Development in all of its stages, from organizing the vision and strategy to implementing plans, requires policy-making. We show that the division of labor and specialization of sciences and some philosophical doctrines cause the emergence of technocracy in policies. Technocracy makes development not happen in the direction of public welfare. For this reason, for sustainable development, we need institutions, strategies, and philosophical contexts that provide a democratic ground for the possibility of criticizing and reforming policies.

The place of scientific expertise in democracy has become increasingly disputed, raising question who ought to have a say in decision-making about science and technology, with what authority, and for what reasons. Public engagement has become a common refrain in technoscientific discussions to address tensions in the rightful roles of experts and the public in democratic decision-making. However, precisely what public engagement entails, who it involves, how it is performed, and to what extent it is desirable for democratic societies remain (...) contested matters. Nevertheless, strong commitments to greater public engagement in the governance of science and technology persist. This essay examines expert discussions about heritable human genome editing beginning from the 2015 International Summit on Human Genome Editing through the controversies surrounding of the first CRISPR-edited humans in late 2018 and the subsequent renewed calls for a moratorium on heritable human genome editing. I examine these discussions as example cases in which the right relations among experts, the public, and technoscientific decision-making are actively reconfigured. I argue that rather than expanding the range of included stakeholders, public engagement serves as an enabling handservant of technocracy that reinforces the position of scientific experts in decision-making as both epistemic and normative authorities. (shrink)

This chapter aims to narrow the gap between how Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) is conceived of in European Commission policy circles and how it is conceived of in scholarly circles. The policy view of RRI and the scholarly view of RRI each have their strengths and weaknesses and both would be better off if coupled to the other. Large and pertinent differences between Scott's High Modernist projects and pRRI, however, perhaps weigh heavier than do the aforementioned similarities. In the (...) policy literature, people see that a straightforwardly optimistic approach to RRI can be found, which simultaneously is very explicit and universalist about what it means to be responsible—see the definition of RRI. Arguably, most of the discrepancies between aRRI and pRRI above can be explained in terms of two more parameters, along which the two can be differentiated—one somewhat philosophical, and one very down-to-earth. (shrink)

This paper traces the role of American technocrats in popularizing the notion later dubbed the “technological fix”. Channeled by their long-term “chief”, Howard Scott, their claim was that technology always provides the most effective solution to modern social, cultural and political problems. The account focuses on the expression of this technological faith, and how it was proselytized, from the era of high industrialism between the World Wars through, and beyond, the nuclear age. I argue that the packaging and promotion of (...) these ideas relied on allegorical technological tales and readily-absorbed graphic imagery. Combined with what Scott called “symbolization”, this seductive discourse preached beliefs about technology to broad audiences. The style and conviction of the messages were echoed by establishment figures such as National Lab director Alvin Weinberg, who employed the techniques to convert mainstream and elite audiences through the end of the twentieth century. (shrink)

This essay argues that Huey Newton’s philosophical explanation of US empire fills an epistemological gap in our thinking that provides us with a basis for understanding the emergence and operational application of predictive policing, Big Data, cutting-edge surveillance programs, and semi-autonomous weapons by US military and policing apparati to maintain control over racialized populations historically and in the (still ongoing) Global War on Terror today – a phenomenon that Black Studies scholars and Black philosophers alike have yet to demonstrate the (...) conceptual acumen to explain. Newton’s ability to explain the conceptual foundation of US empire alongside his prediction of the emergence and application of AI and other Big Data technologies towards the repression of dissidents, criminals, terrorists, and other racialized groups abroad gives intercommunalism the explanatory power to lay the basis for a genealogical account of Black repression that also advances our understanding of how the US as a liberal democratic regime engages in enemy target acquisition (the construction of racialized groups as threats internally and externally) to rationalize the brutal repression of these populations by military-police agencies whose operational application of new AI and computing-surveillance technologies and semi-autonomous weapons are conditioned by the intensity of their racialized dehumanization of the enemy. (shrink)

