This paper responds to two arguments that have been offered against the positing of ‘i-desires’, imaginative counterparts of desire supposedly involved in fiction, pretence, and mindreading. The Introspection Argument asks why, if there are both i-desires and desires, the distinction is so unfamiliar and hard to draw, unlike the relatively clear distinctions between perception and mental imagery, or belief and belief-like imagining. The Accountability Argument asks how it can make sense to treat merely imaginative states as revealing of someone’s psychology, (...) the way we do with responses to fiction. I argue that carefully considering the relationship between other states and their imaginative counterparts sheds light on how we should expect i-desires to differ from desires, and suggests that we may often be in states that are _indeterminate_, in limbo between the two categories. This indeterminacy explains why the distinction is often hard to draw, and why these states can be revealing about us even without (determinately) being real desires. (shrink)

I discuss the apparent discrepancy between the qualitative diversity of consciousness and the relative qualitative homogeneity of the brain's basic constituents, a discrepancy that has been raised as a problem for identity theorists by Maxwell and Lockwood (as one element of the ‘grain problem’), and more recently as a problem for panpsychists (under the heading of ‘the palette problem’). The challenge posed to panpsychists by this discrepancy is to make sense of how a relatively small ‘palette’ of basic qualities could (...) give rise to the bewildering diversity of qualities we, and presumably other creatures, experience. I argue that panpsychists can meet this challenge, though it requires taking contentious stands on certain phenomenological questions, in particular on whether any familiar qualities are actual examples of ‘phenomenal blending’, and whether any other familiar qualities have a positive ‘phenomenologically simple character’. Moreover, it requires accepting an eventual theory most elements of which are in a certain explicable sense unimaginable, though not for that reason inconceivable. Nevertheless, I conclude that there are no conclusive reasons to reject such a theory, and so philosophers whose prior commitments motivate them to adopt it can do so without major theoretical cost. (shrink)

The unity of consciousness has so far been studied only as a relation holding among the many experiences of a single subject. I investigate whether this relation could hold between the experiences of distinct subjects, considering three major arguments against the possibility of such ‘between-subjects unity’. The first argument, based on the popular idea that unity implies subsumption by a composite experience, can be deflected by allowing for limited forms of ‘experience-sharing’, in which the same token experience belongs to more (...) than one subject. The second argument, based on the phenomenological claim that unified experiences have interdependent phenomenal characters, I show to rest on an equivocation. Finally, the third argument accuses between-subjects unity of being unimaginable, or more broadly a formal possibility corresponding to nothing we can make sense of. I argue that the familiar experience of perceptual co-presentation gives us an adequate phenomenological grasp on what between-subjects unity might be like. (shrink)

Panpsychism is a striking metaphysical claim: every part of the physical world has some form of consciousness. Does this striking claim have equally striking ethical implications? Does it change what duties we owe to which beings, or how we should understand the relation between self-interest and altruism? Some defenders as well as critics of panpsychism have suggested it does. Others have disagreed. In this paper, we attempt to survey and organize these existing discussions. We suggest that panpsychism is likely to (...) have significant implications, but that they 1) stop short of some of the most radical implications sometimes associated with the view (by both critics and proponents), and 2) often depend heavily on the exact sort of panpsychism that is endorsed, as well as how one settles various independent questions about value and identity. (shrink)

Some philosophical theories of consciousness imply consciousness in things we would never intuitively think are conscious—most notably, panpsychism implies that consciousness is pervasive, even outside complex brains. Is this a reductio ab absurdum for such theories, or does it show that we should reject our original intuitions? To understand the stakes of this question as clearly as possible, we analyse the structured pattern of intuitions that panpsychism conflicts with. We consider a variety of ways that the tension between this intuition (...) and panpsychism could be resolved, ranging from complete rejection of the theory to complete dismissal of the intuition, but argue in favour of more nuanced approaches which try to reconcile the two. (shrink)

