Abstract: The efficiency and performance of sorting algorithms play a crucial role in various applications and industries. In this research paper, we present a comprehensive comparative analysis of popular sorting algorithms on datasets of different sizes and characteristics. The aim is to evaluate the algorithms' performance and identify their strengths and weaknesses under varying scenarios. We consider six commonly used sorting algorithms: QuickSort, TimSort, MergeSort, HeapSort, RadixSort, and ShellSort. These algorithms represent a range of approaches and techniques, including divide-and-conquer, hybrid (...) sorting, and simple comparison-based methods. To assess their performance, we employ a diverse set of datasets, including the Iris dataset (1K), student dataset (5.8K), Wine dataset (6.5K), Uniform (10K), Normal (10K), Exponential (10K), Bimodal (10K), Yelp dataset (10K), MNIST dataset (42K), Uniform (100K), Normal (100K), Exponential (100K), Bimodal (100K), Uniform (500K), Normal (500K), Exponential (500K), Bimodal (500K), Uniform (1M), Normal (1M), Exponential (1M), and Bimodal (1M). These datasets cover a wide range of sizes and characteristics, allowing us to analyze the algorithms' performance across different dimensions. We measure and compare several key metrics, including execution time, memory usage, algorithmic complexity and stability. By analyzing these metrics, we gain insights into the efficiency and suitability of each algorithm for different dataset sizes and characteristics. We also discuss the implications of the findings in practical applications. Our results reveal important trade-offs among the sorting algorithms. While some algorithms excel in certain scenarios, others demonstrate better scalability or memory efficiency. We identify the best-performing algorithms for specific dataset characteristics and highlight their strengths and limitations. This research can assist developers and practitioners in selecting appropriate sorting algorithms based on their specific requirements and dataset characteristics. In conclusion, this comparative analysis provides a valuable contribution to the understanding of sorting algorithm performance. The findings contribute insights into the efficiency and suitability of popular sorting algorithms across datasets of different sizes and characteristics. By evaluating key metrics and discussing the implications, we offer guidance for selecting the most appropriate sorting algorithm in various practical scenarios. (shrink)

This article explores the philosophical implications of the transition from polytheism to monotheism in our development as a rational species. The methodological vehicle employed in the critical analysis conducted is a survey of Hesiodic theogony for insight into the nature and purpose of the monotheistic platforms we have erected in its place. The aim is not so much to dispute the validity of any belief system, past or present, as it is to expose and examine the prevailing paradigms as extensions (...) of abandoned arrangements originally embraced with the same passion exhibited today. The approach is indeed critical, but the claim is not that the demonstration constitutes a refutation of religious principles or theological doctrines, just that it provides a partial identification and preliminary confirmation of the rational grounds for secular concerns and skeptical suspicions. The latter two are manifested as the correlative conviction that religious orientation and theological explanation are reciprocal parts of a collective work in progress mapping out our common initiative as human beings to make sense of the world at large. (shrink)

This article examines the social contract of Thomas Hobbes in the critical context of the prisoner’s dilemma, with the aim of demonstrating that the tenability of the former is not undermined by the gravity of the latter. The urgency of the problem is that Hobbes postulates a social contract to formalize our collective transition from the state of nature to civil society, while the prisoner’s dilemma challenges both the mechanics and the outcome of that thought experiment. The source of the (...) connection is that the incentives for reneging are presumably strong enough to keep rational persons from cooperating. This article argues that the prisoner’s dilemma undermines a position that Hobbes does not hold. It shows, in contrast, that the context and parameters of the social contract, particularly as envisaged by Hobbes, steer it safely between the horns of the dilemma. The main consideration toward that end is the central role of self-interest in the worldview of Hobbes, who thereby leaves plenty of room for progressive concessions toward peaceful coexistence, thus transforming the relevant model of rationality from utility maximization to utility satisficing, where contractors quickly learn to pursue a mutually satisfactory outcome instead of the best personal outcome. (shrink)

This article is a critical analysis of the decisive mission of Michael H. Mitias to attract attention to a neglected relationship between friendship and morality. The evaluation revolves around the position of Mitias on friendship as a central moral value constituting an integral part of the good life and therefore deserving a prominent place in ethical theory. The corresponding vision is not a whimsical intervention in our standard conception of morality but a unifying initiative to recapture the right way of (...) doing ethics. What sets the present article apart from other reactions to Mitias is a holistic approach drawing on literary considerations as well as philosophical ones. The combined aim is to demonstrate that Mitias is not seeking simply to restore friendship to its rightful place in normative ethical theory, which is indeed the full extent of his express objective, but that he is seeking to do so specifically within virtue ethics. This interpretation rests on a broad engagement with Mitias’s publications beyond the treatise (Friendship: A Central Moral Value) often taken understandably yet erroneously to be his only work on the subject. (shrink)

This article is a critique of the ethical justification model that John Rawls employs in his defense of a liberal conception of justice. Rawls is famous for two things: his attempt to ground morality in rationality and his conception of justice as fairness. His work has been resounding on both fronts, the first constituting the justificatory framework for the second. Yet from the beginning, the outcome has been more doctrinaire than the method should have allowed with design details promising objectivity. (...) This article goes to that beginning, or to a reasonable proxy for it anyway, in the “Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics” (1951), with the aim of exposing and examining the discrepancy where it originates. The goal is not to prey on the earliest version of an initiative later undergoing revision but to identify and investigate the inception of a systematic bias that is retained rather than revised in subsequent iterations. The conclusion is that the decision procedure comes across as too objective to favor a liberal conception of justice over competing alternatives and too universal to identify, produce, or support specific moral principles informing a normative ethical system. (shrink)