The article critically investigates various approaches to “smart” governance, from algorithmic regulation (O’Reilly), fluid technocracy (P. Khanna), “smart states” (Noveck), nudge theory (Thaler/ Sunstein) and social physics (Alex Pentland). It specifically evaluates the cybernetic origins of these approaches and interprets them as pragmatic actualisations of earlier cybernetic models of the state (Lang, Deutsch) against the current background of surveillance capitalism. The authors argue that cybernetic thinking rests on a reductive model of participation and a limited concept of “the political” (...) (whereby the systemic focus is on adaptive behaviour, stability and self-preservation instead of antagonism and dissensus). This limitation becomes particularly articulate in the aforementioned neocybernetic models of governance, and is even intensified in the contemporary monopolistic digital infrastructure. (shrink)

La cuestión principal que se plantea pretende averigüar si la tecnocracia en nuestra sociedad postsecular es un elemento que contribuye o dificulta el desarrollo integral del hombre del que hablaba Popolurum progressio. Divido mi exposición en tres partes recogiendo los mismos términos que aparecen en el título que la encabeza. Hablaré, en primer lugar, de la tecnocracia o de la cultura tecnológica, es decir, el modo en el que es la técnica es vivida y aplicada en los contextos sociales actuales. (...) Situaré después la cuestión en el marco postsecular de nuestra sociedad intentando profundizar en la relación entre ambas magnitudes, la tecnocracia y la postsecularidad. Concluiré mi reflexión analizando las consecuencias, y las oportunidades también, de un nuevo humanismo en continuidad con la propuesta levinasiana, o sea, orientando mi valoración final hacia posibilidad de un humanismo de otro hombre. The main question that is tackled is to find out whether the technocracy in our postsecular society is contributing to the integral development that Populorum Progressio talked about, or it is making it difficult. The paper is divided into three parts. First of all, it talks about technocracy or technological culture, that is to say the way in which technique is lived and applied in current social contexts. Secondly, the question is placed in the postsecular framework of our society, trying to deepen the relationship between both issues: technocracy and postsecularity. The reflection concludes by analyzing the consequences, and also the opportunities, of a new humanism in continuity with the Levinasian proposal, that is, orienting the final assessment towards the possibility of a humanism of another man. -/- . (shrink)

Social Media is part of contemporary technology that is the contentious subject matter within the society. It is paradoxical when social media should provide techniques and objects that serve human being in a positive way, but at the same time, it can dehumanize human being such as alienation. The main problem is because the lack of impact of public policy, which does not involve society in the democratic sphere. The article is about the possibility of democratization social media in the (...) discourse of philosophy of technology. I refer to Andrew Feenberg’s Critical Theory of Technology (CTT) for opening discourse and criticizing social media. Social Media should be changed by the critical view to analyze the internal contradictions in technocracy, which view social media merely as an instrument and value-free. In the other hand, CTT will lead into the discourse of instrumentalization theory, technological rationality, technical code and democratization of social media. I conclude this article by applying CTT to delineate extant approach and consideration of democratization of social media in Indonesian through critical thinking participation and emotional education in the public sphere. (shrink)

Following media-theoretical studies that have characterized digitization as a process of all-encompassing cybernetization, this paper will examine the timely and critical potential of Günther Anders’s oeuvre vis-à-vis the ever-increasing power of cybernetic devices and networks. Anders has witnessed and negotiated the process of cybernetization from its very beginning, having criticized its tendency to automate and expand, as well as its circular logic and ‘integral power’, including disruptive consequences for the constitution of the political and the social. In this vein, Anders’s (...) works, particularly his magnum opus Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen [The Obsolescence of Man], sheds new light on the technologically organized milieus of the contemporary digital regime and also highlights a new form of cybernetic ‘conformism’. The goal of the essay is therefore, not only to emphasize the contemporary nature of Anders’s thought but also to use it to frame a critique of current neo-technocratic and, ultimately, post-political concepts, such as ‘algorithmic regulation’, ‘smart states’, ‘direct technocracy’, and ‘government as platform’. This essay argues that cybernetic capitalism is causing what Anders terms ‘ Unfestgelegtheit’ to disappear; that is, we are losing the originary possibility of technologically (re-)structuring our world in alternative ways, particularly given the determinist character of current technologies. (shrink)