Galileo’s Error is a superlative work of public philosophy, particularly as a way of introducing modern academic panpsychism to a broader audience. In this commentary, I reflect on an issue that is prominent, though often with different background concerns, in both academic and popular discourse: what it means to be ‘scientific’ or ‘unscientific’. Panpsychism is not itself a scientific hypothesis, but neither is it (as critics sometimes claim) in conflict with science. Indeed, Goff argues, and I agree, that panpsychism is (...) an eminently scientific worldview, in the sense of a way of viewing reality that accords with and embraces what science reveals. But what exactly it means to ‘accord with and embrace’ science is disputed; this paper tries to untangle some of the threads. (shrink)

This thesis explores the possibility of composite consciousness: phenomenally conscious states belonging to a composite being in virtue of the consciousness of, and relations among, its parts. We have no trouble accepting that a composite being has physical properties entirely in virtue of the physical properties of, and relations among, its parts. But a long­standing intuition holds that consciousness is different: my consciousness cannot be understood as a complex of interacting component consciousnesses belonging to parts of me. I ask why: (...) what is it about consciousness that makes us think it so different from matter? And should we accept this apparent difference? (shrink)

I analyse the meaning of a popular idiom among consciousness researchers, in which an individual's consciousness is described as a 'field'. I consider some of the contexts where this idea appears, in particular discussions of attention and the unity of consciousness. In neither case, I argue, do authors provide the resources to cash out all the implications of field-talk: in particular, they do not give sense to the idea of conscious elements being arrayed along multiple dimensions. I suggest ways to (...) extend and generalize the attentional construal of 'field-talk' to provide a genuine multiplicity of dimensions, through the notions of attentional proximity and causal proximity: the degree to which two experiential elements are disposed to bring one another into attention when attended, or to interact in other distinctively mental ways. I conclude that if consciousness is a field, it is one organized by attentional and/or causal proximity. (shrink)

‘Radical enactivism’ (Hutto and Myin 2013, 2017) eschews representational content for all ‘basic’ mental activities. Critics have argued that this view cannot make sense of the workings of the imagination. In their recent book (2017), Hutto and Myin respond to these critics, arguing that some imaginings can be understood without attributing them any representational content. Their response relies on the claim that a system can exploit a structural isomorphism between two things without either of those things being a semantically evaluable (...) representation of the other. I argue that even if this claim is granted, there remains a problem for radically enactive accounts of imagining, namely that the active establishing and maintenance of a structural isomorphism seems to require representational content even if the exploitation of such an isomorphism, when established, does not. (shrink)

It has been suggested that the biosphere and its component ecological systems be thought of as “communities”; this is often invoked as a reason to attribute it moral significance. I first disambiguate this claim, distinguishing the purely moral, social-factual, and biological-factual senses of this term, as well as distinguishing primary from derived meanings, drawing on material from philosophy, sociology, psychology, and ecology. I then argue that the ethically important sense of the term is one that does not apply to ecological (...) systems, though it could in the future, and that it is misleading to base ethical arguments on claims about “biotic communities.”. (shrink)

The psychology and phenomenology of our knowledge of other minds is not well captured either by describing it simply as perception, nor by describing it simply as inference. A better description, I argue, is that our knowledge of other minds involves both through ‘perceptual co-presentation’, in which we experience objects as having aspects that are not revealed. This allows us to say that we perceive other minds, but perceive them as private, i.e. imperceptible, just as we routinely perceive aspects of (...) physical objects as unperceived. I discuss existing versions of this idea, particularly Joel Smith’s, on which it is taken to imply that our knowledge of other minds is, in these cases, perceptual and not inferential. Against this, I argue that perceptual co-presentation in general, and mind-perception in particular, yields knowledge that is simultaneously both perceptual and inferential. (shrink)

It has been claimed that we need singular self-knowledge to function properly as rational agents. I argue that this is not strictly true: agents in certain relations could dispense with singular self-knowledge and instead rely on plural self-knowledge. In defending the possibility of this kind of ‘selfless agent’, I thereby defend the possibility of a certain kind of ‘seamless’ collective agency; agency in a group of agents who have no singular self-knowledge, who do not know which member of the group (...) they are. I discuss four specific functions for which singular self-knowledge has been thought indispensable: distinguishing intentional from unintentional actions, connecting non-indexical knowledge with action, reflecting on our own reasoning, and identifying which ultimate practical reasons we have. I argue in each case that by establishing certain relations between agents – relations I label ‘motor vulnerability’, ‘cognitive vulnerability’, ‘evidential unity’ and ‘moral unity’ – we would allow those agents to do everything a rational agent needs to do while relying only on plural, rather than singular, self-knowledge. Finally, I consider the objection that any agents who met the conditions I lay out for selfless agency would thereby cease to qualify as distinct agents, merging into a single agent without agential parts. Against this objection, I argue that we should recognise the possibility of simultaneous agency in whole and parts, and not regard either as disqualifying the other. (shrink)

