law and politics, there is a robust conception of "human rights", but it has become somewhat detached from both the worth of persons in themselves and from duties. In education, talk of "values" imports ethical considerations but hints at a (...) subjectivist view of them. In the psychology and sociology of drug use, ethically thin concepts of "harm minimisation" and "selfimage" dominate discussion and distract attention from the virtue of temperance and the training of character. A more forceful assertion of an ethics based on the worth of persons in these cases would be most desirable. Arguments against objectivity in the fundamentals may be replied to by examining the parallel between ethics and the discipline whose objectivity has been least challenged by relativist arguments, mathematics. (shrink)

While investigating the value of achievements, Dunkle claims that lucky achievements are possible. For instance, if a person does great works, then it is possible that the works have the status of achievements, even if luck plays a crucial role in doing the great works. Rather than examining Dunkle’s claim, this paper proceeds discussion under the assumption that lucky achievements are possible. In particular, based on this assumption, this paper suggests a new approach to the nature of achievement named (...) the Comparative Value Approach. According to the comparative value approach, a product can have the status of an achievement if the product is valuable in an achievement-relevant domain, and in that domain the product is valuable more than most other items which either have been achieved or can be achieved by others. This paper shows that the comparative value approach successfully explains the cases of achievements, including the cases of lucky achievements. Besides this reason, this paper provides three more reasons to show that the comparative value approach is a feasible view of achievements. The comparative value approach can accommodate the fact that there are various kinds of achievements; the approach can explain the relation between the nature of achievement and the achievement-value of a product; and the approach can show why in determining the status of a product it matters that for average people achieving a similar kind of product is sufficiently difficult. Based on these four reasons, this paper concludes that the comparative value approach is a plausible understanding of achievements. (shrink)

Both realist and anti-realist accounts of natural kinds possess prima facie virtues: realists can straightforwardly make sense of the apparent objectivity of the natural kinds, and anti-realists, their knowability. This paper formulates a properly anti-realist account designed to capture both merits. In particular, it recommends understanding natural kinds as ‘categorical bottlenecks,’ those categories that not only best serve us, with our idiosyncratic aims and cognitive capacities, but also those of a wide range of alternative agents. By endorsing an ultimately subjective (...) categorical principle, this view sidesteps epistemological difficulties facing realist views. Yet, it nevertheless identifies natural kinds that are fairly, though not completely, stance-independent or objective. (shrink)

[from the publisher's website] Questions about the existence and attributes of God form the subject matter of natural theology, which seeks to gain knowledge of the divine by relying on reason and experience of the world. Arguments in natural theology rely largely on intuitions and inferences that seem natural to us, occurring spontaneously—at the sight of a beautiful landscape, perhaps, or in wonderment at the complexity of the cosmos—even to a nonphilosopher. In this book, Helen De Cruz and Johan De (...) Smedt examine the cognitive origins of arguments in natural theology. They find that although natural theological arguments can be very sophisticated, they are rooted in everyday intuitions about purpose, causation, agency, and morality. Using evidence and theories from disciplines including the cognitive science of religion, evolutionary ethics, evolutionary aesthetics, and the cognitive science of testimony, they show that these intuitions emerge early in development and are a stable part of human cognition. -/- De Cruz and De Smedt analyze the cognitive underpinnings of five well-known arguments for the existence of God: the argument from design, the cosmological argument, the moral argument, the argument from beauty, and the argument from miracles. Finally, they consider whether the cognitive origins of these natural theological arguments should affect their rationality. (shrink)

This paper aims to examine Kant’s views on evolution of organized beings and to show that Kant’s antievolutionary conclusions stem from his study of natural history and variability of organisms. Accordingly, I discuss Kant’s study of natural history and consider whether his conclusion about impossibility of knowledge about such history expands on the research of history of organized beings. Moving forward, I examine the notion of variability in Kant’s philosophy, and show that his theory of organized beings relies on the (...) preformationist conception of variability that provides limited insight into the history of organisms. I explain that Kant’s endorsement of preformationism is conditioned by a lack of knowledge about the mechanism that successfully explains adaptation and transmutation of organisms leading towards the creation of new species. Finally, I sumarize the following reasons for Kant’s rejection of the hypothesis of evolution: lack of cognitive ability to discover all changes of natural phenomena in different periods of time and adoption of preformationist conception of variability of organized beings. I finish off with a discussion about mechanical inexplicability of organisms and find a third reason Kant believes that the idea of evolution is only “a daring adventure on the part of reason”. (shrink)

In this paper, I am clarifying and defending my argument in favor of the claim that cumulative selection can explain adaptation provided that the environmental resources are limited. Further, elaborate on what this limitation of environmental resources means and why it is relevant for the explanatory power of natural selection.