What is the proper role for scientists in policymaking? This paper explores various roles that scientists can play, with an eye to questions that these roles raise about value-neutrality and technocracy. Where much philosophical literature is concerned with the conduct of research or the transmission of research results to policymakers, I am interested in various non-research roles that scientists take on in policymaking. These include raising the alarm on issues, framing and conceptualising problems, formulating potential policies, assessing policy options (...) for expected efficacy, and more. I consider examples from climate change and Covid-19 policymaking. My intention is to encourage philosophers to expand their interest in values in science out from the conduct of research to the wide array of roles that scientists play in policymaking. The paper is therefore an overview of the landscape of potential research questions, rather than a presentation of a single argument. (shrink)

Since the Enlightenment, there have been advocates for the rationalizing efficiency of enlightened sovereigns, bureaucrats, and technocrats. Today these enthusiasms are joined by calls for replacing or augmenting government with algorithms and artificial intelligence, a process already substantially under way. Bureaucracies are in effect algorithms created by technocrats that systematize governance, and their automation simply removes bureaucrats and paper. The growth of algorithmic governance can already be seen in the automation of social services, regulatory oversight, policing, the justice system, and (...) the military. However, there have also always been justified democratic and economic criticisms of autocracy, bureaucracy, technocracy, and algorithmic governance. Bureaucrats, technocrats, and algorithms embody biases that tend to serve the interests of elites, and all require transparency and democratic accountability, oversight individual citizens are ill equipped to exercise. As state apparatuses are increasingly automated, mechanisms for collective action and democratic oversight also need to be automated. Algorithms and cyborg citizenry will enable a posthuman democracy. Democratically accountable algorithmic governance, enabled by artificial intelligence and human enhancement, can automate bottom-up citizen surveillance, inform debate, aggregate decision making, and ensure the efficient working of the gradually withering state. As paid work disappears and we transition to a postcapitalist economy with a universal basic income, market mechanisms can be replaced with democratic planning. Indeed, only algorithmic governance can secure our future against accelerating threats from technological innovation. (shrink)

In an earlier paper published in a neutrosophic math journal (IJNS), we discussed a new approach to technology, which may be called as ‘opti-realism’ or ‘pess-optimism’ as alternative to utopianism based on technocracy, which may lead the world into global technototalitarianism. In this article, we submit a new approach to Nature and technology, which is more modest and humble, rather than a techno-utopianism version of reality that most futurists argue for. Our proposed approach resembles more to Myer-Briggs 16 types (...) of personality, including IJNS, IFNS etc. In our scheme, there are 8 characters of approach toward technology which can lead to many variations or we call it ‘Permutation.” Of course, if the readers ask one variation that we prefer, we would answer: Small Tech, High Touch. (shrink)

Towards a Critical Theory of Digitality: Günther Anders in the Age of Platform Capitalism and Smart Technocracies -/- Diversos estudios teóricos sobre los medios de comunicación han caracterizado recientemente la cuarta revolución industrial como un proceso de tecnificación y cibernetización omniabarcante. En este contexto, este artículo pretende mos-trar el potencial pertinente y crítico de la obra magna de Günther Anders La obsolescencia del hombre frente al poder cada vez mayor de los dispositivos y las redes cibernéticas. Anders ha sido testigo (...) y ha gestionado el proceso de ciber-netización desde sus inicios, y ha criticado no sólo su tendencia a la automa-tización y a la expansión, sino también la lógica circular y el “poder integral” en el que se basa, incluidas las consecuencias destructivas para la constitución de lo político y lo social. En este sentido, la obra de Anders puede arrojar nueva luz sobre los medios organizados tecnológicamente del régimen digital contem-poráneo. El objetivo del ensayo es, por tanto, no sólo enfatizar la contempora-neidad del pensamiento crítico de Anders y destacar su avanzada comprensión de la tecnología en comparación con los representantes de la teoría crítica tem-prana, sino también utilizarlo para enmarcar una crítica frente a los conceptos neotecnocráticos actuales y, en última instancia, postpolíticos, como la “regula-ción algorítmica”, los “estados inteligentes”, la “tecnocracia directa” y el “gobier-no como plataforma”. Por último, el ensayo pretende abordar, a través de la lente de Anders, la cuestión de la posición y el papel del crítico en relación con los entornos técnicos en constante expansión. Palabras clave: Günther Anders, cibernética, teoría crítica, tecnopolítica, tec-nocracia, digitalización, post-política, crítica a la tecnología. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze the origin of the links between global bioethics (which we differentiate from biomedical bioethics) and human rights. We understand that we are in a global civilizational crisis, whose roots extend to 1492 today, in which the modern-capitalist model used the discourse of human rights to justify its predatory technocracy. There are three theoretical assumptions that support our analysis: 1) The current conditions in which the technique shows its destructive power over nature (Anthropocene) indicate that (...) none of the ethical antecedents are applicable to such circumstances. In this new context, the kantian categorical imperative has been reconverted into a moral and political duty to not instrumentalize either human beings or nature. We call this new ethical consideration bioethics. 2) The current geopolitical composition of the world must be thought in terms of the global North and the global South, as two regions that are forged in the midst of important processes of globalization of the world-system, and whose main consequence lies in the absence of equity in the distribution of wealth and well-being between the two. 3) The current environmental crisis or climate change, the product of an economic model based on extractive technology, has become one of the most serious threats against human rights. (shrink)