If panpsychism is true, it suggests that consciousness pervades not only our brains and bodies but also the entire universe, prompting a reevaluation of our existential attitudes. Hence, panpsychism potentially fulfills psychological needs typically addressed by religious beliefs, such as a sense of belonging and purpose but also transcendence. The discussion is organized into two main areas: the implications of panpsychism for basic human existential needs, such as feelings of kinship, ommunication, and loneliness; and for greater existential questions relating to (...) mystical experiences including transcendent unity and alleviation of the fear of death. In conclusion panpsychism may provide a deeper meaning in life for some people but its broader impact depends on individual dispositions and the cultural context in which it is embedded. (shrink)

The papers in this special issue make important contributions to a longstanding debate about how we should conceive of and explain mental phenomena. In other words, they make a case about the best philosophical paradigm for cognitive science. The two main competing approaches, hotly debated for several decades, are representationalism and enactivism. However, recent developments in disciplines such as machine learning and computational neuroscience have fostered a proliferation of intermediate approaches, leading to the emergence of completely new positions, in particular (...) the Predictive Processing approach. Here, we will consider the different approaches discussed in this volume. (shrink)

This is a reply to Luke Roelof's comments (2017) on my paper "A Dilemma for Russellian Monists about Consciousness" (2015). On both Russellian monism and dualism, experiences are distinct from neural-functional states and they are correlated with some neural-functional states and not others. The only difference between them concerns the status of the extra-logical principles linking experiences with their neural-functional correlates (e. g. increasing S1 firing rates results in increasing pain): Russellian monists hold that they are a priori and (...) necessary, while dualists say that they are a posteriori and contingent. How are we to decide between them? Roelofs suggests that Russellian monism is simpler than dualism. I argue against this. Both face the "T-shirt problem": both require a swarm of extra-logical principles linking brain states with experiences. The Russellian monist might engage in some unbridled speculation: they are somehow derivable from small set of more basic extra-logical principles ("principles of combination"), even if we cannot supply the details. But the dualist can do the same. The only difference is that the dualist will speculate that those more basic principles are contingent rather than necessary a priori. Given our limited evidence, there is no reason (and in particular no simplicity-based reason) to prefer the Russellian monist's speculations to the dualist's parallel speculations. (shrink)