This article is a critical evaluation of Holger Thesleff’s thinking on Plato’s Forms. The emphasis is, more specifically, on his “rethinking” of the matter, as he puts it in the title of his most recent contribution (Alican and Thesleff 2013: “Rethinking Plato’s Forms”). The general aim is to launch the academic reception of that bold intervention in Plato scholarship, which Thesleff cautiously positions a modest proposal — his trademark teaser to elicit a reaction, positive or negative. Representing a sympathetic perspective, (...) coverage here proceeds in the manner of dialectical engagement with the main lines of his interpretation and reconstruction of Plato’s world. The exegetical focus is on tracing the inspiration and reasoning behind his “two-level” model of Plato’s metaphysics, which, in turn, supports his tripartite classification of Forms. The critical focus is on identifying potential areas of misunderstanding and supplying any explanations, analyses, and arguments that may enhance the clarity of the respective positions. (shrink)

Rethinking Plato: A Cartesian Quest for the Real Plato is a quest for the real Plato, forever hiding behind the veil of drama. The quest, as the subtitle indicates, is Cartesian in that it looks for Plato independently of the prevailing paradigms on where we are supposed to find him. The result of the quest is a complete pedagogical platform on Plato. This does not mean that the book leaves nothing out, covering all the dialogues and all the themes, but (...) that it provides the full intellectual apparatus for doing just that. It consists of two parts. The first is a general orientation in three chapters, one each pertaining to the life, thought, and works of Plato. The second is a dialogic companion covering the four dialogues built around the last days of Socrates, with a separate chapter devoted to each: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, and Phaedo. (shrink)

This essay is a meditation on the philosophical preconceptions shaping the reception of Plato’s metaphysics. The central focus is on the dualism of a world of Forms existing separately from the world we know. The overarching aim is to explore the motivation for postulating that second world instead of making do with the one we have. While the approach is indeed exploratory, the underlying suspicion is that everything, Forms and all, belongs in the same world. The goal is not to (...) prove that the Forms exist, nor to evaluate the proofs and objections on record, but to consider why and how they are supposed to exist, and what follows if they actually do. Dialogue toward a mutual understanding of why we think the Forms exist, and why we think they do not, might encourage a “second sailing” in waters where we have been unable to agree whether they do, and where they would if they did. (shrink)

This article is a proposal for retracing the main lines of Plato’s thought, doubling as a roadmap for reconsidering the formative features of his world, including the proprietary stock of conceptual tools he uses for building and maintaining it. Developing an alternative interpretation of his philosophical vision, the central focus is on what he does with the Forms. The guiding paradigm is the unitary pluralism of a hierarchically structured universe comprising interdependent levels of reality as a substitute for the traditional (...) dualism of a world of Forms separated from the world of particulars. An integral part of the model proposed, representing a sharp departure from tradition, is a reorganization of Forms in three distinct categories: Ideal Forms, Conceptual Forms, and Relational Forms. The result is a recalibration of Plato’s insights, tools, and methods toward a better understanding of his overall philosophy, especially his distinctive conception of reality and his unique perspective of the world. The initiative promises, in addition, to restore Plato’s methodological trademark of systematic emphasis on that which is good, a dialectical predilection in articulation of a cosmological constant that cannot be accommodated through a separation of worlds. (shrink)

One over Many: The Unitary Pluralism of Plato’s World is a tightly integrated collection of essays by the author, some newly drafted for the present work, some previously published as journal articles, all conceived and developed in pursuit of corrective intervention in Plato’s metaphysics. The book replaces the standard view of Plato as a metaphysical dualist with an alternative interpretation providing greater explanatory power through the paradigm of unitary pluralism in a single reality built on ontological diversity.

This article questions the place of negative Forms in Plato’s ontology. And it does so against appearances to the contrary, given that Plato himself seems to acknowledge both positive Forms and negative Forms, that is to say, both good ones and bad ones. He may not say so outright, but he invokes both and rejects neither. The apparent finality of this impression is so strong that it creates a lack of direct interest in the subject: Plato scholars do not give (...) negative Forms much thought except where the prospect relates to something else they happen to be doing. Yet when they do give the matter any thought at all, typically for the sake of a prior concern, they try either to support the textual evidence or to contradict it, indicating that the evidence does not stand on its own. The aim of this article is to determine why they tend to affirm or deny the obvious, how they try to confirm or dispute it, and what this says about Plato’s position. The strategic vehicle is a comparative case study. The confirmation comes from Debra Nails (2013), who needs to embrace negative Forms to demonstrate that the unhypothetical first principle of everything is not identical to the Form of the Good, something she cannot do unless Plato recognizes negative Forms. The contradiction comes from Holger Thesleff (2013), who needs to reject negative (Ideal) Forms because the defining feature of his (Ideal) Forms is the possession of positive intrinsic value, which cannot be predicated of anything negative. Despite defending opposite views, or perhaps because of this, they jointly make up for any lack of interest in the scholarly community. I appreciate both yet side with Thesleff. (shrink)

Abstract: This research paper presents the development and evaluation of a neural network-based model for predicting fire alarms in smoke detection systems. Using a dataset from Kaggle containing 15 features and 3487 samples, we trained and validated a neural network with a three-layer architecture. The model achieved an accuracy of 100% and an average error of 0.0000003. Additionally, we identified the most influential features in predicting fire alarms.