Darwin provided us with a powerful theoretical framework to explain the evolution of living systems. Natural selection alone, however, has sometimes been seen as insufficient to explain the emergence of new levels of selection. The problem is one of “circularity” for evolutionary explanations: how to explain the origins of Darwinian properties without already invoking their presence at the level they emerge. That is, how does evolution by natural selection commence in the first place? Recent results in experimental evolution suggest a (...) way forward: Paul Rainey and his collaborators have shown that Darwinian properties could be exogenously imposed via what they call “ecological scaffolding.” This could solve the “black box” dilemma faced by Darwinian explanations of new levels of organization. Yet, despite “scaffolding” recently becoming a popular term in the study of cognition, culture, and evolution, the concept has suffered from vagueness and ambiguity. This article aims to show that scaffolding can be turned into a proper scientific concept able to do explanatory work within the context of the major evolutionary transitions. Doing so will allow us to once again extend the scope of the Darwinian model of evolution by natural selection. (shrink)

What is a gene? Does it represent a natural kind, or is it just a tool for genomics? A clear answer to these questions has been challenged by postgenomic discoveries. In response, I will argue that the gene can be deemed a natural kind as it satisfies some requirements for genuine kindhood. Specifically, natural kinds are projectible categories in our best scientific theories, and they represent nodes in the causal network of the world (as in Khalidi. Natural Categories and Human (...) Kinds: Classification in the Natural and Social Sciences. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013; Khalidi. Synthese 195: 1379–1396, 2018; Khalidi. Are Sexes Natural Kinds, In: Dasgupta S, Weslake B (eds) Current Controversies in Philoso-phy of Science. Routledge, New York, 2020; Khalidi. Philos Sci 88:1–21, 2021). In Sect. 2, I will present a brief history of the gene and the controversy over its status. In Sect. 3, I will introduce the account of natural kinds considered in this paper. In Sect. 4, I will first present the relevant definition of genes and how they can be classified. Then, I will argue that the gene can be considered a natural kind as it satisfies the criteria for natural kindhood. Section 5 concludes. (shrink)

The new externalist picture of natural kind terms due to Kripke, Putnam, and others has become quite popular in philosophy. Many philosophers of science have remained sceptical. Häggqvist and Wikforss have recently criticised this view severely. They contend it depends essentially on a micro-essentialist view of natural kinds that is widely rejected among philosophers of science, and that a scientifically reasonable metaphysics entails the resurrection of some version of descriptivism. It is argued in this paper that the situation is not (...) quite as dark for the new theory of reference as many critics suggest. There are several distinct questions here which should not be conflated and ought to be dealt with one by one. Descriptivism remains arguably problematic. (shrink)

This paper considers the problem of assigning meanings to empty natural kind terms. It does so in the context of the Twin-Earth externalist-internalist debate about whether the meanings of natural kind terms are individuated by the external physical environment of the speakers using these terms. The paper clarifies and outlines the different ways in which meanings could be assigned to empty natural kind terms. And it argues that externalists do not have the semantic resources to assign them meanings. The paper (...) ends on a sceptical note concerning the fruitfulness of using the Twin-Earth setting in debates about the semantics of empty natural kind terms. (shrink)

Despite recent essentialist approaches to Kant’s laws of nature, it is unclear whether Kant’s critical philosophy is compatible with core tenets of essentialism. In this paper, I first reconstruct Kant’s position by identifying the key metaphysical and epistemological features of his notion of ‘nature’ or ‘essence’. Two theses about natures can be found in the literature, namely that they are noumenal in character (_noumenal thesis_) and that they guide scientific investigation as regulative ideas of reason (_regulative thesis_). I (...) argue that Kant’s notion of nature does not entail the noumenal thesis and, based on his model of causal explanation, I propose a novel, _phenomenal thesis_, that allows for a better understanding of the function of natures as regulative ideas. In the last part of the paper, I show that Kant’s ‘essentialism’ is a genuine form of essentialism committed to _de re_ modality, although it differs in several respects from major contemporary essentialist accounts. I conclude by suggesting that Kant’s essentialism (if appropriately updated) can be relevant to the contemporary debate, which has so far been dominated by Humean and Aristotelian proposals. (shrink)

Debates on Nietzsche’s naturalism usually posit nature and culture as competing principles to understand the contingent genesis of humanity. In contrast to this polarizing tendency, I argue that Nietzsche focuses on the cultural characteristics of humanity because of his naturalistic framework. Moreover, I submit that Nietzsche’s conceptualization of the entanglement of nature and culture contains important insights for critically understanding the challenges of the Anthropocene today.