Ziel des Beitrages ist die differenzierende Beschreibung des Projekts Cybersyn sowie die anschließende kritische Perspektivierung ausgewählter neokybernetischer Governance-Konzepte, die in den letzten Jahren verstärkt im Policy-Kontext diskutiert wurden. Die „Entscheidungsmaschine“ Stafford Beers, die der Management-Kybernetiker unter Salvador Allende in den frühen Siebzigern konzipierte, wird zumeist als Projekt eines technisch avancierten, ökonomischen Organisationskonzepts, eines „dritten Wegs“ beschrieben. Der Beitrag diskutiert die Grundkonzeption des „sozialistischen Internets“, seine fortschrittlichen, ökonomischen Ideen und Ästhetiken wie auch die Person Stafford Beer, legt den Fokus aber vor (...) allem auf ein eher selten beschriebenes Teilkonzept, namentlich „Cyberfolk“, eine Art binäres, affektives Echtzeit-Stimmungsbarometer der Bevölkerung zur Live-Bewertung von politischen Reden. In diesem Konnex werden gerade die demokratietheoretischen Implikationen von Cybersyn und seine Vorstellung „totaler Transparenz“ genauer untersucht. Im Anschluss wird expliziert, wie sich in unterschiedlichen gegenwärtigen Konzeptionen fluider Techno- bzw. technoider Expertokratien – von den „smart states“ Beth Novecks bis zur „direct technocracy“ Parag Khannas – die „Kybernetisierung des Politischen“ auch im digitalen Zeitalter – gewissermaßen unter umgekehrtem, d.h. neoliberalen Vorzeichen – revitalisiert und dabei sowohl problematische Partizipations- als auch Emanzipationskonzepte umreisst. Zu untersuchen sind in dieser Hinsicht so auch die reduktiven Aspekte der Beerschen letztlich feedbacklogischen Konzeption des Politischen. (shrink)

