L’article de Francis Dupuis-Déri commenté ici et qui tente de réconcilier l’action directe avec la théorie délibérative pose un certain nombre de questions. En premier lieu, pourquoi concéder aux théories libérales un contenu démocratique alors que ces théories démontrent plutôt une mise à l’écart de l’agir collectif démocratique. En ce sens, les régimes libéraux ne sont pas tant élitistes que profondément oligarchiques. Une fois cette précision apportée au débat, il est possible de lire l’article de F. Dupuis-Déri comme opposant deux (...) visions distinctes du monde, l’une émanant de l’extension du marché économique à toutes les sphères de la vie et l’autre exigeant un monde plus égalitaire. La question du populisme devient alors essentielle pour bien comprendre les raisons qui motivent à dépeindre un groupe comme étant violent et anti-démocratique. Il importe ainsi de bien nommer les phénomènes et, en particulier, de comprendre la nature oligarchique des régimes libéraux pour légitimer les actions directes. (shrink)

. The author has compared the world-view attitudes of oligarchy and capitalism on the basis of analysis of Ludwig von Mises’ writings. The results of such comparison allow us to maintain that there is neither market economy nor competition, and so nor capitalism in Ukraine. The world-view basis of capitalism is the philosophy of liberalism, which has such principles as equality, freedom, inviolability of private property, cooperation in favor of profits of the whole society. On the contrary, oligarchy (...) based on the strong desire of infinitive enrichment and exploitation hasn’t any philosophical basis. (shrink)

Several recent results on the aggregation of judgments over logically connected propositions show that, under certain conditions, dictatorships are the only propositionwise aggregation functions generating fully rational (i.e., complete and consistent) collective judgments. A frequently mentioned route to avoid dictatorships is to allow incomplete collective judgments. We show that this route does not lead very far: we obtain oligarchies rather than dictatorships if instead of full rationality we merely require that collective judgments be deductively closed, arguably a minimal condition of (...) rationality, compatible even with empty judgment sets. We derive several characterizations of oligarchies and provide illustrative applications to Arrowian preference aggregation and Kasher and Rubinsteinís group identification problem. (shrink)

In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which (...) there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (2002), Nehring (2006), Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (2010a). (shrink)

Democracy is widely praised as a great achievement of humanity. However, in recent years there has been an increasing amount of concern that its functioning across the world may be eroding. In response, efforts to combat such change are emerging. Considering the pervasiveness of technology and its increasing capabilities, it is no surprise that there has been much focus on the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to this end. Questions as to how AI can be best utilized to extend the (...) reach of democracy to currently non-democratic countries, how the involvement in the democratic process of certain demographic groups (e.g. ethnic minorities, women, and young people) can be increased, etc. are frequent topics of discussion. In this article I would like not merely to question whether this is desirable but rather argue that we should be trying to envisage ways of using AI for the exact opposite purpose: that of replacing democratic systems with better alternatives. (shrink)

This book offers a detailed study of the political philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Benedict de Spinoza, focussing on their concept of power as potentia, concrete power, rather than power as potestas, authorised power. The focus on power as potentia generates a new conception of popular power. Radical democrats–whether drawing on Hobbes's 'sleeping sovereign' or on Spinoza's 'multitude'–understand popular power as something that transcends ordinary institutional politics, as for instance popular plebsites or mass movements. However, the book argues that these (...) understandings reflect a residual scholasticism which Hobbes and Spinoza ultimately repudiate. Instead, on the book's revisionist conception, a political phenomenon should be said to express popular power when it is both popular (it eliminates oligarchy and encompasses the whole polity), and also powerful (it robustly determines political and social outcomes). Two possible institutional forms that this popular power might take are distinguished: Hobbesian repressive egalitarianism, or Spinozist civic strengthening. But despite divergent institutional proposals, the book argues that both Hobbes and Spinoza share the conviction that there is nothing spontaneously egalitarian or good about human collective existence. From this point of view, the book accuses radical democrats of pernicious romanticism; the slow, meticulous work of organizational design and maintenance is the true centre of popular power. Three minute video summary available via HPBin3. Extended discussion on The Political Theory Review podcast. First chapter open access available via Oxford Scholarship Online. Videos of book talks at National University of Singapore (Centre for Legal Theory) and Universidad de Buenos Aires (Instituto de Investigaciones Gino Germani) available via YouTube. (See links below.). (shrink)

