In this article an attempt is made to detect what could have been the dialectical reasons that impelled the Cār-vāka thinker Udbhatabhatta to revise and reformulate the classical materialistic concept of cognition. If indeed according to ancient Cārvākas cognition is an attribute entirely dependent on the physical body, for Udbhatabhatta cognition is an independent principle that, of course, needs the presence of a human body to manifest itself and for this very reason it is said to be a peculiarity of (...) the body. Therefore, Udbhatabhatta seems to de-scribe the cognizing faculty according to a double ontology: it is both a principle and a characteristic, both inde-pendent and dependent. Two philosophical contexts—Vaisesika and Nyāya schools—are here taken into account as possible anti-Cārvāka fault-finding points of view that spured Udbhatabhatta to reconsider the Cārvāka per-spective. Although we do not have so much textual material on this particular aspect of the ancient and medieval philosophical debate in India, it nonetheless can be supposed that Udbhatabhatta’s reformulation of the concept of cognition was a tentative response to the Vaisesika idea that cognition is not an attribute of the body, rather of the mind (which is here supposed to be eternal), and to the Naiyāyika perspective according to which cognition would be an attribute of an everlasting self. In the case of the Nyāya school, fortunately we have at our disposal the criticism put forward by Vātsyāyana against the materialistic conception of cognition during this time. By examining some Vātsyāyana’s objections, it will emerge that Udbhatabhatta’s idea of cognition really seems to have the aspect of a consistent answer to them, from a renewed materialistic point of view. (shrink)

This paper elaborates upon various responses to the Problem of the One over the Many, in the service of two central goals. The first is to situate Huayan's mereology within the context of Buddhism's historical development, showing its continuity with a broader tradition of philosophizing about part-whole relations. The second goal is to highlight the way in which Huayan's mereology combines the virtues of the Nyāya-Vaisheshika and Indian Buddhist solutions to the Problem of the One over the Many while avoiding (...) their vices. (shrink)

As a guide to source material, the book will be useful to readers already somewhat familiar with Vaiśeṣika, and as a reference guide, the book’s lists of categories (padārthas) and other related concepts will also be handy for the same. However, the book is less satisfactory for readers wishing for a general introduction to the study of Vaiśeṣika, given its organization, coupled with its heavy use of untranslated Sanskrit and assumption that readers are already familiar with Indian philosophy. (...) Philosophically speaking, the book is useful in sketching out the commitments of Vaiśeṣikas and their interlocutors, more on which below, but is sparse when it comes to developing the nuances of the sustained arguments and objections throughout the lengthy history of Vaiśeṣika influence on Indian thought. (shrink)

This chapter considers the literature associated with explorations of consciousness in Indian philosophy. It focuses on a range of methodological and conceptual issues, drawing on three main sources: the naturalist theories of mind of Nyaya and Vaisesika, the mainly phenomenological accounts of mental activity and consciousness of Abhidharma and Yogacara Buddhism, and the subjective transcendental theory of consciousness of Advaita Vedanta. The contributions of Indian philosophers to the study of consciousness are examined not simply as a contribution to intellectual history, (...) but rather with a view to evaluating their relevance to contemporary issues, specifically to the mind-body problem. The presence of dualist positions with strong naturalist undercurrents in Indian philosophy, especially in the Nyaya and Samkhya traditions, rules out the possibility of treating the mind-body problem as an idiosyncratic feature of Cartesian metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper attempts to articulate certain inadequacies that are involved in the traditional way of categorizing Indian philosophy and explores alternative approaches, some of which otherwise are not explicitly seen in the treatises of the history of Indian Philosophies. By categorization, I mean, classifying Indian philosophy into two streams, which are traditionally called as astica and nastica or orthodox and heterodox systems. Further, these different schools in the astica Darsanas and nastica Darsanas are usually numbered into six and three respectively. (...) Nyaya - Vaisesika, Sankhya -Yoga and Purva & Uttara Mimamsa are identified as astica darsanas and Carvaka, Buddhism and Jainism are identified as nastica darsanas (6+3). It is my endeavor to critically analyze the usual astica-nastica distinction of 6+3 classification of Indian philosophy so as to find out the meaning of such a rationale in this categorization. This general consensus is contested in this paper. What I am intended to support and strengthen such a critical analysis and exploration is to discuss these systems of India’s philosophy within the general intellectual milieu of Indian cultural traditions, its orientations, presuppositions and preferences. In order to carry out such a task, I shall be taking recourse to the theories of different scholars, both traditional and modern, in approaching and appropriating Indian Philosophy from different perspectives and their critical-creative approaches shall be scrutinized. (shrink)

"In the programs of Logic and History of Philosophy in the FHUCE study and introduction to logic is always done on the basis of Western classical Greek tradition, and its development is still exclusively through Western culture. This presentation aims to provide a path parallel to the West is the tradition of Nyaya-Vaisesika schools, which arise in the S. V B.C. like a response to the anti-Vedic Buddhist nihilism, and reached an important technical development at the beginning of S. II (...) D.C. when you know the Nyāyasutras attributed to Aksapada Gautama, and are considered the founding text of Nyāya tradition of Indian philosophy. The great virtue of the achievement of these schools is that although the system has Vaisesika been described as "a synthesis between philosophy of nature, ethics and soteriology" , which also applies to school Nyāya in the latter we are also a great emphasis on epistemology and the rules must be observed in philosophical debates. In their synthesis, Nyāya -Vaisesika system gets his language and jargon will be adopted by all who wish to discuss logical issues in India (especially in discussions Vedanta / Buddhism) without the need to adopt such language should assume his ontological, moral and religious premises. (shrink)

The research is a comparative study of the atomic theories of Kanada and Democritus. Because of their pluralistic tendencies, emphasis on causality, their materialistic account of sense knowledge, and their attempt to explain the physical system by means of reduction to the configuration of its constitutive elements, both philosophers present an epistemological base that could accommodate scientific inquiry. Notwithstanding the early and expansive beginning of Indian atomism, modern scientific atomic theory traces its origin to Democritus. Through cross-cultural critical engagement of (...) parallel ideas between Kanada and Democritus, the paper aims to discover the common problems that they dealt with in order to further our understanding of the early history of atomic theory, to evaluate the relative merits and limitations of their proposed solutions, to resolve some difficulties that each account faces by appealing to the other, and to highlight their contributions to the emergence of atomic worldview. (shrink)