This article is a study of the correspondence between Forms and particulars in Plato. Its primary purpose is to determine whether they exhibit an ontological symmetry, in other words, whether there is always one where there is the other. This points to two questions, one on the existence of things that do not have correlative Forms, the other on the existence of Forms that do not have correlative things. Both questions have come up before in the scholarly literature on Plato, (...) but the answers have not been sufficiently sensitive to the intricacies of the questions. Nor have they been adequately resourceful with what little evidence there is in the original sources. The intention here is to make up for that deficiency, not just with better answers, but also with better insight into the questions. (shrink)

This article is a critical appraisal of the two-level model of Holger Thesleff as an interpretive paradigm for the philosophy of Plato. The primary emphasis is on the metaphysics of the model, which revolves around the idea of a single world composed of two levels. Conceived as an alternative to the dualism of worlds traditionally attributed to Plato, the levels in question complement each other in a symbiotic relationship between intelligible phenomena and sensible matter, which jointly account for the whole (...) of reality without the complications associated with a multiplication of worlds. The principal complication in the latter scenario is the difficulty of meaningful interaction under circumstances of radical separation, especially with a strict segregation requiring two different worlds: one for transcendent Forms, one for instantiating particulars. That difficulty does not even come up in the two-level model, which confines everything to a single world, where the possibility of interaction is not undermined by the reality of separation or the severity of segregation. The two-level model avoids that issue altogether by keeping everything together. A purported problem with this monistic alternative, on the other hand, is the inherent impediment to transcendence within a single world, where there would seem to be no room for the requisite ascension. How indeed can anything transcend the only place that exists? Promoting a solitary world as the intended framework for Plato’s metaphysics ostensibly requires retaining some semblance of transcendence, or else providing an acceptable alternative to it, while compressing everything into the same reality. The ultimate goal of the present article is to show why, given a natural challenge to both approaches, that is, despite an apparent obstacle to either perspective, the two-level model is preferable to the two-world alternative. Progress toward that end unfolds as an effort to illustrate and vindicate the way Thesleff meets the methodological challenge to his brand of monism with a philosophical vision originating with Plato himself. (shrink)

This article is a defense of Immanuel Kant against the allegedly neglected alternative in his formulation of transcendental idealism. What sets it apart from other contributions toward the same end is the grounding construction of an interpretive framework — a faithful reconstruction of the one Kant himself provides for transcendental idealism — as opposed to the ad hoc development of a defensive strategy for refuting the charges. The promise, then, is comprehensive clarification instead of pointed rebuttal. The difference is between (...) focusing on the text and focusing on the problem. Doing both may admittedly be not just possible but also required, as the problem is supposed to be in the text, but the point is that it is not there, and furthermore, that we need not go anywhere else to show that it is not there. Thus, the approach is constructive rather than defensive, or more accurately, constructive as well as defensive. And the construction rests on what Kant actually said rather than on what he might have meant or on what he should have said instead. (shrink)

This article questions the central role of the good will in the moral theory of Immanuel Kant. The good will, according to Kant, is the only thing that is good in itself, and therefore good without limitation or qualification. This is an objectionable claim in support of a controversial position. The problem is not just that the good will is not the only thing that is good in itself, which indeed it is not, but more importantly, that the good will (...) is not so much a thing that is good in itself as it is the good kind of a thing that is otherwise neither good nor bad in itself. The goodness of a good will is no more intrinsic than the goodness of a good act. A good will, whatever else it may be, is a will that is good, much like how a good act is an act that is good, neither of which is good for any reason other than the goodness predicated of the corresponding subject. This article thus challenges Kant’s position on ontological grounds. It questions the validity of claiming intrinsic goodness for a complex construct whose goodness is, in fact, extrinsic to its substance. (shrink)

This article is a defense of skepticism, specifically Pyrrhonian skepticism, against a potential complication ostensibly threatening its methodological consistency. The conflict contemplated is that the suspension of judgment based on the discovery of equipollence, which is the central highlight of skeptical investigation, is vitiated by the assent given to the equipollence discovered. The apparent difficulty has a conceptual side as well as a practical side, examined here as separate challenges with a section devoted to each. The conceptual challenge is that (...) the skeptical transition from an equipollence of arguments to a suspension of judgment is undermined either by a logical contradiction or by an epistemic inconsistency, perhaps by both, because the determination and affirmation of equipollence is itself a judgment of sorts, one that is never suspended. The practical challenge is that, independently of any conceptual confusion, suspending judgment in reaction to equipollence evinces doxastic commitment to equipollence, if only because human beings are not capable of making assessments requiring rational determination without believing the premises examined to be true and the conclusions drawn to be compelling. The aim of the present article is to demonstrate that the skeptical position is not vulnerable to such objections. (shrink)