The emerging contemporary natural philosophy provides a common ground for the integrative view of the natural, the artificial, and the human-social knowledge and practices. Learning process is central for acquiring, maintaining, and managing knowledge, both theoretical and practical. This paper explores the relationships between the present advances in understanding of learning in the sciences of the artificial (deep learning, robotics), natural sciences (neuroscience, cognitive science, biology), and philosophy (philosophy of computing, philosophy of mind, natural philosophy). The question is, what at (...) this stage of the development the inspiration from nature, specifically its computational models such as info-computation through morphological computing, can contribute to machine learning and artificial intelligence, and how much on the other hand models and experiments in machine learning and robotics can motivate, justify, and inform research in computational cognitive science, neurosciences, and computing nature. We propose that one contribution can be understanding of the mechanisms of ‘learning to learn’, as a step towards deep learning with symbolic layer of computation/information processing in a framework linking connectionism with symbolism. As all natural systems possessing intelligence are cognitive systems, we describe the evolutionary arguments for the necessity of learning to learn for a system to reach human-level intelligence through evolution and development. The paper thus presents a contribution to the epistemology of the contemporary philosophy of nature. (shrink)

Philosophy, it is said, has always been concerned with space and nature. Since Aristotle, even since the pre-Socratics, and up to Descartes and Leibniz at least, no one was worthy of the title of philosopher if he had not written something about meteors. And not only about meteors: observations on the movements of the Earth and changes in nature, changes of state or speed, transitions and contacts between strange elements, spatial geometrical properties, the order of coexistences - their (...) limits - and the correspondences between scales; force and matter, constructive typologies and geomorphology were an indissoluble part of the philosophical field. It is not that philosophy reflected on these external themes, but that these themes formed the fabric of the philosophical body. What happened, then, between the end of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century? How did the themes related to space and nature become diluted and disappear from philosophical discourses? It is not a question of the split between man and nature, ancient and incommensurable, but of the separation of nature itself, modern and discontinuous, by means of which it was placed alongside the barren, the inert, as a category. -/- La filosofía, se dice, se ocupó siempre de los espacios y de la naturaleza. Desde Aristóteles, incluso desde los presocráticos, y hasta Descartes y Leibniz por lo menos, nadie era digno del título de filósofo si no había escrito algo sobre los meteoros. Y no sólo sobre los meteoros: las observaciones sobre los movimientos de la Tierra y la mudanza en la naturaleza, los cambios de estado o de velocidad, las transiciones y los contactos entre elementos extraños, las propiedades geométricas espaciales, el orden de las coexistencias —sus límites— y las correspondencias entre las escalas; la fuerza y la materia, las tipologías constructivas y la geomorfología formaban parte indisoluble del campo filosófico. No es que la filosofía reflexionase sobre esos temas externos, sino que esos temas formaban el tejido del cuerpo filosófico. ¿Qué sucedió, entonces, entre el final del siglo XVII y la primera mitad del siglo XVIII? ¿Cómo fue que los temas relacionados con el espacio y la naturaleza se diluyeron y desaparecieron de los discursos filosóficos? No se trata de la escisión entre hombre y naturaleza, antigua e inconmensurable, sino de la separación de sí de la naturaleza misma, moderna y discontinua, por medio de la cual fue puesta al lado de lo yerto, lo inerte, como una categoría. (shrink)

The intuitive distinction between natural and unnatural properties (e.g., green vs. grue) informs our theorizing not only in fundamental physics, but also in non-fundamental domains. This paper develops a reductive account of this broad notion of naturalness that covers non-fundamental properties: for a property to be natural, I propose, is for it to figure in a law of nature. After motivating the account, I defend it from a potential circularity charge. I argue that a suitably broad notion of lawhood (...) can be defined independently of naturalness, if we help ourselves to the notion of a fundamental physical property. I end by showing how the notions of naturalness and lawhood that my account delivers help illuminate a number of other important philosophical notions, like causation, reference/meaning, and rational induction. (shrink)