In the framework of judgment aggregation, we assume that some formulas of the agenda are singled out as premisses, and that both Independence (formula-wise aggregation) and Unanimity Preservation hold for them. Whether premiss-based aggregation thus defined is compatible with conclusion-based aggregation, as defined by Unanimity Preservation on the non-premisses, depends on how the premisses are logically connected, both among themselves and with other formulas. We state necessary and sufficient conditions under which the combination of both approaches leads to dictatorship (resp. (...) oligarchy), either just on the premisses or on the whole agenda. This framework is inspired by the doctrinal paradox of legal theory and arguably relevant to this field as well as political science and political economy. When the set of premisses coincides with the whole agenda, a limiting case of our assumptions, we obtain several existing results in judgment aggregation theory. (shrink)

Each of the degenerating constitutions in Book VIII of Plato's Republic is the result of the disappearance of one of the four cardinal virtues. The failure of wisdom creates a timocracy; the failure of courage, an oligarchy; the failure of moderation, a democracy; the failure of justice, a tyranny. The degeneration shows that the disunited virtues are imperfect, though they have some power to stave off vice. Thus Book VIII implies a unity of the virtues thesis according to which (...) perfect virtues can only exist in a united state, but imperfect simulacra of virtue can exist in a disunited state. -/- Published 2011 in Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science. (Please note that the pagination in the uploaded document is not the same as the pagination in the published edition.). (shrink)

In numerous places in his Ethics and Politics, Aristotle associates political justice (or ruling in turns) and the regime of polity. I argue that there is a necessary connection between political justice and polity due to their origins in political mixing. Aristotle is the first to discover political justice and polity because his predecessors had thought that the elements which they combine -- excellence and equality in the case of political justice, and oligarchy and democracy in the case of (...) polity -- were antithetical. The novelty of Aristotle's 'discoveries' points to their connection, namely that both originate in the political mixing of elements. This article examines such political mixing in detail and shows how an institutional arrangement such as ruling in turns can be adapted to different regime-types. (shrink)

In this paper we show how a realistic normative democratic theory can work within the constraints set by the most pessimistic empirical results about voting behaviour and elite capture of the policy process. After setting out the empirical evidence and discussing some extant responses by political theorists, we argue that the evidence produces a two-pronged challenge for democracy: an epistemic challenge concerning the quality and focus of decision-making and an oligarchic challenge concerning power concentration. To address the challenges we then (...) put forward three main normative claims, each of which is compatible with the evidence. We start with a critique of the epistocratic position commonly thought to be supported by the evidence. We then introduce a qualified critique of referenda and other forms of plebiscite, and an outline of a tribune-based system of popular control over oligarchic influence on the policy process. Our discussion points towards a renewal of democracy in a plebeian but not plebiscitarian direction: Attention to the relative power of social classes matters more than formal dispersal of power through voting. We close with some methodological reflections about the compatibility between our normative claims and the realist program in political philosophy. (shrink)

In this article, I define a cultural epistemology as a set of socially reinforced assumptions about how knowledge and truth are produced. Unlike a philosophical epistemology, a cultural epistemology is largely the product of culture and largely invisible. As products of culture, cultural epistemology are relatively unquestioned and, in many cases, philosophically unsophisticated. There are three common types of cultural epistemologies, influenced by who holds power in a given society: an epistemological monarchy, an epistemological oligarchy and an epistemological democracy. (...) A given cultural epistemology subsequently influences the legitimacy of culture and government itself. I argue argue that Americans tend to hold an "epistemological democracy" with two distinct facets: a trust in consensus, linked to living in a democratic republic, and a trust in their own self-interest, linked to market economics and capitalism more generally. These two facets combine, interact, and even oppose each other to legitimize and challenge American culture and its political and economic systems. (shrink)