This article is a defense of John Rawls against recent criticism, ironically my own, though it is also a critique insofar as it addresses a problem that Rawls never does. The original charges were that Rawls’s decision procedure for ethics does not justify his own moral principles, especially those making up his liberal conception of justice, and that the underlying problem may well keep the decision procedure from justifying any moral principles whatsoever, or at least any normatively useful ones. These (...) difficulties are manifested in the work of Rawls as the dogmatism of championing a distinctive conception of justice, a liberal one as he himself calls it, through a justification model that comes across as too objective to permit such a bias and too universal to support any substantive conclusions at all. The solution contemplated here is to position the decision procedure as a justification model responsive to moral progress, and thereby equally open to all moral input, thus removing the inconsistency between the inherent universalism of the design and the distinctive character of the outcome, including the moral principles Rawls himself recommends, so long as they are consistent with moral progress. (shrink)

Mill’s Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill’s Notorious Proof is a defense of John Stuart Mill’s proof of the principle of utility in the fourth chapter of his Utilitarianism. The proof is notorious as an allegedly fallacious attempt by a prominent philosopher who ought not to have made the elementary mistakes he is supposed to have made. This book shows that he did not. The aim is neither to glorify utilitarianism as a normative ethical theory nor to (...) vindicate Mill’s universalistic ethical hedonism as the best form of utilitarianism. The book is devoted primarily to demonstrating that Mill successfully defends what he sets out to establish in his proof of the principle of utility. Much of the discussion is geared toward absolving Mill of the various fallacies with which he has been saddled. (shrink)

Discussion piece on a book of the same name: Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse. Published online as part of the “Book in Focus” program of Cambridge Scholars Publishing (Newcastle upon Tyne, 2021).

Mill’s Principle of Utility: Origins, Proof, and Implications is a scholarly monograph on John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism with a particular emphasis on the proof he provides for the principle of utility. Originally published as Mill’s Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill’s Notorious Proof (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994), the present volume is a revised and enlarged edition with additional material, tighter arguments, and updated references. The initiative is still principally an analysis, interpretation, and defense of the controversial proof, which (...) has yet to attract a scholarly consensus on how it works and whether it succeeds. Well over a century and a half after Mill’s initial contribution, the subject matter continues to figure prominently in classroom discussions, where the principle and its proof are presented and debated in connection with the critical baggage of logical problems and conceptual confusions wrongly attributed to Mill from the beginning. The overarching aim of the book, now supplemented with a comprehensive historical background and salient philosophical implications, remains the vindication of Mill’s reasoning in pursuit of what he promises as a proof of the principle of utility. (shrink)

Quine on Ethics: The Gavagai of Moral Discourse is a comprehensive treatment of Quine’s brief yet memorable foray into ethics. It defends him against his most formidable critics, corrects misconceptions in the present reception of his outlook on morality as a social institution and ethics as a philosophical enterprise, and restores emphasis on observationality as the impetus behind his momentous intervention in ethical theory. The central focus is on Quine’s infamous challenge to ethical theory: his thesis of the methodological infirmity (...) of ethics as compared with science. The ultimate aim is to demonstrate that the challenge is not only valid but also valuable insofar as it identifies opportunities for reformation in moral justification. (shrink)

The Devil’s Advocate versus God’s Honest Truth: A Dialectical Inquiry into the Rationality of Religion is a scholarly monograph exploring the rationality of religion, particularly the tenability of theism, through a dialectical analysis of reasons for belief versus grounds for suspicion. The positive perspective examines traditional proofs for the existence of God, focusing specifically on the teleological, cosmological, and ontological arguments, while the negative perspective contemplates common grounds for misgivings, concentrating especially on methodological difficulties, syncretic developments, and metaethical challenges. The (...) comprehensive yet balanced coverage of the book is designed to meet the needs of readers for critical reflection without compromising the objectivity required to help them sort out their own intuitions and formulate their own judgments in an area that is otherwise dominated by sectarian scholarship and thereby polarized beyond reconciliation. (shrink)

Marx’ın yapıtlarında ahlaki bir kaygı taşıdığı ve bu doğrultuda bir etik teorisine sahip olduğu düşüncesi günümüzde tartışılmaya devam eden bir meseledir. Bu tartışma genellikle Marx'ın yabancılaşma, insan doğası ve kapitalizm hakkında ileri sürmüş olduğu düşünceleri üzerinden yürütülmektedir. Bu kapsamda, ilk olarak, makalede Marx’ın yabancılaşma teorisi ve bu kavramın nasıl ortaya çıktığına ilişkin tarihsel arka plan verilmektedir. Daha sonra yabancılaşma ile insan doğası arasındaki ilişkiyi kurarak, Marx'ın insan doğası anlayışının ona bir etik teorisi imkânı sağlayıp sağlamadığı tartışılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Marx'ın etik (...) teorisine hizmet eden evrensel bir insan doğası anlayışına sahip olduğu fikri, Louis Althusser ve Norman Geras'ın analizi ile irdelenmektedir. Yapılan tartışmalar doğrultusunda, nihai olarak, makalede Marx’ın bir etik teorisine ve ahlak anlayışına sahip olduğu sonucu desteklenmektedir. (shrink)