Philosophy has long either dismissed or paid only minimal attention to creativity, and even with the rise of research on imagination, the creative imagination has largely been ignored as well. The aim of this volume is to correct this neglect. By bringing together existing research in various sub-disciplines, we also aim to open up new avenues of research. The chapters in Part I provide some framing and history on the philosophical study of imagination and creativity, along with an overview of (...) the empirical literature. Part II explores imagination and creativity as they manifest in, and in turn shape, the individual. Part III surveys the role of imagination and creativity across a wide variety of artistic domains, and the chapters of Part IV turn to societal domains. Part V focuses on the interplay of imagination and creativity with regard to particular features of creative subjects and different kinds of creative subjects. *** -/- Part I: Theories and Approaches 1. Theories of Imagination (Peter Kung) 2. Theories of Creativity (Julia Langkau) 3. Historical Treatments of Imagination in the Western Tradition (Lucia Oliveri) 4. Historical Treatments of Creativity in the Western Tradition (Elliot Paul) 5. Non-Western Treatments of Imagination (Reza Hadisi and Jing Iris Hu) 6. Non-Western Treatments of Creativity (Nicolas B. Verger and Vlad Glăveanu) 7. Empirical Treatments of Imagination and Creativity (Dustin Stokes) 8. Experimental Philosophy of Imagination and Creativity (Michael T. Stuart) 9. The Relationship between Imagination and Creativity (Margherita Arcangeli) -/- Part II: Imagination and Creativity in Mind and Action 10. Imagination, Creativity, and Skill (Amy Kind) 11. Imagination, Creativity, and Attention (Bence Nanay) 12. Imagination, Creativity, and Agency (Caterina Moruzzi) 13. Imagination, Creativity, and Emotion (Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni) 14. Imagination, Creativity, and Embodiment (Adriana Clavel-Vázquez and María Jimena Clavel Vázquez) 15. Imagination, Creativity, and Gender (Luke Roelofs) 16. Imagination, Creativity, and Race (Nicholas Whittaker) 17. Imagination, Creativity, and Child Development (Thalia Goldstein, Anna Sofia Caruso, Darian Stapleton, and Lamin Fatty) -/- Part III: Imagination and Creativity in the Arts 18. Imagination, Creativity, and the Visual Arts (Claire Anscomb) 19. Imagination, Creativity, and Music (Matteo Ravasio) 20. Imagination, Creativity, and Fiction (Hannah H. Kim) 21. Imagination, Creativity, and Dance (David Davies and Anna Pakes) 22. Imagination, Creativity, and the Culinary Arts (Patrik Engisch) 23. Imagination, Creativity, and Film (Murray Smith) 24. Imagination, Creativity, and Acting (Tzachi Zamir) 25. Imagination, creativity, and fashion (Laura T. Di Summa) -/- Part IV: Imagination and Creativity in Society 26. Imagination and Creativity in the Scientific Realm (Alice Murphy) 27. Imagination and Creativity in the Moral Realm (Tim Mulgan) 28. Imagination and Creativity in the Political Realm (Avshalom Schwartz) 29. Imagination and Creativity in the Law (Maksymilian Del Mar) 30. Imagination and Creativity in the Religious Realm (Neil Van Leeuwen) 31. Imagination and Creativity in Business (Eric Peterson) 32. Imagination and Creativity in Times of Crisis (Jennifer Fraser and Noah Stemeroff) Part V: Emerging Issues in Imagination and Creativity Research 33. Imagination, Creativity, and Aphantasia (Andrea Blomkvist) 34. Imagination, Creativity, and Neurodivergence (Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa) 35. Imagination, Creativity, and Non-Human Animals (Henry Shevlin) 36. Imagination, Creativity, and Artificial Intelligence (Peter Langland-Hassan) 37. Collective Imagination and Collective Creativity (Nick Wiltsher) . (shrink)

Emphasizing the human body in all of its forms, Beauty Unlimited expands the boundaries of what is meant by beauty both geographically and aesthetically. Peg Zeglin Brand and an international group of contributors interrogate the body and the meaning of physical beauty in this multidisciplinary volume. This striking and provocative book explores the history of bodily beautification; the physicality of socially or culturally determined choices of beautification; the interplay of gender, race, class, age, sexuality, and ethnicity within and on the (...) body; and the aesthetic meaning of the concept of beauty in an increasingly globalized world. Foreward by Carolyn Korsmeyer. Authors include Noel Carroll, Gregory Velazco Y Trianosky, Monique Roelofs, Whitney Davis, Eleanor Heartney, Diana Tietjens Meyers, Phoebe M. Farris, Mary Devereaux, Jo Ellen Jacobs, Karina L. Cespedes-Cortes and Paul C. Taylor, Fedwa Malti-Douglas, Stephen Davies, Jane Duran, Valerie Sullivan Fuchs, Keith Lehrer, Allen Douglas, Cynthia Freeland, Eva Kit Wah Man, Mary Bittner Wiseman, and Peg Brand's essay, "ORLAN Revisited: Disembodied Virtual Hybrid Beauty.". (shrink)

