Artifacts are ubiquitous and influential in our world, but their nature and existence are controversial. Several theories have been proposed to explain the ontology of artifacts. Drawing on Popper's theory of three worlds, this paper suggests a metaphysics for artifacts along the line of a critical rationalist (CR) approach. This theory distinguishes between three realms of reality: the physical world (World 1), the mental world (World 2), and the world of objective knowledge (World 3). The paper argues that artifacts have (...) different ontological components that correspond to these three realms, and that each component is real and causal. The paper shows how this perspective can account for the intentional and functional aspects of artifacts, as well as their dependence on plans that influence different realms of reality. The paper explains how this pluralistic ontology, compared to the rival theories, enables one to explain the relevant ontological problems of artifacts. The paper also explores how this proposal can lead to a research program encompassing a broader range of technologies, such as social artifacts. In sum, the paper suggests that Popper's three worlds theory provides a rich and comprehensive framework for understanding the metaphysics of artifacts. (shrink)

Any adequate philosophy of technology needs to take a clear stance with regard to the limits of criticizability. While observing the canons of criticizability may appear to be simple, many philosophical approaches (whether towards technology or other topics) abandon comprehensive criticizability by adopting some forms of justificationist or essentialist epistemology. This paper aims to show that criticizability can only be upheld by subscribing to a non-justificationist epistemology and by acknowledging the propositions/standards dichotomy; failing to do so leads to undesirable epistemic (...) consequences. (shrink)

Development in all of its stages, from organizing the vision and strategy to implementing plans, requires policy-making. We show that the division of labor and specialization of sciences and some philosophical doctrines cause the emergence of technocracy in policies. Technocracy makes development not happen in the direction of public welfare. For this reason, for sustainable development, we need institutions, strategies, and philosophical contexts that provide a democratic ground for the possibility of criticizing and reforming policies.

Bell introduces local beables in contrast to quantum mechanical observables. The present article emphasizes the importance and necessity of introducing local beables in quantum mechanics from the ontological and epistemological points of view. We argue that suggesting beables in the ontology of quantum mechanics is necessary to give an adequate account of its testability.

The purpose of this paper is to shed some light on the Philosophical relationship between humanities and technology. It will be explained that most disciplines in humanities are Janus-faced: they are part science/knowledge and part technology. The thesis of the paper is that the relationship between the technological aspect of humanities and other technologies is positive and synergetic, while the relationship between their scientific aspect and technologies is almost entirely critical and negative. The argument of the paper is not that (...) the scientific aspect of humanities has nothing positive to offer to the development of technologies, but rather to clarify the nature of this assistance. It is also hoped that the paper’s analysis could help to explain how the scientific aspect of humanities can partake in the process of rationalisation of the development of technology. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaard, in his essay "The Present Age," takes a hostile stance towards the press. This is because he maintains that the press prepares the ground for the emergence of nihilism. Hubert Dreyfus extends this idea to other information technologies, especially the Internet. Since Kierkegaard-Dreyfus’ attitude towards various forms of information technology originates from philosophical anthropology and a particular conception of the meaning of life, assessing the viability of the attitude they hold requires further critical scrutiny. This paper aims to (...) show that, although, Kierkegaard’s and Dreyfus' insights are important in understanding the dangers of information technology their approach concerning the meaning of life and human identity is a one-sided analysis of the problem situation; In particular, their reliance on "Unconditional Commitment" could bring about new undesired consequences. This paper emphasizes that an appropriate stance towards information technology needs, among other things, a richer and more effective philosophical anthropology; one that by utilizing religious-moral wisdom in a sensible manner, provides an effective way to safely benefit from various types of technology without falling into the abyss of nihilism. The paper further argues that we also need to provide an institutional control of technology through piecemeal social engineering in a democratic process. (shrink)