Natur, Kultur und Technik – diese drei Begriffe konstituieren ein mannigfaltiges, komplexes Beziehungsgeflecht, in dessen Zentrum der Mensch und sein Handeln stehen. Wie wollen wir mit technologischen Innovationen und natürlichen Ressourcen umgehen? Lassen sich vermeintliche Gegensätze und Widersprüche auflösen? Und welche kulturelle Praxis kann uns dabei helfen? Fragen wie diese liegen an der Schnittstelle verschiedener Fachdisziplinen. Für die philosophische Reflexion sind sie daher in besonderer Weise fruchtbar. Die Autorinnen und Autoren dieses Bandes thematisieren unterschiedliche Aspekte des Dreigespanns Natur, (...) Kultur und Technik, darunter Bildung, Ernährung, Ethik, Evolution, Nachhaltigkeit, Normsetzung, Umweltmanagement und Willensfreiheit. Sie demonstrieren in ihren Beiträgen ein lebendiges interdisziplinäres Denken, wie es zum Selbstverständnis von APHIN, dem wissenschaftlichen und gemeinnützigen Arbeitskreis philosophierender Ingenieure und Naturwissenschaftler, gehört. (shrink)

Gregor Schiemann verteidigt die Aktualität des aristotelischen und cartesianischen Naturbegriffes, die Natur in Gegensatz zu Nichtnatürlichem definieren. Als gültig könnnen sich diese traditionellen Naturbegriffe jedoch nur noch innerhalb begrenzter Kontexte erweisen. -/- Im ersten Teil seines Buches zeigt der Autor, dass Aristoteles' Bestimmung der Natur als Gegenbegriff zur Technik in der Lebenswelt sowie Descartes' Dualismus von Natur und Geist für das eigene Bewusstseinserleben orientierungsleitend geblieben sind. Dass die Begriffspaare nicht nur in gesonderten Kontexten vorkommen, sondern sich ihre (...) Anwendungen auch wechselseitig durchdringen, führt er im zweiten Teil am Beispiel von Aristoteles' Seelenlehre und Descartes' Mechanismus aus. Die naturphilosophische und erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung verbindet Elemente der analytischen Philosophie mit Ansätzen der Phänomenologie. Sie will zu einem pluralen Verständnis der Natur beitragen, das universelle Geltungsansprüche verabschiedet. (shrink)

Michel Serres’s proposal to extend the social contract to a natural contract has been met with criticism and misunderstanding. In this article, I would like to respond to common criticisms by reconsidering two central related concepts. It is claimed that we cannot represent nature’s interests and therefore cannot come to an agreement, and thus a contract, with nature. However, I will suggest a way out by reinterpreting representation and agreement. I will start with the problem of representation: (...) class='Hi'>nature cannot be represented. Specifically, I will present two counterarguments. The first argument is that political representation is always difficult, even in the case of human beings. Representing nature only seems more difficult because we have forgotten the difficulties associated with representing humans. The second argument aims to rethink representation. Representing nature only seems so hard because we tend to follow a cognitive understanding of representation, as if representation is about representing the ideas of the represented party. Instead, following Michael Saward, I propose an alternative understanding of representation as a game of representative claims and counterclaims: political representation is about claiming to speak on behalf of a referent and then allowing that referent to respond to that claim. Then I turn to the problem of agreement. A natural contract seems difficult because it is hard to imagine what it would mean for nature to agree to a particular proposal. To counter this, I turn to the notion of symbiosis, found in the work of Serres. A natural contract, I will argue, need not be a contract of consensus or synthesis. The alternative is a contract of symbiosis, which does not require all parties to have a common understanding of the situation. Instead, it allows for an agreement in which all parties have their own interests and definition of the situation. In this sense, a natural contract can make sense if it is understood as a contract in which symbiosis is achieved through political representation based on a game of claims and counterclaims. (shrink)

One not infrequently hears rumors that the robust practice of natural theology reeks of epistemic pride. Paul Moser’s is a paradigm of such contempt. In this paper we defend the robust practice of natural theology from the charge of epistemic pride. In taking an essentially Thomistic approach, we argue that the evidence of natural theology should be understood as a species of God’s general self-revelation. Thus, an honest assessment of that evidence need not be prideful, but can be an act (...) of epistemic humility, receiving what God has offered, answering God’s call. Lastly, we provide criticisms of Moser’s alternative approach, advancing a variety of philosophical and theological problems against his conception of personifying evidence. (shrink)