Bilimsel soyutlama temsil edilecek belirli bir hedefin sahip olduğu bazı özelliklerin ihmal edilmesi işlemidir. Her temsil tanım gereği soyutlama içermektedir. Nitekim temsili yapılacak ya da modellenecek hedef sistemde ihmal edilmesi uygun görülen birçok faktör bulunmaktadır. Soyutlamanın bilimsel araştırma için vazgeçilmez bir unsur olduğu fikri tartışma götürmeyecek düzeyde bir hakikat olarak görülmektedir. Ne var ki temsile ilişkin bu işlemin doğası hususunda böylesi tartışmasız bir hakikate sahip değiliz. Bu makalede, ilk olarak, soyutlamaya ait felsefi literatürde yer alan kimi standart görüşleri ele (...) alıyorum. Daha sonra standart görüşlere göre soyutlamanın çok daha rafine versiyonu detaylı olarak analiz edip bu görüşün, bilimde görsel temsillerden biri olan kartografik haritalar için yeterli bir kuramsal zemin sağlamadığını ileri sürüyorum. (shrink)

Çağdaş epistemoloji içerisinde, dışsalcı, güvenilirci ve erdeme dayalı epistemolojik tartışmaların bir benzerini, dini epistemoloji içerisinde etkili bir şekilde yer edinen ve reformcu epistemoloji olarak bilinen yaklaşım üzerinden görebilmek mümkündür. Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff ve William Alston gibi filozofların öne çıktığı bu yaklaşımın ana iddiası, kanıta ya da argümana dayanmaksızın, Tanrı’nın varlığına inanmanın bütünüyle doğru, rasyonel, makul ve güvenilir olacağı şeklindeki bir tezdir. Kanıtın, gerekçelendirme için zorunlu bir koşul olmadığı fikri, algısal deneyimlerin gerekçelendirilmesine benzer şekilde, dini deneyimlerin de öyle olduğu (...) ve dolayısıyla, aynı epistemik statüye sahip olması gerektiğini öne süren, eşitlik tezine dayanır. İlk ortaya çıktığı günden bugüne, üzerinde çokça konuşulan ve tartışılan bir yaklaşım olan reformcu epistemoloji, özellikle son beş yıl içerisinde, oldukça farklı bir hale gelmiştir. Zira bu yaklaşımı, kanıtsalcılıkla uyumlu, erdem epistemolojisiyle bağlantılı ve diğer teistik dinler üzerinden değerlendiren yeni çalışmalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu nedenle, bu makalede, reformcu epistemoloji ana hatlarıyla ele alınmıştır. Beraberinde, ona yöneltilen itirazlara değinilmiş ve sonrasında, bahsi geçen yenilik iddiaları soruşturulmaya çalışılmıştır. Son olarak, teistik inancın rasyonalitesiyle ilgili, farklı bir bakış açısı sunulmuştur. (shrink)

Thought experiments, one of the most effective ways of acquiring knowledge, are an intellectual tool frequently used by scientists or thinkers in their fields of study. Thought experiments used to respond to scientific issues are considered scientific thought experiments, while thought experiments used for philosophical problems are called philosophical thought experiments. In this context, firstly, the differences between scientific and philosophical thought experiments are determined in the article. In particular, philosophical thought experiments are often needed in discussions within the field (...) of epistemology. For this reason, in the rest of the study, the knowledge argument put forward against the idea of physicalism, which is one of the important views in epistemology and which claims that the natural world is basically physical and that everything can be explained by physical laws is included. The knowledge argument briefly argues that there are non-physical properties and information that can only be discovered through conscious experience. Accordingly, it is argued that someone who has all physical knowledge about another conscious may lack knowledge of what it would feel like to have subjective experiences of that entity such as qualia. Consequently, the main idea of the article is to reveal how an epistemological thesis has been questioned by various philosophers in the context of philosophical thought experiments such as Mary’s room, ‘What is it like to be a Bat’, The Martian and the Philosophical Zombie. - Bilgi edinmenin en etkili yollarından bir tanesi olarak değerlendirilen düşünce deneyleri bilim insanları ya da düşünürler tarafından kendi çalışma alanları içerisinde sıklıkla başvurulan düşünsel bir araçtır. Bilimsel konulara cevap vermek amacıyla gerçekleştirilen düşünce deneyleri bilimsel düşünce deneyleri olarak değerlendirilirken, felsefi sorunlara yönelik kullanılan düşünce deneyleri ise felsefi düşünce deneyleri olarak adlandırılmaktadır. Bu kapsamda makalede ilk olarak bilimsel ve felsefi düşünce deneyleri arasındaki farklılıklar belirlenmektedir. Özellikle, epistemoloji alanı içerisinde yer alan tartışmalarda felsefi düşünce deneylerine sıklıkla ihtiyaç duyulmaktadır. Bu nedenle çalışmanın devamında epistemolojide önemli görüşlerden bir tanesi olan ve doğal dünyanın en temelde fiziksel olduğu ve fiziksel yasalarla her şeyin açıklanabileceği iddiasında bulunan fizikalizm düşüncesine karşı ileri sürülmüş bilgi argümanına yer verilmektedir. Bilgi argümanı kısaca sadece bilinçli deneyim yoluyla elde edilebilen ve fiziksel olarak ifade edilemeyen öznel deneyimlerin ve özelliklerin olduğunu savunmaktadır. Buna göre, başka bir bilinçli varlık hakkında bütün fiziksel bilgiye sahip olan birinin, o varlığın qualia gibi öznel deneyimlerine sahip olmasının nasıl bir his olduğu konusundaki bilgilerden yoksun olabileceği fikri savunulmaktadır. Bu doğrultuda, makalenin temel savı fizikalizm gibi epistemolojik bir teze Mary’nin Odası, ‘Yarasa Olmak Nasıl Bir Şeydir’, Marslı ve Felsefi Zombi gibi felsefi düşünce deneyleri bağlamında çeşitli filozoflarca nasıl itiraz edildiğini ve düşünce deneylerinin bu bağlamda nasıl kullanıldığını ortaya koymaktır. (shrink)

