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  1. Kant's Argument That Existence is Not a Determination.Nicholas F. Stang - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):583-626.
    In this paper, I examine Kant's famous objection to the ontological argument: existence is not a determination. Previous commentators have not adequately explained what this claim means, how it undermines the ontological argument, or how Kant argues for it. I argue that the claim that existence is not a determination means that it is not possible for there to be non-existent objects; necessarily, there are only existent objects. I argue further that Kant's target is not merely ontological arguments as such (...)
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  2. Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement.Nicholas F. Stang - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (6):1117-1139.
    In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as (...)
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  3. Artworks Are Not Valuable for Their Own Sake.Nicholas F. Stang - 2012 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (3):271-280.
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  4. A Kantian Response to Bolzano’s Critique of Kant’s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction.Nicholas F. Stang - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):33-61.
    One of Bolzano’s objections to Kant’s way of drawing the analytic-synthetic distinction is that it only applies to judgments within a narrow range of syntactic forms, namely, universal affirmative judgments. According to Bolzano, Kant cannot account for judgments of other syntactic forms that, intuitively, are analytic. A recent paper by Ian Proops also attributes to Kant the view that analytic judgments beyond a limited range of syntactic forms are impossible. I argue that, correctly understood, Kant’s conception of analyticity allows for (...)
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