16 found
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  1. Testimonial Entitlement and the Function of Comprehension.Peter J. Graham - 2010 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 148--174.
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  2. Epistemic Normativity and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 247-273.
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  3. Functions, Warrant, History.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. Cambridge University Press. pp. 15-35.
    I hold that epistemic warrant consists in the normal functioning of the belief-forming process when the process has forming true beliefs reliably as an etiological function. Evolution by natural selection is the central source of etiological functions. This leads many to think that on my view warrant requires a history of natural selection. What then about learning? What then about Swampman? Though functions require history, natural selection is not the only source. Self-repair and trial-and-error learning are both sources. Warrant requires (...)
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  4. Liberal Fundamentalism and its Rivals.Peter J. Graham - 2006 - In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford University Press. pp. 93--115.
    Many hold that perception is a source of epistemically basic (direct) belief: for justification, perceptual beliefs do not need positive inferential support from other justified beliefs, especially from beliefs about one’s current sensory episodes. Perceptual beliefs can, however, be defeated or undermined by other things one believes, and so to be justified in the end there must be no undefeated undermining grounds. Similarly for memory and introspection.1..
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  5. Against Actual-World Reliabilism: Epistemically Correct Procedures and Reliably True Outcomes.Peter J. Graham - 2016 - In Miguel Angel Fernandez (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press.
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  6. Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?Peter J. Graham - 2006 - Philosophica 78:105-127.
    Orthodoxy in epistemology maintains that some sources of belief, e.g. perception and introspection, generate knowledge, while others, e.g. testimony and memory, preserve knowledge. An example from Jennifer Lackey B the Schoolteacher case B purports to show that testimony can generate knowledge. It is argued that Lackey's case fails to subvert the orthodox view, for the case does not involve the generation of knowledge by testimony. A modified version of the case does. Lackey's example illustrates the orthodox view; the revised case (...)
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  7. Testimony as Speech Act, Testimony as Source.Peter J. Graham - 2015 - In Chienkuo Mi, Ernest Sosa & Michael Slote (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn toward Virtue. Routledge. pp. 121-144.
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  8. The Function of Perception.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Scientia: Bridges between Virtue Epistemology and Philosophy of Science. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Synthese Library. pp. 13-31.
    What is the biological function of perception? I hold perception, especially visual perception in humans, has the biological function of accurately representing the environment. Tyler Burge argues this cannot be so in Origins of Objectivity (Oxford, 2010), for accuracy is a semantical relationship and not, as such, a practical matter. Burge also provides a supporting example. I rebut the argument and the example. Accuracy is sometimes also a practical matter if accuracy partly explains how perception contributes to survival and reproduction.
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  9. Does Justification Aim at Truth?Peter J. Graham - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):51-72.
    Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer 'Yes'; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In 'The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism' they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. 'Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding' of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no 'connection to the truth.' A 'truth-aimed ... epistemology is not entitled to (...)
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  10. Intelligent Design and Selective History: Two Sources of Purpose and Plan.Peter J. Graham - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 3:67-88.
    Alvin Plantinga argues by counterexample that no naturalistic account of functions is possible--God is then the only source for natural functions. This paper replies to Plantinga's examples and arguments. Plantinga misunderstands naturalistic accounts. Plantinga's mistakes flow from his assimilation of functional notions in general to functions from intentional design in particular.
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  11. Metaphysical Libertarianism and the Epistemology of Testimony.Peter J. Graham - 2004 - American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1):37-50.
    Reductionism about testimony holds that testimonial warrant or entitlement is just a species of inductive warrant. Anti-Reductionism holds that it is different from inductive but analogous to perceptual or memorial warrant. Perception receives much of its positive epistemic status from being reliably truthconducive in normal conditions. One reason to reject the epistemic analogy is that testimony involves agency – it goes through the will of the speaker – but perception does not. A speaker might always choose to lie or otherwise (...)
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  12. Epistemic Evaluations: Consequences, Costs and Benefits.Peter J. Graham, Megan Stotts, Zachary Bachman & Meredith McFadden - 2015 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 4 (4):7-13.
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  13. Theorizing Justification.Peter J. Graham - 2010 - In Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press.
    The standard taxonomy of theories of epistemic justification generates four positions from the Foundationalism v. Coherentism and Internalism v. Externalism disputes. I develop a new taxonomy driven by two other distinctions: Fundamentalism v. Non-Fundamentalism and Actual-Result v. Proper-Aim conceptions of epistemic justification. Actual-Result theorists hold that a belief is justified only if, as an actual matter of fact, it is held or formed in a way that makes it more likely than not to be true. Proper-Aim theorists hold that a (...)
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  14.  84
    Against Inferential Reliabilism: Making Origins Matter More.Peter J. Graham - 2014 - Philosophical Analysis: The Journal of the Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy 15:87-122.
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  15.  36
    Causation and Free Will By Carolina Sartorio.Peter J. Graham, Andrew Law & Jonah Nagashima - 2018 - Analysis 2 (78):371-373.
    Review of Carolina Sartorio's Causation and Free Will.
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  16.  59
    Russell’s Logical Construction of the World.Peter J. Graham - forthcoming - In Diego Machua & Baron Reed (eds.), Skepticism: From Antiquity to the Present. Continuum.
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