This paper centers on the implicit metaphysics beyond the Theory of Relativity and the Principle of Indeterminacy – two revolutionary theories that have changed 20th Century Physics – using the perspective of Husserlian Transcedental Phenomenology. Albert Einstein (1879-1955) and Werner Heisenberg (1901-1976) abolished the theoretical framework of Classical (Galilean- Newtonian) physics that has been complemented, strengthened by Cartesian metaphysics. Rene Descartes (1596- 1850) introduced a separation between subject and object (as two different and self- enclosed substances) while Galileo and Newton (...) did the “mathematization” of the world. Newtonian physics, however, had an inexplicable postulate of absolute space and absolute time – a kind of geometrical framework, independent of all matter, for the explication of locality and acceleration. Thus, Cartesian modern metaphysics and Galilean- Newtonian physics go hand in hand, resulting to socio- ethical problems, materialism and environmental destruction. Einstein got rid of the Newtonian absolutes and was able to provide a new foundation for our notions of space and time: the four (4) dimensional space- time; simultaneity and the constancy of velocity of light, and the relativity of all systems of reference. Heisenberg, following the theory of quanta of Max Planck, told us of our inability to know sub- atomic phenomena and thus, blurring the line between the Cartesian separation of object and subject, hence, initiating the crisis of the foundations of Classical Physics. But the real crisis, according to Edmund Husserl (1859-1930) is that Modern (Classical) Science had “idealized” the world, severing nature from what he calls the Lebenswelt (life- world), the world that is simply there even before it has been reduced to mere mathematical- logical equations. Husserl thus, aims to establish a new science that returns to the “pre- scientific” and “non- mathematized” world of rich and complex phenomena: phenomena as they “appear to human consciousness”. To overcome the Cartesian equation of subject vs. object (man versus environment), Husserl brackets the external reality of Newtonian Science (epoché = to put in brackets, to suspend judgment) and emphasizes (1) the meaning of “world” different from the “world” of Classical Physics, (2) the intentionality of consciousness (L. in + tendere = to tend towards, to be essentially related to or connected to) which means that even before any scientific- logical description of the external reality, there is always a relation already between consciousness and an external reality. The world is the equiprimordial existence of consciousness and of external reality. My paper aims to look at this new science of the pre- idealized phenomena started by Husserl (a science of phenomena as they appear to conscious, human, lived experience, hence he calls it phenomenology), centering on the life- world and the intentionality of consciousness, as providing a new way of looking at ourselves and the world, in short, as providing a new metaphysics (as an antidote to Cartesian metaphysics) that grounds the revolutionary findings of Einstein and Heisenberg. The environmental destruction, technocracy, socio- ethical problems in the modern world are all rooted in this Galilean- Newtonian- Cartesian interpretation of the relationship between humans and the world after the crumbling of European Medieval Ages. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) comments that the modern world is going toward a nihilism (L. nihil = nothingness) at the turn of the century. Now, after two World Wars and the dropping of Atomic bomb, the capitalism and imperialism on the one hand, and on the other hand the poverty, hunger of the non- industrialized countries alongside destruction of nature (i.e., global warming), Nietzsche might be correct: unless humanity changes the way it looks at humanity and the kosmos. The works of Einstein, Heisenberg and Husserl seem to be pointing the way for us humans to escape nihilism by a “great existential transformation.” What these thinkers of post- modernity (after Cartesian/ Newtonian/ Galilean modernity) point to are: a) a new therapeutic way of looking at ourselves and our world (metaphysics) and b) a new and corrective notion of “rationality” (different from the objectivist, mathematico- logical way of thinking). This paper is divided into four parts: 1) A summary of Classical Physics and a short history of Quantum Theory 2) Einstein’s Special and General Relativity and Heisenberg’s Indeterminacy Principle 3) Husserl’s discussion of the Crisis of Europe, the life- world and intentionality of consciousness 4) A Metaphysics of Relativity and Indeterminacy and a Corrective notion of Rationality in Husserl’s Phenomenology . (shrink)

Ecofeminist philosophy is a development of feminist philosophy that addresses the intersection of sexism and environmental issues. Coined by Francoise d’Eaubonne, the term “ecofeminism” refers to a diverse collection of feminist thought that shares the conviction that the present environmental crisis is due not solely to the anthropomorphic nature of dominant conceptualisations of human-nature relations, with their emphasis on notion of mastery and control, but also to their androcentric nature. Technology features frequently in ecofeminist writings, in analyses of technocracy (...) (Birkeland 1993), Nuclear Power (Caputi 1993), reproductive technologies (Diamond 1990), or the production of computer interfaces (Romberger 2011), to give but a few examples. Despite being a recurrent theme, technology itself as a phenomenon is rarely directly considered. For many ecofeminists technology seems to operate as an umbrella term for a collection of artefacts whose positive or negative characteristics are ultimately contingent upon the manner in which they are employed. The individual technologies appear as value neutral. There are of course exceptions to this piecemeal approach to technological artefacts, and in this chapter I shall focus upon two ecofeminist philosophers whose consideration of technology moves from the individual instance towards a more general account of the nature of technology. The first, Karen Warren, gives technology a central place in her philosophical analysis. However, I shall suggest, her commitment to an instrumental understanding of technology renders her approach problematic. I will then consider the work of Vandana Shiva. Standard analyses of Shiva’s work tend to overlook the philosophical dimensions of her thought, in particular the continuous emphasis on science and technology. I argue that Shiva puts forward a sophisticated technological determinist philosophy of that emphasises the role of political and patriarchal interests in technological development and subsequent social and environmental interventions. (shrink)

The seventies, a decade of new barbarians, ecologists, new conservatives, pollution, cancer, flying saucers, working suburbs violence, technocracy and petrol crisis.