Bilimi ve bilimsel bilgiyi kültür, değer ve öznel yargılardan izole ederek nesnel bir şekilde ortaya koyabilmeye yönelik hararetli tartışmaların yaşandığı yirminci yüzyıl bilim anlayışının temel gayesi, deney ve gözleme tabi olabilecek fiziki dünyadaki olguları, mantıksal çözümlemeye tabi tutarak birleştirilmiş bilime ulaşmaktır. Bu amaca giden yolda olgulara dayanmayan ve sınanamayan her türlü metafizik öge yok sayılır. Bilimsel bilginin sadece deney ve gözleme tabi olana, diğer bir deyişle olgu verilerine dayandığı iddiasını taşıyan bu düşünce sistemi, özellikle Viyana Çevresi üyeleri tarafından benimsenmiştir. Bu (...) bakımdan Çevre üyelerinin bilimsellik anlayışındaki temel ölçüt olgulara dayanan önermelerin ya da yargıların doğrulanabilmesidir. Bilimsel bilginin sadece olgusal dünyanın gözlemlenmesi ve bu gözlem sonucunda ortaya konulan önermelerin ya da ifadelerin doğrulanmasıyla sağlandığını düşünen Çevre üyelerinin bu savlarındaki amacı bilimi ve onun bilgisini her türlü kültür ve değer alanından uzaklaştırarak metafiziksel unsurlardan arındırılmış nesnel bilgiye ulaşmaktır. Çevre üyelerinin birçoğu bilim alanı içerisinde tartışmaya yol açan meselelerin aslında metafiziksel içerikli ve dolayısıyla bunların görünüşte problemler olduğunu belirterek bu tartışmaların bilimsel bilginin gelişimi önünde bir engel oluşturacağı kanaatindedir (Hızır, 1965, s. 254). Söz gelimi, Carnap’a göre, metafizik ögeler olgusal içeriğe sahip olmadığı ve sınanabilir nitelikte olmadıkları için bilim alanı içerisinde değerlendirilemez. Bu nedenle, metafizik ögeler hem doğrulanması mümkün olmadığı hem de dilin mantıksal dizimine genellikle uymadığı gerekçesiyle anlamsızdır (Öztürk, 2011, s. 155). Bu bakımdan Çevre üyelerine göre, olgulara dayanmayan ve bilimde yanılsamalara yol açan metafizik söylemler bilimden ayıklanmalı ve bilimsel bilgi ancak olgu ve deneye dayanan önermeler üzerinden yürütülmelidir. Öte yandan Çevre düşünürleri mantıksal çözümleme yoluyla olgulara dayanan önermelerin metafiziksel unsurlar içeren önermelerden ayırt edilebileceğini ifade etmiştir. Bu bağlamda metafizik önermeleri, metafizik olmayan önermelerden ayırt edecek ölçütün doğrulanabilirlik olduğunu savunurlar. Çevre üyelerinin bu tutumları bir bakıma bilim ve sözde bilim arasında ayrım yapma ve metafiziği bilimin dışında tutma çabası olarak da değerlendirilebilir (Kabadayı, 2011, s. 39-40). Yirminci yüzyıl bilim anlayışında bilimsel etkinlikte gözlemin ve gözlemi yürüten bilim insanlarının dolaysız öznel duyu verileriyle ilişkili olduğu bu nedenle gözlem verilerinin psikolojizmin etkisinde olduğu fikri ortaya atılır. Başta Neurath olmak üzere dönemin bilim felsefecileri bilimsel bilginin kültür, değer ve psikoloji gibi öznel unsurlardan uzaklaştığı sürece değerli olduğu kanısında olduğu için bu fikre karşı çıkmaktadır (Gillies, 2018, s. 123). Görüldüğü üzere, Çevre üyelerinin temel amacı metafizik önermelerden arındırılmış, olgulara dayanan bir bilime ulaşmaktır. Bu amacın gerçekleşmesine olanak sağlayacak yöntem ise mantıksal çözümlemedir. Bu bağlamda Çevre üyeleri olgulara dayanan ve doğrulanabilen önermelerin, söz dizimi (sentaks) ve anlamsal (semantik) açıdan incelemeye tabi tutulması gerektiğini düşünmektedir (Yardımcı, 2018, s. 13-15). Özellikle Carnap (1935, s. 9-10) doğrulamanın ancak öne sürülen önermenin mantıksal analize tabi tutularak yapılması gerektiğini iddia etmiştir (Irzık, 1962, s. 65). Bununla birlikte, felsefenin işlevi, önermeleri mantıksal analize tabi tutarak yalın hale getirmektir. İşte felsefenin bu yönü Neurath’da bilimin birliği, Carnap’ta ise bilimin sentaksı, yani bilimin mantığı üzerine çalışma anlamına gelir (Hızır, 1965, s. 252). Bilimi, bilim olmayandan ayırma yöntemi olarak kullanılan doğrulama işlemi, teorik bir söylem ve gözlem önermesi arasında yapılan bir işlem olması bakımından mantıksal ve dilsel bir özellik taşır. Buradaki temel sorun ise teorik bir önermenin gözlem önermelerine indirgenebilir nitelikte olması ve gözlem önermelerinin, gözlem ile nasıl ilişki kurduğunu saptamaktır. İşte Viyana Çevresi üyeleri bu ilişkinin protokol önermeleri ile kurulduğu kanaatindedir (Ural, 2012, s. 105-107) çünkü onlara göre; öznelerarası bir bilimin sağlanması için yansız ve anlam karmaşasından arındırılmış bir dil gereklidir (Serin, 2015, s. 55). Bu dil de ancak protokol önermeler aracılığıyla kurulabilir. Bu bağlamda Çevre üyelerinin, metafiziksel ifadeler barındıran önermelerin anlamsızlığı ve bilimleri ortak bir paydada birleştiren fiziksel bir dil oluşturma olmak üzere iki temel hedefinin olduğu söylenebilir (Godfrey-Smith, 2003, s. 25; Salgar, 2012, s. 187). (shrink)