Since 1976 Hilary Putnam has on many occasions proposed an argument, founded on some model-theoretic results, to the effect that any philosophical programme whose purpose is to naturalize semantics would fail to account for an important feature of every natural language, the determinacy of reference. Here, after having presented the argument, I will suggest that it does not work, because it simply assumes what it should prove, that is that we cannot extend the metatheory: Putnam appears to think that all (...) we may determinately say about the relations between words and entities in the world is what the model theory tells us, but he has never offered justifications for that. At the end of the article, I will discuss the apparently reliable intuition that seems to me to be at the root of the argument, that is that, given a formal theory, there is an infinite number of ways of connecting it to, or of projecting it onto, the world. I will suggest that we should resist this intuition, because it rests on a very doubtful notion of world, which assumes that for any class of objects there is a corresponding property. (shrink)

This paper asks when a natural disease kind is truly 'reactive' and when it is merely associated with a corresponding social kind. I begin with a permissive account of real kinds and their structure, distinguishing natural kinds, indifferent kinds and reactive kinds as varieties of real kind characterised by super-explanatory properties. I then situate disease kinds within this framework, arguing that many disease kinds prima facie are both natural and reactive. I proceed to distinguish ‘simple dependence’, ‘secondary dependence’ and ‘essential (...) dependence’ between a natural kind and its classification, and argue that a natural kind is only really reactive, in an important sense, under conditions of essential dependence. On this basis, I offer a principled hypothesis for why psychiatric kinds tend to be more metaphysically unstable than paradigm somatic disease kinds. (shrink)

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Immanuel Kant characterizes the sublime as a negative pleasure derived from the encounter with something absolutely great. Some scholars have claimed that Kant’s notion of the sublime only applies to objects in nature (Abaci 2008, 239). Others contend that the object that provokes the sublime experience is not confined to objects of nature since the sublime is an experience in the mind (Clewis 2010, 169). This paper argues that Kant’s Critique (...) and the Grateful Dead’s song “The Other One” provide a framework for understanding the artistic mathematical sublime in music, wherein the pleasure and displeasure experienced when engaging with music can be identified as instances of the sublime. Beginning with an elucidation of Kant’s concepts of judgments of taste and the sublime, the paper explores their similarities and differences. Notably, his theory of the sublime is less developed than his theory of the beautiful. This provides an opportunity to interrogate arguments surrounding which objects can elicit the sublime and how artworks represent or present it to their viewers. After demonstrating a textual disparity of the role of music in Kant’s Critique, I show how music without words, also known as jams, can fit the definition of free beauty and can be classified as art. The discussion further delineates the process of experiencing the mathematical sublime and describes indicators in music theory for discerning the sublime in musical compositions. I use the Grateful Dead’s performance of “The Other One” on April 7, 1972, to illustrate how particular works of art manifest the mathematical sublime. The paper concludes by reflecting on how the qualitative description of the piece highlights why “The Other One” should be seen as both artistic (because, while the piece is coherent, there is no discernible concept that seems to unify it) and sublime (because it is mind-blowingly complex). How we engage with music like the Grateful Dead can allow us to discuss why particular works of art are meaningful to us. (shrink)

Modern science began as natural philosophy, an admixture of philosophy and science. It was then killed off by Newton, as a result of his claim to have derived his law of gravitation from the phenomena by induction. But this post-Newtonian conception of science, which holds that theories are accepted on the basis of evidence, is untenable, as the long-standing insolubility of the problem of induction indicates. Persistent acceptance of unified theories only in physics, when endless equally empirically successful disunified rivals (...) are available, means that physics makes a persistent, problematic metaphysical assumption about the universe: that all disunified theories are false. This assumption, precisely because it is problematic, needs to be explicitly articulated within physics, so that it can be critically assessed and, we may hope, improved. The outcome is a new conception of science—aim-oriented empiricism—that puts science and philosophy together again, and amounts to a modern version of natural philosophy. Furthermore, aim-oriented empiricism leads to the solution to the problem of induction. Natural philosophy pursued within the methodological framework of aim-oriented empiricism is shown to meet standards of intellectual rigour that science without metaphysics cannot meet. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a unified causal account of natural kinds. Using as a starting point the widely held view that natural kind terms or predicates are projectible, I argue that the ontological bases of their projectibility are the causal properties and relations associated with the natural kinds themselves. Natural kinds are not just concatenations of properties but ordered hierarchies of properties, whose instances are related to one another as causes and effects in recurrent causal processes. The resulting account (...) of natural kinds as clusters of core causal properties that give rise to clusters of derivative properties enables us to distinguish genuine natural kinds from non-natural kinds. For instance, it enables us to say why some of the purely conventional categories derived from the social domain do not correspond to natural kinds, though other social categories may. (shrink)

