Results for 'Taurek'

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  1. Don’t Count on Taurek: Vindicating the Case for the Numbers Counting.Yishai Cohen - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (3):245-261.
    Suppose you can save only one of two groups of people from harm, with one person in one group, and five persons in the other group. Are you obligated to save the greater number? While common sense seems to say ‘yes’, the numbers skeptic says ‘no’. Numbers Skepticism has been partly motivated by the anti-consequentialist thought that the goods, harms and well-being of individual people do not aggregate in any morally significant way. However, even many non-consequentialists think that Numbers Skepticism (...)
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  2. What Would Taurek Do?Tyler Doggett - manuscript
    A very short, exegetical paper about Taurek's "Should the Numbers Count?," arguing against the view that Taurek requires giving chances.
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    A Response to John Taurek's Should the Numbers Count.Nia McCabe - manuscript
    This short essay outlines the problem Taurek responds to and the argument he uses in Should the Numbers Count. His argument posits that in a situation where you can either prevent harm to one stranger or five strangers but you cannot prevent harm to all six, the best thing to do is is give each person an equal chance of survival by flipping a coin. Although this paper is largely an explication, I do provide a short critique of (...)'s argument. I claim flipping a coin overlooks the worth of the individual people at risk, and other solutions may be better suited to solve this ethical dilemma. (shrink)
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  4. Giving Each Person Her Due: Taurek Cases and Non-Comparative Justice.Alan Thomas - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):661-676.
    Taurek cases focus a choice between two views of permissible action, Can Save One and Must Save Many . It is argued that Taurek cases do illustrate the rationale for Can Save One , but existing views do not highlight the fact that this is because they are examples of claims grounded on non-comparative justice. To act to save the many solely because they form a group is to discriminate against the one for an irrelevant reason. That is (...)
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  5. The Many, the Few, and the Nature of Value.Daniel Muñoz - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):70-87.
    John Taurek argues that, in a choice between saving the many or the few, the numbers should not count. Some object that this view clashes with the transitivity of ‘better than’; others insist the clash can be avoided. I defend a middle ground: Taurek cannot have transitivity, but that doesn’t doom his view, given a suitable conception of value. I then formalize and explore two conceptions: one context-sensitive, one multidimensional.
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  6. Saving the Few.Tyler Doggett - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):302-315.
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  7. Each Counts for One.Daniel Muñoz - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.
    After 50 years of debate, the ethics of aggregation has reached a curious stalemate, with both sides arguing that only their theory treats people as equals. I argue that, on the issue of equality, both sides are wrong. From the premise that “each counts for one,” we cannot derive the conclusion that “more count for more”—or its negation. The familiar arguments from equality to aggregation presuppose more than equality: the Kamm/Scanlon “Balancing Argument” rests on what social choice theorists call “(Positive) (...)
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  8. Pro Tanto Rights and the Duty to Save the Greater Number.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 13:190-214.
    This paper has two aims. The first is to present and defend a new argument for rights contributionism – the view that the notion of a moral claim-right is a contributory (or pro tanto) rather than overall normative notion. The argument is an inference to the best explanation: it is argued that (i) there are contributory moral factors that contrast with standard moral reasons by way of having a number of formal properties that are characteristic of rights, even though they (...)
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  9. Why the numbers should sometimes count.John T. Sanders - 1988 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 17 (1):3-14.
    John Taurek has argued that, where choices must be made between alternatives that affect different numbers of people, the numbers are not, by themselves, morally relevant. This is because we "must" take "losses-to" the persons into account (and these don't sum), but "must not" consider "losses-of" persons (because we must not treat persons like objects). I argue that the numbers are always ethically relevant, and that they may sometimes be the decisive consideration.
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  10. Numbers without aggregation.Tim Henning - 2023 - Noûs.
    Suppose we can save either a larger group of persons or a distinct, smaller group from some harm. Many people think that, all else equal, we ought to save the greater number. This article defends this view (with qualifications). But unlike earlier theories, it does not rely on the idea that several people's interests or claims receive greater aggregate weight. The argument starts from the idea that due to their stakes, the affected people have claims to have a say in (...)
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  11. Can't Kant count? Innumerate Views on Saving the Many over Saving the Few.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 13:215-234.
    It seems rather intuitive that if I can save either one stranger or five strangers, I must save the five. However, Kantian (and other non-consequentialist) views have a difficult time explaining why this is the case, as they seem committed to what Parfit calls “innumeracy”: roughly, the view that the values of lives (or the reasons to save them) don’t get greater (or stronger) in proportion to the number of lives saved. This chapter first shows that in various cases, it (...)
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  12. Once more Into the numbers.Richard Brook - manuscript
    Abstract Tom Dougherty observes that challenges to counting the numbers often cite John Taurek’s 1977 article, “Should the Numbers Count.” Dougherty, though sympathetic to Taurek’s (and others) critique of consequentialism’s aggregating good across individuals, defends a non-consequentialist principle for addition he calls “the Ends Principle. Take the case (he labels “Drug”) when an agent, possessing a dose of a lifesaving drug, can save one person with the entire dose, or two people, each of whom only need half the (...)
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  13. What Is Goodness Good For?Christian Piller - 2015 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies Normative Ethics: Volume 4. pp. 179-209.
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  14. Analytische Moralphilosophie: Grundlagentexte.Philipp Schwind & Sebastian Muders (eds.) - 2021 - Frankfurt am Main, Deutschland: Suhrkamp.
    Die Moralphilosophie des 20. und 21. Jahrhunderts hat mit Konsequentialismus, Deontologie, Kontraktualismus und Tugendethik nicht nur höchst einflussreiche Theorieparadigmen produktiv weiterentwickelt, sondern auch eine Reihe wichtiger neuer Probleme aufgeworfen. Der vorliegende Band versammelt zentrale Beiträge der analytischen Moralphilosophie, u. a. von David Gauthier, Shelly Kagan, Frances Kamm, Thomas Nagel, Michael Slote, Christine Swanton und Susan Wolf, die für ein Verständnis gegenwärtiger Diskussionen in der normativen Ethik unabdingbar sind. -/- Inhaltsverzeichnis: Vorwort Einleitung: Analytische Moralphilosophie der Gegenwart -/- 1. Konsequentialismus Shelly Kagan: (...)
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  15. Will more organs save more lives? Cost‐effectiveness and the ethics of expanding organ procurement.Govind Persad - 2019 - Bioethics 33 (6):684-690.
    The assumption that procuring more organs will save more lives has inspired increasingly forceful calls to increase organ procurement. This project, in contrast, directly questions the premise that more organ transplantation means more lives saved. Its argument begins with the fact that resources are limited and medical procedures have opportunity costs. Because many other lifesaving interventions are more cost‐effective than transplantation and compete with transplantation for a limited budget, spending on organ transplantation consumes resources that could have been used to (...)
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  16. Is saving more lives always better? On giving a chance to minorities.Valena Reich - 2022 - Aporia 32 (2):1-11.
    Questioning the ethical reasoning behind ways of attributing value to lives impacts philosophical dilemmas encountered in policy making and innovation in AI. For instance, this sort of reasoning requires us to determine how self-driving cars should behave when encountering real-life dilemmas such as inevitably crashing into one person as opposed to a group of people. -/- This issue will be examined with the Rocks Case, a case of conflict of interest where all the relevant parties are strangers, and we can (...)
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