XIX. yüzyılın ilk yarısında A.Comte tarafından sistemleştirilen pozitivizm akımı, deneye ve gözleme dayalı bilginin, tek geçerli bilgi türü olacağı varsayımından yola çıkan bir düşünce sistemidir. Pozitivizmi hazırlayan nedenlerin başında Fransız İhtilali ve aydınlanma düşüncesi yer almaktadır. Pozitivizmin Osmanlı düşüncesine girişi, devletin en buhranlı dönemini yaşadığı XIX. Yüzyıla denk gelir. Islahat hareketlerinin hız kazandığı, buna bağlı olarak batıcılık düşüncesinin iyiden iyiye hissedildiği bu yüzyılda, batı kaynaklı düşünce akımları da Osmanlı düşüncesinde kendilerine yer bulmaya başlamışlardır. Batılaşma çerçevesi içerisinde Fransa’ya gönderilen öğrenciler ve (...) tercüme eserler vasıtasıyla kendisini ortaya koyan pozitivizm, dönemin birçok düşünürünü etkilemiştir. Pozitivizmden etkilenen düşünürlerden birisi olarak Abdullah Cevdet, siyasi ve kültürel birçok alanda düşüncelerini bu doğrultuda dile getirmiştir. Cevdet’in düşünceleri başta yaşadığı dönem olmak üzere, kendisinden sonra da günümüze kadar ulaşmış ve pozitivist-materyalist cenahta kendisine yer bulmuştur. Halifelik müessesesini bünyesinde barındıran bir imparatorluk olarak Osmanlı’nın, pozitivist-materyalist görüşleri benimseme eğiliminde çok da istekli bir eğilim sergilemediği düşünülmektedir. Tüm eleştirilere ve kabullenememelere rağmen Abdullah Cevdet ve pozitivist fikirleri son dönem Osmanlı düşüncesinde sağladığı fikri dinamizm sebebiyle, düşünce dünyamız açısından olumlu bir etkiye sahip olmuştur. (shrink)

XIX. yüzyılın ilk yarısında Auguste Comte tarafından sistemleştirilen pozitivizm akımı, deneye ve gözleme dayalı bilginin, tek geçerli bilgi türü olacağı varsayımından yola çıkan bir düşünce sistemidir. Pozitivizmi hazırlayan nedenlerin başında Fransız İhtilali ve aydınlanma düşüncesi yer almaktadır. Pozitivizmin Osmanlı düşüncesine girişi, devletin en buhranlı dönemini yaşadığı XIX. Yüzyıla denk gelir. Islahat hareketlerinin hız kazandığı, buna bağlı olarak batıcılık düşüncesinin iyiden iyiye hissedildiği bu yüzyılda, batı kaynaklı düşünce akımları da Osmanlı düşüncesinde kendilerine yer bulmaya başlamışlardır. Batılaşma çerçevesi içerisinde Fransa’ya gönderilen öğrenciler (...) ve tercüme eserler vasıtasıyla kendisini ortaya koyan pozitivizm, dönemin birçok düşünürünü etkilemiştir. Pozitivizmden etkilenen düşünürlerden birisi olarak Abdullah Cevdet, siyasi ve kültürel birçok alanda düşüncelerini bu doğrultuda dile getirmiştir. Cevdet’in düşünceleri başta yaşadığı dönem olmak üzere, kendisinden sonra da günümüze kadar ulaşmış ve pozitivist-materyalist cenahta kendisine yer bulmuştur. Halifelik müessesesini bünyesinde barındıran bir imparatorluk olarak Osmanlı’nın, pozitivist-materyalist görüşleri benimseme eğiliminde çok da istekli bir eğilim sergilemediği düşünülmektedir. Tüm eleştirilere ve kabullenememelere rağmen Abdullah Cevdet ve pozitivist fikirleri son dönem Osmanlı düşüncesinde sağladığı fikri dinamizm sebebiyle, düşünce dünyamız açısından olumlu bir etkiye sahip olmuştur. (shrink)