My main point is that the creation of a free public time implies the creation of a democratic collective inspired by the project of social ecology. The first and second parts of this article focus on the modern social phenomena correlated to the general crisis and the emergence of the Internet Age (Castells, 2012). The third and fourth parts focus on new significations that seem to inspire modern social movements and the challenges that modern democratic ecological collectivities face. I use (...) the term “social ecology” as defined by Murray Bookchin: “Social ecology is based on the conviction that nearly all of our present ecological problems originate in deep-seated social problems” (Bookchin, 2006, p. 19). And I use the term “democracy” exclusively in the original, true meaning, of direct democracy where society is self-governed by the equal participation of every individual to political decisions and functions, as opposed to a modern representative democracy or republic, where political decisions rest in the hands of an oligarchy. In this sense, a truly democratic political collectivity is a truly ecological collectivity and vice versa. (shrink)

This article examines Aristotle’s theory of ‘factional conflict’ (stasis) in Book 5 of the Politics and claims that it is mainly directed against the a-historical account of constitutional change Plato develops in the Republic. Aristotle’s investigation of the causes of stasis is oriented towards the normative political goal of stabilizing political orders and preventing their ‘change’ (metabolê) into different ones. This article argues that the constitution Aristotle calls ‘polity’ (politeia) constitutes his solution to the challenge of stabilizing democracies and oligarchies. (...) The paper also aims at elucidating Aristotle’s conception of an empirical political science, his political realism, and the method he applies in conjunction with it in the ‘empirical’ Books of the Politics (Book 4 through 6). (shrink)

Most scholars have thought that in the _Republic_ democracy is supposed to be worse than timarchy or oligarchy, but lately certain commentators have denied that it is. Is it, then? We argue that pursuing this question leads to a dead end: it simply is not clear how bad democracy is supposed to be in the _Republic_. To make our case, we first marshal the strongest available evidence that democracy is supposedly better than timarchy and oligarchy. Next we lay (...) out the strongest available evidence that democracy is supposedly worse. And then we explain why there is an impasse. (shrink)

In Book 3 of Herodotus’Histories, seven Persian noblemen discuss which form of government would best fit the empire. If we accept its dramatic date, 522 BCE, this scene offers the first example of a comparative definition of monarchy, oligarchy and democracy. It offers, even more strikingly, the very first description of the government of the many — a novel political order that will eventually be called a democracy. The power of the people, this quintessentially Hellenic thing, was then a (...) Persian invention, an idea that occurred originally not to the masses of a polis, not to an Athenian demagogue, but to a relative of the Great King. In the course of the narrative, democracy will prove to be a unique form of government: the winning one. The Histories take up the challenge of recounting, and accounting for, a most improbable defeat, and for an even less foreseeable victory. The text does so not by preaching a morality of self-knowledge and self-control, but by exposing the realistic effects of different kinds of rule. Against the odds, democracy enhances and strengthens a small polis, Athens, making it grand and successful. Notwithstanding its immeasurable capabilities, the Persian monarchy fails. The turning point is the battle of Salamis, a prowess of the dêmos. A theatrical pause, in the narration of how the Great Kings came to prepare their campaigns against Greece, the debate offers a counterfactual explanation to historical events, in terms of political theory. This is, I will argue, the effect of the scene on the Histories. (shrink)

