Citations of:
Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case
Social Choice and Welfare 40 (4):10671095 (2013)
Add citations
You must login to add citations.


How can the propositional attitudes of several individuals be aggregated into overall collective propositional attitudes? Although there are large bodies of work on the aggregation of various special kinds of propositional attitudes, such as preferences, judgments, probabilities and utilities, the aggregation of propositional attitudes is seldom studied in full generality. In this paper, we seek to contribute to filling this gap in the literature. We sketch the ingredients of a general theory of propositional attitude aggregation and prove two new theorems. (...) 

How can different individuals' probability functions on a given sigmaalgebra of events be aggregated into a collective probability function? Classic approaches to this problem often require 'eventwise independence': the collective probability for each event should depend only on the individuals' probabilities for that event. In practice, however, some events may be 'basic' and others 'derivative', so that it makes sense first to aggregate the probabilities for the former and then to let these constrain the probabilities for the latter. We formalize (...) 

How can different individuals' probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem assume that the set of relevant events  the agenda  is a sigmaalgebra and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction (intersection). We drop this demanding assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. One might be interested in the probability of rain and that of an interestrate increase, but not in the probability of rain or (...) 

This introduces the symposium on judgment aggregation. The theory of judgment aggregation asks how several individuals' judgments on some logically connected propositions can be aggregated into consistent collective judgments. The aim of this introduction is to show how ideas from the familiar theory of preference aggregation can be extended to this more general case. We first translate a proof of Arrow's impossibility theorem into the new setting, so as to motivate some of the central concepts and conditions leading to analogous (...) 

I propose a general collective decision problem consisting in many issues that are interconnected in two ways: by mutual constraints and by connections of relevance. Aggregate decisions should respect the mutual constraints, and be based on relevant information only. This general informational constraint has many special cases, including premisebasedness and Arrow’s independence condition; they result from special notions of relevance. The existence and nature of (nondegenerate) aggregation rules depends on both types of connections. One result, if applied to the preference (...) 

Judgment aggregation studies how to aggregate individual judgments on logically correlated propositions into collective judgments. Different logics can be used in judgment aggregation, for which Dietrich and Mongin have proposed a generalized model based on general logics. Despite its generality, however, all nonmonotonic logics are excluded from this model. This paper argues for using nonmonotonic logic in judgment aggregation. Then it generalizes Dietrich and Mongin’s model to incorporate a large class of nonmonotonic logics. This generalization broadens the theoretical boundaries of (...) 