The revolution brought about by quantum mechanics in the early 20th century was nothing short of remarkable. It shattered the foundational principles of classical physics, giving rise to a plethora of controversial and intriguing conceptual questions. Questions that still perplex and confound the scientific community today. Is the quantum mechanical description of physical reality complete? Are the objects of nature truly inseparable? And most importantly, do objects not have a specific position before measurement, and are there non-causal quantum jumps? These (...) vital problems continue to garner more attention as time passes, particularly with the fading of positivism. If you're a student seeking to explore the fascinating philosophical foundations of quantum mechanics, this book might be just what you need. Written in Persian, brings you closer to the heart of quantum controversies and the fascinating world of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The recent pandemic is a reminder of several important lessons from Popper's philosophy. My aim in this paper is to address some of these lessons. By making use of Popper's theory of three worlds, I explain how coronavirus has a far-reaching impact on the ecosystem of rationality, and how the viruses that threaten humans could also be a threat to the whole life on Earth. Applying the epistemological distinction between science and technology, I go on to explain the pivotal role (...) of science in preventing further crises. This, I argue, is done by putting technology in the sphere of rationality; through both criticizing technologies and inspiring the invention of clean technologies, and also technologies that serve us as alerting systems. I shall argue that critical rationalism helps us to understand the ‘pandemic problem situation’ in a more informed manner and thus helps us to find out about the vulnerable points of our ecosystem of rationality in a more efficient way. In the latter part of the paper, I shall develop the thesis that while during the recent pandemic, science did it best to warn us about its dangers, the policy-makers, who are technologists of a sort, in many countries did not take those warnings seriously. Even when the crisis turned into a global catastrophe, the three types of technologies (health-care, lock-down, and diagnosis and treatment) were not fully efficient in controlling the pandemic. Drawing on Popper’s ideas I shall argue that in the face of the current emergency, our best chance to improve our situation is to apply the method of piecemeal social engineering to alleviate people’s suffering. (shrink)

Essentialism is one of the common approaches in the philosophy of technology. Based on this approach, technology has an independent essence, and knowing technology requires knowing this essence. The present article aims to criticize essentialism in the philosophy of technology in the framework of critical rationalism. The paper argues that essentialism is inadequate because it leads to irrationalism and determinism and destroys any ground for reform and critical discussion about technology; instead, it recommends sudden and irrational changes. Secondly, it contains (...) some presuppositions and false doctrines about the evolution of technology and its relation to humans. We will also explain that essentialists’ recommendation to take refuge in art or hold a free relationship towards technology is inconclusive in facing technological inconveniences. Instead, local considerations should be taken into account in the modification process, and they should be carried out piecemeal and in a critical context. (shrink)

Based on an epistemological approach, humanities and natural sciences are two completely different realms that are governed by different rules. From this position, it is usually concluded that these two should not interfere in each other's territory. This idea, which also has supporters in other categorizations such as science and theology, relies mainly on Wittgenstein's doctrines. The purpose of the article is to argue that such an approach ultimately leads to the isolation of different realms of knowledge. We argue why (...) this position is incorrect and has adverse consequences for the development of knowledge in all domains. (shrink)

The cliché understanding of mass media is that they are tools and means to transmit news and expand communications whose function is to be informative, provide entertainment and promote ethical codes among people. This paper, mainly relying on the views and approaches of 'Heidegger' and 'Marx' about technology, aims to analyse the media and its relation with advertisement. This analysis has put under question the current common belief and shows that the advertisement industry implies a biased viewpoint toward the world, (...) which will bring about certain philosophical requirements and consequences. This analysis also shows that the media in the new world are structurally manufactured to operate under the influence of social relations and acts. (shrink)

Through his phenomenological approach, Husserl criticized the situation of science and called it a crisis. He aimed to suggest a way out of this crisis by presenting a philosophical program. However, restoring philosophy to its ancient unifying situation, saving science from this crisis, and giving it a human face, requires, according to critical rationalism, to consider the objectivity and rationality of science. Ignoring these considerations puts science on an incorrect and inconvenient path. These considerations require a revision of Husserl’s essentialism (...) and justificationsim, and placing truth as the aim of science. (shrink)

In this paper, we first examine the reasons for opposing metaphysics. While assessing these reasons, we intend to reach a plausible stance regarding the relationship between science and metaphysics and its role and importance in scientific activity. There are different views on this old question. We argue that the interaction of metaphysics and science is a complex interaction that can only be defended in the light of a critical approach. In this critical attitude, one should not only pay attention to (...) the role and importance of metaphysics in science but also should have an epistemic humility about his expectations of it. (shrink)