Philosophers have long been interested in a series of interrelated questions about natural kinds. What are they? What role do they play in science and metaphysics? How do they contribute to our epistemic projects? What categories count as natural kinds? And so on. Owing, perhaps, to different starting points and emphases, we now have at hand a variety of conceptions of natural kinds—some apparently better suited than others to accommodate a particular sort of inquiry. Even if coherent, this situation isn’t (...) ideal. My goal in this article is to begin to articulate a more general account of ‘natural kind phenomena’. While I do not claim that this account should satisfy everyone—it is built around a certain conception of the epistemic role of kinds and has an obvious pragmatic flavour—I believe that it has the resources to go further than extant alternatives, in particular the homeostatic property cluster view of kinds. (shrink)

La structure du comportement details consciousness-nature relations by navigating between realist and intellectualist alternatives. A phenomenological reading of form guides its attempt to formulate a view that does not reduce consciousness to matter or perceptual structure to a product of mind. I show that this strategy relies on hitherto overlooked idealist commitments. Forms are perceived objects whose intentional structure is intelligibly organized. Having denied that forms are constituted by mind or emergent from matter, Merleau-Ponty likens form-constitution to an ideal (...) process of intentional self-organization. Despite recognizing that Gestalt psychology develops fruitful models of perceptual self-organization, and adopting the transcendental view that form is significant for consciousness, his revisionary interpretation of form outstrips these accounts’ ontologies of mind and nature, and is better understood in light of a post-Kantian philosophical heritage. These results cast Merleau-Ponty’s relation to the Gestalt, post-Kantian, and phenomenological traditions in new light, challenge naturalizing interpretations of Structure, and motivate a rethinking of the status of metaphysics in his early thought. (shrink)

What my suggestion rules out – if it is right – is the project of using some thesis about the conative or cognitive nature of motivation to argue for some thesis in meta-ethics. [...] facts about human motivation can be captured equally well with conativist or cognitivist language. And if that is true, then nothing about motivation either implies or rules out internalist moral realism.

Die Autorin klärt in ihrem philosophischen Essay darüber auf, was Natur aus naturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive ausmacht und stellt in diesem Kontext die Frage nach der menschlichen Stellung in der abstrakt gefassten Natur. Doch mehr als ein Zweig der irdischen Fauna bleibt den Menschen nicht, resümiert die Autorin, allenfalls in ihren emotional überheblichen Einbildungen.

The book on "Science and the image of man" pursues different pathways by way of which science contributes to the understanding of human beings as a species: the scope and limits of human cognition are revealed by the history and the mental structure of science in a more precise manner than by any other cultural effort. Insights into the evolution and function of the human brain elucidate the origin and the range of general human capabilities, such as language, self-representation and (...) strategic thought. These capabilities are the products of biological evolution as well as preconditions of cultural development, which is based on traditions rather than on genetic inheritance. At the metatheoretical level, modern science reveals its own intrinsic limitations and is open to different cultural and philosophical interpretations. Human consciousness is a product of evolution of the human brain, and yet it may not be possible to decode the mind-brain relation fully by finite procedures. One of the specifically human capabilities is cognition-based empathy; it may have evolved in conjunction with strategic thought, because it facilitates the prediction of the behaviour of others, but it also motivates altruistic behaviour. Stereotyped controversies between sociologists and social biologists on human ethics appear somewhat outdated; there is a biological basis in humans not only for egoism but, to a limited extent, also for cooperativity and solidarity. Ethical demands should respect the biological conditions of the human species. They imply that cooperativeness is a real but limited resource. It requires activation, but excessive moralism is counterproductive. -/- -/-. (shrink)

There have been many attempts to determine what makes a natural kind real, chief among them is the criterion according to which natural kinds must be mind-independent. But it is difficult to specify this criterion: many supposed natural kinds have an element of mind-dependence. I will argue that the mind-independence criterion is nevertheless a good one, if correctly understood: the mind-independence criterion concerns the unification principles for natural kinds. Unification principles determine how natural kinds unify their properties, and only those (...) natural kinds that have a mind-independent unification principle should be considered real. (shrink)

The aim of natural language ontology is to uncover the ontological categories and structures that are implicit in the use of natural language, that is, that a speaker accepts when using a language. This article aims to clarify what exactly the subject matter of natural language ontology is, what sorts of linguistic data it should take into account, how natural language ontology relates to other branches of metaphysics, in what ways natural language ontology is important, and what may be distinctive (...) of the ontological categories and structures reflected in natural language. (shrink)

