This essay illustrates the main aspects of the discussion between Brentano and Stumpf about «tonal fusion». In his Tonpsychologie, Stumpf essentially moved from a Brentanian standpoint. Yet, he did not adopt Brentano’s subsequently developed new theory of «sensible qualities», so that a polemic eventually arouse between them. Far from representing a marginal issue, the episode is relevant to our understanding of their relationship. The discussion as to the mechanism of tonal fusion reveals a general divergence between Brentano and Stumpf concerning (...) the idea of human sensibility as a whole and of the method of psychology. (shrink)

This essay addresses the interrelations between philosophy and experimental sciences that lie at the heart of Carl Stumpf’s epistemology. Following a biographical exposé demonstrating how Stumpf succeeded in acquiring a dual competence in both philosophical and scientific fields, we examine the vast array of academic disciplines encompassed by his research. Such a biographical treatment aims, indeed, to better promote the thrust of Stumpf’s assertion that philosophical enquiries should always be carried out in close connection with scientific practices, and underlines how (...) philosophico-scientific interactions established his work as a central pillar in the history of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German thought. (shrink)

In his Spinozastudien Stumpf dismisses the commonplace interpretation of Spinoza’s parallelism in psychophysical terms. Rather, he suggests to read Ethics, II, Prop. 7, as the heritage of the scholastic doctrine of intentionality. Accordingly, things are the intentional objects of God’s ideas. On this basis, Stumpf also tries to make sense of the puzzling spinozian doctrine of the infinity of God’s attributes. In support of this exegesis, Stumpf offers an interesting reconstruction of the history of intentionality from Plato and Aristotle to (...) the late Scholastics. Besides its intrinsic value, Stumpf’s confrontation with Spinoza is illuminating in explaining his own position concerning a crucial phenomenological question such as intentionality. Actually, Stumpf avoids defining the mental in terms of intentionality and maintains, rather, a moderate but professed dualistic position, thus deeply diverging from both Brentano and Husserl. (shrink)

The ancient Greeks already used to give ethnic names to their different scales, and observations on differences in music of the various nations always raised the interest of musicians and philosophers. Yet, it was only in the late nineteenth century that “comparative musicology” became an institutional science. An important role in this process was played by Carl Stumpf, a former pupil of Brentano’s who pioneered these researches in Berlin. Stumpf founded the Phonogrammarchiv to collect recordings of folk and extra-European music (...) and a dedicated journal, the Sammelbände für vergleichende Musikwissenschaft. Gifted in the field of science no less than in that of musicology, Stumpf developed an empirically-oriented approach to phenomenology, deeply divergent from Husserl’s and highly influential over the Berlin school of Gestalt psychology. A self-declared “outsider” among armchair philosophers, Stumpf experimentally investigated the perception of sounds and the origins of musical consonance. Developing the physiological studies of Ernst Weber on the sense of touch, Stumpf discovered that two sensations of tone, given at the same time, tend to mix in a certain degree. Musical consonance – he claimed – lays in this level of “tonal fusion”, not in the allegedly “natural” series of the harmonic partials of a vibrating chord, as suggested by the naturalists of all times from Pythagoras to Stumpf’s great contemporary Hermann Helmholtz. Accordingly, no musical system can claim for preponderance over the others: Stumpf’s researches in comparative musicology served to corroborate his theses on “tonal fusion” and the psychological foundations of consonance. Although Stumpf later revised and finally abandoned this theory, its permanent value lays in its opposition to dominant naturalistic approaches. The commitment for comparative musicology at the Berlin School is then no concession to a positivistic fashion for exoticism. The fundamentally Eurocentric stance of naturalistic theories of music is also fiercely contrasted by Stumpf’s pupil Erich Hornbostel, who suggests that music ought to be considered as culture, rather than as nature, and focuses attention on the eventually melting human cultures. The Berlin school flourished until the Nazis forced most of its exponents to emigration and, for tragically obvious reasons, heavily discouraged researches on these topics. (shrink)

Together with other influential psychologists of the time, Wundt considers internal data as absolute evidence, grounding psychology on this assumption. In opposition to his former mentor, Külpe aims at rehabilitating Kant’s transcendental aesthetics. Yet, he is far from embracing transcendentalism and rejects Kant’s skepticism as to the possibility of a scientific psychology. Nevertheless, Külpe believes that Kant is right in considering internal data as unreliable for scientific purposes: accordingly, psychology should share the same scientific methodology of any other science.

