The paper is focused on the criticisms that theorists of political constitutionalism raise against legal constitutionalism, especially with regard to the idea of representation and political sovereignty. At the same time, the intention is to reconstruct the debate between legal and political constitutionalism in contemporary liberalism, starting from the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty. This debate concerns two different approaches: the political one rejects the idea of judicial review by the Supreme Court because it may establish a possible rule of the judges (...) (Michelman; Dworkin). It defends the role of Parliament in constitutional matters, in contrast with the role of the Supreme Court, inasmuch as – according to them – it is not open to political participation. Parliament is considered the only place in which we can exercise our constitutional power and in which our rights could be adequately protected (Bellamy; Waldron; Tushnet; Goldoni). On the other hand, legal constitutionalism upholds the idea of judicial review, defending the role of the Supreme Court as “exemplar of public reason” (Rawls 1993). This article tries to answer to three fundamental questions about constitutional democracy under the banner of political liberalism: 1. What do we mean by counter-majoritarian difficulty? 2. What is the answer that legal and political model of constitutionalism give to this question? 3. What is the role of constitutional courts in democratic regimes and what is their authority within the State? (shrink)

This contribution pays special attention to the Italian legal framework concerning the collaborative and sharing economy, with a focus on those economic initiatives which are platform mediated. This choice is due to the importance of the concept of “platform” in the definitions of the CSE provided at both the Italian and the European levels. As highlighted in some studies, most actors of the CSE can be considered not only economic disruptors but also policy disruptors. Thus, the chapter tries to shed (...) light on the difficulties Italian regulators had while dealing with the emergence of these actors, especially in sectors such as food, accommodation, delivery, and transport. Italian policymakers were not able to design new regulatory frameworks to cope with the challenges of CSE, privileging bans or almost total deregulation over the elaboration of innovative rules. Regarding the issue of digital labour, the Italian legislator adopted a partial solution, creating a framework that dualizes the labour market, maybe with the aim of satisfying both digital workers and platforms. Overall, it seems that the Italian ecosystem of the CSE is bound to evolve, especially after the appearance of the health crisis related to the COVID-19. (shrink)

We discuss models that attempt to provide an explanation for the violation of Bell inequalities at a distance in terms of hidden influences. These models reproduce the quantum correlations in most situations, but are restricted to produce local correlations in some configurations. The argument presented in (Bancal et al. Nat Phys 8:867, 2012) applies to all of these models, which can thus be proved to allow for faster-than-light communication. In other words, the signalling character of these models cannot remain hidden.

The review is available online on Estudos Kantianos.

This is a Lithuanian translation, by Giedrius Sadauskas, of my paper, ‘The Philosopher as a “Secret Agent” for Peace: Taking Seriously Kant’s Revival of the “Old Question” ’, in Valerio Rohden, Ricardo R. Terra and Guido A. de Almeida (eds.), Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants, vol. 4 of Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008), pp.601-612. An offprint of the English version is available in the "Kant 4 - Moral and political philosophy articles" section (...) of this website. An online version of the text (in Lithuanian) is available at the link shown below. (shrink)