FISIOLOGIA DA REPRODUÇÃO BOVINA: 2 - ESTRO E SERVIÇO -/- -/- INTRODUÇÃO -/- -/- A identificação de vacas em cio (estro ou cio) é, sem dúvida, a prática mais importante no manejo da reprodução do rebanho leiteiro. Apesar dos avanços no conhecimento da fisiologia da reprodução a nível celular e molecular, a identificação de vacas em estro continua sendo o problema reprodutivo mais importante e o que mais causa prejuízos econômicos. Na indústria de laticínios no Brasil, seu impacto não foi (...) estimado, porém, a estimativa feita por países como os Estados Unidos onde se perdem 300 milhões de dólares por ano pode dar uma ideia, atribuída apenas à baixa eficiência na detecção de estros. Por que é cada vez mais difícil detectar vacas em estro? A resposta está relacionada aos aspectos intrínsecos da vaca leiteira moderna, associadas as práticas de manejo dos rebanhos atuais, caracterizados por possuírem grande número de vacas nos plantéis. -/- -/- 2.1 Como saber que uma vaca está em cio/estro? -/- -/- O comportamento estral é causado por um aumento no estradiol sérico produzido pelo folículo ovulatório. O aumento do estradiol provoca mudanças de comportamento e modificações na genitália externa e interna. A vaca mostra-se inquieta, sua vocalização aumenta, ela anda mais, tenta montar em outras vacas e aceita montar no touro ou em outra vaca, bem como urinam com mais frequência (micção frequente). A vulva fica levemente inflamada, à palpação retal o útero pode ser visto com tônus ou turgor (duro e contraído) e ao massagear o colo do útero observa-se que sai abundante muco cristalino da vulva. O mecanismo clássico proposto na regulação do estro é baseado principalmente no papel do estradiol; no entanto, estudos recentes indicam que o GnRH pode participar da regulação do estro ao nível do hipotálamo. O estro possui duração entre 8 e 18 horas e a intensidade do mesmo é afetada por fatores ambientais e intrínsecos a vaca moderna (figuras de 1 a 6). -/- -/- -/- Figura 2: A observação do grupo sexualmente ativo facilita a identificação das vacas em estro. -/- Figura 1: As vacas em estro formam grupos ativos (grupo sexualmente ativo) separados do resto das vacas. A conformação desses grupos facilita a observação do estro. -/- -/- A formação de grupos de vacas é um fator ideal para a detecção de vacas em cio, elas ficam juntas e começam a montar uma nas outras, a cheirar a urina de ambas etc. comportamentos que podem ser visualizados de longe pelo tratador e diagnosticado o cio o mais breve possível para o manejo reprodutivo adotado pela propriedade seja para monta natural ou controlada e/ou inseminações artificiais (IA) e artificiais em tempo fixo (IATF). -/- -/- Figura 3: O único comportamento positivo do estro é a aceitação da monta de outra vaca. É frequente que a vaca que realiza a monta também esteja em estro, o que só será afirmado até que ela aceite a monta de outra vaca. -/- -/- Figura 4: Cada monta dura de 5 a 7 segundos -/- Figura 5: A vaca leiteira aceita de 5 a 30 montas distribuídas entre 8 e 18 horas. -/- Figura 6: Além das mudanças comportamentais, os estrogênios causam alterações na genitália interna. Uma delas é a produção de muco cervical, que juntamente com o turgor uterino, constituem os sinais genitais do estro. -/- -/- O cio pode ser dividido em três fases, a inicial, a fase de cio verdadeiro e a fase final. O cio verdadeiro quando é observado, é caracterizado pelo momento em que a vaca aceita claramente a monta. Por sua vez, os sinais de início e final de cio se misturam, apresentam nervosismo e inquietação, cheiram e lambem a vagina e a urina de outras vacas, apoiam a cabeça na garupa de outras fêmeas etc. (figura 7). Uma das sugestões adotadas nas propriedades para facilitar a identificação do cio em um rebanho é realizada pelos funcionários com a utilização de um bastão ou fita de coloração da garupa das vacas. -/- Figura 7: Principais sinais que demonstram que a vaca está entrando em cio. As imagens mostram o início do cio, cio verdadeiro e final do cio. -/- CONTINUA. BAIXE O