Stumpf’s doctrine of the categories is of great importance for our understanding of his philosophy. This theme had been widely discussed among German thinkers after Kant; Brentano himself had repeatedly dealt with it since his early works. However, Stumpf considerably diverges from Brentano on this crucial philosophical topic. Although a systematic discussion can be found only in Stumpf’s posthumous Erkenntnislehre, his core ideas on the categories can be traced to his early work on space of 1873. In fact, Stumpf claims (...) that the peculiar relationship between extension and color is analogous to the relationship that holds between substance and accidents. Thus, like any other category, substance empirically stems from perception. Sensory experience, for Stumpf, is made up of perceptual wholes, whose attributes are typically bound to each other, rather than separately given in bundles, as Hume and other associationists used to assume. Thus, the achievements of Stumpf’s holist psychology effectively contributes a solution to this classic metaphysical problem. (shrink)

This essay focuses on realism in ontology and on the problem of defining reality. According to the definition given by many realists, reality is independent of our thoughts, conceptual schemes, linguistic practices, etc. Yet, this merely negative definition of reality has some disadvantages: it implies a dualistic view, and it is incompatible with scientific realism. As an alternative, I introduce and discuss the traditional definition of reality as effectiveness, or capability of acting. I then attempt to determine to what extent (...) this definition can be helpful in the debate concerning ontological realism. (shrink)

This essay is about the Wolfgang Köhler’s philosophical ideas expressed in his The Place of Value in a World of Facts of 1938. Köhler, who strongly supports a scientific world view, considers the question as to whether science is able to cope with human values, besides natural facts. Relying upon phenomenological analyses, and on his previous researches in natural philosophy, Köhler introduces his doctrine of “epistemological dualism”. From a historical point of view, this theory exhibits some similarity with the philosophical (...) ideas expressed by Köhler’s Berlin mentor Carl Stumpf. It is argued that Köhler’s epistemological dualism actually supports ontological monism and aims at offering a unified view of natural facts and human values. (shrink)

The essay investigates the question of the transition from a physiological view of anthropology to one ‘from a pragmatic point of view’ in the work of Immanuel Kant. The concepts this thinking hinges on are those of ‘prudence’ and ‘character’, which are crucial for the break that Kant’s anthropological thought represents with that of earlier and later philosophy.

This essay focuses on the relation between man and the world in Kant’s anthropology. Within Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, used as a manual by Kant for his lessons, empirical psychology is situated between cosmology and rational psychology. However, this view is untenable for Kant, at least after the first Critique. Consequently, whereas Baumgarten explains, for instance, obscure ideas referring to the bodily position in the world, Kant’s pragmatic approach excludes this. Yet, the concept of «Welt» retains paramount importance within Kant’s Anthropology. The (...) two parts of the work are thus harmonically linked: the first offers an account of a largely pathological human psychology; the second a way out of the pathology through the construction of a social and historical human world. Accordingly, anthropology responds to the «Weltbegriff» of philosophy and helps to correct the deviations from the final rational destination of mankind. (shrink)

This essay aims at an analysis of Stumpf’s doctrine of categories. In Erkenntnislehre Stumpf argues that all categories empirically stem from outer and inner perception. Although Stumpf champions an empiricist explanation of the matter, he firmly rejects associationism. In his conception of the origin of categories, including substance, Stumpf builds on the assumption that human perception behaves dynamically. Sensory experience consists indeed essentially of perceptual wholes. The analysis of Stumpf’s theses is of great importance for our thorough understanding of his (...) philosophy. His theory regarding this crucial philosophical topic diverges considerably from Brentano’s. (shrink)