Töz problemi Antik Çağ’dan bu yana farklı adlandırmalar, farklı yorumlamalar şeklinde tartışılmaktadır. Bu çalışma, modern felsefenin kurucularından ve rasyonalist düşünürler olan René Descartes’ın epistemolojisinde ve Benedictus Spinoza’nın ontolojisinde oldukça ciddi bir öneme sahip olan töz kavramının neye karşılık geldiğini ve ortaya çıkardığı temel problemleri ele almaktadır. Descartes’ın birden fazla tözün olabileceği fikri ile düalist bir töz anlayışı geliştirdiği yerde, Spinoza Descartes’a bir eleştiri olarak tek bir tözün kabulüne dayalı monist bir töz anlayışı geliştirmiştir. Doğal olarak bu çalışma töz kavramına (...) tarihsel bir çerçeve çizerek, Descartes’ın ruh-beden düalizmine dayanan töz anlayışı ile Spinoza’nın Tanrı temelli töz anlayışını karşılaştırmayı amaçlamaktadır. (shrink)

There is a significant debate going on long time about the existence of a theory of consciousness in Spinoza’s philosophical system of thought. This article, on the one hand, offers a different reading to alleviate the current debate, and on the other hand, it aims to bring together and analyze the main theses of this debate. In this matter, it is argued that a theory of consciousness can be deduced in Spinoza’s system of thought, and despite all its parallelism, the (...) possibility of conceptual thinking the “mind” independently from the “body” even if not in reality, is examined. In this context, first, the doctrine of “ideas of ideas” is put forward as the metaphysical basis of consciousness. Then, the “degrees of consciousness”, which are formed according to the mind’s ability to reach more “ideas” about the parts that make up the complex structure of the body, and to extract the “ideas of ideas” from these “ideas”, are determined as the epistemological aspect of consciousness. Depending on the degrees of ideas of the body’s affections by the mind and the kinds of knowledge, it is determined how the human mind reaches the consciousness of “self”, “God” and “other things”. The conclusion in the study is that in Spinoza, consciousness is built on “knowledge”; while “ideas” represents knowledge, the “ideas of ideas” represents consciousness. Thus, the unclear boundaries of the distinction between “conscious minds” and “un- conscious minds” and “conscious ideas” and “un-conscious ideas” in the human mind, which are at the center of almost all discussions, are tried to be clarified. In this sense, Spinoza’s theory of consciousness in its most general scope is based on the theory of mind and the theory of knowledge, which is a result of first. In Spinoza’s theory of mind, especially when it comes to the human mind, every change that occurs in the body, corresponds to an idea (parallelism) or is represented as an idea. The ideas that occur in the human mind are just representations of the affections of the body, that is, of the changes that occur in the body according to the effects it receives and influences as a result of the relations established by the body. While the human mind perceives some of these ideas in a “confused”, “fragmentary” or “inadequate” way, it grasps some of them “clearly” or “adequately”. Spinoza puts forward his theories of mind and knowledge on this basis. However, the human mind is not settled with only the ideas of the body’s affection that occur in it, but also constitute secondary ideas about these ideas, regardless of whether they are adequate or inadequate. These secondary ideas express awareness of primary ideas, whether they are adequate or inadequate. In the article, this constitution and awareness, that is, the “ideas of the ideas”, is tried to be revealed in detail as the basic ground or main line of the Spinozist theory of consciousness. Other results or outcomes of the theory of consciousness require first to understand this basic ground. Accordingly, the human body is a very complex structure that has the most parts or components in Nature compared to the others. The human mind, on the other hand, has the capability to reach ideas about each element and its change of the complex structure of the body. However, the content of these ideas is formed according to the degree to which the human mind recognizes its own body. The degree to which the human mind knows its own body also determines the degree of its consciousness. Spinoza states that non-human beings also have a certain “degree of animation”, and while stating that what he says is valid for other beings as well as human beings, he also tries to justify that the human body is superior to other bodies and the human mind to other minds. Spinoza sees the superiority of one body over the other as the ability of one to perform more actions on one’s own, compared to the other. The more parts a body has or the more different kinds of objects it contains, the more it is available to perform actions and influences or receives effects. Because when a body encounters or interacts with other bodies, each of its parts can be affected by this encounter or relationship. Therefore, the more complex the body has, the more ideas the mind can have. This is the reason why the mind of a person is superior to other minds because of whose body is superior to other bodies. Depending on the human mind’s ability to know its own body, there are “unconscious ideas” and “conscious ideas” between the two minds when compared to and between ideas in the same mind, as well as a difference degree in consciousness from a lower level to a higher level. This degree of difference is discussed in the article as the epistemological result or outcome of consciousness. The “self-consciousness” of human, which comes to the fore as a result of considering the metaphysical basis of consciousness and its epistemological result together, constitutes the last subject of the article. Keywords: Philosophy, Spinoza, Mind, Consciousness, Ideas of Ideas, Self- Consciousness, Panpsychism. (shrink)