An obvious tendency in the nature of modern development is the overpowering influence of Westernization. We now live in the midst of a technocracy being monitored by the west. This has been given a psychological anchorage that, in nation like Nigeria, our policy for development seems to be undermining the potential in our culture and tradition. We have tacitly accepted a separation of Tradition and Modernity. Thus, our leaders with serious tenacity embrace globalization, deregulation, privatization and readily ponder to (...) western recommendation. Meanwhile, there is a pervading menace of unproductive corruption prebandalism, financial recklessness, crass materialism, uncritical adoption of foreign paradigm and trivialization of indigenous initiatives. It is pertinent to note that development has a cultural basis, its pattern is motivated by reality within a given culture. It does not thrive on holistic import of artifacts across cultural latitude without prior look into the expediency and workability of such. With reference to Africa, development pattern must ensue from the people’s experience and integrated to the global network in pragmatic nature. It is not transferred technology nor a consumer’s economy. It is not attainable at the undermining of indigenous initiative and the strong ethos that define our brotherhood. So, a thorough hermeneutic of development in Africa must pay crucial attention to the cultural imperatives, the ethos and perception of development as an organic whole, not an absolute concentration on the technical and the economical. (shrink)

An obvious tendency in the nature of modern development is the overpowering influence of Westernization. We now live in the midst of a technocracy being monitored by the west. This has been given a psychological anchorage that, in nation like Nigeria, our policy for development seems to be undermining the potential in our culture and tradition. We have tacitly accepted a separation of Tradition and Modernity. Thus, our leaders with serious tenacity embrace globalization, deregulation, privatization and readily ponder to (...) western recommendation. Meanwhile, there is a pervading menace of unproductive corruption prebandalism, financial recklessness, crass materialism, uncritical adoption of foreign paradigm and trivialization of indigenous initiatives. It is pertinent to note that development has a cultural basis, its pattern is motivated by reality within a given culture. It does not thrive on holistic import of artifacts across cultural latitude without prior look into the expediency and workability of such. With reference to Africa, development pattern must ensue from the people’s experience and integrated to the global network in pragmatic nature. It is not transferred technology nor a consumer’s economy. It is not attainable at the undermining of indigenous initiative and the strong ethos that define our brotherhood. So, a thorough hermeneutic of development in Africa must pay crucial attention to the cultural imperatives, the ethos and perception of development as an organic whole, not an absolute concentration on the technical and the economical. (shrink)

This article elucidates the neutrality of social media in the discourse of philosophy of technology. I prefer to Don Ihde’s postphenomenology and Andrew Feenberg’s critical theory of technology for opening discourse and criticizing the status of neutrality in social media. This article proves that social media cannot be neutral because there are internal contradictions in technocracy that view social media merely as an instrument. Through postphenomenology, social media becomes non-neutral because it has the relation intensionality between human and technology (...) based on four basic forms of technological mediation: embodiment relations, hermeneutic relations, alterity relations, and background relations. In another side, the critical theory of technology will be bringing discourse in instrumentalization theory, post-technological rationality, and technological democratization perspective. I conclude this article by describing social media users in Indonesia have to actualize in the democratization of the social media through active participation in the critical reasoning framework and sensitivity feeling in the public sphere. (shrink)

Various media-theoretical studies have recently characterized the fourth industrial revolution as a process of all-encompassing technicization and cybernetization. Against this background, this paper seeks to show the timely and critical potential of Günther Anders’s magnum opus Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen vis-à-vis the ever-increasing power of cybernetic devices and networks. Anders has both witnessed, and negotiated, the process of cybernetization from its very beginning, having criticised not only its tendency of automatization and expansion, but also the circular logic and the “integral (...) power” it rests upon, including the destructive consequences for the constitution of the political and the social. In this vein, Anders’s oeuvre can indeed shed new light on the techno-logically organized milieus of the contemporary digital regime. The aim of the essay is, thus, not only to emphasize the contemporariness of Anders’s critical thought, but also use it to frame a critique vis-à-vis current neo-technocratic and, ultimately, post-political concepts, such as “algorithmic regulation”, “smart states”, “direct technocracy”, and “government as platform”. The essay finally seeks to, through Anders’s lens, address the question of the position and role of the critic in relation to ever expanding technical environments. (shrink)