PDF!!! -/- RESUMO -/- -/- < >Nos Estados Unidos, 300 milhões de dólares são perdidos devido à baixa eficiência na detecção do estro. A eficiência na detecção do estro no Brasil é de 40 a 50%. A meta de eficiência para detecção de estro é > 60%. Com a observação das vacas em dois períodos diários de três horas cada (manhã e tarde), consegue-se uma eficiência na detecção de estro de 80%. Menos de 20 por cento das vacas devem ter um intervalo de serviço duplo e nenhum de mais de 48 dias. A taxa de prenhez é obtida multiplicando-se a eficiência na detecção do estro pela porcentagem de concepção e dividindo por 100 (50 * 30/100 = 15%). A taxa de prenhez em rebanhos norte-americanos é de 15%. Nos Estados Unidos, para cada ponto percentual que diminui a taxa de prenhez, não há mais de US$ 12 a US$ 15 por vaca por ano. No Brasil, para cada ponto percentual que aumenta a taxa de prenhez, na faixa de 15 a 20%, é gerada uma renda anual adicional de $ 190 reais por vaca. Não mais que 25% das vacas devem estar vazias no 150º dia pós-parto. Não mais do que 8% devem as vacas ser cobertas no 250º dia pós-parto. 8% das vacas devem engravidar a cada mês. O estro ocorre 48 a 120 horas após o tratamento com PGF2α. 80% é a precisão na palpação do corpo lúteo. Quatorze dias devem decorrer entre duas injeções de PGF2α. Menos de 25% das vacas incluídas no programa de pré-sincronização devem chegar à IATF. No momento da ovulação, a primeira injeção de GnRH deve ser aplicada entre o quinto e o nono dia do ciclo estral. A inseminação cronometrada é realizada 14-16 horas após a segunda injeção de GnRH. O tratamento com dispositivos intravaginais liberadores de progesterona dura 12 dias. Se a duração do tratamento é menor deve-se injetar PGF2α ao retirá-lo. -/- -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- -/- ATUESTA, Jorge; DIAZA, Angela Gonella. Control hormonal del ciclo estral en bovinos y ovinos. Spei Domus, v. 7, n. 14, 2011. -/- COLAZO, Marcos Germán; MAPLETOFT, Reben. Fisiología del ciclo estral bovino. Ciencia Veterinaria, v. 16, n. 2, p. 31-46, 2017. -/- Fisiologia Clínica do Ciclo Estral de Vacas Leiteiras: Desenvolvimento Folicular, Corpo Lúteo e Etapas do Estro. Belo Jardim: IFPE, 2020. -/- Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Ovulação, Controle e Sincronização do Cio. Belo Jardim: IFPE, 2020. -/- DOBSON, H. et al. The high‐producing dairy cow and its reproductive performance. Reproduction in domestic animals, v. 42, p. 17-23, 2007. -/- DO VALLE, Ezequlel Rodrigues. O ciclo estral de bovinos e métodos de controle. EMBRAPA-CNPGC., 1991. -/- FURTADO, Diego Augusto et al. Inseminação artificial em tempo fixo em bovinos de corte. Revista científica eletrônica de medicina veterinária, v. 16, p. 1-25, 2011. -/- GALON, Nadav. The use of pedometry for estrus detection in dairy cows in Israel. Journal of Reproduction and Development, v. 56, n. S, p. S48-S52, 2010. -/- HOPPER, Richard M. (Ed.). Bovine reproduction. John Wiley & Sons, 2014. -/- LOPEZ, H.; SATTER, L. D.; WILTBANK, M. C. Relationship between level of milk production and estrous behavior of lactating dairy cows. Animal reproduction science, v. 81, n. 3-4, p. 209-223, 2004. -/- MACMILLAN, Keith L. Recent advances in the synchronization of estrus and ovulation in dairy cows. Journal of Reproduction and development, v. 56, n. S, p. S42-S47, 2010. -/- MUNIS DE OLIVEIRA, G. Fisiologia da Reprodução Bovina e Métodos de Controle do Ciclo Estral. Trabalho de conclusão do curso de especialização em Reprodução e Produção de Bovinos–UCB. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, 2006. -/- O'CONNOR, MICHAEL L. Estrus detection. In: Current therapy in large animal theriogenology. WB Saunders, 2007. p. 270-278. -/- RIPPE, Christian A. El ciclo estral. In: Dairy Cattle Reproduction Conference. 2009. p. 111-116. -/- ROELOFS, Judith et al. When is a cow in estrus? Clinical and practical aspects. Theriogenology, v. 74, n. 3, p. 327-344, 2010. -/- VIVEIROS, Ana Tereza de Mendonça. Fisiologia da reprodução de bovinos. Lavras: UFLA, p. 62, 1997. (shrink)