As the word demos denotes, the democracy is generally considered as the rule or governance based on the general base of people in which monarchy or oligarchy form is excluded. We have a classical view about the four forms of government, which was proposed by Platonic concepts. Most idealistic form of government, in his prongs, could be found in Crete and Sparta, which was nevertheless not a democratic form. His accolade of these two nations, which, of course, would be (...) a kind of God’s product so to be most benevolent, humanly appealing, efficient and philanthropic. This means the democratic form of government is not best, but most favored alternative to police the society. The political terms, henceforth, would supervene the concept of democracy, and, for many reasons and on historical wake, democracy is generally accepted as practically most desired form of rule or governance. While some modern scholar revealed, a mini-republic can be a niche to contest the merits of various forms of governance. We can gauge a scope of elements we value through the governance process, human intrinsic, efficiency, equality, welfare and even individual happiness. As the time is a small city community, called a polis, in Plato and Socrates, a mini republic can be well envisaged in understanding the Platonic Republic. In that case, most benevolent ruler may be superior to any other form of governance, which can be a philosopher’s Republic. The ideal ruler would behave and govern with mighty intelligence and concomitant power to rule. It is idealistic to produce maximum happiness of polis constituents. The worst contras, however, a tyranny, comes that the constituents legitimately expel their ruler by a collective vote. This extreme contrast and the way of process also could be ascertained in the ancient form of oriental monarchy. The dynasty could be legitimately revoked to restore new heritage of emperor or Kings where a kind of rebellion, as elucidated by Locke, is well justified in the name of heaven’s command. Given the size of polis or governed territory, there are separate ways to redress the evils of tyranny while the Oriental culture has not recognized the kind of formal vote methods. Any means to expel the tyranny could be embraced to rebel. For our purpose of grasp through this working paper, I would theorize on the traditional elements of public policy and democratic form of government. (shrink)

Over the course of its six seasons, the Netflix show the House of Cards (HOC) details the rise to power of Claire and Frank Underwood in a fictional United States. They achieve power not by winning free and fair elections, but by exploiting various weaknesses of the U.S. political system. Could such a thing happen to our own democracies? This chapter argues that it is a threat that should be taken seriously, as the structure of HOC’s democratic institutions closely mirrors (...) our own, and the flaws that the Underwoods exploit are precisely those that have allowed autocrats to capture democracies “from the inside.” Of even greater concern, these flaws may flow from the nature of democracy itself. This possibility is explored by considering the events of the HOC in the light of the anti-democratic arguments of Plato and Hobbes. The chapter concludes by briefly considering responses to these arguments. (shrink)

Efforts to ‘green’ civic republican thought link environmentalist with democratic ends. Such efforts cast both as contributions to virtuous world-making that contests ‘actually existing unsustainability’ and, so, seeks to realize freedom as nondomination. In the context of the erosion of both democratic and environmentalist achievements since the 1970s, however, a focus on contestation’s other side, the ‘world-unmaking’ virtue of obstruction, is warranted. ‘Democratic’ interpreters of Niccolò Machiavelli’s work urge such an understanding of political virtue, which they ground not in equal (...) freedom as nondomination but in civic liberty. Civic liberty is realized when all are able (1.) to participate in formulating rules and (2.) to defend procedures sufficient to subject all to constraint by so-formulated rules. Civic liberty therefore requires mobilization of majorities’ latent capacity to (re.1.) contest ‘public’ government decisions and (re. 2.) obstruct elites’ ‘private’ capacity to act with impunity in relation to such rules. This concept offers two insights into the current ‘crises’ of democracy and the environment. First, if, as empirical observers suggest, a significant cohort of elites have ‘seceded’ from electoral democracies, the normative concept ‘civic liberty’ unsettles contestatory presumptions about the deliberative character of contemporary politics. Second, if it is also true that a significant cohort of the poor are ‘seceding’ from mainstream politics out of frustration with the inegalitarian consequences of elite malfeasance, then the emphasis the concept places on the politics of majoritarian veto-power aimed at reining-in elite impunity might be useful to those who hope to make anti-democratic populists less attractive to at least some of this cohort. (shrink)