A large part of Richard Rorty’s works focus on criticizing the received view about philosophy. He argues, in his historical reconstruction of philosophical activity, that there has always been a misconception about philosophy in the history of philosophy. This misconception assumes that philosophy aims to grasp the ultimate knowledge, so it desperately engages in an attempt to achieve “truth”. In this view, which he calls representationalism and points to it by the metaphor of the mirror of nature, knowledge aims to (...) represent something out of mind, and the duty of philosophy is to put forward a theory about the representation. According to Rorty, based on this popular view philosophy is a foundational discipline that aims to evaluate epistemological claims of other disciplines. Rorty attempts to criticize and reject this Cartesian epistemological agenda for philosophy. Rorty’s approach to philosophy is therapeutic; that is, he tries to resolve philosophical problems rather than solve them. By adopting a historical method, Rorty seeks to show that “philosophy as epistemology” is a result of the dominance of what he calls the metaphor of the mirror of nature. From a critical rationalist perspective, the present article intends to critique Rorty’s views on epistemology. In this paper, Rorty’s historiographical approach is criticized in several ways. First, Rorty offers a one-sided and biased reconstruction of the history of philosophy to fit the abovementioned metaphor. Secondly, he treats history as rigid data from which it is possible to draw doctrinal conclusions. Whereas, as critical rationalists have said time and again, history by itself has no meaning. Moreover, Rorty’s justificationism is criticized. Rorty maintains that knowledge needs to be justified, and since it cannot be justified through representation, it must be justified by the consent of society. In other words, agreement in a group of people can provide an epistemic authority. Thus, both Rorty’s view and foundationalism, despite their differences, share justificationism in epistemology. That is, they both believe that knowledge needs to be justified. On the other hand, as critical rationalists have shown, justification in any shape and form, whether internal or external, is neither possible nor necessary. We also attempt to illustrate how Rorty’s epistemological approach results in confusion between epistemology and psychology; moreover, his epistemological behaviorism still suffers from some sort of justifications. In conclusion, Rorty expresses his criticism of epistemology with the metaphor of the mirror of nature. According to him, foundationalism is the result of the conflation of the Platonic conception of knowledge as something unchangeable, with the Cartesian mind that seeks certainty. However, his ignorance of the main crux of the matter in epistemology causes his own suggestion of epistemological behaviorism to suffer from the same problem, that is justificationism, which now appears in another form, i.e., social consensus. While, as critical rationalists repeated time and again, justification is neither possible nor necessary and not even desirable. They have shown that a non-justificationist approach to knowledge aimed at truth as a regulative idea could be a better approach. (shrink)

This paper examines how science and metaphysics interact in our theories about space and time. It is argued that scientific development affects philosophical thoughts about space and time. We first review the traditional arguments of substantivalists and relationists about space and time, especially those contained in the correspondence between Leibniz and Clarke. Then we show the mutual influence of science and metaphysics in the modern scientific era: for example, in neo-Newtonian structure, field theory, and special and general theories of relativity. (...) In the end, we claim that the substantivalist's position seems more defensible considering new scientific theories, such as Einstein's theory of general relativity. (shrink)

The book's purpose is to provide readers with a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between physics and philosophy in the historical context of the 19th century. Through an elaborate examination of the influence of mechanistic philosophy, the evolution of ontology, and the emergence of energy, the author aims to explain the phenomenological laws of thermodynamics in the framework of the mechanical approach. Additionally, the book delves into the introduction of field theory and the beginning decline of the mechanical approach. In (...) essence, this book is a journey that takes you through the most significant milestones of the 19th century in the realm of physics. It illuminates a theoretical framework, i.e., critical rationalism, that facilitates examining the interaction between physics and metaphysics. With the unraveling of history and the preparation of philosophical thought, the book prepares the reader for the eventual abandonment of the 'ether' and paves the way for the birth of the theories of relativity and quantum mechanics. (shrink)