The paper compares the ideas developed by Bozzi and Stumpf with regard to unity, identity, and causality. Although Bozzi’s formulation is independent from the one made by Stumpf in his Erkenntnislehre, these two positions share the same innovative importance granted to perceptual experience and to the problem of the origin of categories. Thus, despite different levels of awareness and formalization, in both authors we see the features of what we can call – analogous- ly to Bozzi’s naïve physics – a (...) “naïve metaphysics”, at whose core lie the refusal of intellectualism, and the determination of the origin of categories in the concrete stream of perception. (shrink)

This essay addresses the attitude of some leading Neo-Kantian philosophers toward scientific psychology and psychophysics. Early influential figures like Friedrich A. Lange counted Gustav T. Fechner’s psychophysical law among their allies in the rehabilitation of the Kantian standpoint. Later on, however, Neo-Kantian philosophers firmly rejected psychological measurement as a whole and harshly criticized the methods adopted by several psychologists of their time. For example, the Marburg mathematician and philosopher August Stadler reduced the validity of Fechner’s law to the mere physiological (...) sphere, and Hermann Cohen conceived the application of mathematical integration to human sensations as an inane enterprise. (shrink)

Many nineteenth-century psychologists assume that the measurement of psychic intensity is a prerequisite to the development of a truly scientific psychology. In the first edition of the Psychology from an empirical point of view, Brentano deals with this question. He assumes that all psychic phenomena admit of a certain intensity. Later on, Brentano retreats this doctrine and claims that only sensible phenomena admit of an intensity, whereas intellectual presentations do not. As a consequence, Brentano introduces a radical gap between sensible (...) and noetic consciousness. By contrast, Stumpf maintains a continuity between sensations and presentations. The main difference between them is the degree of their intensity. The essay provides a discussion and a comparison of the above mentioned points of view. (shrink)

Can music express the world-view of a certain composer, or of a certain historical era – and how? In 19th Century, the wide-ranging philosophical implications of this question raised an intriguing quarrel between the formalists’ scepticism as to this point and their various opponents. Starting from the case study of the German psychologist and philosopher of music Georg Anschütz, it is argued that allowing for a systematic link of music and the world-views easily turns into the far more demanding claim (...) that music is the best and perhaps the only way to express them properly. In turn, this attitude sits well with the tendency to think of music hearing as a disembodied process, hinting at the deep dimension of synesthesia rather than to that of music as a cultural phenomenon, in Erich Hornbostel’s sense. (shrink)

Il lavoro analizza la tempestiva ricezione da parte di Cornelio Fabro della filosofia di Carl Stumpf, così come esposta nella postuma Erkenntnislehre. Fin dai lavori dei primi anni Quaranta Fabro adotta una concezione della ‘fenomenologia’ distante da quella di Husserl perché ricalcata sulla definizione stumpfiana. Più in generale, Fabro si ispira a Stumpf ancor più che allo stesso Brentano. A partire dalla distinzione tra ‘fenomeni' e ‘funzioni psichiche’ Stumpf è infatti capace di proseguire il rilancio dell’aristotelismo con coerenza ancor maggiore (...) del maestro, all’insegna di un pieno riconoscimento del significato conoscitivo della percezione contro gli tipici di eccessi di ogni forma di intellettualismo. (shrink)

Hegel’s treatment of character in §395 of Encyclopedia is considered together with the commentaries given in his lectures. In these texts Hegel addresses some philosophical problems concerning character. In Hegel’s view, in fact, human character has a “natural basis” and yet depends on a free individual choice. Attention is drawn at Kant’s treatment of the same subject matter in Anthropology form a pragmatic point of view, which is the source of Hegel’s tripartite arrangement of Naturell, temperament and character. Diverging from (...) Kant, however, Hegel introduces a dialectic development within the development of character. (shrink)

In this essay I analyze Kant's concept of character in the light of the concept of nature adopted in Kant's Pragmatic anthropology. In the Preface, Kant contrasts mechanical nature with freedom and opts for a pragmatic, rather than a physiological anthropology. In the Anthropological characteristics, however, Kant introduces his teleological concept of nature. Accordingly, he defends the view that there is no basic contrast between the purpose of nature (in the latter sense) and human freedom.