In this article I intend to show the strict relation between the notions of “second nature” and “recognition”. To do so I begin with a problem (circularity) proper to the theory of Hegelian and post- Hegelian Anerkennung. The solution strategy I propose is signifi cant also in terms of bringing into focus the problems connected with a notion of “space of reasons” that stems from the Hegelian concept of “Spirit”. I thus broach the notion of “second nature” as (...) a bridgeconcept that can play a key role both for a renewal of the theory of Anerkennung and for a rethinking of the “space of reasons” within the debate between Robert Brandom and John McDowell. Against this background I illustrate the novelties introduced by the dialectical conception of the relation between fi rst and second nature developed by Hegel and the contribution this idea can make to a revisited theory of recognition as a phenomenon articulated on two levels. I then return to the question of the space of reasons to show the contribution the renewed conception of recognition as second nature makes to the definition of its intrinsic sociality as something that is not in principle opposed to a sense of naturalness. (shrink)

The relation between Martin Heidegger and radical environmentalism has been subject of discussion for several years now. On the one hand, Heidegger is portrayed as a forerunner of the deep ecology movement, providing an alternative for the technological age we live in. On the other, commentators contend that the basic thrust of Heidegger’s thought cannot be found in such an ecological ethos. In this article, this debate is revisited in order to answer the question whether it is possible to conceive (...) human dwelling on earth in a way which is consistent with the technological world we live in and heralds another beginning at the same time. Our point of departure in this article is not the work of Heidegger but the affordance theory of James Gibson, which will prove to be highly compatible with the radical environmentalist concept of nature as well as Heidegger’s concept of the challenging of nature. (shrink)

This article contains the results of a theoretical analysis of the phenomenon of natural language understanding (NLU), as a methodological problem. The combination of structural-ontological and informational-psychological approaches provided an opportunity to describe the subject matter field of NLU, as a composite function of the mind, which systemically combines the verbal and discursive structural layers. In particular, the idea of NLU is presented, on the one hand, as the relation between the discourse of a specific speech message and the meta-discourse (...) of a language, in turn, activated by the need-motivational factors. On the other hand, it is conceptualized as a process with a specific structure of information metabolism, the study of which implies the necessity to differentiate the affective (emotional) and need-motivational influences on the NLU, as well as to take into account their interaction. At the same time, the hypothesis about the influence of needs on NLU under the scenario similar to the pattern of Yerkes-Dodson is argued. And the theoretical conclusion that emotions fulfill the function of the operator of the structural features of the information metabolism of NLU is substantiated. Thus, depending on the modality of emotions in the process of NLU, it was proposed to distinguish two scenarios for the implementation of information metabolism - reduction and synthetic. The argument in favor of the conclusion about the productive and constitutive role of emotions in the process of NLU is also given. (shrink)

A fundamental problem in science is how to make logical inferences from scientific data. Mere data does not suffice since additional information is necessary to select a domain of models or hypotheses and thus determine the likelihood of each model or hypothesis. Thomas Bayes’ Theorem relates the data and prior information to posterior probabilities associated with differing models or hypotheses and thus is useful in identifying the roles played by the known data and the assumed prior information when making inferences. (...) Scientists, philosophers, and theologians accumulate knowledge when analyzing different aspects of reality and search for particular hypotheses or models to fit their respective subject matters. Of course, a main goal is then to integrate all kinds of knowledge into an all-encompassing worldview that would describe the whole of reality. A generous description of the whole of reality would span, in the order of complexity, from the purely physical to the supernatural. These two extreme aspects of reality are bridged by a nonphysical realm, which would include elements of life, man, consciousness, rationality, mental and mathematical abstractions, etc. An urgent problem in the theory of knowledge is what science is and what it is not. Albert Einstein’s notion of science in terms of sense perception is refined by defining operationally the data that makes up the subject matter of science. It is shown, for instance, that theological considerations included in the prior information assumed by Isaac Newton is irrelevant in relating the data logically to the model or hypothesis. In addition, the concepts of naturalism, intelligent design, and evolutionary theory are critically analyzed. Finally, Eugene P. Wigner’s suggestions concerning the nature of human consciousness, life, and the success of mathematics in the natural sciences is considered in the context of the creative power endowed in humans by God. (shrink)