This article is by design a response to Alastair M. Taylor's "For Philosophers and Scientists: A General Systems Paradigm." That work is an advance over stage theories. But its focus on modernization tacitly accepts marginalization. Its focus on an undifferentiated evolving human species disregards intra- and intersocietal conflicts. Its uncritical talk of societal energy shifts obscures the reality of conquest and exploitation. If general systems theory is to be truly objective, it should take into account world-around system imbalance and the (...) relevance of Newton's Third Law. (Publisher omitted title of this article and used only its subtitle.). (shrink)

How can democratic governments be relied upon to achieve adequate political knowledge when they turn over their authority to those of no epistemic distinction whatsoever? This deep and longstanding concern is one that any proponent of epistemic conceptions of democracy must take seriously. While Condorcetian responses have recently attracted substantial interest, they are largely undermined by a fundamental neglect of agenda-setting. I argue that the apparent intractability of the problem of epistemic adequacy in democracy stems in large part from a (...) failure to appreciate the social character of political knowledge. A social point of view brings into focus a number of vital factors that bear on our understanding of democratic epistemology and our assessment of its prospects: the essential role of inclusive deliberation, the public's agenda-setting function, institutional provisions for policy feedback, the independence of expert communities, and the knowledge-pooling powers of markets. (shrink)

To clarify the proper role of values in science, focusing on controversial expert responses to Covid-19, this article examines the status of (in)convenient hypotheses. Polarizing cases like health experts downplaying mask efficacy to save resources for healthcare workers, or scientists dismissing “accidental lab leak” hypotheses in view of potential xenophobia, plausibly involve modifying evidential standards for (in)convenient claims. Societies could accept that scientists handle (in)convenient claims just like nonscientists, and give experts less political power. Or societies could hold scientists to (...) a higher bar, by expecting them not to modify evidential standards to avoid costs only incidentally tied to error. (shrink)

This essay develops a model of democratic representation from the standpoint of epistemic theories of democracy. Such theories justify democracy in terms of its tendency to yield decisions that “track the truth” by integrating asymmetrically dispersed knowledge. From an epistemic point of view, I suggest, democratic representatives are best modeled as epistemic intermediaries who facilitate the vertical integration of knowledge between policy experts and non-experts, and the horizontal integration of knowledge among diverse non-experts. The primary analytical payoff of this model (...) is that it provides a clear rationale for variation in the norms and institutionalization of representative behavior. Sometimes a delegate-like approach is the right one, and sometimes a trustee-like approach is better. The key determinant is the effect of these models on the epistemic quality of outcomes under different circumstances. Towards the end of the essay, I apply the model to the present revival of populism and consider its implications in that context. (shrink)

In We Have Always Been Cyborgs (2021), Stefan L. Sorgner argues that, given the growing economic burden of desirable welfare programs, in order for Western democratic societies to continue to flourish it will be necessary that they establish some form of algocracy (i.e., governance by algorithm). This is argued to be necessary both in order to maintain the sustainability and efficiency of these programs, but also due to the fact that further integration of humans into technical systems provides the only (...) effective means to bridge gaps in functionality and governance. However, Sorgner’s position is entirely insensitive to the design turn in applied ethics, which argues against the neutrality of technology, instead maintaining that technology and society co-construct each other with persistent feedback loops. This, I argue, is a problem for his account inasmuch as technologies, as they become more ubiquitous, likewise become pervasive and inextricable from our sociotechnical infrastructures. As such, less-than-beneficent forces, as current trends illustrate, can appropriate these seemingly banal infrastructures to gear them towards oppressive ends, thereby ultimately threatening the social democracies that Sorgner’s position aims to buttress. (shrink)

Two challenges have faced policymakers during the Covid-19 pandemic: First, they must determine the reliability of expert testimony in the face of uncertainty; second, they must determine the relevance of different kinds of expertise with regard to particular decisions. I argue that both these problems can be fruitfully analyzed through the lens of trust by introducing an in-depth case study of Iceland’s handling of the first wave of the Covid-19 pandemic. I contend that the problem of relevance highlights the limited (...) appeal of a thoroughly technocratic society. Value judgments, best realized through democratic processes, are always lurking in the background. (shrink)

فلسفة التكنولوجيا - فال دوسيك (المقدمة والفصلين الثالث والرابع) - ترجمة وتعليق، في إطار مشروع لترجمة الكتاب بالكامل بالاشتراك مع آخرين.