Naturalism about natural kinds is the view that they are none other than the kinds discoverable by science. This thesis is in tension with what is perhaps the dominant contemporary view of natural kinds: essentialism. According to essentialism, natural kinds constitute a small subset of our scientific categories, namely those definable in terms of intrinsic, microphysical properties, which are possessed necessarily rather than contingently by their bearers. Though essentialism may appear compatible with naturalism, and is indeed sometimes qualified with the (...) epithet “scientific,” it has become increasingly clear in recent years that only a minority of categories posited by science satisfy those conditions. I will not try to argue against essentialism directly in this chapter. Instead, I will attempt to articulate an alternative, naturalist conception of natural kinds, according to which the mark of natural kinds is their discoverability by science, not just basic science but the special sciences and even the social sciences. (shrink)

This article uses the case study of ethnobiological classification to develop a positive and a negative thesis about the state of natural kind debates. On the one hand, I argue that current accounts of natural kinds can be integrated in a multidimensional framework that advances understanding of classificatory practices in ethnobiology. On the other hand, I argue that such a multidimensional framework does not leave any substantial work for the notion “natural kind” and that attempts to formulate a general account (...) of naturalness have become an obstacle to understanding classificatory practices. (shrink)

The claim that common sense regards free will and moral responsibility as compatible with determinism has played a central role in both analytic and experimental philosophy. In this paper, we show that evidence in favor of this “natural compatibilism” is undermined by the role that indeterministic metaphysical views play in how people construe deterministic scenarios. To demonstrate this, we re-examine two classic studies that have been used to support natural compatibilism. We find that although people give apparently compatibilist responses, this (...) is largely explained by the fact that people import an indeterministic metaphysics into deterministic scenarios when making judgments about freedom and responsibility. We conclude that judgments based on these scenarios are not reliable evidence for natural compatibilism. (shrink)

This paper compares tracking and phenomenal intentionality theories of intentionality with respect to the issue of naturalism. Tracking theories explicitly aim to naturalize intentionality, while phenomenal intentionality theories generally do not. It might seem that considerations of naturalism count in favor of tracking theories. We survey key considerations relevant to this claim, including some motivations for and objections to the two kinds of theories. We conclude by suggesting that naturalistic considerations may in fact support phenomenal intentionality theories over tracking theories.

We respond to Swinburne’s reply to our critique of his argument for the Resurrection by defending the relevance of our counterexamples to his claim that God does not permit grand deception. We reaffirm and clarify our charge that Swinburne ignores two crucial items of Negative Natural Theology (NNT)—that God has an exceptionally weak tendency to raise the dead and that even people with exemplary public records sometimes sin. We show, accordingly, that our total evidence makes it highly probable that Jesus (...) was not sinless, incarnate, or resurrected and that God has permitted massive deception regarding these defining Christian dogmas. (shrink)

This paper contends that some of the recent critical appraisals of universals theories of natural laws, namely, van Fraassen's analysis of Armstrong's probabilistic laws, are largely ineffective since they fail to disclose the incompatibility of universals and any realistic natural law setting. Rather, a more profitable line of criticism is developed that contests the universalists' claim to have resolved the induction problem (i.e., the separation of natural laws from mere accidental regularities), and thereby reveals the universals' philosophically inadequate concept of (...) a physical property. (shrink)

When we ask what natural kinds are, there are two different things we might have in mind. The first, which I’ll call the taxonomy question, is what distinguishes a category which is a natural kind from an arbitrary class. The second, which I’ll call the ontology question, is what manner of stuff there is that realizes the category. Many philosophers have systematically conflated the two questions. The confusion is exhibited both by essentialists and by philosophers who pose their accounts in (...) terms of similarity. It also leads to misreading philosophers who do make the distinction. Distinguishing the questions allows for a more subtle understanding of both natural kinds and their underlying metaphysics. (shrink)

Natural kind essentialism is a specification of the intuitive idea that there are some mind-independent or objective categories in nature. These categories are thought to be characterised by a shared essence, which may involve intrinsic or extrinsic properties, mechanisms, or causal history. While the ontological basis of natural kinds has its roots in antiquity and especially Aristotle, the contemporary notion of a “natural kind” in philosophical discussion is often traced to William Whewell’s and John Stuart Mill’s work in the (...) 1800s. In its more modern form, natural kind essentialism was popularised in the 1970s mainly by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam. Traditionally, natural kind essentialism has been associated with intrinsic and microstructural properties, but contemporary work has made it clear that more refined versions of natural kind essentialism may have to accept extrinsic or relational essences. (shrink)